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FOREWORD 
 
 
During the last decade, many developing countries have 
adopted or are in the process of enacting competition laws. There is 
growing awareness among developing countries of the adverse effects 
of anti-competitive practices on their economies as well as their 
populations. The effects of such practices are not easily quantifiable and 
may therefore not be obvious. Nevertheless, developing countries have 
come to recognize the potential benefits that can be derived from 
competition law enforcement. The drive to establish legal and 
institutional frameworks in order to fight anti-competitive practices has 
intensified in recent decades. 
 
In over three decades working with many developing countries 
across the globe, UNCTAD has accumulated a wealth of knowledge and 
expertise in making competition law and policy work for development. 
The Accra Accord (paragraph 104) recognizes that "UNCTAD is the 
focal point for the work on competition policy and related consumer 
welfare within the United Nations system. It provides to its Member 
States a forum for intergovernmental policy dialogue and consensus 
building in the area of competition laws and policies. … a forum to 
discuss competition issues on the multilateral level, … . UNCTAD's work 
in this area should promote competition law regimes that take into 
account the prevailing conditions in the developing countries."  Within 
this framework, the current publication brings together studies by 
practitioners and academics focussed on identifying the effects of anti-
competitive practices on developing countries and their development 
prospects.  
 
The various sections of this publication cover a wide range of 
cross-cutting competition issues. The publication highlights the 
synergies between competition and consumer laws and policies. It 
emphasizes the role of competition law and policy as a complementary 
policy tool in poverty alleviation. It also draws attention to competition 
concerns in commodity markets, which are of crucial importance to 
developing and least developed countries. Moreover, it provides lessons 
from a broad range of experiences from developed as well as 
developing countries, including economies in transition. The contribution 
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of competition enforcement can often be indistinguishable from that of 
other economic policies in increasing efficiency and competition. 
Nonetheless, this publication upholds the view that competition law and 
policy are supportive of the overall process of economic development by 
curbing anti-competitive practices that negatively impact consumers and 
increase costs to business.  
 
It is my hope that this publication, which is being launched at 
the ninth session of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on 
Competition Law and Policy in Geneva, in July 2008, will contribute to 
the enhanced understanding among government officials, private-sector 
stakeholders, consumer organizations and civil society of the necessity 
of competition law and policy and raise awareness on the damage 
caused by anti-competitive practices on the economies of developing 
countries. 
 
I would like to reiterate that UNCTAD will continue to support 
developing countries in their efforts in adopting competition and 
consumer laws and establishing and strengthening the capacities of 
their competition authorities through technical assistance and capacity-
building programmes. 
 
 
 
 
 
Supachai Panitchpakdi 
Secretary-General of UNCTAD 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
During the 1990s, many studies were undertaken to 
demonstrate the effects of anti-competitive practices on consumers and 
producers both in developing and developed countries. Damages 
caused by such practices to developing countries have implications for 
the purchasing power of consumers through increased prices. 
Producers in the developing world are also affected by anti-competitive 
practices through increased barriers to entry by restriction of information 
on technology. A World Bank study1 shows that, in 1997, developing 
countries imported US$81.1 billion worth of goods from industries where 
companies were involved in price-fixing arrangements in the 1990s. 
These goods represented 6.7 per cent of imports and 1.2 per cent of 
GDP in developing countries. These figures reveal the significance of 
the economic impact of the damages of anti-competitive practices on 
developing economies. It is worth mentioning that the quantitative 
effects of anti-competitive business practices are not easy to 
demonstrate. The most obvious effect of such practices is seen in the 
form of price increases in markets involving output-restricting or price-
fixing cartels and dominant firms abusing their market power. In such 
cases, consumers are the ones who suffer directly from restricted 
competition.  
 
One of the policy options available to governments to prevent or 
eliminate anti-competitive practices is the introduction and enforcement 
of competition law. The interrelationships between competition law and 
other government policies, such as consumer protection, 
macroeconomic policies and poverty alleviation, are an important 
catalyst to economic development and better livelihoods. Among these 
policies the synergies accruing between competition and consumer 
protection law enforcement to protect consumer interest and welfare are 
worth noting. 
 
This publication is a compilation of studies done by competition 
practitioners and academics. It brings together studies quantifying the 
                                                 
1
 Margaret Levenstein and Valerie Suslow (2001), Private International Cartels 
and their Effect on Developing Countries, Background Paper for World Bank’s 
World Development Report 2001, available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/wdr/2001/bkgroundpapers/levenstein.pdf. 
 vi 
effects of anti-competitive practices, on the one hand, and, on the other, 
studies demonstrating/emphasizing the benefits of competition law and 
policy, through establishing links between competition and other cross-
cutting issues. Part A deals with the interaction between competition 
and consumer policies. Part B focuses on competition law and policy 
and on poverty eradication. Part C discusses competition issues in 
commodity markets. Part D is devoted to lessons learnt from 
competition policy and law enforcement; experiences of developing as 
well as developed countries from both national and regional 
implementation perspectives. Lastly, Part E deals with specific anti-
competitive practices, such as cartels, abuse of dominance and patent 
policy, which have a bearing on competition in the market. 
 
The Interface between Competition and Consumer Policies 
 
Competition and consumer protection law and policy areas form 
part of the development perspective of UNCTAD's work. Considering 
the needs of consumers, especially in developing countries, and the 
imbalances they face in economic terms, educational levels and 
bargaining power, UNCTAD published the Guidelines for Consumer 
Protection.2 The objectives stated in the Guidelines include, among 
others, assisting countries in controlling abusive business practices by 
all enterprises, which practices adversely affect consumers, and 
encouraging the development of market conditions, which provide 
consumers with greater choice at lower prices. These objectives point to 
the close relationship between consumer protection and competition 
policies. 
 
Competition law and consumer protection policies are 
complementary and mutually reinforcing. Competition in the market 
increases efficiencies and encourages innovation. Competition also 
creates incentives for product differentiation and improves the quality of 
goods and services provided. In that sense, competition enhances 
consumer welfare by providing consumers with a wider choice at 
competitive prices. Consumer protection strengthens competition in the 
markets. Consumers make informed decisions in their preference for 
goods and services in respective markets when they are well informed. 
                                                 
2
 UN Guidelines for Consumer Protection, United Nations, New York and 
Geneva, 2001, available at: http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/poditcclpm21.en.pdf. 
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This increases competition between firms and results in efficiency 
and/or quality improvement, which in turn benefits consumers. In this 
publication there are studies that quantify benefits to consumers from 
competition in different sectors of the economy as well as those that 
quantify the adverse effects of anti-competitive practices on consumers 
(Sections 1, 2 and 3). These studies illustrate the strong link between 
competition and consumer protection. Other studies use econometric 
models to demonstrate the contribution of competition law to alleviate 
the costs of cartels incurred by consumers. Some competition 
authorities have even estimated the rate of return in terms of consumer 
welfare on each dollar spent on competition law enforcement (Section 
2).  
 
In some cases, total damages caused by the violation of 
competition law are found to be significant while the damage per 
consumer is relatively low, especially with respect to the price of the 
product and the household budget. These are some of the factors 
hindering or discouraging consumers from initiating private damage 
actions. There are particular cases in which the market where violation 
takes place is different from the market where the damage occurs. 
Therefore damages are not visible to individual consumers. In such 
cases, consumers may not be aware of the costs they incur. Market 
assessment can be a useful tool to give visibility to damages caused by 
anti-competitive practices. Such studies would strengthen the 
competition advocacy work of competition authorities, by analysing the 
level of competition in the market as well as the causes and possible 
consequences of all factors restricting competition. The outcomes of 
these studies may be used by policy makers in decision and policy 
making (Section 13). It is interesting to note that one of the tasks of the 
US Federal Trade Commission's Bureau of Competition is to provide 
information for consumers, businesses and policy makers on 
competition issues and market analysis (Section 1). 
 
With respect to the interface between competition and 
consumer interest, there are trade-offs between the two. Competition 
law works to achieve efficiencies in the market. These can be 
categorized as productive, allocative and dynamic efficiencies. It is 
unlikely to achieve all these efficiencies at the same time. Therefore, the 
competition authorities have to make an assessment as to which 
efficiency shall be given more weight in each competition case. This 
creates a trade-off between different types of efficiencies. One trade-off 
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is between static and dynamic efficiency while another occurs between 
productive and allocative efficiencies. For instance, although consumers 
would not gain from dynamic efficiencies resulting from innovation in the 
short term, they may benefit significantly in the long term (Section 1).  
 
Tensions between competition and consumer interest arise in 
situations where competition results in outcomes not favourable to 
consumers, such as high switching costs, trade-offs between price and 
quality. Additionally, consumers may have difficulties in price 
calculations due to complex pricing schedules offered by companies. 
This problem is prevalent in recently liberalized sectors, such as utilities 
and professional services, where there could be need for regulations to 
protect consumers and ensure that an adequate quality of services is 
provided. However, such regulations may reduce competition in these 
markets and in the extreme cases may even result in anti-competitive 
practices (Section 1). Furthermore, competition in the market may lead 
to negative effects on the environment and may not fully address the 
social benefits of public good. In these areas, there is need to impose 
regulatory rules to balance the long-term costs and benefits in terms of 
social welfare. Health and safety issues also require attention by 
consumer protection authorities since information asymmetries impede 
the functioning of competitive markets, such as in the restaurant food 
and used car markets (Section 2).  
 
In jurisdictions such as India, the EU and the US, competition 
law includes promotion and protection of consumer interest and welfare 
among its goals. In these cases, there is a direct reference to consumer 
welfare and interest. In the case law of many jurisdictions, relevant 
courts or competition authorities consider consumer interest in their 
decisions. Although consumer interest is one important element of 
competition law, not all aspects of consumer interest, such as safety, 
health, environment and privacy, can be addressed by competition law 
enforcement. These additional aspects of consumer interest require 
specialized laws, which also protect consumers against unfair business 
practices (Section 1).  
 
However, Section 3 provides examples of how effective 
enforcement of competition law in developing countries can inherently 
enhance consumer welfare. Case examples exemplify how merger 
evaluation accords the competition authority with an opportunity to 
approve mergers with conditions geared towards enhancing consumer 
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welfare. Such conditions may include continued availability of goods and 
services in the domestic market and a better quality and wider range of 
products. 
 
The synergies between competition laws and consumer 
protection laws should be exploited to promote competition and 
consumer welfare. These two policies use different tools but reinforce 
one another to correct market failures. Competition law facilitates the 
work needed by consumer policy by ensuring effective competition in 
markets, while consumer policy contributes to strengthening of fair 
competition, that is, competition on merits rather than through fraud and 
deception, between firms by enhancing the ability of consumers to make 
informed decisions and exercise choice (Section 1).  
 
Government support is crucial in providing the necessary 
infrastructure to develop and implement consumer protection policies 
and in ensuring consumer participation in developing countries. 
Competition laws that are not complemented by consumer protection 
provisions or separate consumer laws risk failure to protect consumers 
against anti-competitive practices (Section 2).  
 
Competition and Poverty Eradication 
 
We live in an era of market-driven globalization, in a world 
increasingly interdependent and with unprecedented openness in the 
global economy, a world in which the volume of trade and economic 
growth has no precedent in history. This is an era, which, though largely 
beneficial, has also brought about poverty and inequalities in wealth and 
opportunities for the people and small and medium economic actors in 
the markets. It is also an age that needs to translate these positive 
aspects into gains for developing countries and particularly their people. 
 
Poverty is one of the greatest challenges facing developing 
countries today. The phrase "living on less than a dollar a day" has crept 
into modern literature, news items, journals and other media to describe 
the dire hopelessness of the poor within world populations. In this 
context, the Millennium Development Goals, and in particular poverty 
alleviation/reduction and/or eradication, comprise a subject that has 
been elevated in profile. It features among the top priorities of all 
international organizations and governments for policy implementation. 
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Poverty has become a subject of study by research institutions and 
individuals. It has also been identified as one of the most important 
areas for ensuring coherence and aligning global and domestic policies. 
 
Poverty is a reality in almost all countries at various dimensions 
and magnitudes and the denial of it in any context negatively affects the 
efforts made in dealing with it. The existence of poverty is associated 
with many causes including government policies, poor planning and 
non-motivation. Nonetheless, the cause of poverty not withstanding, its 
alleviation is perceived to emanate from some policy interventions 
(Section 5 and 6). Therefore, it is necessary for governments to identify 
the poor, what they need and where they are located.  
 
Certain factors have been identified as causes of poverty in 
developing countries. They include lack of progressive economic growth 
due to other factors, for instance prevalence of diseases such as 
HIV/AIDS, high population growth rates, lack of infrastructure support, 
etc. Debt burden perpetuates poverty in many developing countries 
where a large percentage of GDP goes to debt servicing, leaving limited 
resources to tackle poverty-related issues (Section 5). Other possible 
factors could be associated with high inequality in income between the 
rich and the poor, or between those who are able to exploit the available 
opportunities and those who are not. Disparities could be based on 
rural-urban, inter-racial and/or inter-social factors, climatic conditions, 
access to markets and historical factors.  
 
In connection with this, many authors have studied the pro-
growth and pro-poor benefits of competition in the markets, finding 
indications that economies with competitive domestic markets generally 
tend to have higher growth rates and per capita income.  
 
International competition has seen a period of intensification, 
now that interdependence of national economies has increased to a 
point where all economies are exposed to the influence of events and 
policies originating in other parts of the globe. The widely accepted 
economic notion that barriers to competition impede innovation, growth 
and prosperity is supported to some extent by the proliferation of policy 
and law initiatives dealing with competition at both national and regional 
levels. Bearing this in mind, in a spirit of continuous coherence, the 
United Nations took the step of adopting in 1980 the UN Set of 
Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of 
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Restrictive Business Practices. The adoption of the UN Set has been 
widely received as a key effort in articulation at a global level, since it is 
the only multilateral instrument on competition policy providing a set of 
rules for the control of anti-competitive practices. Crucially, these rules 
also recognize the development dimension of competition law and policy 
and provide a framework for international cooperation and exchange of 
best practice. It is important to recall that UNCTAD is the focal point on 
all capacity building and technical assistance work related to 
competition policy and consumer protection within the United Nations 
system. 
 
In this regard, assessing the actual contributions and potential 
implications of competition in poverty alleviation is a complex exercise, 
particularly because the implications of competition on poverty 
alleviation, on welfare and on the overall development prospects of 
developing countries remain an open debate. Within this context, the 
authors have endeavoured to take on these multifaceted issues and 
challenges giving us their useful insights, from the perspective of legal 
economic theory and policy (Section 4), and also from the point of view 
of the practice of competition on the ground (Section 5 and 6).  
 
Section 4 describes the two classical visions on a desirable 
competition law: (1) that of developed countries, which often insists that 
antitrust is only for aggregate efficiency and consumer welfare, believing 
that any broader focus will lead to the protection of small competitors 
undermining the overall efficiency of the economy; and (2) the reply 
given by developing countries, which argue that their antitrust laws and 
policies must also address issues of distribution and power. 
 
Elaborating on the broad question of how to obtain gains from 
competition, Section 4 advances the notion that antitrust should not be 
used to protect inefficient small economic actors against big actors. It 
should be used to empower small economic actors against big actors by 
facilitating mobility and market access, which in turn produce 
efficiencies in the society.  
 
Competition law and policy intervention have been advocated 
as policy tools to deal with poverty in developing countries.  These 
instruments should take deliberate measures aimed at expanding the 
entrepreneurial base, through the prohibition of anti-competitive 
arrangements and the control of mergers/acquisitions, and at promoting 
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effective competition in infrastructure industries. Energy, 
telecommunications, and financial markets are important pillars of 
economic growth and also contribute to the creation of direct and 
indirect employment, which is an essential tool for alleviating poverty 
(Section 6). 
 
Experiences from developing countries have shown that 
prudent competition policy and law enforcement can assist specific key 
sectors to accommodate/include more players. Many rural communities 
in developing countries, who totally depend on the agricultural sector, 
are classified as poor. Therefore, a competition authority would pay 
attention to these sectors in order to tackle anti-competitive practices 
affecting them. Such intervention can directly and/or indirectly contribute 
to wealth maintenance and creation, which is key to poverty alleviation. 
Section 5 gives examples of some agricultural sub-sectors that can be 
identified for intervention by competition policy and law. The analysis 
illustrates the contribution of competition law enforcement efforts in 
alleviating poverty, in the cotton, horticulture, floriculture, poultry and 
beef sectors and points to the fact that intervention has yielded positive 
results. 
 
Competition Issues in Commodity Markets 
 
Given the importance of commodities as a source of income 
and livelihoods in many developing countries, it is inevitable that they 
form part of any poverty reduction strategy. According to the Common 
Fund for Commodities, there are more than 55 developing countries for 
which 50 per cent or more of all merchandise exports are comprised of 
non-oil commodities, the majority of which are located in Africa, where 
approximately half of the countries are commodity dependent. In many 
cases only one or two commodities are the main exports of many 
countries. Further, commodities account for 70 per cent of the 
merchandise exports of the least developed countries and more than 70 
per cent of the world's poor live in rural areas and directly or indirectly 
depend on commodities for their livelihood3. These statistics emphasize 
                                                 
3
 Common Fund for Commodities: Basic Facts 2007. 2007 available at:  
http://www.common-fund.org/download/content/CFC_BF_English.pdf. 
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that developments in commodity sectors have implications for poverty 
reduction. 
 
There are certain competition problems in commodity markets, 
which are usually characterized by a high degree of concentration as 
well as vertical integration between various stages of the value chain. 
Section 7 provides the developments and problems encountered in the 
cocoa market in the Ivory Coast, which supplies 40 per cent of the world 
demand for cocoa. The analysis of the value chain from Ivorian farm 
gate to a bar of dark chocolate on the shelves of French supermarkets 
reveals that chocolate makers and/or distributors have been gaining 
more and more from a bar of dark chocolate between 1992 and 2001 
(Section 7). 
 
The trend following the liberalization of cocoa markets has been 
the elimination of small local traders through tough competition with 
large multinational firms. Over time, the remaining local exporting and 
processing companies became subsidiaries of large multinational firms. 
On the other hand, cocoa markets have been experiencing increased 
horizontal concentration through mergers of large multinational 
companies, such as those between large chocolate companies and 
cocoa processing firms, or through takeovers by large international 
companies of smaller companies operating at the national market. As a 
result of these developments, small local cocoa producers have to 
contend with a strong purchasing power held by several large 
multinational companies. 
 
The existence of an oligopolistic market structure with high 
concentration and market power points to competition law enforcement 
as a potential instrument to curb anti-competitive practices. 
Nonetheless, it is difficult to gather evidence on anti-competitive 
behaviour, such as collusive agreements and other concerted practices, 
in oligopolistic markets. Another policy option is merger control, which 
ensures that mergers and acquisitions likely to increase market 
concentration and reduce potential competition are either prevented or 
approved with conditions. As for abuse of market power in commodity 
markets local farmers do not have enough bargaining power and are in 
a disadvantaged position to negotiate fair prices for their products vis-à-
vis large international cocoa traders. The approach to competition law 
implementation in commodity markets should be on how to protect 
producers from the purchasing power of international traders and 
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processors rather than how to protect consumers from market power. 
There are also other policies to exploit, such as price stabilization, which 
were dismantled during the liberalization process (Section 7). 
 
Another important issue that concerns consumers as well as 
producers in developing countries is voluntary product standards 
imposed by industry associations, which are sometimes composed of 
dominant firms. While product standards may seem to aim at improving 
consumer welfare via increased quality and safety, or encourage 
environment-friendly production processes, they can also be used by 
dominant firms as entry barriers against competing firms (Section 8). 
This is where competition authorities may step in to curb the anti-
competitive effects of such practices. Examples show mposition of 
voluntary product standards has implications especially for small and 
medium-sized enterprises in developing countries. Product standards 
increase the cost of production and export for these small 
producers/exporters thereby restricting their access to the markets of 
developed countries. 
 
Lessons from Competition Policy and Law Enforcement 
 
Developing countries and economies in transition tend to be 
more vulnerable to anti-competitive practices. This scenario may be 
attributed to high entry barriers, less diversified and smaller markets, 
rather asymmetric firms, and in general conditions that allow dominant 
firms to abuse their position. Some developing countries do not have 
competition laws in place and, in those that have laws, their competition 
authorities have limited experience and resources for effective 
enforcement. For these countries, it is especially beneficial to learn from 
other countries’ experiences. 
 
As national economies integrate into the world economy 
through liberalization and with each other through regional trade 
agreements, barriers to trade are normally eliminated. In such an open 
international economy, no country can escape the effects of anti-
competitive practices originating outside their national borders, such as 
international cartels or mergers and acquisitions, which may restrict 
competition. Also, there are difficulties faced by small and medium-sized 
firms in developing economies, such as business networks providing 
support for the ‘insiders’ and making it more difficult for ‘outsiders’ to 
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enter particular activities or markets.  Such practices restrict the 
development of entrepreneurial capabilities due to lack of competition. 
For these reasons, it is becoming particularly important to tackle these 
problems both at regional and national levels. This can be achieved by 
including competition provisions in regional trade agreements, 
especially between developing countries.  
 
In this regard, Section 9 discusses competition law and policy at 
regional level in the context of the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) and explores the usefulness of an effective 
competition law and policy in this region. The authors identify two major 
considerations in the design of an effective competition policy in this 
regional grouping. One concern is whether or not there should be a 
regional competition law, together with the mechanisms by which this 
law would be made effective within members' national legal frameworks. 
The other concern is whether the region should establish a separate 
competition authority that will treat individual cases either alone or in 
cooperation with national competition authorities and courts. This 
Section recommends the promotion of a regional competition policy, 
which will improve gains at all levels and tackle cross-border anti-
competitive practices, which are negatively affecting the development 
prospects of countries in this region. It makes a general call for 
coherence at all levels, including both at policy and law making. It is 
essential for competition authorities around the globe to learn and 
borrow from each other’s experiences, especially from the history of 
good practice and reform. 
 
Competition law and policy have become crucial in transition 
economies due to privatization policies, where there is always the risk of 
replacing state monopolies with private ones. Section 10 presents the 
experience of Romania and provides an assessment of the 
effectiveness of its competition policy implementation. Competition 
policy plays an important role in the liberalization of certain sensitive 
sectors of the economy. Privatization and development of a competition 
policy represented a real challenge for Romania in its process of 
transition to a market economy. This challenge also entailed reforms to 
economic regulations and the adoption of other necessary legislations 
besides competition law. Romania's experience with competition law 
enforcement demonstrates the importance of competition policy in the 
context of transition towards a market economy and emphasizes the 
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need to develop an operational competition regime in developing 
countries.  
 
Competition law and policy together with effectively functioning 
markets are conducive for enhancing productive capacity, trade and 
investment as well as improving the use of knowledge in favour of 
development. In this regard, Section 11 describes the experience of 
Australia, a country with a stable economy and a well-developed 
competition law. This Section elaborates on the significant limitations of 
the Trade Practices Act 1974 prior to the 1995 amendments. It also 
describes the broader reforms of Australian competition policy and the 
quantifiable benefits of these reforms for the economy and consumers. 
It is worth noting that, in Australia, broad investigative powers of the 
competition authority have been particularly important for effective 
enforcement, which brought about outcomes benefiting a large number 
of consumers. The Australian experience is useful to demonstrate that 
competition law may require amendments over time so as to respond to 
the needs of the changing economic conditions at both national and 
global level. 
 
Section 12 takes us back to the developing world and provides 
the experiences of China in anti-monopoly practice from 1993 to 2007 
and the reforms undertaken to ensure the coherent and consistent 
application and enforcement of the anti-monopoly law. The author 
provides his critical approach to past as well as recent developments on 
competition law and policy in China, with a focus on aspects to be 
reinforced and revised in the application of the new law. After a long 
legislative history of about twenty years, the new integrating 
Antimonopoly Law was passed on 30 August 2007, and will take effect 
on 1 August 2008.   
 
This Section provides recommendations to adopt an approach 
that is consistent with international standards and to make necessary 
institutional arrangements to solve the past problems in future practice. 
The Chinese experience is one from which timely lessons of competition 
policy and law enforcement can be drawn. 
 
This Part of the publication provides some insights and 
examples from various countries' practices, from which important 
lessons of policy integration, legal and institutional design, action on 
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specific sectors, legal certainty, enforcement enhancement and reform 
could be learnt.  
 
Addressing Specific Anti-Competitive Practices 
 
Anti-competitive practices have implications for the economic 
growth and development of nations. Such practices restrict competition 
and deteriorate consumer welfare by creating entry barriers and price 
increases, which lead to efficiency and innovation concerns. 
 
Cartels are one of the most harmful anti-competitive practices 
and cause significant damage to the economy as well as to consumers. 
Section 13 provides a case example of the Turkish yeast cartel, which 
was detected and investigated by the Turkish Competition Authority. 
This Section quantifies the damages caused by this price-fixing cartel in 
the yeast market in Turkey. Using the optimal deterrence theory, the 
authors define the optimal fine, which would ideally deter anti-
competitive practices, to be equal to the net harm to persons other than 
the violator. In some cases, even if the fines imposed are at the optimal 
level, it is not sufficient to deter anti-competitive practices. To ensure 
that consumers benefit from competition law, private damage actions 
may also be encouraged by raising awareness among consumers on 
the adverse impacts of anti-competitive practices (Section 13). 
 
Abuse of a dominant position is another type of anti-competitive 
conduct, which can be exercised by large firms, both multinationals and 
state-created monopolies, such as utilities, transport and 
telecommunications, in relatively smaller markets. Rules on abuse of 
dominance aim to ensure free competition in markets, which creates 
incentives for firms to become more efficient and innovative.  Such rules 
are also used to contribute to the equal distribution of wealth among 
different parts of the society. However, the level of economic 
development of countries and the size of their economies may create 
contradicting situations or factors from a competition’s perspective. 
Firstly, developing economies often have smaller markets and, hence, a 
small number of firms that can benefit from economies of scale and 
operate efficiently. That is why markets in developing countries are 
more likely to be concentrated. Second, the established large firms in 
developing countries play an important role in increasing investment. 
Therefore, these economies are likely to benefit from relatively lax rules 
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on abuse of dominance. Thirdly, in countries where the priority is on 
equal income distribution, policies may be designed to support small 
firms representing poorer parts of the society vis-à-vis large and 
dominant companies (Section 14). These factors should be considered 
carefully by developing countries in designing their competition law and 
policy, in particular the rules on abuse of dominance. Economic 
efficiency concerns should be weighed against public interest concerns 
in the best way. The objectives of the competition law should be clearly 
reflected in the law. Further, there are different approaches to abuse of 
dominance in developed countries, such as the EU and US, arising from 
different assumptions as to which types of conduct are harmful and how 
difficult it is to distinguish harmful types of conduct from others. 
Regardless of the type of approach to abuse of dominance, the 
assumptions made and the economic factors dominant in a country 
should be analysed and grounded on economic reality (Section 14).   
 
Competition law and policy cross-cut many areas, one of which 
is intellectual property rights (IPR). IPR protection may endow 
companies with significant market power. While IPR policies increase 
incentives to innovate in an economy, they may cause efficiency losses 
due to abuse of market power by companies protected by IPR rules. In 
this respect, there is a trade-off between competition law and patent 
policy. This is even more so for developing countries considering the 
fact that innovating companies are usually situated in developed 
countries. Developing countries need to strike the right balance between 
competition and IPR policies, particularly patent policies, depending on 
their productive, imitative and innovative capacities as well as their 
openness to attract foreign direct investment from developed countries 
(Section 15). 
 
Avenues for Future Research 
 
This publication illustrates the adverse effects of anti-
competitive practices on developing countries, and touches upon many 
cross-cutting competition issues. Future studies focusing on the effects 
on the economy of important decisions taken by competition authorities 
in the past, particularly in developing countries, may be very useful 
(Section 14). In this respect, it would be wise to support developing 
countries to undertake studies to analyse the impact of their decisions 
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on various actors in the economy, such as consumers and small and 
medium enterprises, as well as on their development prospects. 
 
Another area of research could be quantitative analysis of the 
impact of anti-competitive practices and the lack of effective competition 
regimes, particularly in developing countries, on national economies, in 
general, and on consumers, in particular (Section 3). 
 
This publication contributes to the illustration of the adverse 
effects of anti-competitive practices on developing countries and their 
development prospects as well as to emphasize the benefits of 
competition law enforcement. Considering that many developing 
countries have been making efforts to adopt and implement competition 
law, this field of research will not saturate any sooner and has the 
potential to absorb further research. 
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COMPETITION LAW AND CONSUMER PROTECTION — 
INSIGHTS INTO THEIR INTERRELATIONSHIP 
 
Vinod Dhall*  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Competition law and consumer protection are intricately 
connected. It is impossible to talk of one without dealing with the other. 
At a fundamental level, these two are complementary and mutually 
reinforcing, both being elements of a broader framework of social 
welfare. Competition law by maintaining and preserving competition 
enhances consumer interest. On the other hand, consumer policy 
strengthens competition between firms. Yet the two are not identical 
areas and their boundaries do not coincide. Nevertheless, they overlap 
or intersect at various points, reflecting both synergies and tensions. 
The challenge before authorities is to maximize the synergies and 
minimize the tensions thereby smoothing the interface between the two 
disciplines. 
 
 This article explores the complex but interesting 
interrelationship between the two disciplines and offers insights into how 
the synergies and tensions might be better understood by competition 
and consumer protection authorities and by law or policy makers. 
                                                 
*
 The author is Member and Acting Chairman of the Competition Commission of 
India. These are his personal views. E-mail: dhall.vinod1@gmail.com. 
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2. The economics of competition law4 
 
Competition law is an economic law; it is about the behaviour of 
economic agents. Economics provides a theoretical basis for the law; it 
also provides the tools with which to analyse markets and competition 
within them5. As J. Brandeis once said “A lawyer who has not studied 
economics…. is very apt to become a public enemy”6. Therefore, for a 
proper appreciation of competition law it is important to have an 
understanding of the economic concepts inherent in the law.  
 
Competition in the economic sphere denotes the process of 
rivalry between firms for the patronage of customers. The European 
Commission defines competition as a situation in which firms or sellers 
“independently strive for buyers’ patronage in order to achieve a 
particular business objective, for example, profits, sales, or market 
share”7. Richard Whish refers to competition in the commercial world as 
“a striving for the custom and business of people in the market place”8. 
In this sense, competition is the equivalent of rivalry between firms; this 
rivalry may be in different forms such as for price, service, or a 
combination thereof, or other factors.  
 
Competition is at the heart of the market-based economy. The 
debate about the relative merits of a market-based economy versus a 
state-controlled, planned economy that raged for decades seems to 
have been broadly settled in favour of the former. Countries across the 
globe are reforming their economies, and undertaking privatization and 
                                                 
4
 This section is based on the chapter “Overview: Key Concepts in Competition 
Law” by Vinod Dhall in Dhall, Vinod (ed.) Competition Law Today: Concepts, 
Issues and the Law in Practice, (2007), Oxford University Press, New Delhi. 
5
 See Doern. G. Bruce and Stephen Wilks (2001): Comparative Competition 
Policy – National Institutions in a Global Market, Oxford University Press. 
6
 Quoted in Whish, Richard (2005): Competition Law, Oxford University Press, 
5th Edition, p. 1. 
7
 Glossary of Terms used in EU Competition Policy, Director General for 
Competition, Italy. (2002), available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm./competition/general_info/glossary_en.html  
8
 See Whish, Richard (2005), Competition Law, Oxford University Press, 5th 
Edition. For another definition, see: Consumer International (2003): The 
Consumer Guide to Competition: A Practical Notebook, March 2003. 
 5 
deregulation. As they do so, the forces of competition come increasingly 
onto the centre stage of the economy.  
  
A perfectly competitive market requires that there should be a 
large number of sellers and buyers, each seller, therefore, having only a 
small share of the market. Further, the product should be 
homogeneous, there should be no entry or exit barriers or information 
asymmetries and both the seller and buyer should have access to the 
market. In such a market, sellers are price takers, not price makers, and 
the price of a product equals its marginal cost; each supplier makes only 
a normal profit. 
 
A perfectly competitive market is said to achieve both allocative 
efficiency and productive efficiency. The combined effect of allocative 
and productive efficiencies is that society’s welfare overall is maximized. 
Consumer welfare is also maximized in such a situation. Allocative 
efficiency is achieved when the goods are produced in the quantities 
desired by society, and it is not possible to make anyone better off 
without making someone else worse off. Productive efficiency is 
achieved when goods are produced at the lowest possible cost, that is, 
as little of society’s wealth is expended in the production process as is 
necessary. Competition also enhances dynamic efficiency in that it 
spurs innovation, development of new products and technological 
growth. 
 
If perfect competition is at one end of the spectrum, at the other 
end is monopoly. Here, there are many buyers but only one seller, who 
is a monopolist and who is in a position therefore, to increase prices and 
reduce the volume of supply. In this situation there is allocative 
inefficiency, which is also referred to as deadweight loss. In economic 
theory, however, the objection to monopoly is not only that the 
monopolist is able to charge excessively and reduce production, but 
also that monopoly is inefficient. The inefficiency arises out of higher 
costs, for example, through higher remuneration and excessive staff. A 
monopolist may also waste resources by maintaining excess capacity or 
indulging in excessive product differentiation. This situation is also 
referred to as X-inefficiency, the term first used by Liebenstein9.  
                                                 
9
 Liebenstein (1966): Allocative Efficiency vs. X-Efficiency (1966) 56 American 
Economic Review 392–415 quoted at p. 5, Whish, Richard (2005) ibid. at note 
64.  
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A weakness of the competition theory, however, is that in the 
real world neither perfect competition nor a perfect monopoly exists. 
Perfect competition is based on assumptions (mentioned above) that 
are unlikely, if not impossible, to be found in real life, where the situation 
is likely to be somewhere between these two poles of perfect 
competition and a monopoly. Nevertheless, perfect competition is a 
model that is still useful to demonstrate the concept of productive and 
allocative efficiency and as a benchmark against which to measure the 
actual situation in the market. Short of perfect competition, therefore, 
other more realistic concepts have evolved over the years. For example, 
some economists have settled for the concept of “workable 
competition”, evolved by Clark in 194010. This concept considers it 
worthwhile to aim to produce the best competitive arrangements that are 
practically attainable. Some economists have advanced the theory of 
“contestable market” according to which firms are constrained by 
competitive forces, provided entering into the market is free and exit is 
costless; that is, the incumbent enterprise must be wary of a ‘hit-and-
run’ entry by competitors. The EC competition law uses the expression 
“effective competition” though what is meant by effective competition 
does not appear to have been spelt out.  
 
Another weakness in the competition theory is that in certain 
situations, competition may in fact not yield the best result in terms of 
efficiencies, as for example, where the economies of scale support the 
existence of only one enterprise. Further, in the case of certain 
industries, there exists what is called the “network effect”, that is, the 
utility of a product or service increases with the increase in the number 
of consumers, e.g. in telecommunications or personal computer 
operating systems. Thus, the network effect could, in certain situations, 
indicate that it is more beneficial to have only one or a few producers of 
products or providers of services.  
 
In the United States, two important economic schools of thought 
have greatly influenced competition law and policy. In the 1950s, the 
structure-conduct-performance concept was developed by what has 
come to be known as the ‘Harvard school’ of thought, attributed to E.S. 
                                                 
10
 Clark (1940): Towards a Concept of Workable Competition (1940) 30 
American Economic Review 241–256 quoted at p. 14, Whish (2005) ibid. at note 
64. 
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Mason and J.S. Bain. According to this school, the market structure 
influences conduct, which, in turn, influences performance. 
Concentrated markets are regarded as quite susceptible to economic 
power and its exercise. Antitrust law is regarded as an important tool to 
protect the market. This school gives to competition law a more 
interventionist role and places less confidence in the markets. According 
to this view, competition policy should be mainly concerned with 
structural remedies rather than with behavioural remedies.  
 
In the 1970s and 1980s, the ascendancy of the ‘Chicago school’ 
of thought produced a revolution in antitrust thinking. The ‘Chicago 
school’ focuses on the pursuit of efficiency as the sole goal of antitrust, 
efficiency consisting of allocative efficiency and productive efficiency. 
According to this view, most markets are competitive, and entry barriers 
are more imagined than real; a monopolist’s position is quickly eroded 
and firms are rational in their pursuit of profit maximization. The Chicago 
school believes that antitrust policy should be less interventionist than 
demanded by the structure-conduct-performance paradigm. The 
Harvard school saw concentration as the evil. The Chicago school does 
not worry about concentration so much, and thinks government 
intervention is usually clumsy and inefficient. Therefore the foundation is 
not concentration but non-intervention unless the plaintiff can show 
price-raising outcomes from specific conduct or transactions. But the 
Chicago school itself spans a spectrum, with some applying more robust 
market premises than others.  
 
Both the ‘Harvard’ and ‘Chicago’ schools have left their stamp 
on antitrust thinking. However, recent years seem to have witnessed a 
rapprochement between the two. It is being increasingly recognized that 
while economics may provide the tools for analysis and it may also 
indicate what questions to ask, it does not always yield definitive 
answers, and it does not provide space for society’s values to be taken 
into consideration.  
 
The European tradition of competition law owes a lot to the 
German ordoliberal school of thought, also referred to as the Freiburg 
school. This sees competition law almost as part of an ‘economic 
constitution’. It believes that competition is necessary for economic 
welfare and that economic freedom is necessary for political freedom. It 
stresses the necessity of dispersing private economic power so as not 
to influence political power. The ordoliberal school had a profound 
 8 
influence on the early decisions in European competition law and could 
account for its greater concern in protecting the freedom of competitors 
to compete on merits. 
 
Competition law employs a number of economic tools in 
analysing individual cases; for example, an important starting point in 
analysing a case is to determine the relevant market, the purpose of 
which is to identify the products and services that are such close 
substitutes for one another that they operate as a competitive constraint 
on the conduct of the supplier of those products and services. The 
relevant market comprises the relevant product market and the relevant 
geographic market. An economic tool usually employed in determining 
the relevant product market is the SSNIP test (Small but Significant 
Non-transitory Increase in Price, also called the hypothetical 
monopolistic test) to assess primarily the demand side substitutability of 
the product. Also, economic tools are used for determining the entry 
barriers, which may include determining the economies of scale, extent 
of product differentiation, extent of capital requirement, and predatory 
behaviour.  
 
Some empirical studies have tried to measure the gains from 
competition in the markets. In the United States, in a contemporaneous 
review of the deregulation of natural gas, long-distance 
telecommunications, airlines, trucking and rail, it was reported that real 
prices dropped at least 25 per cent and sometimes close to 50 per cent 
within ten years of deregulation in those industries11. The annual value 
of consumer benefit from such deregulation was estimated to be 
approximately US$5bn in the long-distance telecommunications 
industry, US$19.40bn in the airline industry, US$19.60bn in the trucking 
industry, and US$9.10bn in the rail industry. At the same time, there 
were improvements in the quality of service. A study by the Australian 
Productivity Commission, quoted by the OECD, estimates that 
Australian household “annual incomes are, on average, around A$7,000 
higher as a result of competition policy”12. The same OECD document 
                                                 
11
 Robert Luke, J. (1997): Economic Deregulation and Customers Choice: 
Lessons for the Electricity Industry, George Messing University Centre for 
Market Process”, quoted in Crampton , Paul (2003) Competition and Efficiency 
as Organizing Principles for all Economic and Regulatory Policy Making, OECD-
IADB, April 2003.  
12
 OECD (2005): The Relationship between Competition Authorities and 
Sectoral Regulators, Document No. DAF/COMP/GF (2005) 2 for Global Forum 
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also quotes a study that estimates that pro-competition policy 
developments in New Zealand and the United Kingdom have added 
around 2.5 percentage points to their employment rate over the 1978–
1998 period; countries with more modest reforms, such as Greece, Italy 
and Spain added only 0.5–1 per cent to the employment rate13. Another 
study finds that “reforms promoting private governance (i.e. 
privatization) and competition tend to boost productivity. In 
manufacturing, gains to be expected from lower entry barriers are 
greater the farther a given country is from the technology leader”14.  
 
In India, economic reforms comprising, inter alia, of 
liberalization, privatization and pro-competition policies, were introduced 
since the early 1990s. As these reforms took effect, economic growth 
surged, and consumer sovereignty has asserted itself. The market-
based economy that has emerged is offering to the Indian consumer 
competitive prices, a wider range of goods and a better quality of 
products and services. 
 
Two elements are required to maintain competition in the 
economy: a competition policy and a competition law. Competition 
policy refers generally to a set of government measures that enhance 
competition, give primacy to market forces, facilitate entry and exit, 
reduce administrative controls, and minimize regulations. Competition 
law refers to a statute to prohibit and penalize anti-competitive practices 
and regulate potentially anti-competitive mergers. Competition policy 
and law are mutually complementary, one trying to promote a market-
based economy as opposed to a controlled or regulated economy, the 
other trying to remove impediments that may be placed by private 
players in the functioning of the market economy, and thereby maintain 
and preserve competition in the markets.  
 
                                                                                                            
on Competition, OECD February, 2005 at p. 3. available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/8/61/237607.pdf. 
13
 Nicoletti, Guiseppe and Stefano Scarpetta (2001): Interaction between 
product and labour market regulations: do they affect employment? Evidence 
from OECD Countries OECD Economics Working Papers, quoted in OECD 
(2005) ibid. 
14
 Nicoletti, Guiseppe and Stefano Scarpetta (2003): Regulations, Productivity 
and Growth: OECD Evidence, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 
2944, January 2003 quoted in OECD (2005), ibid. 
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3. Anti-competitive practices 
 
Unfortunately, competition in the market can be suppressed or 
negated through anti-competitive practices by enterprises; these are 
often referred to as market failures. If competition is to be maintained 
and its benefits are to be reaped by society, including the consumers, 
such anti-competitive practices must be restrained, and to do so is the 
primary purpose of competition law and its justification. Anti-competitive 
practices are generally considered in three categories: cartels and other 
anti-competitive agreements, abuse of dominant position 
(monopolization) by an enterprise, and anti-competitive mergers. These 
cause harm to consumers and society in varying degrees.  
 
The harm could be even greater in developing countries, 
because there the markets are generally more fragile as concentration 
levels are higher, dominant position is more prevalent, entry barriers are 
higher (regulatory restrictions, capital scarcity, etc.) and competition 
authorities are relatively less resourced or skilled in disciplining anti-
competitive practices. A World Trade Organization (WTO) report15 
observes: 
 
 “There are reasons to believe that developing economies tend 
to be more vulnerable to anti-competitive practices than 
developed countries. The reasons include: high ‘natural’ entry 
barriers due to inadequate business infrastructure, including 
distribution channels, and (sometimes) intrusive regulatory 
regimes; asymmetries of information in both product and credit 
markets; and a greater proportion of local (non-tradeable) 
markets. Thus it may be particularly important to protect, 
consumers in developing countries against cartels, monopoly 
abuses, and the creation of new monopolies through mergers. 
Bid rigging in public procurement markets (i.e. collusive 
tendering) is also pervasive in many developing economies, and 
merits vigorous enforcement initiatives”.  
 
  Cartels are the most pernicious form of anti-competitive activity. 
A World Bank Background Paper shows that in 1997 developing 
countries imported US$81.1 billion worth of goods from industries that 
                                                 
15
 WTO, Trade Policy Review – Report by the Secretariat: INDIA[2007], WTO 
Document No. WT/TPR/S/182. p. 96. 
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had seen a price-fixing conspiracy during the 1990s16. Those imports 
represented 6.7 per cent of the imports and 1.2 per cent of the GDP in 
the developing countries and an even larger proportion of trade in the 
poorest developing countries for whom the 16 products in question 
represented 8.8 per cent of the imports17. The OECD’s Global Forum on 
Competition, 2001, contains a list of 26 cartel and bid rigging cases 
reported by 12 developing countries18. However, there are only a few 
examples of global cartels being successfully penalized in developing 
countries; the reasons for this are well known, such as limited capacity 
of the domestic competition agencies to investigate and unearth 
evidence, difficulty in securing cooperation of the corresponding 
agencies in industrialized countries, and limitations in the law.  
 
4. Consumer interest as a goal of competition law 
 
 Competition law, through the promotion and preservation of 
competition in markets, enhances consumer welfare. This is, therefore, 
one of the justifications for competition law and also gives to it wider 
acceptability in the public eye. Frequently, consumer interest may 
feature explicitly as one of the goals of competition law.  
 
 In the Indian competition law19, protection of the ‘interests of 
consumers’ figures specifically both in the preamble to the Act as well 
as in the duties of the Commission. The preamble states as follows: “An 
Act to provide, keeping in view the economic development of the 
country, for the establishment of a Commission to prevent practices 
having adverse effect on competition, to promote and sustain 
competition in markets, to protect the interests of consumers and to 
ensure freedom of trade carried on by other participants in markets, in 
                                                 
16
 Levenstein, Margaret and Valerie Suslow (2001): Private International Cartels 
and their Effect on Developing Countries, Background Paper for World Bank’s 
World Development Report 2001, available at 
http://www.worldbank.org/wdr/2001/bkgroundpapers/levenstein.pdf. 
17
 Ibid. 
18
 OECD (2001): Global Forum on Competition: Summary of Cartel cases 
described by invitees, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/41/30/2491386.pdf. 
19
 The Competition Act, 2002, later amended by the Competition (Amendment) 
Act, 2007. May be found on the website of the Competition Commission of India: 
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India, and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto”. Section 
18 of the Act further states that: “It shall be the duty of the Commission 
to eliminate practices having adverse effect on competition, promote 
and sustain competition, protect the interests of consumers and ensure 
freedom of trade carried on by other participants, in markets, in India.”. 
 
 
Box 1 
Competition advocacy 
 
Competition advocacy is increasingly recognized as an integral and 
important component of competition law and policy. In many 
jurisdictions, the competition authority undertakes competition advocacy 
with a view to promoting more competition-friendly policies and 
regulations. In some countries, such a rule is mandated by the 
competition law itself.  
 
  India’s Competition Act, 2002 provides a statutory base for the 
Commission to undertake competition advocacy with the government, 
regulations and other statutory bodies. Section 49 of the Act provides 
that the government, central or state, may refer a competition policy 
matter to the Commission for its opinion on its possible effect on 
competition. The Commission is required to give its opinion within 60 
days, which will be considered by the government, but the opinion is not 
binding on the government. However, the Act also provides that “the 
Commission shall take suitable measures for the promotion of 
competition advocacy, creating awareness and imparting training about 
competition issues”. This provision, therefore, allows the Commission to 
undertake advocacy even where a reference is not received from the 
central or state government. Accordingly, the Commission has offered 
its opinion about the possible adverse effect on competition of a number 
of proposed government laws or policies. Some examples are given 
below: 
 
(i) The Department of Posts proposed to introduce a law giving a 
monopoly to India Posts over delivery of mail below 300 g (later reduced 
to 150 g), providing for mandatory registration of private service 
providers, introducing a USO contribution by private service providers to 
India Posts, and setting up a mail regulation to regulate the private 
service providers. In the view of the Commission, certain aspects of the 
proposal could likely adversely affect competition in the markets and 
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create an uneven playing field between private and public service 
providers. The Commission also pointed out that this sector had no 
features justifying economic regulation. 
 
(ii) The Commission interacted with the Department of 
Telecommunications and the telecom regulation to advocate ‘number 
portability’ with the view to reduce consumer switching costs and 
thereby enhance the level of competition in the telecom market. It also 
advocated a more competition-based policy for the allocation of 
spectrum.  
 
(iii) The Commission, through a high-level working group constituted by 
the National Planning Commission, has recommended the 
pronouncement of an overarching competition policy by the government. 
Similar advocacy-based proposals have been made by the Commission 
in other cases. There is reason to believe that the Commission’s 
recommendations have had a positive effect and the outcomes in a 
number of cases have coincided with the Commission’s views. 
 
 There has been a feeling that trade associations in certain 
industries are being used as a platform for concerted action in respect of 
prices. Though the Commission’s enforcement has not yet commenced, 
it has, as an advocacy measure, interacted with several associations to 
draw their attention to the new law and the serious consequences that 
could follow from a violation of the law once its enforcement begins. The 
Commission has emphasized the benefits from competition for 
consumers and the industry and the adverse effect on both from anti-
competitive practices. Trade associations and chambers are being 
urged to adopt a compliance code at their level, for example by 
excluding certain types of subjects from discussion in association 
meetings such as prices, tenders and profit margins. These 
interventions by the Commission have substantially increased the 
awareness of the associations in respect of the competition law.  
 
Prof. Timothy Muris, while he was Chairman of the US Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC), has stated: “Policies that we traditionally 
identify separately as ‘antitrust’ and ‘consumer protection’ serve the 
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common aim of improving consumer welfare and naturally complement 
each other”20. The FTC’s statement of purpose declares21: 
 
“The Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of Competition 
champions the rights of American consumers by promoting and 
protecting free and vigorous competition. The Bureau: 
 
- reviews mergers and acquisitions, and challenges those 
that would likely lead to higher prices, fewer choices, or less 
innovation; 
- seeks out and challenges anti-competitive conduct in the 
market place, including monopolization and agreements 
between competitors; 
- promotes competition in industries where consumer impact 
is high, such as health care, real estate, oil & gas, 
technology, and consumer goods; 
- provides information, and holds conferences and 
workshops, for consumers, businesses, and policy makers 
on competition issues and market analysis.”. 
 
 Similarly, in the United Kingdom, the Office of Fair Trading 
(OFT) states as its responsibility: “The OFT is responsible for 
making markets work well for consumers. We achieve this by 
promoting and protecting consumer interests throughout the UK, 
while ensuring that businesses are fair and competitive”22. 
 
 The European Commission in its XXXIInd Report on 
Competition Policy 2002 defines the goal of European competition 
law: “One of the main purposes of European competition policy is to 
promote the interests of consumers, that is, to ensure that 
consumers benefit from the wealth generated by the European 
economy. This objective is horizontal in nature: the Commission 
thus takes the interest of consumers into account in all aspects of its 
competition policy, namely in countering anti-competitive 
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Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, at The Fordham 
Corporate Law Institute’s Twenty-Ninth Annual Conference on International 
Antitrust Law and Policy, New York City, October 31, 2002.  
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agreements, in particular hard-core cartels and abuses of dominant 
positions, but also in the control of concentrations and state aid 
granted by Member States”23. 
 
 It is interesting to see that this definition became more refined in 
the recently published Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) 
EC. Point 13 of the Guidelines declares the goals of European 
competition law in very explicit terms: “The objective of Article 81(1) 
is to protect competition on the market as a means of enhancing 
consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient allocation of 
resources. Competition and market integration serve these ends 
since the creation and preservation of an open single market 
promotes an efficient allocation of resources throughout the 
community for the benefit of consumers”24. 
 
5. Trade-offs 
 
 Pursuit of efficiencies being a strong feature of competition law, 
the extent to which the consumer interest is served by competition law 
depends very much on the efficiency standard that is pursued in its 
application. In general, it is highly unlikely that the three kinds of 
efficiencies, i.e. productive, allocative and dynamic, can be achieved 
simultaneously and, therefore, there have to be trade-offs in assessing 
the efficiency gains, as pointed out by Cseres25.  
 
 One trade-off is between static and dynamic efficiencies. In 
today’s knowledge-based economy, technological growth and 
innovation play an increasing role by bringing new products and 
services continuously to consumers. Knowledge-based assets may 
constitute a huge proportion of an enterprise’s assets, even when these 
are not reflected in its balance sheet. Accordingly, competition in 
product or process innovation may be more important than mere price 
competition. Thus, dynamic efficiency brought about by innovation can 
be in the long-term interest of the consumer even if in the short term the 
                                                 
23
 Cseres, Katalin Judit, Competition Law and Consumer Protection, 2005, 
Kluwer Law International, The Hague, p. 324. 
 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 For a treatment of the efficiency trade-offs, see ibid. pp. 311–313. 
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consumers may not gain anything. Competition authorities, therefore, 
have to be increasingly aware of the welfare-maximizing gains from 
dynamic efficiency vis-à-vis static efficiency. 
 
 Similarly, there is a trade-off between allocative and productive 
efficiencies. This may happen when a more efficient and, therefore, a 
lower cost firm tries to enhance its market power by increasing its 
market share. This may lead, on the one hand, to higher productive 
efficiency as the average cost of production in the industry would 
decline; on the other hand, it could lead to lower allocative efficiency 
due to higher prices in the market. Such a trade-off may be particularly 
compelling in the case of a merger. The merger, through economies of 
scale or scope or otherwise, may reduce production costs leading to 
productive efficiency. On the other hand, the merger may increase the 
enterprise’s market power and thereby enable the enterprise to increase 
prices. If the competition authority gives greater weight to productive 
efficiency it may lead to the transfer of income from consumers to 
producers and the opposite would be true if the competition authority 
gave greater weight to allocative efficiency. 
 
 Similarly, as Cseres further explains, the extent to which 
consumer interest is served depends upon the welfare standard 
pursued by a competition authority. Some authorities adopt the 
consumer welfare model, according to which the ultimate goal of 
competition law should be to prevent increases in consumer prices due 
to the exercise of market power by dominant firms. The consumer 
welfare standard is tilted in favour of consumers and considers wealth 
transfers from consumers to producers as being harmful. Consequently, 
it assigns less weight to efficiencies unless these directly benefit the 
consumers through, for example, lower prices or better products. This 
approach also runs the risk of focusing on short-term consumer welfare 
and relatively ignoring the long-term benefits to consumers from higher 
efficiencies. 
 
 The other welfare model is based on the concept of total 
welfare. This looks at the gains to society as a whole, irrespective of 
whether the gains are to producers or to consumers and whether there 
is a transfer of wealth from consumers to producers. Efficiencies 
therefore are desirable, even if the gains from them are not directly 
passed on to consumers. This approach values the long-term consumer 
welfare by accepting that higher levels of efficiency today, even if they 
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directly increase producer welfare, would benefit consumers in the long 
run, possibly with a lag in time. This approach further acknowledges that 
a higher level of producer surplus may be necessary for investment in 
innovation, which in turn would lead to dynamic efficiency and would 
benefit consumers in the long run.  
 
6. Consumer interest in the application of competition law 
 
 According to the theory of competition, consumer welfare is 
enhanced in competitive markets. Consumer interest also figures 
frequently as one of the important goals of competition law. However, in 
the practical implementation of competition law, consumer interest is 
generally a ‘concealed aspect’ of competition law, being indirectly 
served by its application, but not always figuring explicitly or up-front in 
the analysis of competition law cases. Explicit reference to the 
consumer is relatively rare and participation of consumers in decision 
making in competition law is rarer still26. Nevertheless, consumer 
interest remains integral to the theory of competition law, and its 
presence does surface in different forms in the application of the law. 
 
Box –2  
Anti-cartel enforcement 
 
 In India, the cement industry, which had been under price and 
distribution control for many years, was de-controlled in early 1989. 
Some time thereafter there were allegations that the industry was 
manipulating prices and indulging in cartelization and that this was being 
done through the involvement of the trade association, the Cement 
Manufacturers Association of India. An enquiry was initiated by the 
Monopolistic and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission (MRTPC) 
under the Monopoly and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969. 
 
 The MRTPC found direct as well as indirect evidence of 
concerted price fixing and noted the existence of a common platform in 
the form of the Cement Manufacturers Association of India; the 
                                                 
26
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Association had a role in determining prices during the control regime 
and the same apparatus continued after the de-control. The 
Commission concluded that all the respondents, except three, were 
indulging in restrictive trade practices and acting in concert. The 
Commission issued a “cease-and-desist order” and directed the 
respondents not to indulge in any arrangement directly or indirectly 
through the instrumentality of the Association, or otherwise, in fixing 
prices. 
 
 The Commission’s order was pronounced in December 2007 at 
a time when the cement prices had been ruling at high levels causing 
dissatisfaction amongst consumers and others; hence, the order was 
generally welcomed. However, there was also dissatisfaction over the 
fact that the order was passed almost 17 years after the proceedings 
were initiated thereby greatly diluting its remedial effect for consumers. 
 
 The MRTP Act suffered from the weakness that it did not give 
the MRTPC the power to impose penalties and thereby lacked 
effectiveness. On the other hand, the new Competition Act, 2002 
contains more effective provisions, particularly against cartels. It 
provides for a high penalty up to 10 per cent of the turnover or three 
times the profit for each year of the cartel activity. It also has a leniency 
provision providing for lenient treatment to a party to a cartel that 
discloses the cartel activity, provides full, true and vital evidence and 
cooperates with the Commission in the proceedings against the cartel. 
The Competition Commission is also vested with sufficient powers of 
investigation and collection of evidence. It is expected that the 
Competition Act 2002, will thereby provide a more effective framework 
for action against cartels. 
 
 
Perhaps the protection of the consumer is most pointedly present in 
provisions against abuse of dominance. For example, the Indian 
Competition Act, 2002, in Section 4 thereof, states that there shall be an 
abuse of dominant position if an enterprise or a group: 
“ (b) limits or restricts  
(i) …… 
(ii) technical or scientific development relating to goods or  
 services to the prejudice of consumers;”. 
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Further, in the definition of dominant position itself, consumer 
interest figures prominently; it is defined as a: 
 “position of strength, enjoyed by an enterprise, in the relevant 
market, in India, which enables it to:- 
(i) --- 
(ii) affect its competitors or consumers or the relevant market in its  
 favour.”. 
 
In the factors for the determination of dominant position in 
Section 19(4) of the Act, amongst other factors, the following, which 
make specific reference to the consumer, have been included: 
“(f) dependence of consumers on the enterprise; 
(h) entry barriers including barriers such as regulatory barriers,  
 financial risk, high capital cost of entry, marketing entry  
 barriers, technical barriers, economies of scale, high cost of  
 substitutable goods or service for consumers.”. 
 
In Sections 19(6) and 19(7) of the Act, the relevant geographic 
market and the relevant product market are each to be determined on 
the basis of a number of factors. “Consumer preferences” specifically 
features amongst the factors for determining both the relevant 
geographic market and the relevant product market. 
 
Similar references to the consumer are to be found in the 
definition of abuse of dominant position in Article 82 of the EC Treaty as 
well as in the definition of dominance itself. Article 82 which prohibits 
abuse of dominant position states that “such abuse may, in particular, 
consist in: (b) limiting production, markets or technical development to 
the prejudice of consumers”. Howells notes that: “Indirectly, Article 82 is 
a consumer policy instrument in its capacity to suppress inefficient 
practices such as high prices which are not adequately controlled by the 
market in the absence of effective competition”27. He further notes that 
Article 82 contains one of the Treaty’s rare explicit references to the 
consumer and the prohibition contained therein has been judicially 
described as motivated by “the concern not to cause harm to 
consumers”28. 
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For the determination of dominant position, the test laid down by 
the European Court of Justice in United Brands v Commission29 has 
served as the standard ever since and it makes a specific reference to 
consumers: 
 
“65 The dominant position thus referred to by Article [82] relates 
to a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking 
which enables it to prevent effective competition being 
maintained on the relevant market by affording it the power to 
behave to an appreciable extent independently of its 
competitors, customers and ultimately of its consumers”. 
 
Determination of the relevant market is one of the essential 
steps in the investigation of a case. In determining the relevant market 
an important analytical tool often used by competition authorities is the 
SSNIP test. Howells30 notes that this test is based on inspection of 
consumer behaviour. If a non-transitory increase in price, say by 5 to 10 
per cent, does not lead to the switching of a substantial number of 
consumers to a second product, then the second product is not part of 
the same market as the first product. For example, in 1998 Football 
World Cup31 the Commission applied this test and found that consumers 
of tickets for the Finals of the Football World Cup did not treat that 
product as interchangeable with tickets for other football or sports 
events or other forms of entertainment. The World Cup tickets therefore 
constitute a separate market, and the organizers enjoyed a dominant 
position, even a monopoly, in this market. The determination of the 
relevant market is primarily an exercise on the demand side to 
determine whether for the consumer a particular product is substitutable 
by another product or not, in economics referred to as elasticity of 
demand.  
 
A dominant firm carries a “special responsibility” not to abuse its 
market power to set unfair prices or act to segregate the market. 
Howells notes that a most strikingly interventionist feature of Article 82 is 
that “it may be applied in order to require a reluctant dominant firm to 
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respond to consumer demand”. For example in RTE, BBC, ITP three 
television companies printed separate guides to future programmes, 
using copyrights which they held over their own listings to prevent the 
appearance of a single, integrated publication32. A consumer was thus 
forced to buy three separate guides. The firms were obliged by the 
courts to make their listings available to third parties, subject to payment 
of a reasonable fee. The protection of the consumer interest is explicit in 
this decision, which imposes consumer choice on unwilling firms. The 
courts observed that the companies had abused the economic power 
they enjoyed under their copyright by unjustifiably preventing the 
appearance of a new product for which there was potential consumer 
demand. The same principle has been reiterated by the European Court 
of Justice in the Magill case33 and recently reconfirmed in the IMS 
Health case34 by stating that a new product must not be denied to 
consumers because of the refusal to license by the dominant enterprise. 
 
Many competition laws include consumers among the entities 
that can file complaints against an anti-competitive practice or a merger. 
The UK law in fact has the concept of ‘super complaints’ that can be 
brought by recognized consumer associations. Good examples of 
consumer complaints resulting in major decisions are the Kawasaki35 
case and the BEUC v Commission case36. In Kawasaki, a complaint by 
a frustrated consumer led to a finding that an arrangement that 
prevented export of motorcycles to Belgium from Britain, where the 
prices were relatively low, violated Article 8137. In BEUC, the Court of 
First Instance annulled the Commission’s decision rejecting the 
complaint of BEUC, a consumer representative organization, as being 
inadequately reasoned, thus demonstrating that the consumer complaint 
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should have been taken seriously38. A consumer group may also be 
permitted to intervene in proceedings before the court. In Fordwerke AG 
and Ford of Europe Inc v Commission39, BEUC had complained to the 
Commission about Ford’s practices which involved suppression of 
imports into the UK, and the court upheld the right of BEUC to intervene 
in support of the Commission’s case.  
 
Competition laws in most jurisdictions permit claims for 
compensation or damages and there are cases where large amounts 
have been allowed by the courts or authorities as compensation to 
consumers. In the Indian law (Section 53N), a claim for compensation 
by the injured party may be filed before the Competition Appellate 
Tribunal, based on the finding by the Commission or by the Appellate 
Tribunal itself in an appeal case, and the Appellate Tribunal may pass 
an order for the recovery of compensation from any enterprise for any 
loss or damage shown to have been suffered as a result of any 
contravention of the Act having been committed by the enterprise.  
 
In the United States, private action for enforcement of the 
antitrust law is common and in fact constitutes the vast majority of the 
cases in the courts. Many of these cases of private action constitute 
consumer-driven complaints. Over 90 per cent of all competition cases 
in the United States remain private treble damage actions that can be 
brought under either state or federal law or combined into a single case 
in federal court40. (The US has the principle of treble damages whereby 
compensation can be claimed up to three times the cost of the injury 
caused.) 
 
7. Growth of consumer protection law  
 
In sum, it would be seen above that competition law has the 
indirect effect of protecting consumer interest, even where there is no 
explicit reference to consumer protection. However, a direct and explicit 
reference to the consumer interest occurs in specific provisions of the 
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competition law, and is also reflected in several orders passed by the 
courts or the competition authorities. But competition law is neither 
designed to, nor can it, protect all aspects of consumer interest. The 
main thrust of the competition law is to protect and maintain the process 
of competition in markets so as to make markets work better and 
thereby result in the benefits of higher efficiencies, innovation and 
increase in consumer welfare. Competition law has a broader role and is 
part of the institutional framework for the management of the economy. 
It is therefore part of the economic reforms process in many economies 
that are liberalizing and migrating to market-based economies. 
Competition law may be designed to serve various objectives apart from 
protecting and maintaining the process of competition. These could be 
gains in economic efficiencies (productive efficiency, allocative 
efficiency and dynamic efficiency), preventing a high level of 
concentration of economic power and its consequent abuse for 
economic or even for political purposes, maintaining the freedom of 
trade or occupation and protection of small and medium enterprises. In 
the EU, an important aim is to protect the common market. In the midst 
of these various objectives, consumer interest features as one of the 
elements, albeit an important one, and therefore it would be unrealistic 
to expect that competition law can protect consumer interest in its 
entirety.  
 
There are certain aspects of consumer interest where 
competition law cannot reach at all. These are, for example, aspects 
relating to safety (for instance in electrical gadgets and toys), health (for 
instance, in the case of drugs and food items), environment (for 
instance, air pollution and pollution of drinking water sources), and 
privacy (which can be breached, for instance, through leakage of credit 
or other data). For the protection of consumer interest in these areas 
specialized laws have been enacted in various countries.  
 
In India, for example, consumer protection laws comprise a 
wide spectrum with specific dimensions and parameters, ranging from 
the country’s constitution to the general or specific consumer-centric 
laws41. In the constitution, there are many provisions that have a direct 
bearing on the consumer interest particularly in the provisions contained 
in the ‘Directive Principles of State Policy’. The state is required, inter 
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alia, to direct its policy towards securing that the ownership and the 
control of the material resources of the community are so distributed as 
best to subserve the common good, and the operation of the economic 
system should not result in the concentration of wealth and means of 
production to the common detriment. The state is also obligated to 
secure for all workers, work, a living usage, and conditions of work 
ensuring a decent standard of life in the same way as the ILO is 
promoting the interests of workers as consumers. Regarding public 
health, the State is required to take steps to raise the level of nutrition 
and the standard of living to improve public health and to prohibit the 
consumption of intoxicating drugs or drugs that are injurious to health. 
As part of the fundamental rights, the constitution guarantees freedom 
of profession, trade or business, thereby ensuring that a citizen cannot 
be restrained from carrying on a business except by a law imposing a 
reasonable restriction in the interest of the general public. For example, 
restrictions can be placed on a harmful trade or a dangerous trade. 
 
Specific enactments in India dealing with consumer protection 
include, for example: the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954; 
Essential Commodities Act, 1955; Prevention of Blackmarketing Act, 
1980; the Standards of Weights and Measures Act, 1976; the Standards 
of Weights and Measures (Enforcement) Act, 1985; the Bureau of Indian 
Standards Act, 1986; the Sugar (Regulation of Production) Act, 1961; 
the Infant Milk Substitutes, Feeding Bottles and Infant Food (Regulation, 
Supply and Distribution) Act, 1992; Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940; the 
Drugs and Magic Remedies (Objectionable Advertisement) Act, 1954; 
the Indian Medicine Central Council Act, 1970; Indian Telegraph Act, 
1858; the Jute Packaging Material (Compulsory Use in Packing 
Commodities) Act, 1987; Sale of Goods Act, 1930; the Competition Act, 
2002; the Electricity Act, 2003, and the Consumer Protection Act, 
198642. 
 
Worldwide, as societies progressed and markets grew, so too 
did the growth of unfair trade practices by producers or suppliers. On 
the other hand, the economic position of consumers was weak in 
comparison with that of producers and suppliers. The consumers had to 
seek redressal under the common law including the law of torts. But the 
process of redressal was long and tedious, as well as expensive, and 
the unequal resources available to the consumer vis-à-vis the producers 
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or suppliers ensured that the balance of advantage continued to lie with 
the latter. 
 
According to Cseres43, “market failures were manifold. Freedom 
of contract resulted in a weak or inexistent bargaining position for 
consumers, freedom of competition made price fixing, restrictions of 
competition and misleading trade practices possible and equality of 
rights and duties meant that there was no place for special consumer 
rights or any form of positive discrimination. The asymmetrical and 
unilateral structure of communication, namely the knowledge and 
information advantage held by the producer disadvantaged or even 
damaged consumers. Further, the lack of safety, barriers to access to 
justice and representation called for some kind of interference to help 
consumers. The measures which tried to correct and remedy these 
market failures form an important part of the active consumer protection 
rules.”. 
 
This weakness in the position of the consumer and the need to 
protect consumer interest has, in most countries, given rise to not only 
the specific laws for protection of health, safety, and environment and 
other similar specific regulations but also to the evolution of generic 
consumer protection law. Cseres44, further states “The aim of the 
interventionist measures was to re-establish consumers’ market power 
through granting them an equal bargaining power and through 
safeguarding their sovereignty. The welfare state took over certain 
duties of economic development in order to create greater economic 
security and guarantee certain social rights for every citizen. The 
welfare state modified the classical principles of freedom of contract, 
freedom of competition and fault liability as these allegedly treated 
consumers unfairly. It was contended that the state could adjust the 
effects of externalities, provide the market with information and contest 
monopolies. The state was seen as being able to distribute welfare in a 
just way and to guarantee allocative efficiency. State intervention was 
justified by its task to correct and remedy market failures. Consumer law 
was actually brought into being because of the presence of market 
failures. The state was believed to be able to prevent loss or damage 
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caused by market failures and to provide remedies. This was realized 
through granting consumers certain basic rights”.  
 
In consumer law, the focus is on the consumer and on 
protecting consumer interest. Consumer law consists, first of all, of 
mandatory rules that guarantee that parties will not depart from the 
legislative rules to the detriment of the consumer. It further comprises an 
obligation to disclose information as information plays a significant role 
in consumers’ lives. Only well-informed market parties can exercise their 
buying power and activate competition. Consumer law measures 
address the safety and quality controls of consumer goods and services, 
and consumer’ ability and willingness to exercise choice. Generic 
consumer law is aimed at the improvement of existing substantive law, 
such as liability, standard form contracts, competition or advertising45.  
 
The manner in which the generic consumer protection law 
protects consumer interest depends very much on the perception of the 
consumer’s position as an economic actor. There are broadly two 
approaches to consumer protection: the paternalistic approach and the 
liberal approach. Cseres explains46 that the paternalistic approach 
regards the market as being non-transparent through product 
differentiation and multiplicity of package and distribution methods and 
that the competitive market is unable to transport the necessary 
information to the consumers. Furthermore, consumers are believed to 
decide in an irrational way and are uninformed because of non-
transparency on the market. This approach relies heavily on state 
intervention in order to realize its policy goals: disclosure and provision 
of information in understandable ways, regulation of the substance of 
transactions, statutorily mandated contract terms or standard form 
consumer transactions in order to strengthen the market to adjust the 
environment of consumers.  
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An OECD paper47 points out that recent advances in 
“behavioural economics” have argued that even when markets are 
reasonably competitive and search and information costs are not 
especially high, the consumer is not always able to make a rational 
choice suggesting that increased competition to the extent to which it 
leads to a proliferation of choices available to consumers, could yield 
only small, or in some instances even negative, welfare gains48. 
“Behavioural economics” argues for an even more “paternalist” 
approach in respect of consumer protection policy. The OECD paper, 
however, argues against this approach and in favour of primary reliance 
on competitive markets as the means of empowering consumers, further 
stating that a more interventionist approach to consumer policy could 
involve substantial costs including the costs of regulatory errors that are 
inevitable under a paternalistic approach. Thus, competition and market 
forces may be important ways of addressing concerns about the efficacy 
with which consumers make complex choices, because firms in 
competitive markets have incentives to offer consumers “solutions” that 
allow potential gains from trade to be more fully realized.  
 
The other approach to consumer protection law is the liberal 
approach. This approach is less interventionist and has greater faith in 
the disciplining effects of competitive markets and the ability of the 
consumers to take rational decisions. Furthermore, it believes that 
competition law itself is able to rectify market failures and it strengthens 
the position of the consumer. Competition law, coupled with providing 
greater information to consumers and consumer education and 
counselling, could ensure that those goods and services most wanted 
by consumers would be provided to them at affordable prices. The 
liberal model sees less need for direct intervention by the state on 
behalf of the consumers, and therefore finds a patronizing approach 
unnecessary.  
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8. The interface between competition law and consumer 
protection 
8.1. Synergies 
 
As a general proposition, competition law and consumer law are 
complementary and even mutually reinforcing, though their perspectives 
may differ and they may apply different tools to correct market failures. 
Competition law functions primarily at the interface between firms – in a 
sense on a horizontal plane – preventing structural or behavioural 
patterns that would damage competition, and it tries to restore effective 
competition in the market. On the other hand, consumer law generally 
functions at the interface between the enterprises and consumers – in a 
sense on a vertical plane – trying to address the unequal relationship 
between the two and ensure that conditions prevail in this relationship 
that will enable consumer choice to be effectively exercised. Cseres49 
observes that  
 
“Although the two legal disciplines focus on different 
market failures and offer different solutions and apply different 
techniques to correct market failures they are both aimed at 
keeping the market competitive and try to bring market 
performance close to the model of perfect competition…… 
These are actually two different approaches to achieve the 
same goal: a competitive market where consumer sovereignty 
is safeguarded and welfare is maximized. Competition law and 
consumer protection are thus mutually reinforcing disciplines.”. 
 
Competition in the market brings for firms the risk of losing 
customers to rival firms. There is therefore pressure on them to provide 
the best ‘value for money’ to the consumer in the products or services 
offered by the firms. A satisfied consumer will bring repeat business and 
will reduce the marketing costs. Thus, effective competition, when 
present in the markets, will compel firms to address consumer problems 
and find market solutions to the same. The OECD paper50 cites several 
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examples to support this argument. It refers to the case of “confusopoly” 
– apparently deliberate attempts by firms to offer consumers choices 
that are confusing, for example by offering prices that are difficult to 
compare. But other firms may compete by cutting through the maze and 
offering price packages that are simple and easy to understand. The 
telecommunications and airlines industries are examples where 
“confusopoly” abound. In the telecommunications industry, firms have 
been announcing pricing plans that are both difficult to understand and 
to compare with each other. In the airlines industry, firms offer low fares, 
but these may be bounded by restrictions on days of use or minimum 
stay restrictions. But recent trends demonstrate the incentive for 
competing firms to announce simpler, easier to understand price 
packages. 
 
According to the OECD paper51 “This reduces the burden that 
would otherwise fall on consumer policy in terms of enforcing product 
and service standards, as firms will have incentives of their own to meet 
and exceed customer expectations. In that sense, ensuring that a 
market is effectively competitive can help one of the central concerns of 
consumer policy”. It further states that firms that operate in effectively 
competitive markets, and hence can hope to attract the customer away 
from rivals, will have incentives to reduce those customers’ switching 
costs, both by informing them of the gains from shifting and by helping 
them to bear the one-off costs that shifting involves. The result of firms 
investing in reducing the switching costs incurred by each other’s 
customers can be both to make competition more vigorous and to 
diminish the need for consumer policy interventions aimed at reducing 
switching costs. 
 
Just as competition law can benefit consumers and can reduce 
the need for direct consumer policy interventions, consumer policy can 
also strengthen competition in markets. Policies that ensure that 
advertising and product descriptions are honest and informative, that 
contract terms and the obligations they involve are understandable and 
not disproportionate, and that consumers can reasonably expect 
products to be safe and fit-for-purpose, will both make consumer choice 
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a more effective discipline (thus directly strengthening competition) and 
will force firms to compete on their merits (rather than on the basis of 
fraudulent or misleading claims or of unfair contract terms)52. Equally, 
product standards, by facilitating comparisons between products, 
increasing the ease with which products from one supplier can be 
replaced by products from another, and concentrating competition on 
performance rather than on features that are inessential to it, can 
directly improve both consumer choice and the competitive process.  
 
In short, each of these two policy instruments can be used to 
advance the goals also pursued by the other; competition policy, by 
keeping markets effectively competitive, can reduce the work that needs 
to be done by consumer policy, and consumer policy, by enhancing the 
ability of consumers to exercise choice, can help make markets more 
effectively competitive and force firms to compete on their merits, 
thereby supporting the ends of competition policy. Averett and Lande 
have observed very insightfully that competition law provides consumers 
with a choice of competing products and services and consumer 
protection law allows consumers to exercise that choice free from fraud, 
coercion, deception, or demonstrably false information53. 
 
Since consumer policy protects and strengthens the position of 
the consumer, the consumer has greater confidence in the markets and 
is encouraged to participate therein. Being better informed, the 
consumer will be able to make rational choices amongst the available 
products and services. In this way, consumer protection will facilitate 
greater competition between firms. Cseres makes the interesting 
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observation54 that “Many consumer problems are actually micro-
competition problems. A poorly informed consumer who is not aware of 
alternative choices and who might be subject to the seller’s 
discrimination is in fact subject to monopoly power. Or a consumer 
entering a contract with unfair contract terms is subject to the 
exploitation of market power”55. Deceit by one group of sellers may lead 
consumers to doubt the integrity of an entire industry or to distrust 
markets generally. Therefore, competition is not simply fundamental to 
consumer policy but, as the chairman of the OFT remarked, “much 
consumer policy is competition policy”56. Thus competition and 
consumer policy seem to be truly complementary. 
 
8.2. Tensions 
 
While competition law and consumer protection are 
complementary in many ways, their interface also creates various 
challenges due to the tensions that arise between the two disciplines. 
The above analysis demonstrated that in the implementation of 
competition law certain trade-offs are involved and this may determine 
the extent to which competition law serves consumer interest. If the 
competition agency gives greater weight to total welfare as against 
consumer welfare or if it gives greater weight to productive efficiency as 
against allocative efficiency, to that extent it would provide less 
satisfaction to consumer interest. Similarly, if it gives greater weight to 
dynamic efficiency as against static efficiency, to that extent it would 
provide less satisfaction to short-term consumer interest.  
 
According to Cseres57 “The economic arguments of competition 
may lead to outcomes which are not always acceptable to consumers, 
like high switching costs. More competition might result in the restriction 
of outlets and, therefore, more difficult access for consumers. Lower 
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prices might be realized at the expense of quality or creating information 
problems”. Cseres cites the examples of telecommunications and 
energy markets where deregulation and liberalization have increased 
competition and lowered prices for consumers, but have also led to 
additional costs, for example, the difficulty in coping with the complex 
calculations involved in making product choices. In electricity, while it 
has provided better prices and choices for large users, it has raised 
difficulties for consumers to exercise their choices. 
 
The opening of previously highly regulated markets to 
competition may well raise new issues for consumer protection58, for 
example following the liberalization and introduction of greater 
competition in financial markets, utility markets and professional 
services. In financial markets, this has exposed consumers to new risks 
and difficulties in making complex choices; in utility markets (such as 
electricity and telecommunications) it has created challenges in respect 
of service, quality, management of customer complaints and of 
disconnection for non-payment, as well as consumer choice in the face 
of complex pricing schemes. In professional services, it has raised 
complex issues of balancing competitive pressures (for example, in 
terms of pricing and marketing, including advertising) with consumer 
protection in situations characterized by potentially large information 
asymmetries and substantial error costs. When a market becomes more 
exposed to competition than it was previously, the incentives of market 
participants may change in ways that raise consumer protection 
concerns. For instance, it may attract “fly-by-night” operators whose 
unscrupulous practices undermine consumer confidence in the market 
as a whole or incumbent firms may seek ways of locking customers in 
and taking advantage of them59.  
 
In the case of the professions, such as legal, medical, 
accounting, engineering and health, regulatory restraints are placed on 
these occupations with a view to protect consumers in the face of 
information asymmetries. These services are complex and it is generally 
difficult for an ordinary consumer to assess their quality, more 
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particularly to assess the quality before the service has been delivered. 
For the consumer, the result of making a wrong selection can be serious 
damage in certain cases, for example in selecting a wrong surgeon for a 
brain surgery or selecting a wrong architect or engineer for a complex 
bridge. Thus, regulatory rules are imposed to assure consumers of 
adequate quality of service, such as by prescribing minimum 
qualifications for surgeons who can perform brain surgery or for 
architects and engineers who can provide architectural or engineering 
designs for complex bridges. These regulatory rules substitute the need 
for information gathering and assessing by consumers themselves. 
However, such regulations also reduce competition within the 
professional services. This may be even more true in the case of 
restrictions such as those placed on advertising, restrictions on the 
number of professionals who shall be allowed to qualify each year, 
restrictions on professionals having foreign degrees who will be allowed 
to practise and so on. In some cases, these restrictions may actually 
extend into areas such as price fixing and collective boycott, which are 
patently anti-competitive.  
 
9. Coordination between competition law and consumer 
protection 
 
Considering that the aims of competition law and consumer 
protection law are mutually complementary and reinforcing, but that they 
have different approaches to similar problems and there are clearly 
areas of tension between them, the question arises as to how best to 
maximize the synergies and minimize the tensions.  
 
 An economics-based approach could smooth the interface 
between the two disciplines. Competition law is an economic law, with 
economics providing the theoretical underpinning for the law as well as 
the analytical tools used in the application of the law. Over the last 
several decades, the economics of competition law has expanded 
immensely with enormous research and study enriching the field. On the 
other hand, the role of economics in the field of consumer law has been 
much less obvious. Nevertheless, economic insight would facilitate a 
better analysis of the problems arising from market failures and would 
also provide a better understanding as to which problems can be 
addressed by the market itself and which cannot be so addressed and 
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therefore, require the specific tools provided by consumer protection 
law. This would provide for a more cost-effective approach towards the 
solution of problems and would avoid unnecessary or excessive 
intervention in the market through the medium of the consumer law. The 
OECD paper60 recommends a tightly coordinated combination of the two 
disciplines: consumer policy tools while seeking approaches that 
effectively protect consumers should not unduly or unnecessarily restrict 
competition, and competition policy should be brought to bear to ensure 
that, subject to appropriate consumer protection safeguards being in 
place, competition should be allowed to work where it can, including by 
the elimination of any unjustified restriction on entry and on competitive 
conduct. 
 
 Another issue that arises is about the implications of the 
interface between the two disciplines on the institutional design for their 
implementation. Specifically, a practical question that arises is whether 
the two disciplines are better located in the same institution or in 
separate institutions. There is no uniform pattern in this regard. 
 
 While in most countries, separate agencies handle competition 
law and the generic consumer protection law, in a few countries the 
same institution is responsible for both laws. For example, in the United 
States, the responsibility for enforcement of competition law lies with 
two agencies, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) and the 
United States FTC. While the DOJ enforces only competition law, the 
FTC enforces both competition law and the consumer protection laws 
through Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits 
both unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts and 
practices. Though the FTC was set up in 1914 under the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, the responsibility for consumer protection was added 
subsequently in 1938. The FTC has a Bureau of Competition and a 
separate Bureau of Consumer Protection. Its regional field offices 
originally handled both competition and consumer protection cases but 
over time most regional offices have come to specialize entirely in 
consumer protection matters with competition cases being only a small 
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part of their agenda. Waller has observed that, though the FTC has a 
dual responsibility, it is organized in a way that tends to emphasize the 
separateness of the two fields rather than their common elements61. 
 
 In the UK, the OFT and in Australia the Australian Competition 
and Consumer Commission (ACCC) have responsibility for enforcement 
of both the laws. In India, the MRTPC has responsibility against both 
anti-competitive practices (“restrictive trade practices”) and anti-
consumer practices (“unfair trade practices”) both of which are 
prohibited under the Monopolistic and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 
1969. In fact, although the MRTP Act was enacted in 1969, the 
provisions against unfair trade practices were added only several years 
later in 1984. Since then the unfair trade practices have tended to 
account for the larger number of cases before the Commission, to that 
extent distracting it from restrictive trade practices. However, given the 
seriousness of the issues of consumer protection, India enacted a 
dedicated consumer protection law, the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. 
Under this Act a separate mechanism altogether was set up for 
redressal of consumer disputes. This mechanism consists of District 
Forums in each district of the country, State Commissions in each state 
of the country and a National Commission at the apex level. The 
jurisdiction for hearing consumer disputes has been divided between the 
three levels of redressal agencies according to the value of the goods or 
services and compensation claimed, if any, the bigger cases going to 
the higher-level agencies. The State-level Commissions also hear 
appeals against the orders of the District Forums and the National 
Commission hears the appeals against the orders of the State 
Commissions. Appeals against the orders of the National Commission 
are heard by the Supreme Court. This extensive machinery, having a 
network spread all over the country was found to be necessary in view 
of the large size and population of the country and to provide easy 
access to the redressal forums for individual consumers and consumer 
organizations. The Supreme Court of India has observed that “…the 
regulation is a milestone in the history of socio-economic regulation and 
is directed towards achieving public benefit…”62. In case of competition-
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related cases it is neither necessary nor possible to replicate a 
mechanism of this size and reach. 
 
 
Box –3 
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 in India 
 
 The Supreme Court of India in its judgement under the 
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 described the Act as a milestone. The 
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 is a dedicated consumer protection law 
with a comprehensive mechanism for receiving and deciding consumer 
complaints. This Act does not address competition-related issues. In a 
far-reaching judgement Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta, 
the Supreme Court observed that even government bodies or 
development authorities that develop/allot land and/or construct houses 
for the common man in discharge of their statutory functions render a 
‘service’ and, hence, are subject to the provisions of the Consumer 
Protection Act. Therefore, any defect or deficiency in such services 
would be an unfair trade practice and would amount to denial of service. 
The court observed that a complaint regarding use of sub-standard 
material or delay in the delivery of a house could not be rejected as 
being not maintainable under the Act. The court went on to observe that 
the Commission under the Consumer Protection Act had the power to 
award compensation not only for the loss or damage suffered but also 
for injustice, harassment and distress suffered by the consumer. Where 
the suffering is due to proven mala fide, an oppressive or capricious act 
of a public servant, the Commission is obliged to direct the Department 
concerned to pay the amount of compensation from the public fund 
immediately and later recover the same from the public servant 
responsible for such act. In such cases, the state or its instrumentality is 
duty-bound to later recover the amount of compensation so paid from 
the public servant concerned.  
 
 
 The new Competition Act, 2002 in India provides that the MRTP 
Act, 1969 would be repealed and the MRTPC would be dissolved. It 
would continue for two years to dispose of pending cases but no new 
cases under that Act would be entertained as once the enforcement 
provisions of the Competition Act, 2002 were brought into force, new 
competition-related cases would be entertained only by the Competition 
Commission of India, and new consumer complaints would be heard 
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only by the redressal agencies set up under the Consumer Protection 
Act, 1986, thus effectively separating the two institutional bodies. 
 
 In the EU, the DG Competition is responsible for the application 
of the competition law and has been a very vigorous and proactive 
competition agency. There has been a perception that consumer 
protection issues have not figured sufficiently in actual practice in the 
enforcement of the EC competition law. Some observers have felt that it 
seemed as if consumer protection is still the little sister and competition 
law the big brother in the overall EC policy making and while both legal 
areas have their own DGs within the Commission, there seems be little 
cooperation and discussion between the two63. To handle better the 
integration of the two disciplines, in December 2003 the Commission 
announced the appointment to a new post called the Consumer Liaison 
Officer designed to raise the profile of the consumer interest in the 
administration of the competition law. The Consumer Liaison Officer has 
the task of liaising between the DG Competition and consumer 
organizations at the national and EC levels as well as between the DG 
Competition and other DGs in the Commission64.  
 
 There are both pros and cons of integrating the two disciplines 
into one authority. The obvious advantage of the integration is that the 
knowledge of both domains can be jointly brought to bear in dealing with 
a particular case. A broader range of tools would be available to the 
authority and it could select the application of that particular tool that is 
the least costly and most effective. Thus, if in a particular case the 
economics-based approach indicates that the issue can be resolved by 
the markets themselves, no intervention may be necessary. If the issue 
can be addressed through the remedies provided by the competition law 
then a remedy can be found under that discipline. But if the issue is 
such that it could be remedied only through the application of the 
consumer law then the agency could do so.  
 
As a general rule, competition policy, other than by prohibiting 
anti-competitive conduct, has relatively little scope to make markets 
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more structurally competitive than they would otherwise be; moreover, 
policies that seek to “de-concentrate” oligopolistic markets, either 
through forced divestments or by subsidizing or otherwise assisting 
entry, are often contentious and seem likely to impose costs that are 
considerably greater than the benefits. In that sense, competition 
authorities may have few means to alter the supply side of markets so 
as to make rivalry a more effective discipline. However, in those cases, 
action on the demand side of the market may provide an effective 
alternative: for example, if better consumer information, or reduced 
switching costs, make the demand each firm faces more elastic, that will 
usually create incentives for each firm to price more aggressively for any 
given market structure65. Thus, by making available a broader range of 
remedies to the integrated authority responsible for both laws, this 
institutional arrangement will enable a more cost-effective choice of 
remedy. 
 
According to the OECD paper66, there may also be benefits of 
integration in terms of public support and public accountability. By 
linking the authority’s competition policy activities to its consumer 
protection agenda and extending the linkages between its competition 
policy decisions and the promotion of consumer interest, the authority 
can enhance public acceptance of competition policy. This may be 
especially important in countries where competition law is a recent 
development and its importance, role and substance have not yet been 
fully understood. In respect of accountability, it notes that competition 
policy is economy-wide in its reach and the individual actions and 
decisions of the competition authority are of broad interest to the 
business, legal and academic communities, as they are seen as 
precedents that may extend beyond the firms and industries directly at 
issue. Hence, the decisions of the competition authority are subject to 
greater outside scrutiny. On the other hand, consumer law is seen as 
more industry specific and involves decisions that individually have low 
stakes in absolute, economy-wide terms. This results in lower public 
interest and less monitoring of consumer law authorities. The absence 
of close monitoring could lead to regulatory failure, with the agency 
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being captured either by the ideology of consumer protection  without a 
proper appreciation of the costs regulation can impose  or by the 
regulated firms or entities, which have an interest in using consumer 
protection to create barriers to the entry and expansion of new players. 
These risks are likely to be less if the consumer protection authority 
were integrated with the competition law authority which is subject to 
greater scrutiny.  
 
Equally, there are also negative aspects to the integration of the 
two disciplines into one authority. The two disciplines rely on different 
sets of instruments in the pursuit of their work and the contexts in which 
the instruments are applied also differ. Competition law is steeped in 
economics whereas consumer law could be more ideology driven. The 
casework of competition law would generally consist of a smaller 
number of cases, but with each case being large in absolute terms. On 
the other hand consumer law casework would generally consist of a 
large number of smaller cases. Geographical reach may be of critical 
importance for consumer protection agencies with a view to providing 
early access to complainants but in the case of competition law a 
multiplicity of benches or offices of the competition authority could give 
rise to the problem of inconsistencies in the orders placed or 
approaches adopted in similar cases; considering the economy-wide 
reach of competition law cases, such inconsistencies could lead to 
considerable uncertainties in the eyes of enterprises. In this respect, 
therefore, there is a mismatch between the nature of the work involved 
in the two disciplines and this may not be conducive to their integration 
into a single agency. On balance, there appears to be little overall 
advantage in integrating the two agencies, particularly in countries large 
in terms of size or population. 
 
The OECD paper67 notes that while there are both upsides and 
downsides in integrating the two agencies, in practical terms what is 
most important is that the competition authority should have in-house 
access to the skills involved in the formulation of consumer policy and 
that it should have the ability to watch and intervene in the consumer 
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policy developments that have material competition implications, and 
within the government there should be an entity that has a 
comprehensive oversight of consumer protection.  
 
10. Conclusions 
 
 Competition in the markets brings various benefits by enhancing 
efficiencies, incentivizing innovation and increasing consumer welfare. 
The consumer also benefits through wider choice, better products and 
services and more competitive prices. Competition law through 
promotion and preservation of competition in markets thereby enhances 
consumer welfare. This is, therefore, one of the aims and justifications 
for competition law. Accordingly, consumer interest may feature 
explicitly as one of the goals of competition law, examples of which may 
be seen in the laws of various jurisdictions. However, the extent to 
which competition law can serve consumer interest depends upon the 
efficiency and the welfare standards pursued in its application, and there 
are certain trade-offs that cannot be avoided. 
 
 In the application of the competition law, consumer interest is 
generally a concealed aspect and it may not figure explicitly in the 
analysis of individual competition law cases. But its presence does 
surface in different forms in the application of the law.  
 
 However, competition law is neither designed to, nor can it, 
protect all aspects of consumer interest. Competition law has a broader 
remit and it is part of the institutional framework for the management of 
the economy. Consumer interest features as just one of the elements in 
competition law, albeit an important one. Therefore, it would be 
unrealistic to expect that competition law can protect consumer interest 
in its entirety. Certain aspects of consumer interest cannot be reached 
at all by competition law such as safety, health, environment and 
privacy; there are, therefore, specialized laws in various countries for 
the protection of these aspects of consumer interest. In addition, to 
protect consumers against unfair trade practices by producers or 
suppliers, generic consumer protection laws have come into existence 
in various countries. 
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 Generic competition law may be based on one of two 
approaches: (i) the paternalistic approach that considers the consumer 
as a relatively helpless entity requiring an interventionist approach from 
the state for protecting his interest; or (ii) the liberal approach which is 
less interventionist and has greater faith in the ability of well-informed 
consumers to protect their own interest. The competition law and the 
generic consumer protection law, each serves consumer interest but in 
different ways and through different instruments. Generally, the two laws 
are complementary and even mutually reinforcing. Competition law 
creates a pro-consumer environment and provides consumers with a 
choice of competing products and services, while consumer protection 
law enables the consumers to exercise that choice effectively free from 
inhibiting factors such as fraud, coercion, deception or false information. 
 
 Competition, when present in the markets, will compel firms to 
address consumer problems and find market solutions to the same. 
Thus, if competition policy is allowed to fully operate, firms would be 
under pressure to find market-based solutions to consumer problems 
and to that extent intervention through the instrument of consumer 
policy would be less necessary. On the other hand, consumer policy, by 
protecting and strengthening the position of the consumers and better 
informing them, enables them to make rational choices and thus 
strengthen competition in markets. 
 
 On the other hand, there are tensions in the interface between 
the two laws. Competition can sometimes lead to outcomes that are not 
always acceptable to consumers such as high switching costs, trade-
offs between price and quality and difficulties in coping with complex 
calculations in making choices. These tensions are more particularly 
visible in recently liberalized areas such as the utilities and the 
professions. 
 
 By adopting an economics-based approach, the interface 
between the two disciplines can be better smoothed out. Economic 
insight would provide a better understanding as to which consumer 
problems can be addressed by the markets themselves and which 
problems require specific tools provided by the consumer protection law.  
 
 In respect of the institutional machineries for the implementation of the 
two laws, there are both advantages and disadvantages in integrating 
them into a single institution. Both kinds of systems seem to exist in 
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different countries; however, more countries appear to have separate 
institutional machineries. Whatever be the institutional design, a more 
tightly coordinated approach in the application of the two laws would be 
beneficial. Competition law authorities should remain alert to 
developments in consumer protection policies that impact competition, 
and as part of their competition advocacy role should suggest changes 
that will have minimal adverse impact on competition. On the other 
hand, consumer protection authorities need to have a better 
appreciation of how competition itself can resolve many consumer 
problems, thereby reducing the burden on competition policy to make 
direct interventions on behalf of the consumer, which can sometimes be 
quite costly. 
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COMPETITION POLICY AND CONSUMER POLICY: 
COMPLEMENTARITIES AND CONFLICTS IN THE 
PROMOTION OF CONSUMER WELFARE 
 
Pradeep S. Mehta68, Siddhartha Mitra69 and Cornelius Dube70 
1. Introduction 
 
The adverse impact of anti-competitive practices on consumer 
welfare is widely acknowledged. Thus, more and more countries are 
adopting competition laws and policies aimed at controlling such 
adverse impact. Consumer policies and laws are also being adopted in 
many developing countries, with consumer movements becoming 
increasingly more visible, advocating for the protection of consumers 
against anti-competitive practices and other sources of harm. The 
ultimate objective behind having both a competition policy and a 
consumer policy is maximization of consumer welfare in the face of anti-
competitive practices in both developed and developing countries. 
However, competition policy also has the additional objective of 
providing a level playing field for all producers. 
 
Given that both competition policy and consumer protection 
policies share a common ultimate objective of promotion of consumer 
welfare, are the two policies perfectly complementary? The question is a 
complex one as competition policy simultaneously addresses the needs 
of both producers and consumers. It results in marginal cost pricing 
which implies that producers are not wiped out through predatory pricing 
and consumers are not hurt through collusive price setting. Consumer 
policies on the other hand may also not be quite as effective in assisting 
the competitive process, particularly if the emphasis is to get the lowest 
possible prices for the consumer. Given the imperfect complementarities 
between the two types of policies, the interface between competition 
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and consumer protection policies is explored from a developing country 
perspective. It analyses areas of potential conflict and 
complementarities between the two, discusses methods for 
measurement of costs to the consumers from anti-competitive practices 
and the impact of competition policies on such costs.  
Section 2 presents a brief discussion on the basics of 
competition law and policy, while an overview of consumer policy is 
provided in Section 3. The interface between the two policies is 
discussed in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the conflicts between the 
attainment of competitive markets and consumer interests. Costs of 
anti-competitive practices, possible methods that can be used to 
quantify the damage to consumers and the estimation of benefits 
conferred by competition laws are discussed in Section 6. Section 7 
looks at the efforts by consumers in developing countries to further their 
interests. Concluding remarks and observations are reserved for 
Section 8. 
2. Overview of competition policy and law 
 
Competition policy can be briefly defined as those government 
measures that directly affect the behaviour of enterprises and the 
structure of industry. Competition policy basically covers two elements. 
The first involves putting in place a set of policies that promotes 
competition in local and national markets, such as a relaxed industrial 
policy, a liberalized trade policy, easy exit and entry conditions, reduced 
controls, curbing unnecessary government interventions and greater 
reliance on market forces. The second, known as competition law, is the 
more critical component and comprises legislations, judicial decisions 
and regulations specifically aimed at preventing anti-competitive 
business practices, and the concentration and abuse of market power. It 
generally focuses on three measures: control of mergers and 
acquisitions, control of restrictive business practices and control of 
unfair trade practices. All of these measures result in benefits to the 
consumer. 
 
The ultimate objective of competition policy has generally been 
identified as the promotion of efficiency and maximization of welfare, 
defined as the sum of consumer and producer surpluses. 
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2.1. Merger control 
 
Firms may use mergers and acquisition as a means of engaging 
in anti-competitive practices, especially if the merger results in firms 
acquiring market power. Competition law is aimed at establishing 
whether a merger or acquisition results in a substantial reduction in 
competition in the market. Mergers that have such an outcome are 
normally prohibited, or approved subject to conditions that ensure 
minimization of damage if there are some benefits to the public 
generated by such mergers.  
2.2. Restrictive business practices 
 
Restrictive Business Practices (RBPs) are of two types: anti-
competitive agreements and abuses of dominance. Anti-competitive 
agreements can be further classified into horizontal agreements and 
vertical agreements; similarly abuse of dominance practices can be 
classified into exploitative abuses and exclusionary abuses. Conduct 
under RBPs is sometimes subjected to a cost-benefit analysis before 
being prohibited; in other cases proof of occurrence is enough for 
ensuring illegality. 
 
Horizontal agreements or cartels have traditionally been 
considered the most damaging of all anti-competitive practices and 
therefore are most susceptible to punitive action. Cartels are 
arrangements among firms that produce and sell the same product for 
the purpose of exacting and sharing monopolistic rents. Most 
commonly, they accomplish this by agreeing on a relatively high 
benchmark price for their product that none of the member firms are 
permitted to underbid (i.e. price-fixing cartels), by dividing the market by 
geographic territory or customer segments and granting each other 
monopoly power in separate localities/segments (i.e. market-allocating 
or customer-sharing cartels), agreeing to restrict output (output-
restriction cartels) or by conniving on tendering bids (bid rigging), etc. 
 
Vertical agreements, which also come under competitive 
scrutiny, are usually contractual arrangements between suppliers 
(manufacturers) and distributors (retailers), which extend beyond simple 
arms-length pricing. They are usually motivated by the desire for vertical 
control within a principal–agent relationship, where the principal (the 
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manufacturer) imposes contractual obligations on its agent (the retailer) 
when delegating responsibility for selling its goods71. This includes 
resale price maintenance (where a manufacturer and its distributors 
agree that the latter will sell products of the former at certain prices at or 
above/below a price floor/ceiling) and exclusive dealing (where a retailer 
or wholesaler is ‘tied’ to purchasing from a supplier). 
  
The term ‘abuse of dominance’ refers to anti-competitive 
business practices that a dominant firm may engage in to maintain or 
increase its market power. “Exploitative conduct” under abuse of 
dominance covers certain practices in which the dominant firm uses its 
market power to exploit other market participants without directly 
affecting the structure of the market, i.e. through price discrimination, 
and by paying low prices to suppliers. “Exclusionary conduct” is aimed 
directly at preserving or exacerbating anti-competitive aspects of the 
structure of the market, i.e. the firm creates or maintains monopoly 
power by refusing to deal with a competitor, through predatory pricing, 
or by engineering an increase in the costs faced by rivals. Both 
exploitative and exclusionary conducts are regarded as anti-competitive 
practices and are regulated by competition law. 
2.3. Unfair trade practices (UTPs) 
 
UTPs are practices that directly disadvantage the consumer 
such as misleading claims and advertising, conditional selling, 
excessive pricing, discriminatory pricing and other misrepresentations. 
These are per se illegal under most competition laws, and only proof of 
occurrence is required to justify punitive action. However, many 
countries with consumer laws do not have competition laws dealing with 
UTPs. The competition law of many countries, such as the USA, 
Australia, Canada, Zambia, Tanzania and Korea covers UTPs. In India, 
these have existed under both the consumer law and the competition 
law. However, under a new competition law which came into effect in 
2007, UTP provisions have been deleted, and are dealt with forthwith 
under the consumer law. 
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3. Basic tenets of consumer policies 
 
Consumer policy refers to actions taken by the government to 
provide and ensure the attainment of consumer rights. This may be in 
the form of a comprehensive consumer law, or various sector-specific 
rules and regulations that govern the conduct and standards of firms so 
that consumers are protected. It takes into account consumer concerns, 
ranging from product quality and safety issues, weights and measures, 
availability of choices in the market to fair prices of products. Consumer 
protection policy aims to provide for protection to consumers from 
defective, dangerous or inferior goods, fraudulent and other unfair 
selling practices and to ensure quality and safety, fair pricing and 
advertising, availability of credit, etc. 
Consumer policies for all countries are generally constructed in 
terms of the 1985 United Nations Guidelines for Consumer Protection 
(as expanded in 1999)72. The Guidelines call upon governments to 
develop, strengthen and maintain a strong consumer policy and provide 
for enhanced protection of consumers around eight themes, namely:  
 
(i) physical safety;  
(ii) promotion and protection of consumers’ economic interests;  
(iii) standards for the safety and quality of consumer goods and 
services; 
(iv) distribution facilities for essential goods and services;  
(v) measures enabling consumers to obtain redress;  
(vi) education and information programmes;  
(vii) promotion of sustainable consumption; and  
(viii) specific areas concerning health.  
 
Salient features under the themes include the following issues 
that form the basis upon which consumer interest can be maximized: 
 
(i) Appropriate policies should ensure that goods produced by 
manufacturers are safe for intended use, with distributors 
ensuring their proper handling and storage. Consumers 
should also be informed about the proper use of goods and 
the risks involved in their use, with the government adopting 
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policies through which manufacturers recall defective and 
hazardous products for replacement or modification, as well 
as provide for adequate compensation to the consumer.  
(ii) Government policies should seek to enable consumers to 
obtain optimum benefit from their economic resources by 
resulting in adherence to satisfactory production and 
performance standards and the use of adequate distribution 
methods, fair business practices, informative marketing and 
effective protection against practices that adversely affect 
consumer welfare and freedom of choice in the market place.  
(iii) Governments should encourage and ensure the availability of 
facilities to test and certify the safety, quality and performance 
of essential consumer goods and services. 
(iv) Governments should consider adopting specific policies to 
ensure the distribution of essential goods and services where 
this distribution is endangered, as could be the case in rural 
areas. Such policies could include assistance for the creation 
of adequate storage and retail facilities in rural centres, 
incentives for consumer self-help and better control of the 
conditions under which essential goods and services are 
provided in rural areas; 
(v) Governments should undertake legal and/or administrative 
measures to enable consumers to obtain redress through 
formal or informal procedures that are expeditious, fair, 
inexpensive and accessible. Enterprises should be 
encouraged to resolve consumer disputes in a fair, 
expeditious and informal manner and to make information on 
redress and other dispute-resolving procedures available to 
consumers. 
(vi) Governments should develop or encourage the development 
of general consumer education and information programmes, 
including information on the environmental impact of 
consumer choices and behaviour and the possible benefits 
and costs of changes in consumption. In this exercise the 
government should take into account the cultural traditions of 
the people concerned. The aim of such programmes should 
be to enable consumers to be capable of making an informed 
choice of goods and services, and become conscious of their 
rights and responsibilities. 
(vii) Governments, in partnership with business and relevant 
organizations of civil society, should develop and implement 
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strategies that promote sustainable consumption through a 
mix of policies that could include regulations, economic and 
social instruments, sectoral policies with regard to land use, 
transport, energy and housing, information programmes to 
raise awareness of the impact of consumption patterns, 
removal of subsidies that promote unsustainable patterns of 
consumption and production, and promotion of sector-specific 
environmental management best practices. 
 
The Guidelines have implicitly recognized eight consumer rights 
that were made explicit in the Consumers International’s Consumer 
Charter for Global Business: 
 
(i) right to basic needs;  
(ii) right to safety;  
(iii) right to choice;  
(iv) right to redress;  
(v) right to information;  
(vi) right to consumer education;  
(vii) right to representation; and 
(viii) right to a healthy environment. 
 
These eight rights by and large cover the framework of what a 
consumer needs for optimal protection and satisfaction, but in relation to 
a market where the consumer has buying power and is an economic 
participant. In countries, poor ones particularly, where the consumer 
does not have purchasing power, opportunities to be able to acquire 
goods must be made available. This has been covered somewhat in the 
right to basic needs, but the manner in which this right is defined under 
the above charter is more in terms of access, rather than ability. Quite 
often access too can be thwarted by anti-competitive practices or policy 
distortions. Therefore the Consumer Unity and Trust Society (CUTS) 
has added the Right to Opportunities as the ninth right.  
 
On another one, CUTS has also added the Right to Boycott as 
the tenth right as an explicit declaration of something that is recognized 
implicitly under the right to choice, but is not proactive in putting meat on 
sinews of what a consumer needs. The consumer does practice the 
right to boycott in situations when legal redress is not forthcoming or the 
opposing party does not accede easily (see Section 6.1 below). In many 
reported cases of anti-competitive practices, boycott by customers has 
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often been used successfully, when redress was either not forthcoming 
or was protracted.  
4. Interface between competition and consumer laws 
 
The interface between competition and consumer policies can 
best be understood by looking at how competition policy, in addition to 
ensuring a level playing field for all participants, can also help achieve 
consumer objectives and how consumer policies can assist in achieving 
competitive markets.  
4.1. How does competition law protect the consumer?  
 
As discussed in Section 2, competition law basically covers 
control of mergers and acquisitions, control of restrictive business 
practices and control of unfair trade practices, all of which can lead to an 
adverse impact on the consumer through higher prices or suboptimal 
quality. However, it is only the control of UTPs (misleading advertising, 
conditional selling, excessive pricing, discriminatory pricing, etc) that 
has a direct impact on consumer welfare whereas the impact of 
restrictions on other practices is more indirect. Thus, often actions by 
competition authorities on UTPs get better publicity and public buy-in. 
 
Although following an indirect route, merger control and taking 
action on restrictive practices also aim at serving the interest of the 
consumer by ensuring competitive markets. Merger control is 
undertaken to ensure that firms do not attempt to use mergers to 
enhance concentration in the industry and gain market power, which 
could result in them being able to get away with practices that oppose 
the interest of the consumer, such as excessive pricing, restricting 
availability of products in the market and poor quality. 
 
By controlling restrictive business practices, competition law 
ensures that firms in dominant positions do not engage in practices 
aimed at consolidating their market positions by eliminating competition 
through conduct that is incidentally also contrary to the interest of the 
public, such as the maintenance of reasonable prices and consumer 
freedom. Thus competition law is generally designed to promote the 
welfare of the consumer, albeit indirectly through the generation of 
competition in markets. 
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Competition law can also help consumers to attain most of their 
basic rights. With the aim of ensuring fair competition, competition law 
ensures lower prices than those obtained under unregulated conduct. 
This implies that competition can make basic needs more accessible to 
the poor73. Moreover, it also ensures the right to choice. In pure and 
simple terms, the right to choose means there should be a range of 
varieties available to consumers, which is precisely what competition 
law aims at through the removal of behavioural and structural barriers to 
entry.  
4.2. Can a consumer policy ensure competitive markets? 
 
Just as an effective competition policy can be used as a tool to 
ensure the existence of competitive markets, an effective consumer 
policy can also assist in both the creation and maintenance of the 
competitive process. An effective consumer policy for any country is not 
only one that has a comprehensive consumer law enacted in terms of 
the UN Guidelines and Consumer International’s Consumer Charter for 
Global Business, but one that also has sector-specific consumer laws 
and standards structured to suit the social, economic and political milieu 
in that particular country. Such an effective consumer policy will assist in 
the competition process in several ways, and these include the 
following.  
 
First, by ensuring that measures are put in place that facilitate 
consumer safety in the use, distribution and handling of goods, ensure 
replacement and compensation to the consumer in the case of defective 
products and facilitate provision of information to the consumer about 
product availability, consumer policies in many cases not only facilitate 
the attainment of competitive prices but also competitive quality. 
 
Second, by advocating for an extensive consumer awareness 
programme with regard to their rights as well as best buying practices, 
consumer policies ensure that all consumers make informed purchases. 
With consumers making such informed decisions, firms would have to 
ensure that their products have the necessary attributes to attract 
consumers. One way of doing this is through price competition, where 
each firm tries to work on the lowest possible profit margins to gain an 
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advantage over rivals. This is a major characteristic of a competitive 
market, which consumer policy can help to attain.  
 
Third, an effective consumer policy that aims for the 
achievement of the right to access essential goods and services 
(adequate food, clothing, shelter, health care, education, public utilities, 
water and sanitation) and the right to choose (to be able to select from a 
range of products and services, offered at competitive prices with an 
assurance of satisfactory quality) should also provide means through 
which consumers can seek these rights. This implies that the policy 
should inter alia try to ensure a contestable market, where there are 
more producers of a given class of products so that product variety is 
enhanced. This also leads to an increase in market supply and 
stimulates competitive prices.  
 
Fourth, by instituting a process that tries to prevent anti-
consumer practices by manufacturers, distributors and others and 
empowers consumer organizations to self-monitor adverse practices 
(such as false or misleading claims in marketing as well as other 
abusive business practices) consumer policy gives rise to the 
generation of information that facilitates the implementation of 
competition policy. 
 
Thus, we can conclude that consumer policy is in many ways 
complementary to competition policy: in trying to protect consumers 
equally from producers’ malpractices it ensures a level playing field for 
all producers. Similarly, competition policy in trying to ensure a level 
playing field for producers has to ensure that no producer attains an 
advantage through anti-consumer practices.  
4.3 What are the sources of conflict between the two 
policies? 
 
However, even though the two policies may be complementary, 
there may also be areas where these may be in conflict. Although cases 
of conflicts between competition authorities and institutions that oversee 
the implementation of consumer protection may be few, it is not too 
difficult to understand in theory the sources of potential conflict between 
the two policies. As has already been pointed out, competition policy 
aims at ensuring that both producer and consumer surpluses are 
maximized, while consumer protection policy generally focuses on 
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consumers. Competition policy is concerned with the supply-side 
structure of markets and the behaviour of firms, while consumer policy 
focuses on a well-informed understanding of what’s happening on the 
demand side (Sylvan, 2006). Producer surplus in isolation can be 
maximized through the minimization of consumer surplus, while the 
reverse is equally true for the maximization of consumer surplus. Thus, 
competition laws have to be flexible to allow for a balance between the 
two objectives, which can work at variance with the expectations of 
consumers.  
 
The other source of conflict stems from the fact that competition 
also caters for a market that is not normally a focus under consumer 
laws – the market for intermediate goods. In addition to considering the 
market for final goods, competition law also deals with intermediate 
markets that have little direct relationship to the final consumer. In such 
markets, the customer is often a firm or retailer who has to further add 
value to the product before it is made available to the consumer. Testing 
competition law objectives against consumer welfare as a deciding 
factor for the benefit of the law may not be appropriate in this case.  
 
The third area of conflict is when competition interest is weighed 
against public interest, i.e. when competition law adjudication needs to 
take into consideration social objectives such as the environment, 
employment, small industries, etc., when arriving at a conclusive 
position. For example, small and medium enterprises get preferential 
treatment under various competition laws, which is mainly to give them 
an advantage over larger enterprises and pure application of the 
competition law may not be undertaken. Employment gains and losses 
may also override efficiency considerations (consumer/economic 
interest) in adjudicating a case on a merger, as under the South African 
competition law. Affirmative action, i.e. preferential treatment to 
historically disadvantaged persons, under the South African competition 
law may also override efficiency considerations. 
  
Broadly speaking, while competition policy is more of a 
proactive policy for ensuring efficient production and resulting consumer 
benefits, consumer protection policy puts forward mainly a reactive 
agenda to protect the interests of consumers74. Interventions by 
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consumer protection authorities often result in anti-competitive 
outcomes as compliance may result in significant operation costs 
affecting the viability of firms. This is particularly true for interventions on 
prices; although based on the noble realization that allowing market 
forces to determine prices in most developing countries often results in 
monopolistic prices due to the high incidence of market failure. Most 
price control structures unfortunately have a huge bias against 
producers in favour of consumers. Prices are often controlled to levels 
that are below the competitive level, thereby reducing incentives for 
expansions and entrance into the industries. This may be at variance 
with the objectives of competition policy. 
5. Conflicts between competitive markets and consumer 
interest objectives 
 
The discussion in this section deals mainly with the impact of 
naturally competitive markets (those in which there is no intervention by 
the government or any quasi-governmental agency in the free play of 
market forces) on consumer interest. In this context, it is important to 
distinguish between naturally competitive markets and those for which 
we need a competition regime. Competition policy and law provide for 
artificial interventions if impediments to free and fair competition among 
firms prevail in markets. Naturally competitive markets are characterized 
by minimal or non-interference by government or regulatory authorities 
as the interaction of the forces of supply and demand is expected to 
result in an efficient allocation of resources. However, competition law 
and policy can simulate a naturally competitive market (referred to as 
just “competitive market” from here on in this section) provided 
government interference does nothing other than remove the barriers to 
the free play of market forces.  
 
There can be cases where competitive markets do not promote 
consumer interest. Some such prominent cases are those of 
externalities, common property resources and public goods. 
 
 An externality occurs when one party's actions impose 
uncompensated benefits or costs on another party. Environmental 
problems are a classic case of externality. For example, even though a 
manufacturer may operate in a competitive market, the smoke from a 
factory may adversely affect the health of local residents while soiling 
the property in nearby neighbourhoods. If bargaining was costless and 
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all property rights were well defined, people would eliminate externalities 
through bargaining without the need for government regulation. From 
this perspective, externalities arise from high transactions costs and/or 
poorly defined property rights that prevent people from reaching efficient 
outcomes through market transactions75. Thus, competitive markets 
may not necessarily result in promotion of consumer interests. 
 
Second, competitive markets might not result in due care of 
common property resources. Resources that may become congested or 
overused, such as fisheries or the broadcast spectrum, represent 
common property resources that may not be serviced under competitive 
markets despite being critical for the welfare of consumers Thus, 
intervention in the competitive market system for the achievement of 
consumer interest objectives is required.  
 
Third, consider a public good, such as defence, basic scientific 
research or roads, the provision of which to an individual cannot occur 
without providing the same level of benefits free of charge to other 
individuals. For example the use of pavements in cities cannot be 
limited to pedestrians who pay municipal taxes. In competitive markets, 
the amount a private consumer is willing to pay for an extra unit of the 
good is only a fraction of the total benefits derived by society, the latter 
being equal to the sum of individual benefits. If the production of an 
extra unit of the good costs more than an individual’s private willingness 
to pay for it but less than what society benefits from it, no individual will 
be willing to pay a price in the market that covers the cost. Thus, the 
extra unit will not be produced. Therefore, in competitive markets these 
goods are not produced in quantities that are required for the 
maximization of consumer welfare. This implies that there is a limit to 
the extent to which competitive markets may promote the interest of 
consumers. Consequently, consumer interest movements may resist the 
allocation of resources through competitive markets and call for 
government provision of such goods funded by subsidies and other 
means. 
 
Fourth, inadequate or asymmetric information might hinder the 
working of competitive markets to the detriment of consumers. This 
refers to a state in which producers know much more about the 
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characteristics of the product than consumers. Examples are restaurant 
food or used cars. Because information is costly to produce and 
disseminate it is difficult to safeguard consumer interests under such 
conditions in competitive markets, particularly in the case of developing 
countries. Given that it is time consuming or costly for consumers to 
evaluate complex information about products or services (e.g. medical 
therapies) they expect the government to intervene and regulate to 
ensure that minimum quality standards are met. As a result, competitive 
markets are not highly regarded as far as consumer interest issues are 
concerned. 
 
Thus, we have seen that in some cases naturally competitive 
markets or competition policy/law, which stimulates such markets, do 
not result in outcomes consistent with maximization of consumer 
welfare. 
6. Costs of anti-competitive practices to consumers 
6.1. Estimated costs of anti-competitive practices to 
consumers 
 
It is a generally accepted that anti-competitive practices are 
costly to consumers, largely in terms of the increase in prices faced by 
them. The most prevalent of the practices is conduct relating to collusion 
among competitors (often referred to as 'hard-core' cartels) which 
results in price fixing, output restrictions, market sharing and bid rigging. 
Cartels harm consumers and have pernicious effects on economic 
efficiency. A successful cartel raises prices above the competitive level 
and reduces output. Consumers (which may also include businesses 
and governments) choose either not to pay the higher price for the 
cartelized product, thus foregoing the product, or pay the cartel price 
and thereby unknowingly transfer income to the cartel operators. 
Further, a cartel shelters its members from full exposure to market 
forces, reducing pressures on them to control costs and to innovate. All 
of these effects harm efficiency in a market economy.  
 
Although it is not easy to impute monetary value to the costs, 
there is a general prevalence of anti-competitive practices, particularly in 
developing countries. Most of these practices may continue to prevail 
undetected due to various constraints faced by competition authorities. 
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By drawing on some empirical studies however, various estimates can 
be made regarding the costs of cartels to consumers. Recent research 
has indicated that the harm caused by cartels, particularly international 
cartels amounts to billions of dollars annually76. For example, the 
median cartel overcharge was 17-19 per cent for domestic cartels, and 
30-33 per cent for international cartels. For most types of cartels there 
have been modest downtrends in cartel mark-ups over time. In 
particular, it should be emphasized that since 1990 the average 
overcharges of discovered cartels has fallen to 25 per cent for 
international cartels. However, anti-competitive practices discovered in 
different countries around the world have reaffirmed the significant 
damage caused by them to consumers.  
 
Through a study combining trade data with a sample of US and 
European prosecutions of international cartels in the 1990s, Levenstein 
et al. (2003) quantified the effects of international cartels on developing 
countries. They found that in 1997, developing countries imported 
US$54.7 billion of goods from a subsample of 19 industries with 
previous cartel experience during the 1990s. These imports were 5.2 
per cent of the total imports and 1.2 per cent of the gross domestic 
product (GDP) in developing countries, which in turn implies that the 
damage to consumers through importing cartelized products could be 
significant.  
 
An early study by Eckbo (1976) also proved the profitability of 
cartels at the expense of consumers. Using international data of 51 
cartel agreements in 18 industries, Eckbo found that about the 30 per 
cent of the agreements analysed (19 of the 51 cartel agreements) were 
able to raise the price 200 per cent above the unit cost of production 
and distribution. Another international cartel impact study was done by 
Yu (2003). Using import data based on the Harmonized System (HS), 
Yu calculated overcharges in the vitamins cartel (1990–1999), the citric 
acid cartel (1991–1995), the bromine cartel (1995–1998), the seamless 
steel tubes cartel (1990–1995), the graphite electrodes cartel (1992–
1997), and the lysine cartel (1992–1995). The results indicate that the 
overcharges to developing countries generated through collusion by 
these cartels are large: US$1.71 billion, US$67 million, US$8 million, 
US$1.19 billion, US$975 million and US$43 million, respectively. There 
are many other examples that can be found in the literature to give 
                                                 
76
 Sweeney (2006). 
 58 
estimated costs of cartels for consumers, with the conclusion that 
consumers spread across the globe have lost billions of dollars as a 
result of cartel activities. 
 
Without quantifying the costs, it is also possible to demonstrate 
the costs of cartels for consumers by focusing on their prevalence in the 
domestic economies of many developing countries in Africa, Asia and 
Latin America. The following examples are going to demonstrate not 
only the existence of cartels in developing countries, but also their 
prominence as a source of economic harm to consumers77.  
 
To begin with, concentration of market power in the trade of a 
number of agricultural products and price-fixing agreements often limit 
the income of small farmers in developing countries. Such concentration 
confronts coffee producers in Kenya and Latin America, cotton farmers, 
and tea and tobacco growers in Malawi, fish processors and exporters 
in the Lake Victoria region, and milk processors in Chile. Price fixing in 
the production or the distribution of basic food products is prevalent in 
many developing countries. For example, in Peru poultry firms and their 
associations engaged in what amounted to price fixing by agreeing to 
prevent new entry, exclude some existing competitors, and limit the 
availability of live poultry for sale in order to raise or maintain prices. It 
was also the case in Zambia where the dominant producer of day-old 
chicks (60 per cent market share), Hybrid Poultry Farm (HPF) and 
Galaunia Holdings Limited (GH), the largest buyer in the poultry sector, 
entered into sales and purchase agreements which included provisions 
foreclosing competition on day-old chicks, table birds (broilers) and 
frozen chickens as well as an agreement that GH could not begin to sell 
day-old chicks in competition with HPF.  
 
The milling industry is also frequently cartelized, resulting in 
high prices for basic staples, which consumers can hardly afford to 
boycott. For example, in Peru, Indecopi's (Instituto Nacional de Defensa 
de la Competencia y de la Protección de la Propiedad Intelectual) first 
important cartel case was the 1996 "Bread Case" against wheat flour 
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 Unless otherwise specified, the examples have been extracted from Jenny 
(2006). The report had also extracted the cases from databases dealing with 
African countries, Asian countries and Latin American countries, prepared by 
Fredric Jenny, Simon Evenett and Julian Clark. 
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producers and their association. Eleven producers were found to have 
ended a price war through a price-fixing agreement and the association 
had made recommendations about the price of bread. In Malawi, where 
the industry consists of a few giants (notably Press Bakeries and 
Portuguese Bakeries) and many small baking firms, the Master Bakers 
Association fixed prices, and hence there was no competition until 
consumer organizations started a boycott and the Minister of Trade 
intervened to prohibit price collusion among the bakeries. In Turkey, 
several price-fixing cases among bakers were investigated by the 
General Directorate of Consumer and Competition Protection before 
1997 and since then by the Competition Authority. 
 
The transport sector is also known for cartelized behaviour. 
Examples include Kenya, where in November 2003 two members of the 
Matatu Owners Association (MOA) gave an insight into the operations of 
the cartel. According to them, "the cartel comprises a group of city 
matatu owners who want monopoly over lucrative routes”. Along the 
same lines, a report from South Africa in 2001 indicates that in the Cape 
Town area taxi associations are organized into territories and taxi 
associations have come to "own" the routes they serve. Huge profits are 
being made with passengers left with no choice. In Turkey, the 
competition authorities prosecuted offenders involved in cartel cases 
against bus companies. In India, in only about 2-3 per cent of cases do 
customers directly access truck owners and book their goods for transit. 
The cargo operators cartelize and decide the freight, and there is no 
competition at their level. Instances of cartelized operations of the 
truckers’ unions around major production sites and factories are also 
rampant78. In Nepal, bus syndicates operate as cartels and ironically the 
Government created a provision in the Transportation Act for 
syndicates79. In the air transport sector, the Brazilian competition 
watchdog, CADE (Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Economica), 
ruled that carriers Varig, TAM, Vasp and the now-defunct Transbrasil 
had formed an illegal cartel in the mid-1990s covering the Sao Paulo–
Rio de Janeiro market, the country's busiest sector. 
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 Jain, Sunil (2005) in chapter on “Competition Issues in Transportation 
Sectors” in Towards a functional competition policy for India, CUTS and 
Academic Foundation, Mehta, P.S. (Ed.). 
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 Adhikari, Ratnakar and Dhrubesh Regmi (2001) in “Anticompetitive Practices 
in Nepal”, CUTS and SAWTEE referred to in the Chapter on Nepal by Navin 
Dahal (2006) in Competition Regimes in the World – A Civil Society Report, 
CUTS and INCSOC, Mehta, Pradeep S. (Ed.). 
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The oil sector is also not spared from cartelization. In Zambia, in 
1999, nine oil-marketing companies were prosecuted for participating in 
a price-fixing conspiracy involving the supply of refined petroleum 
products. The companies had acted collectively in making price 
adjustments since 1997, after holding regular meetings where 
exchanges of information regarding sales volumes and prices took 
place. The cartel leaders also forced other companies to comply with 
standard behaviour on prices. In Malawi, when the government 
eliminated price controls on petroleum products, all or most of the oil 
companies concerned formed a joint company called Petroleum 
Importers Limited, through which they jointly monopolized the 
importation of all oil products into Malawi, and colluded on prices. When 
a new petroleum importer emerged on the market and introduced new 
fuel prices different from (and lower than) those of the cartel it was 
persuaded to join the cartel.  
 
Finally, the cement industry, which provides a major input into 
low-cost housing, has also witnessed an incidence of cartels in 
developing economies. In Egypt, in December 2002, Al Arham 
newspaper reported that representatives of almost all local cement 
producers had met and set a price range for cement between LE167 
and LE176 per ton. Just hours before the meeting, the price had been 
as low as LE125 per ton. According to the press report, the cement 
manufacturers involved had considered the possibility of entering into a 
market-sharing agreement if the price-fixing agreement did not succeed 
in keeping the prices up. In South Africa, the largest cement companies 
at the time (PPC, Anglo-Alpha and Blue Circle) operated as an officially 
sanctioned cartel until 1996, when the Competition Board forced the 
companies to discontinue the practice. In Turkey, between 1997 and 
2002, the Competition Board announced decisions against anti-
competitive agreements among cement producers, including a 1999 
case in which five cement companies were fined nearly 900 billion 
Turkish Lira (TRL) (US$603,000) for a price-fixing and market-division 
agreement in the Aegean region.  
 
The above examples demonstrate that consumers indeed 
continue to be subjected to an extra cost in terms of cartel activities, 
particularly price-fixing agreements in critical sectors of the economy. 
The estimated costs for end consumers in such instances will amount to 
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a very significant portion of their budget, given the multiplier effect on 
the production and value chains 
6.2. Methods of measuring costs of cartelization 
 
Although the damage caused by cartels may be indisputable, 
the procedure for measurement of costs inflicted by them on consumers 
may be a source of debate. Moreover, the measures may tend to 
underestimate the damage, as there are undiscovered cases. Most of 
the methodologies used to determine the impact of cartels use cases 
that have been discovered, and the discovery rate is highly dependent 
on the competencies of regulatory authorities, as well as on the 
competition laws being used. The most common method used is the 
one that tries to provide an estimate of the value of the damage caused 
by a cartel by determining the overcharge that resulted from it.  
 
Overcharge is an economic term that refers to the difference 
between an observed market price and a price that would have been 
observed in the absence of collusion. The latter is often called a "but-for 
price" or a competitive "benchmark price". Overcharge is therefore the 
difference between the price charged by cartel members and the prices 
that they could have charged “if the cartel was not present”. Given that 
the price that should have been paid is not observable, it has to be 
estimated. Estimating total overcharge involves using this estimated 
price to calculate total damages caused by the cartel. This can be done 
by using the following approaches: 
 
6.2.1. Direct proof of damages 
 
In some cases, direct proof of damages may be available. This 
could, for example, include evidence of side-payments or scorecards in 
bid-rigging cases where cartel members make side-payments or keep 
records of obligations to each other. However, this type of evidence may 
potentially understate damages incurred by customers of the cartel. This 
is because cartel behaviour often increases costs that are avoidable 
(and competed away) in the absence of coordination. 
 
Another method of calculating overcharge is to simply observe 
the price decreases that result in the market of a cartelized product 
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following a price-fixing cartel’s demise on being discovered by the 
regulatory authorities. This reveals the price increases that can be 
attributed to the cartel by simply subtracting the new price after the 
demise from the price before detection of the cartel. Estimation of the 
total damage caused by international cartels in developing countries 
involves determination of the total value of exports of the cartel to 
developing countries. The total overcharge can be calculated by 
following the approach used by Yu (2003): 
 
Total Overcharge = 
eCartelpric
eActualpriceCartelpric
*Imports −   
 
where Cartelprice is the actual price paid with the cartel being present, 
Actualprice is the estimated price that should have been obtained in the 
absence of a cartel, and Imports refer to the total value of imports from 
the cartelized industry. 
 
The same formula can also be used to calculate the overcharge 
from the domestic cartels but one would need to substitute local sales or 
turnover by the cartel for imports in the formula. This would give us an 
estimate of damage to consumers. 
 
Consider the following demonstration of Yu’s procedure. Let us 
consider a country where a cartel has existed since 1990. While 
calculating the overcharge for 1994 it is necessary to adjust for the 
secular trend in competitive prices while defining the Actualprice in 
1994. Let us assume that the price in 1990 before a cartel came into 
existence was $100 and the price in 1994, after a cartel arrived, is $140. 
The overcharge per unit should not be calculated as 140–100= $40. 
This would be an overestimate of overcharge per unit (for rising price) 
because, even in the absence of cartel formation, prices would have 
increased at their long-run rate. Thus, if we find that the long-run secular 
trend for the product price is an increase of four per cent per annum 
then for the four-year period from 1990 to 1994 we can conclude that 
prices would have risen by 17 per cent in the absence of the cartel to 
$117. Thus, the per unit overcharge is $23 instead of $40 as we had 
calculated earlier. Let us assume that the value of the imports of the 
developing country from the cartelized industry is $1,000,000. In this 
case we have 
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Total Overcharge=
=
140
23
*000,000,1
$ 164,000 
 
 
Direct proof of damages can also be used in a different context 
in determining the damages from bid-rigging cartels. What is required 
here is to identify two similar contracts that are made from a cartelized 
bid and a non-cartelized bid, and then make a cost/price analysis of the 
two bids. The bids must be similar enough to allow for comparison. The 
difference in the bids would constitute the damage to the consumers. 
The method can also be extended to other types of cartel behaviour and 
anti-competitive practices. 
6.2.2. Statistical evaluation of damages 
 
Two approaches can also be used under this method. The first 
involves taking the price as an independent variable and regressing it 
using ordinary least squares and a dummy variable, which indicates the 
presence of a cartel. Thus, if we have time series data for a country we 
can run the econometric model  
ttt uDtP +++= λβαln
 (1) 
where the variable “t” denotes the time period and tD  equals 1 for any 
year in which a cartel exists and 0 for others. The coefficient β  gives 
the long-run secular rate of change of prices without the effect of cartels 
and 
λe
 denotes the “overcharge per unit”. These two coefficients can 
be estimated by the ordinary least squares method. If we have a panel 
data set (multiple countries and multiple time periods) then we can use 
a fixed effects model which can be presented as follows: 
ititiit uDtP +++= λβαln
 (2) 
where the notation is the same as that before except that the subscript i 
is used to depict data pertaining to country i. By permitting a different 
intercept for each country we are allowing for the fact that the starting 
competitive price (i.e. price at t=0) is different for each country. Such 
panel regressions enable the use of data across countries. This results 
in an increase in the number of observations used. Such an increase in 
the data used greatly enhances the reliability of regression results.  
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In both cases the researcher needs to check for the statistical 
significance and positive sign of λ  in order to establish that cartels do 
give a significant upward push to prices. It is only then that the 
magnitude of 
λe
 can be considered to be a measure of the “overcharge 
per unit”. Of course, it must be kept in mind that the reliability of any 
statistical method is conditional on the use of a sufficient number of 
observations. In this case we require at least 20 observations on prices. 
 
Instead of looking at the secular trends of prices the alternative 
would be to do a joint estimation of the demand and supply functions 
using data from time periods in which competition had existed. From the 
demand and supply functions reduced form equations providing price 
and quantity demanded in terms of independent variables (such as input 
prices, income) can be calculated. In any year in which there is a cartel 
the corresponding competitive price can be calculated by substituting 
that year’s value for input price and income. The rest of the method is 
the same as that explained previously  
 
The more direct method of calculating loss in consumer welfare 
due to cartelization comes from the measurement of consumer surplus 
which is defined as the maximum that consumers are willing to pay for 
the marketed quantity of a product less the amount they actually pay. 
Cartelization leads to an increase in the price and a reduction in quantity 
– there is not only an increase in the price but also a reduction in 
quantity transacted which is a positive determinant of consumer surplus. 
In Figure 1  pˆ  is the competitive price and 
−
p
 is the cartelized price. 
The triangle defined by the horizontal line from point pˆ , the vertical axis 
and the demand curve is the consumer surplus under competition 
whereas the triangle corresponding to
−
p
 is the consumer surplus at the 
cartelized price. The difference between the two is the shaded area 
shown in Figure 1 and is equal to the loss in consumer surplus due to 
cartelization. 
 
How do we estimate this loss in consumer surplus? This is 
easily done by using the estimates of the demand curve mentioned 
earlier and finding the area enclosed by the demand curve (as obtained 
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by substituting the present values of independent variables) between 
the competitive and cartelized price. This area gives a measure of the 
loss in consumer welfare due to anti-competitive practices.  
 
 
Figure 1: Loss in consumer surplus due to the presence of a 
cartel 
 
 
In Equations (1) and (2) we can introduce a dummy variable 
that equals 1 when there is a cartel constrained by a competition law but 
equals 0 otherwise (competition without law and cartel without law) The 
coefficient of the dummy can be used to calculate the reduction in 
overcharge per unit of output caused by the introduction of competition 
laws. The product of the quantity transacted80 and the reduction in 
overcharge per unit gives the decrease in total gains from cartelization 
(at the expense of the consumer) attributable to the competition law. 
When divided by the expenses of the competition commission that 
implements the competition law we get the rate of return on expenses 
incurred to facilitate competition. This procedure was used by Clarke 
and Evenett (2002) for the international vitamin cartel and reveals a 
significant rate of return.  
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Alternatively, the estimated reduction in the overcharge and the 
given cartel price in the presence of competition law can be used to 
predict the cartel price in the absence of competition law. The latter 
price is higher and the difference in the consumer surpluses 
corresponding to the former and latter price should be an estimable 
positive amount that shows the increase in consumer welfare brought 
about by the introduction of a competition law. This amount divided by 
the expenditure of the competition enforcement agency yields the 
consumer surplus saved per unit expenditure on competition facilitation 
and is an indication of how useful competition laws and related 
expenditures are in promoting consumer welfare. 
 
A similar method of cost–benefit analysis (benefits in terms of 
consumer welfare increase weighed against the costs of competition law 
enforcement needed to achieve that increase) can be illustrated by the 
results of an exercise performed by the Korean Fair Trading 
Commission (KFTC) which are shown in Table 1. In 2000, each dollar 
spent on competition law enforcement yielded US$20.57 in terms of 
consumer welfare gains. In 2001, this number increased to 28.64, 
suggesting even better implementation of competition law. The 
researcher needs to be aware that such a rosy picture of the efficiency 
of competition law enforcement might not emerge if we study countries 
that are less developed. Powerful monopolistic business lobbies might 
influence a government to sabotage, slow down or render ineffective the 
implementation of competition laws. This might result in low benefit/cost 
ratios, which symbolize the subordination of economic considerations to 
the interests of monopolistic business and their political allies.  
 
Table 1: Costs and benefits of competition law enforcement 
(millions of US dollars) 
  2000 2001 
Cost Budget 15.9 18.4 
Benefit Consumer 
welfare 
increase 
 327  527 
Benefit/Cost 
Ratio 
 20.57 28.64 
Source: Adapted from Chapter 17 on Korea by Dr Joseph Seon Hur in 
Competition Regimes in the World – A Civil Society Report, CUTS 
and INCSOC. 
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7. Consumer participation in developing countries 
 
The extent to which consumers also have an influence on the 
market outcomes plays a part in determining the extent to which 
companies may successfully engage in anti-competitive practices. 
However, in developing countries, consumers are an unorganized 
group. They usually transact on an individual basis with business 
people, and hence have very little bargaining power. They are also not 
fully aware of their legitimate rights and obligations, as well as the legal 
tools that can be used to promote their interests. The existence of 
various market failures and the common information asymmetries make 
consumers a vulnerable lot. 
  
Given their very weak countervailing power in the market, 
consumers cannot always boycott products that are excessively priced 
as a result of cartels. They cannot lobby for an improvement in the 
quality of products or successfully complain about practices by the 
companies that are harmful to their interest. Most importantly, most 
consumers are not even aware that some of the practices by companies 
are anti-competitive, due to a lack of awareness initiatives. Consumer 
movements are very weak in most developing countries, and the 
consumers generally have to be their own representatives. The end 
result is that companies take advantage, and production and marketing 
decisions are generally one sided, with little regard given to consumer 
reactions.  
 
Some developing countries have gone a step further and 
enacted some consumer laws to ensure consumer participation in the 
market. However, implementation of such laws continues to be a 
problem. Most of the laws define general principles rather than provide 
for any specific measures, and are generally ineffectual. Sub-standard 
and unsafe products have become the order of the day because of 
weak mechanisms and tools for policing market behaviour of firms; fake 
and imitated goods are quite prevalent.  
 
Consumer regulation of the ills of the market system is crucial, 
as it forms a countervailing force against anti-competitive behaviour. 
Consumer associations are normally formed to ensure participation of 
consumers in activities that oppose anti-consumer and anti-competitive 
practices. The initiative for these should start from the government, 
which should put in place conducive policies and measures that can 
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ensure the sustained existence of such associations. It has generally 
been observed that consumer issues cannot be best handled by 
competition authorities alone. A need for a separate consumer body, 
enacted in terms of consumer protection laws to safeguard the interest 
of consumers, therefore, exists. Consumer movements may be present, 
but with no consumer body to attend to grievances, their concerns are 
not normally taken care of.  
 
The existence of competition laws but without complementary 
consumer laws has failed to protect the consumers against harm by 
companies, given that competition laws may not comprehensively cover 
consumer issues. This is typically the case in countries such as Zambia, 
(consumer issues are not adequately covered under the Competition 
and Fair Trading Act, 1994), Zimbabwe (the Competition Act, [Chapter 
14:28] is not comprehensive as far as consumer issues are concerned), 
Tanzania (the Fair Competition Act, 2003 does not provide for the 
adjudication of direct consumer-related issues; these are dealt with by 
the Civil Courts81), Jordan (the Competition Law No. 33, 2004 has 
provisions that try to ensure fairness in the economy, but is very 
inadequate as far as consumer protection is concerned), Kazakhstan 
(the Anti-monopoly Law, 2001 has provisions for the “protection of the 
interest of the consumer”, but the law is hardly sufficient), etc. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
The conclusion that emerges is that competition and consumer 
welfare are symbiotically linked though cases of conflict may persist. 
Competition policies promote efficiency in production, which in turn 
leads to lower prices for consumers. This is consistent with the 
maximization of consumer welfare. On the other hand, consumer laws 
while pursuing the objectives of maintaining prices at the lowest 
possible level might make it cost-ineffective for producers to undertake 
production. This introduces a conflict of objectives.  
 
Also noted is that both market-friendly reforms and market 
failures have become common across developing countries. This 
implies that efforts should be made to ensure the co-existence of the 
two policies, with minimal or no conflicts resulting. In order to do that, 
                                                 
81
 Mehta (2006).  
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the first step should be to ensure that the competition and consumer 
policies are designed to try and meet the expectations of all 
stakeholders rather than being biased towards one particular player, i.e. 
business or consumers. Consumer interests should be explicitly 
recognized in the designing of competition policy, and advocacy should 
be included as a tool for awareness promotion among consumers. At 
the same time, however, the promotion of efficient markets as an 
objective need not be necessarily compromised. 
 
Creation of a competition culture in the economy with the 
simultaneous involvement of consumers in the entire process can 
ensure that the advantages of market-based competition are fully 
realized. This exercise of ensuring participation of all stakeholders in the 
reforms ensures a reconciliation of the perceptions of various players by 
taking into account their different characteristics and expectations. 
However, it may be difficult to coordinate between the government's 
objective of promoting public interest and competition authority's 
objective of promoting efficient markets. The government’s commitment 
to growth as a political objective and the overall political climate matter 
for a competition culture to prevail in the economy. Ensuring that the 
adoption of competition laws gets a political buy-in is therefore crucial, 
and there is a need to properly align competition policy outcomes with 
political incentives for this to succeed. This might not be difficult as 
politicians themselves are involved in the law-making process and have 
vested interests in keeping prices as low as possible in order to win 
cheap popularity and votes. It is through these measures that the 
conflicts between competition and consumer policy highlighted might be 
overcome82.  
 
Anti-competitive conduct such as the formation of cartels or 
exploitative pricing by dominant firms is seen to inflict a huge loss on 
consumers and this makes the enactment of competition laws and their 
implementation a must for protecting consumers. The magnitudes of 
welfare improvements brought about by these laws have been 
measured in the past and found to be extremely significant in many 
cases. The quantitative literature cited supports this point and suggests 
new estimation procedures in this regard which can make the estimation 
more robust. What is of great importance, especially in the case of 
developing countries, is the existing diversity in political will to 
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implement competition laws and have successful competition 
commissions. Such differences in political will can lead to diversity in 
efficiency and welfare outcomes emanating from the same set of 
competition laws. Big businesses in developing countries might also 
exercise their lobbying powers with political groups to paralyse the 
working of competition commissions in some cases, thus contributing to 
diversities. Any econometric cross-country exercise carried out 
exclusively for developing countries that reports a statistically 
insignificant effect of competition laws on consumer welfare should not 
be taken at face value, i.e. it should be interpreted as meaning that 
there are implementation problems, due to poor political will or political 
capture, in most countries.  
 
Finally, gains facilitated by competition laws have to be weighed 
against the costs required to implement them. The literature on cost-
benefit analysis is reviewed for this purpose to suggest a methodology 
that is both theoretically robust and quantitatively feasible. Here again, 
developing country experience might suggest a cost-benefit ratio that is 
higher for developing countries than for developed countries because of 
poor implementation and large leakages from the system. 
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ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES AND THEIR ADVERSE 
EFFECTS ON CONSUMER WELFARE: THE 
ZIMBABWEAN EXPERIENCE 
 
 
Alexander J. Kububa∗ 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The socio-economic impact of the implementation of 
competition policy and law in developing countries has been most 
intense on consumer welfare and protection. This has been because of 
the proven adverse effects of restrictive business practices (RBPs) on 
the general welfare of consumers, which competition policy and law 
aims at preventing or controlling. A recent study undertaken in 
Zimbabwe on the impact of the implementation of competition policy and 
law in that country clearly showed the positive relationship between 
effective competition and consumer welfare. The findings in Zimbabwe 
in this regard are representative of the impact of competition policy and 
law in most other developing countries. 
 
That there is a symbiotic relationship between the effective 
implementation of competition policy and law and consumer welfare and 
protection is no longer in doubt from the many empirical studies on the 
subject that have been undertaken by various competition 
experts/practitioners worldwide. From the studies undertaken, it is now a 
generally accepted fact that the ultimate objective of competition policy 
and law is consumer welfare. It has also been found that competition 
and consumer welfare are mutually enhancing. Consumer satisfaction 
that arises and flows from the protection and benefits of competition 
leads to increased public appreciation and acceptance of the 
implementation of competition policies and laws, which in turn facilitates 
the creation of a healthy culture of competition in society. 
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What might still need further study, particularly in developing 
countries, is the extent in quantitative terms of the adverse effects on 
national economies, in general, and on consumers, in particular, of the 
lack of effective competition regimes.  
 
The term ‘consumer’ can be defined in both its narrow and 
broad sense. In its narrow sense, the term has been defined as to 
“include any person: (a) who purchases goods other than for the 
purpose of resale but does not include a person who purchases any 
goods for the purpose of using them in the production and manufacture 
of any goods or articles for sale; and (b) to whom a service is 
rendered”83. Similar definitions of the term are found in the competition 
legislations of Kenya, Malawi and Zambia. This narrow definition of a 
consumer excludes companies that buy and consume raw materials or 
intermediate products in their production processes. In its broad sense, 
the term has been defined to include both individuals and organizations 
that consume finished goods or raw materials. The Consumer 
Protection Act of Nepal defines the term in the following manner: “(a) 
Consumer means an individual or institution consuming or using any 
consumer good or service. (b) Consumer goods mean goods or 
materials made through the admixture of several goods which are 
consumed or used by consumers; the term includes raw materials, 
colours, flavours or chemicals used in the production of such consumer 
goods”84. The broader definition of the term ‘consumer’ supports the 
notion that the term should refer to all categories of consumers and not 
only to the ultimate user of goods and services. The meaning of 
consumer in this essay will be based on the broader definition of the 
term since the consumption of goods and services used in the 
production of final products ultimately affects the consumer as defined in 
the narrower sense. 
 
                                                 
83
 Definition of ‘consumer’ in terms of Article 1 of the Competition Regulations of 
the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). 
84
 Consumer Protection Act, 1998. 
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According to Rachagan (2003)85, the term ‘consumer welfare’ 
refers to the benefits that are derived by individuals from the 
consumption of goods and services. Rachagan also noted that 
individual consumers are not only concerned with product price, choice 
and quality, but also more critical to them are issues of employment, 
sustained development and equity. Consumer welfare therefore means 
the same as ‘consumer interests’. In this essay therefore, consumer 
welfare includes everything that the consumer desires for his/her well-
being.  
 
This study aims at analysing anti-competitive practices and their 
adverse effects on consumer welfare. Following this introductory 
section, competition and its socio-economic effects are briefly analysed, 
and then RBPs are explained. Then, the interface between competition 
and consumer laws and policies is discussed before exploring the main 
topic of anti-competitive practices and their adverse effects on 
consumer welfare. The practical experience of Zimbabwe in using 
competition policy and law for consumer welfare and protection 
purposes will also be explored in some detail. In conclusion, some 
thoughts are expressed on whether or not there are any conflicts 
between the attainment of competitive markets and consumer interests. 
2. Competition and its socio-economic effects 
 
Competition is the process by which sellers strive to gain the 
patronage of buyers in achieving their primary objectives of increased 
sales, larger market shares and greater profits. Sellers are more likely to 
attract and retain buyers if the quality of their goods or services is higher 
and the prices lower than those of their rivals, or if they are innovative in 
their production processes and marketing techniques.  
 
The theory of competition is however a difficult and complex 
one and has been conceptualized in a number of different ways. It is 
therefore no wonder that the term ‘competition’ is rarely defined in 
competition legislation of either developing or developed countries. 
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According to Fourie and Smit (1999)86, there are a number of 
different uses, definitions and concepts of the term ‘competition’ 
depending on who one is and for what purpose one wants to use the 
definition. The ordinary consumer view of competition is that of rivalry 
between contestants, as in sport. Under this view, there is a winner, and 
someone “gets the bone”. This view is sometimes referred to as the 
intuitive view. The typical business person’s view of competition is 
similar to the intuitive view of rivalry, but with more intense challenges of 
trying to gain an advantage over other competitors. Competition is taken 
as a process whereby firms strive against each other to secure custom 
for their products, i.e. it represents the active rivalry of firms for 
customers: thus the nature of competition is such that enterprises 
compete to outsmart their competitors87. 
 
Economists have developed different schools of thought on 
competition, such as: (i) the structural approach (which defines different 
states of competition in terms of structural conditions, i.e. number of 
firms, conditions of entry, etc.); (ii) the process approach (which views 
competition in terms of behaviour and conduct of the market participants 
without much reference to market structure, i.e. how a firm behaves 
towards its competitors, or responds to new entrants, in order to protect 
its market position); and (iii) the efficiency approach (which refers to 
neither market structure nor behaviour of firms, but only considers the 
outcome or performance in terms of efficiency: competition under this 
approach is seen as any state of affairs that maximizes consumer 
welfare, or any efficient state of affairs regardless of market structure or 
conduct of firms).  
 
While the above schools of thought on competition were 
developed separately and under different conceptual assumptions, a 
hybrid concept based on the schools has emerged. This is the structure-
conduct-performance approach. Under this approach, the hypothesized 
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linkage between the three different concepts of structure, conduct and 
performance is that the structure (i.e. the number of players, ease of 
entry, etc.) of a market explains or determines to a large degree the 
conduct (e.g. pricing policy, advertising, etc.) of the participants in the 
market, and the performance (i.e. efficiency, technological progress) of 
the market is simply an evaluation of the results of the conduct88. The 
structure-conduct-performance relationship has been further developed 
to take into account the reverse effect of conduct on the structure since 
it has been found that conduct can sometimes “feedback” to change 
structure. For example, a firm can reduce its production costs to a point 
where it can profitably price its competitors out of the market. Shepherd 
(1997)89 also noted that a firm that is superior in efficiency or innovation 
so that it obtains high profits will generally increase its market share, 
thus affecting the market structure. A firm can also strategically engage 
in exclusionary practices (e.g. predatory pricing) that drive its weaker 
competitors out of the market. Decisions by firms in direct competition to 
merge also alter market structures. Government policies also can affect 
both market structure and conduct. Conduct in a market can also 
influence government policies. 
 
Figure 1 shows a schematic representation of the structure-conduct-
performance model as discussed above. 
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Figure 1: The structure-conduct-performance model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
Source: Viscusi et al.90. 
 
 
The usefulness of the structure-conduct-performance model is 
that it brings from the abstract the understanding of the functioning of 
real-life markets and firms. While each of the separate concepts of 
structure, conduct and performance is conceptually sound, it fails to 
appreciate how firms operate as corporate entities. As observed by 
Shepherd (1997), “firms are organisations of humans, with much room 
for variety, historical change, and contrasting motives”. 
 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) in its Glossary of Industrial Organisation Economics and 
Competition Law provides a comprehensive definition of competition, 
which is reproduced in Box 1.  
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Box 1: OECD definition of competition 
Competition is a situation in a market in which firms or sellers 
independently strive for the patronage of buyers in order to achieve a 
particular business objective, e.g. profits, sales and/or market share. 
Competition in this context is often equated with rivalry. Competitive 
rivalry between firms can occur when there are two firms or many firms. 
This rivalry may take place in terms of price, quality, service or 
combinations of these and other factors which customers may value. 
 
Competition is viewed as an important process by which firms are 
forced to become efficient and offer a greater choice of products and 
services at lower prices. It gives rise to increased consumer welfare and 
allocative efficiency. It includes the concept of ‘dynamic efficiency’ by 
which firms engage in innovation and foster technological change and 
progress. 
 
Source: OECD Glossary of Industrial Organisation Economics and Competition Law. 
 
 
Vigorous competition between firms is the lifeblood of strong 
and effective markets. Competition helps consumers to get a good deal. 
It encourages firms to innovate by reducing slack, putting downward 
pressure on costs, and providing incentives for the efficient organization 
of production. When working effectively, competition involves a process 
of rivalry between firms that strive to win customers by achieving the 
lowest level of costs and prices, developing new products or services or 
exploiting particular strengths, skills or other advantages to meet 
customer needs more efficiently and effectively than competitors. 
 
Competition thus forces firms to become efficient and to offer a 
greater choice of goods and services at lower prices. In a competitive 
market economy, price signals tend to be free of distortions and create 
incentives for firms to redeploy resources from lower to higher-valued 
uses. The benefits that flow from competition therefore include 
increased economic efficiency, innovation, and consumer welfare. 
Economic efficiency generated by competition includes both ‘productive’ 
efficiency (i.e. producing without waste) and ‘allocative’ efficiency (i.e. 
producing the goods and services that society values most highly).  
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It has however been found that firms have natural inclinations to 
acquire market power, that is to obtain discretionary control over prices 
and other related factors determining business transactions. Such 
market power may be gained by limiting competition through: (i) the 
erection of barriers to commerce; (ii) the conclusion of collusive 
agreements and arrangements to restrict output and increase prices; 
and (iii) engagement in other anti-competitive business practices. This 
imperfect competition is generally viewed as market failure that results 
in inefficient allocation of resources, and adversely affects industry 
performance and economic welfare. Such market failures enable sellers 
to deliberately reduce output and charge higher prices at the expense of 
consumers and society in general, hence the need for regulation in the 
form of competition policy and law. 
 
The term competition policy is used to cover policies adopted by 
governments to address the anti-competitive behaviour of enterprises, 
whether private or public91, and to influence competition in markets. 
Competition policy is therefore a regulatory tool that is employed by 
governments to address market failures caused by engagement of firms 
in RBPs by maintaining or creating a foundation for effective functioning 
of markets. In this connection, the effective implementation of 
competition policy requires appropriate legislation that gives the policy 
legal force and the establishment of regulatory authorities to enforce the 
law and ensure a level playing field for all competing firms in order to 
stimulate efficiency and protect consumers. Competition law, on the 
other hand, and as implied in the foregoing, is a set of rules that firms 
must follow in ensuring that the market does not fail from anti-
competitive practices. The use of competition law reflects a country’s 
wish to harness the power and efficiency of the market mechanism. This 
power can be blunted or lost if firms can avoid competing with each 
other by colluding, or if firms in dominant positions abuse their 
dominance by preventing competition. Competition law is therefore a 
subset of competition policy since it is the legal framework that gives 
effect to that policy. 
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As stated by CUTS International (2000)92, the main objective of 
competition policy is to preserve and promote competition as a tool to 
ensure efficient allocation of resources in an economy. This would result 
in the maximization of real income in an economy. Further, from the 
consumer perspective, it would result in the best possible choice of 
quality, reasonable prices and adequate supplies. The pursuit of these 
objectives would lead to controlling the concentration of economic 
power, encouraging innovation, protecting and promoting social welfare 
and in particular the interests of consumers.  
The World Trade Organization (WTO) summarized some socio-
economic objectives of competition law, as listed in Box 2. 
 
 
Box 2: WTO list of some socio-economic objectives of competition 
law 
 
• Protecting consumers from the undue exercise of market power. 
• Promoting economic efficiency, in both a static and dynamic sense. 
• Promoting trade and integration within an economic union of free 
trade. 
• Facilitating economic liberalization, including privatization, 
deregulation and the reduction of internal trade barriers. 
• Preserving and promoting the sound development of a market 
economy. 
• Promoting democratic values, such as economic pluralism and the 
dispersion of socio-economic power. 
• Ensuring fairness and equity in marketplace transactions. 
• Protecting the ‘public interest’, including considerations relating to 
industrial competitiveness and employment. 
• Minimizing the need for more intrusive forms of regulation or 
political interference in a free market economy. 
• Protecting opportunities for small and medium-sized businesses 
Source: Annual Report of the WTO Secretariat, 1997. 
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Competition laws of most countries deal with enterprise 
behaviour by prohibiting such RBPs as monopolization and anti-
competitive agreements and mergers. 
 
3. Restrictive business practices 
 
Broadly speaking, there are four main types of business 
practices that can have restrictive or anti-competitive effects. These are: 
(i) horizontal restraints; (ii) vertical restraints; (iii) abuse of dominant 
position; and (iv) anti-competitive mergers and acquisitions. 
 
Horizontal restraints are agreements or arrangements between 
competing firms producing identical or similar goods or services to 
restrict competition through price-fixing arrangements, collusive 
tendering and market or customer allocation agreements. Such 
agreements or arrangements are sometimes referred to as ‘hard-core 
cartels’ and are considered to be the most serious of anti-competitive 
practices because of their harmful effects on economies and 
consumers.  
 
Vertical restraints are agreements or concerted practices 
entered into between two or more companies each of which operates, 
for the purposes of the agreement, at a different level of the production 
or distribution chain, and relating to the conditions under which the 
parties may purchase, sell or resell certain goods or services. Such 
restraints include tie-in arrangements (whereby downstream firms are 
required to purchase a certain range of products before being allowed to 
purchase a particular product), exclusive dealing arrangements 
(whereby distributors are assigned exclusivity within a geographic area, 
or over specific products or particular types of customers), and resale 
price maintenance (whereby retail price is fixed by the producer or price 
floors or ceilings are imposed on the distributors). 
 
Dominance and its abuse is a very interesting subject in 
competition policy and law, mainly because this is the area where the 
use of the ‘rule of reason’ approach is most justified. According to 
Viscusi et al. (1998), “the standard dominant firm model assumes that 
there is one big firm and a large number of small price-taking firms, 
typically referred to as the ‘competitive fringe’, (and) because of its 
position, the dominant firm is modelled as selecting a price that the 
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fringe firms take as given in deciding how much to supply”93. A firm is in 
a dominant position in a market when it is in a position to exercise a 
high degree of market control. A person in a dominant position will be 
able to set prices or other market conditions without significant 
constraint from competitors or consumer reaction. He/She will thus be 
able to initiate and maintain an appreciable increase in price, or 
reduction in supply, quality or degree of innovation, without suffering an 
adverse impact on profitability in the short or long term.  
 
Dominance therefore comes with market power. Anderson et al. 
(1999)94 explained the concept of market power as follows: “the concept 
of market power refers to the ability of a firm (or a group of firms acting 
jointly) to profitably maintain prices above competitive levels for a 
significant period of time. The qualifier ‘profitably’ is important – it 
denotes the fact that in order to exercise market power, a firm must be 
in a position to raise prices without losing sales so rapidly that the price 
increase is unprofitable and must be rescinded, as would be the case in 
a competitive market. In addition to higher than competitive prices, the 
exercise of market power can be manifested through reduced quality of 
product or service or a lack of innovation in the relevant market(s)”.  
 
It has however been generally accepted that dominance per se 
is not anti-competitive since firms may legitimately achieve a dominant 
position in the market through, for example, innovation, superior 
production or distribution methods or greater entrepreneurial efforts, i.e. 
conduct that is encouraged under competition. It is its abuse, or the 
exercise of the market power that comes with the dominance, that is 
cause for competition concern. A firm enjoying a dominant position in 
the market may not only exercise its market power by exerting a 
significant influence on the market price or restrain the market output of 
a specific commodity or service, but may also create barriers thus 
restricting entry or the freedom of other enterprises to operate in the 
market. Two broad types of business conduct by dominant firms have 
traditionally been recognized as abusive under competition law. These 
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are: (i) exploitative abuses (in which a firm takes advantage of its market 
power by charging excessively high prices to its customers, 
discriminating among customers, paying low prices to suppliers, or 
through related practices); and (ii) exclusionary abuses (in which a firm 
attempts to suppress competition, for example by refusing to deal with a 
competitor, raising competitors’ costs of entering a market, or charging 
predatory prices)95. Abusive practices also include raising rivals’ costs, 
and various forms of vertical restraints. 
 
The abusive practices of a firm in a dominant position, or 
monopolization, are particularly anti-competitive because the market 
would not offer alternatives for consumers.  
 
Regarding anti-competitive mergers and acquisitions, it has 
been found that most mergers pose little or no serious threat to 
competition, and may actually be pro-competitive. Such benevolent 
mergers have a number of economic advantages such as resultant 
economies of scale, reduction in the cost of production and sale, and 
gains of horizontal integration, all of which can lead to increased 
efficiency and lower prices to the consumer. Other mergers however 
seriously harm competition by increasing the probability of exercise of 
market power96. In this regard, concerns about vertical restraints and 
abuse of dominance come to the fore. Mergers can also sometimes 
produce market structures that are anti-competitive in the sense of 
making it easier for a group of firms to cartelize a market, or enabling 
the merged entity to act more like a monopolist. 
 
All of the three main types of mergers (i.e. horizontal mergers, 
vertical mergers and conglomerate mergers) may have anti-competitive 
elements. Horizontal mergers present the greatest danger to 
competition by the mere fact that they reduce the number of competing 
firms in the relevant market. Such mergers most directly lead to market 
concentration, which could in turn create dominant or monopoly 
situations that reduce or eliminate competition. Some analysts have 
gone as far as viewing horizontal mergers as attempts at legitimizing 
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collusive and cartel-like behaviour between competing firms. Since 
vertical mergers combine firms at different stages in the production and 
distribution process, they may also have harmful effects on competition 
if they give rise to risk of markets becoming foreclosed to third parties. 
Conglomerate mergers present the least danger to competition since in 
the case of pure conglomerates there is no functional link whatsoever 
between the merged firms97. Such mergers can however be potentially 
anti-competitive if they are considered in the context of the additional 
financial strength (or ‘deep pockets’) they give to the parties involved, 
which the parties can use against actual or potential competitors in their 
combined markets through cross-subsidization.  
 
4. Interface between competition and consumer laws and 
policies 
 
It has been demonstrated above that the main goals of 
competition policy and law are, or should be, economic efficiency, a 
check on concentration of economic power, and consumer welfare. In 
most countries that have adopted competition policy and law, therefore, 
the objectives of such policies and laws are aimed in one way or 
another at enhancing the welfare and/or ensuring the protection of the 
consumer through the prevention and control of RBPs.  
 
The common objectives of competition policy and law as 
enshrined in competition legislation of many countries include: (i) 
prohibiting RBPs; (ii) controlling monopolies and concentrations of 
economic power; (iii) regulating mergers and acquisitions; (iv) 
strengthening the efficiency of production and distribution of goods and 
services; (v) ensuring the best possible conditions for the freedom of 
trade; and (vi) encouraging innovation. In protecting the process of 
competition, competition law becomes a very important consumer 
protection law. The primary objective of competition law is to prohibit 
those business practices that unreasonably deprive consumers of the 
benefits of competition, resulting in higher prices for inferior products 
and services. Some competition laws also prohibit unfair trade practices 
that mislead or deceive consumers, and include provisions relating to 
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product safety and product information and unconscionable (or grossly 
unfair) conduct. 
 
A number of countries worldwide have hybrid laws that deal with 
both competition and consumer protection. The country that has the 
most comprehensive law in this regard is probably Australia. Australia’s 
Trade Practices Act 1974 is the country’s competition and consumer 
law. The Act promotes efficient markets and fair-trading practices which 
seek to maximize consumer welfare. Its stated object is “to enhance the 
welfare of Australians through the promotion of competition and fair 
trading and provision for consumer protection”, which thus recognizes 
the Act’s dual role of promoting competition and efficiency together with 
consumer protection. The Act has provisions on ‘restrictive trade 
practices’, which are defined as “contracts, arrangements or 
understandings that restrict dealings or affect competition”98. Such 
practices include price-fixing arrangements (between competitors which 
have the purpose or effect of fixing, controlling or maintaining prices for 
goods and services supplied or acquired by the parties), exclusionary 
provisions (also known as collective boycotts, which are arrangements 
between two or more persons who are competitive with one another 
where the arrangement has the purpose of restricting the supply of 
goods or services to or the acquisition of goods or services from 
particular persons or classes of persons, or the supply of goods or 
services to or the acquisition of goods and services from particular 
persons or classes of persons in particular circumstances or on 
particular conditions), and anti-competitive agreements (or 
arrangements, which have the purpose or effect of substantially 
lessening competition in a market).  
 
The Act also has provisions on the prohibition of 
unconscionable conduct, and a whole section on consumer protection, 
whose object is to protect the consumer by eliminating unfair trade 
practices. Unfair trade practices include misleading or deceptive 
conduct (conduct aimed at misleading or deceiving consumers), 
unconscionable conduct (conduct that can be seen in accordance with 
the ordinary concepts of mankind to be so unfair as to be against 
conscience), false or misleading representations (on the quality, value, 
condition or grade of goods, etc), bait advertising (advertising for supply 
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of goods and services knowing that the firm would not be able to supply 
the goods and services), harassment and coercion (using physical force 
or undue harassment or coercion in connection with the supply or 
possible supply of goods or services, and pyramid selling (e.g. purchase 
of certificates for a particular dollar value, with the newest entrant 
starting at the bottom of the pyramid and obliged to sell the certificates 
to progress up the pyramid). 
 
In the east and southern African region, an increasing number 
of countries are also adopting hybrid laws that deal with both 
competition and consumer protection. The situation in some of these 
countries is shown in Table 1.  
 
 
Table 1: Competition-consumer protection laws in selected east 
and southern African countries 
 
 
Kenya 
 
The objective of the Restrictive Trade Practices, Monopolies and 
Price Control Act, 1988, Chapter 504 is “to encourage 
competition in the economy by prohibiting restrictive trade 
practices, controlling monopolies, concentrations of economic 
power and prices and for connected purposes”. 
 
The Act provides for the appointment of the Monopolies and 
Prices Commissioner for its administration. 
 
The Act has provisions on the control of monopolies and 
concentrations of economic power, including mergers and 
takeovers. Prohibited restrictive trade practices include 
agreements or arrangements: (i) hindering or preventing the sale 
or supply of goods and services; (ii) restricting the terms and 
conditions of sale or supply; (iii) fixing prices; and (iv) limiting or 
restricting the output or supply of goods. It also has provisions 
relating to the control and display of prices. 
 
 
Malawi 
 
The objective of the Competition and Fair Trading Act, 1998, 
(Cap. 48.09) is “to encourage competition in the economy by 
prohibiting anti-competitive trade practices; to establish the 
Competition and Fair Trading Commission; to regulate and 
monitor monopolies and concentrations of economic power; to 
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protect consumer welfare; to strengthen the efficiency of 
production and distribution of goods and services; to secure the 
best possible conditions for the freedom of trade; to facilitate the 
expansion of the base of entrepreneurship ...”. 
 
The Act prohibits “any category of agreements, decisions and 
concerted practices which are likely to result in the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition to an appreciable extent in 
Malawi or in any substantial part of it”. 
 
Abuse of dominance practices prohibited include: (i) predatory 
behaviour towards competitors; (ii) discriminatory pricing and 
discrimination, in terms and conditions, in the supply or purchase 
of goods and services; (iii) making the supply of goods or 
services dependent upon the acceptance of restrictions on the 
distribution or manufacture of competing or other goods; and (iv) 
resale price maintenance. 
 
Trade agreements and arrangements prohibited include: (i) 
colluding in settling uniform prices in order to eliminate 
competition; (ii) collusive tendering and bid rigging; (iii) market or 
customer allocation; (iv) allocation by quota as to sales and 
production; (v) collective action to enforce arrangements; (vi) 
concerted refusals to supply goods or services to potential 
purchasers; and (vii) collective denials of access to an 
arrangement or association which is crucial to competition. 
 
The need to enact consumer protection legislation to work hand 
in hand with Malawi’s competition legislation under the 
administration of the competition authority was recognized early 
in Malawi. Accordingly, a Consumer Protection Bill was drafted in 
2001 to address the specific interests and needs of consumers99. 
The Bill was sponsored and promoted by the Consumer 
Association of Malawi (CAMA), and provided for the 
establishment of a Consumer Protection Council whose 
functions include the identification of price mechanisms and the 
determination of whether the quality and prices of goods and 
services are justifiable. The Council would also carry out, 
promote or participate in consumer education programmes and 
activities and disseminate consumer information to the public. 
The Bill also provided for the establishment of Small Claims 
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Courts. 
 
 
Tanzania 
 
According to a consultants’ report on a competition policy model 
for the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
region100, the Fair Competition Act of Tanzania, 2003, prohibits 
anti-competitive agreements that have the effect of preventing, 
restricting or distorting competition in Tanzania. It is prohibited 
for a business in a dominant position to use its dominance with 
the object or effect of preventing, restricting or distorting 
competition. A merger that creates or strengthens a dominant 
position is prohibited but can be approved if benefits attributable 
to it more than offset any adverse effects. 
 
The Act established the Fair Trade Commission as an 
independent unitary competition authority. It also established the 
National Consumer Advocacy Council to represent the views of 
consumers to the Fair Trade Commission (as well as to 
Government Ministries and other regulatory authorities). 
 
Zambia 
 
The objectives of the Competition and Fair Trading Act, 1994, 
Chapter 417 are “to encourage competition in the economy by 
prohibiting anti-competitive trade practices; to regulate 
monopolies and concentrations of economic power; to protect 
consumer welfare; to strengthen the efficiency of production and 
distribution of goods and services; to secure the best possible 
conditions for the freedom of trade; to expand the base of 
entrepreneurship; and to provide for matters connected with or 
incidental to the foregoing”. The Act is administered by the 
Zambia Competition Commission (ZCC). 
 
The Act has provisions on anti-competitive agreements, abuse of 
dominance and anti-competitive mergers. It also has provisions 
directly aimed at protecting consumers. In this regard, it 
prohibits: (i) withholding or destroying producer or consumer 
goods with the aim of bringing about a price increase; (ii) 
excluding liability for defective goods; (iii) making false and 
misleading representations; and (iv) supplying products that are 
likely to cause injury to health or physical harm to consumers. 
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Zimbabwe The Competition Act, 1996, [Chapter 14:28] has the objective “to 
promote and maintain competition in the economy of Zimbabwe; 
to establish an Industry and Trade Competition Commission and 
to provide for its functions; to provide for the prevention and 
control of restrictive practices, the regulation of mergers, the 
prevention and control of monopoly situations and the prohibition 
of unfair trade practices; and to provide for matters connected 
with or incidental to the foregoing”. 
 
As in most other countries’ competition legislations, anti-
competitive practices prohibited in the Act include restrictive 
horizontal and vertical agreements (price-fixing arrangements, 
market-sharing agreements, bid rigging, resale price 
maintenance, etc.), abuse of dominant position (predatory 
pricing, tied and conditional selling, exclusive dealing, etc.), and 
anti-competitive mergers (covering horizontal, vertical and 
conglomerate mergers). 
 
The Act also has provisions directly aimed at consumer 
protection. These provisions prohibit unfair trade practices such 
as “misleading advertising, false bargains, and distribution of 
commodities or services above advertised price”. 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from indicated sources. 
 
 
At the regional level, countries that belong to the Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)101 have agreed on 
the formulation and adoption of a regional competition policy and law to 
deal with cross-border competition and consumer protection concerns. 
 
The COMESA competition law prohibits as incompatible with 
the Common Market all agreements between undertakings, decisions by 
associations and concerted practices that may affect trade between 
Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition within the Common Market. 
Collusive agreements such as price-fixing, market-sharing and bid 
rigging are prohibited per se. Exploitative and exclusionary abuses of 
dominant firms are also prohibited. Merger control is also 
comprehensively provided for in the law. 
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The regional competition law also deals extensively with 
consumer protection, since it was recognized that competition law and 
consumer protection law are complementary in that they deal with 
different kinds of market failure. A variety of practices that can be 
detrimental to consumers are prohibited. These include “false or 
misleading representation of goods or services, unconscionable conduct 
in consumer and business transactions, and supply of unsafe goods”. 
Product safety and product information is also of primary concern in the 
law. 
 
5. Anti-competitive practices and their adverse effects on 
consumer welfare 
 
It is a proven fact that free and open competition benefits 
consumers by ensuring lower prices and new and better products. 
Competition among enterprises benefits consumers whether it comes in 
the form of price competition or non-price competition. Price competition 
benefits consumers since it involves an attempt to win customers by 
offering them a product at a lower price than the competitors. The 
consumer therefore benefits from the resultant lower prices. Non-price 
competition benefits the consumer since competitors go for sales 
promotion, advertising, quality upgrading, offer after-sales service and 
so forth to increase their share of the market. Again, consumers benefit 
from better quality products and after-sales service.  
 
In addition to generating consumer benefits, competition policy 
and law also directly contributes to consumer protection. In this regard, 
it is noted that consumers are the main losers of anti-competitive 
activities in a market since they are most vulnerable to the abuses of big 
business because of their atomistic nature. Consumers therefore require 
the protection of competition law the most since the adverse effects of 
anti-competitive practices are disproportionately severe for them.  
 
Firms will often be tempted to ensure increased profits by 
restricting the process of competition. When competitors agree to fix 
prices, rig bids or allocate customers, or otherwise operate as 
monopolies, consumers lose the benefits of competition. Consumers 
also lose the advantage of choice of shopping around and freely 
choosing the products and businesses that best meet their needs. The 
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prices that result when competitors agree to collude are in most cases 
artificially high. Such prices do not accurately reflect the cost of 
production and distribution, and therefore distort the allocation of 
society’s resources. The result is a loss not only to individual consumers 
but also to the economy as a whole.  
 
All types and forms of RBPs that are prohibited or controlled by 
competition law have adverse effects on consumer welfare.  
 
Evenett and Jenny (2004)102 assembled a comprehensive 
database of allegations of anti-competitive practices made in Sub-
Saharan African publications, principally in newspapers and other 
periodicals. They located 120 distinct allegations of anti-competitive 
practices in 68 lines of business in 12 African countries103 over a period 
of ten years. The most frequent allegation by a large margin concerned 
cartels, especially outside of South Africa. Allegations against foreign 
firms, some of which were African, ranged between a quarter and two-
fifths of the total number of allegations, suggesting that many domestic 
firms were the subject of allegations as well. There were 12 lines of 
business where allegations were made in more than one Sub-Saharan 
African country. Many of those lines of business directly affected the 
well-being of the poor, those employed in the agricultural sector, and 
small business. 
 
It should however be noted that virtually all the allegations of 
anti-competitive practices in Sub-Saharan Africa that were analysed in 
the Evenett and Jenny study were picked from newspapers and other 
publications. The actual number of the allegations made and 
investigated by the competition authorities in the respective countries is 
definitely much higher.  
 
The anti-competitive practices were divided into three 
categories: (i) those that hurt consumers directly; (ii) those that hurt 
                                                 
102
 Simon J. Evenett and Frederic Jenny, in a presentation titled An Inventory of 
Allegations of Anti-Competitive Practices in Sub-Saharan Africa delivered at the 
Centre for Regulation and Competition (CRC) 3rd International Conference: Pro-
Poor Regulation and Competition: Issues, Policies and Practices, held in Cape 
Town, South Africa, 7–9 September 2004. 
103
 Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, South 
Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
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farmers; and (iii) those that excluded and hurt other businesses. 
Examples of such practices are given in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Some anti-competitive practices in Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
Anti-competitive 
practices that hurt 
consumers directly 
 
• Vertically integrated monopoly in the sugar 
industry in Malawi. 
• Millers’ cartel in Zambia. 
• Anti-competitive merger in the beer sector in 
Malawi. 
• Price fixing in the distribution of oil in Kenya. 
• Cartel in the oil sector in Uganda. 
• Cement monopoly in Malawi. 
• Taxi cartels in South Africa. 
• Private monopolies in the rail and transport 
sectors in Malawi. 
 
Anti-competitive 
practices that hurt 
farmers 
 
• Price fixing and market sharing in the fertilizer 
industry in Kenya. 
• Collusion among tea buyers in Malawi. 
• Buyers’ cartel in the cotton industry in 
Zimbabwe. 
• Price fixing by purchasers of cotton in Malawi. 
 
Anti-competitive 
practices that excluded 
or hurt other businesses 
 
• Sugar cartel in South Africa. 
• Margin fixing in the banking sector in Uganda. 
• Exclusionary practices in the cable television 
sector in Nigeria. 
• Abuse of dominance in the telecommunications 
sector in South Africa. 
• Price fixing and trade associations in the freight 
transport sector in Malawi. 
• Franchise arrangements in the soft drinks 
industry in Zambia. 
• Jet fuel cartel in South Africa. 
 
Source: Compiled from a Simon Evenett and Frederic Jenny 
presentation on Anti-competitive Practices in Sub-Saharan Africa: 
Myths, Reality and Perspectives. 
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While it is extremely difficult to accurately quantify the adverse 
effects of most anti-competitive practices on the consumer because 
other economic factors may simultaneously be involved, considerable 
progress has been made in quantifying the effects of cartel behaviour. 
 
A cartel has been defined as a formal agreement among 
competing firms in an oligopolistic industry on such matters as total 
industry output, market shares, prices, allocation of customers and/or 
territories, bid rigging, or a combination of these and other matters. The 
mutual benefit of members is the primary aim of cartels. Generally, a 
cartel attempts to emulate a monopoly by restricting industry output, 
raising or fixing prices in order to earn higher profits104. A paraphrased 
definition of a cartel provided by the OECD is that “a cartel is an 
agreement, practice, or arrangement by competitors to collude and fix 
prices, rig bids, allocate quotas, or divide markets”105. Cartels are 
considered the most harmful anti-competitive conduct prevalent the 
world over, and are outlawed in most countries. 
 
There are different types and kinds of cartels. A private cartel 
exists between two or more firms that are not controlled by a 
government. The main objective of a private cartel is to raise prices 
above competitive levels, thus harming the customers. Within this 
category of cartels, there are international private cartels and domestic 
private cartels. International private cartels exist when members of a 
private cartel are based in different countries, or when the cartel’s 
agreement affects the markets of more than one country. Domestic 
private cartels, as the name implies, exist between firms in the same 
country and whose agreements only affect the market of that country. 
Cartels that involve state enterprises, as in the case of the Organization 
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), and other commodity 
agreements on sugar, coffee, etc., are not covered under competition 
enforcement rules. Such cartels are sovereign cartels and therefore 
immune from the law.  
                                                 
104
 S. Sothi Rachagan, Competition Policy and Law in the Consumer and 
Development Interest, a paper presented as communication from Consumers 
International to the Fifth Session of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts 
(IGE) on Competition Law and Policy, held in Geneva, Switzerland, on 2–4 July 
2003. 
105
 As reported in CUTS Briefing Paper No. 5/2006 on Private International 
Cartels – An Overview. CUTS Centre for International Trade, Economics & 
Environment, Jaipur, India, 2006. 
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The term collusion, on the other hand, has been used to refer to 
informal agreements, arrangements or conspiracies that seek to achieve 
what cartels do. The economic effects of cartels and collusive behaviour 
are however the same. 
 
The costs to the consumer of cartelization, particularly from 
private international cartels, have been calculated with some degree of 
accuracy. Evenett (2003)106 noted that attempts to quantify the impact of 
private international cartels have grown in sophistication over the years. 
Studies initially focused on the price reductions observed after a cartel 
collapsed, and most studies pointed to a 20–40 per cent fall in prices. 
Therefore, if total sales of a cartelized product during a particular period 
amounted to US$10 billion, it could be calculated that the prejudice to 
consumers who bought the product in terms of price overcharges was 
US$2–4 billion. More sophisticated empirical techniques have been 
used in analysing the effects of certain individual private international 
cartels. Evenett observed that an analysis of the international vitamins 
cartel, which divided up the world markets for various types of vitamins 
from 1989 until 1999, was able to recover estimates of the overcharges 
paid by 90 vitamin-importing nations throughout the 1990s. The total 
overcharges in India amounted to US$25.71 million. The total 
overcharges for ten European Union Member States were estimated to 
be US$660.19 million. 
 
Reporting on the effects of the graphite electrodes cartel (1992–
1997), Evenett quoted the OECD as having estimated that the cartel 
affected US$5–7 billion in sales worldwide, and that throughout the 
world the cartel resulted in price increases from roughly US$2,000 per 
metric tonne to US$3,200–3,500 in various markets. In Korea, the 
damage incurred by the companies importing graphite electrodes was 
estimated by the Korea Fair Trade Commission at approximately 
US$139 million. The lysine cartel (1992–1995), under which cartel 
members engaged in price fixing, allocation of sales quotas and 
monitoring of volume agreements, is estimated to have resulted in 
overcharges to customers in the United States as high as US$141 
million. 
                                                 
106
 Simon J. Evenett, Can Developing Economies Benefit from WTO 
Negotiations on Binding Disciplines for Hard Core Cartels?, UNCTAD Series on 
Issues in Competition Law and Policy, United Nations, Geneva, 2003. 
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Jenny (2004)107 reported on how Brazil lost US$500 million to 
an international cartel from its privatization of Eletropaulo Metropolitana, 
a Government-owned electricity distribution company. The privatization 
of the electricity company was done through floating a tender, with the 
reserve price that was publicly announced before the bids being 
US$1.78 billion. Three bidders were allowed to participate in the 
auction: (i) Enron, a US energy trader; (ii) the Light Energy Consortium 
(comprising AES, a large US energy group, Electricité de France, 
Houston Industries, and CSN, a Brazilian steel company); and (iii) VBC, 
a Brazilian group. Just before the auction took place, AES, a member of 
the Light Energy Consortium, approached Enron with an offer that for 
not bidding for Eletropaulo Metropolitana, Enron would be allowed to 
build a power plant with AES to supply Eletropaulo, as well as operate 
the plant and provide all the fuel (the Light Energy Consortium had 
considered a similar deal with VBC but had decided against it on advice 
from its lawyers). At the auction, the Light Energy Consortium came 
armed with two bid envelopes: one offering US$1.78 billion and another 
offering an extra US$500 million. When it became apparent that Enron 
and VBC, who were both at the auction, were not submitting bids, the 
Light Energy Consortium submitted the lower bid for US$1.78 billion. 
 
If Enron or VBC had submitted bids, the Light Energy 
Consortium would have submitted the higher bid with an extra US$500 
million. That was the amount that Brazil directly lost through the rigging 
of the bid. It was also estimated that Brazil could have lost up to US$1 
billion, being the difference between the bid of US$1.78 billion deposited 
by the Light Energy Consortium and the maximum value of Eletropaulo 
Metropolitana as estimated by Enron when it was considering bidding. 
There were however other indirect costs to Brazilian consumers of 
electricity that arose from the bid rigging. Under the bid rigging 
agreement between Enron and the Light Energy Consortium, Enron 
would be granted a contract for the production of electricity, and part of 
the increase in the cost of electricity due to the contract would naturally 
be passed on to electricity consumers.  
 
                                                 
107
 Frederic Jenny, Detection and Repression of Anti-competitive Practices in 
Developing Countries: A Case Study, a presentation at the Sixth Session of the 
Intergovernmental Group of Experts (IGE) on Competition Law and Policy, held 
in Geneva, Switzerland, on 8–10 November 2004. 
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It has also been observed that businesses will have less 
incentive to trade fairly when competitors can obtain a short-term 
advantage by misleading consumers, supplying unsafe goods or acting 
in a grossly unfair way. The costs of such short-term advantages will fall 
on both consumers and legitimate traders, often to the long-term 
detriment of consumers as the increased risks of doing business 
discourages changes to entrenched buying and investing behaviour. 
 
Consumers are indeed the biggest beneficiaries of the effective 
implementation of competition policy and law, not only from lower 
prices, better quality of goods and services, and greater choice of goods 
and services that result from competition-induced economic efficiency 
and innovation, but also from the protection that they get from the 
prohibition and control of anti-competitive practices. 
 
6. The Zimbabwean experience 
 
As in most other developing countries, the adoption of 
competition policy and law in Zimbabwe was a direct result of the 
introduction of economic reforms in the country. In 1991, the 
Government of Zimbabwe concluded consultations on its “Framework 
for Economic Reform”, which led to the adoption of both a stabilization 
and structural adjustment programme under the Economic Structural 
Adjustment Programme (ESAP). The programme’s central components 
were: (i) fiscal deficit reduction combined with prudent monetary policy; 
(ii) trade liberalization; (iii) domestic deregulation; (iv) public enterprise 
reform; and (v) measures to alleviate the impact of the reforms on 
vulnerable groups. 
 
Within the structural adjustment program, the Government was 
specifically concerned with competition and monopoly regulation issues. 
This was partially derived from the concern to protect consumers, as 
well as the need to ensure that exports are effectively promoted, and to 
encourage indigenous entrepreneurs. While it was noted that 
competitiveness would be greatly enhanced by the economic reforms, 
explicit competition policies were still needed in the context of the ESAP 
since it was noted that markets are not perfect, business behaviour is 
not automatically pro-competition, and public policy measures may be 
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unintentionally inconsistent108. Competition policy within the context of 
the structural adjustment program should thus be designed to: (i) 
provide government and citizens with confidence that the ESAP would 
not be manipulated by special interests; (ii) ensure that the benefits of 
the ESAP are broadly shared among both businesses and consumers; 
and (iii) further promote a switch to production for export markets. 
Consequently, the main principles of competition policy were to lower 
barriers to entry, and reduce RBPs, particularly monopolistic tendencies. 
 
In a minute to the then Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning 
and Development, the then Ministry of Industry and Commerce in May 
1991 officially mooted the idea of seriously considering the adoption of 
competition policy and the establishment of a competition authority in 
Zimbabwe. The submissions made in that minute clearly laid out the 
raison d’être and the basic parameters for competition policy in 
Zimbabwe, as shown in Box 3. 
 
 
                                                 
108
 Report on Study of Monopolies and Competition Policy in Zimbabwe, 
prepared for the Government of Zimbabwe by Implementing Policy Change 
(IPC), September 1992. 
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Box 3: Initial Government suggestions on the adoption of 
competition policy and establishment of a competition authority in 
Zimbabwe  
 
Monopolistic conditions in the Zimbabwean market are the result either 
of Government granting a parastatal the sole rights to a product, 
franchising, or the size of the market which restricts competitors from 
entry. In the case of parastatals, Cabinet in essence controls the prices 
the monopolies can charge with the stated principle of allowing them to 
break even. Until now Government has controlled the potential 
monopolistic tendencies of other firms through the price control 
mechanism. As price controls are lifted, monopolies will tend to improve 
their profit picture. In the absence of a regulatory body, the end result 
will probably be lower output levels and higher prices for those products 
that enjoy a truly monopolistic market. The following are the issues, 
among others, which a study team will have to address: 
 
1. Defining a monopoly 
 
Ground rules of what constitutes a pure monopoly have to be 
established. There may be only one producer of a good but it may 
be incorrect to describe the company as a monopoly because there 
are substitute products. The definition of what a product is and how 
far the Government is willing to consider substitutes will be 
important in the application of the rules. This should therefore be 
explicitly determined. 
 
2. Monopoly power 
 
There are known cases of dominant price leadership in Zimbabwe, 
i.e. the largest firm sets a price and the others proceed to agree on 
it. An example of that, prior to controls, was petrol. There are other 
forms of collusion that result in a monopoly situation even though 
there may be more than one producer. There is need for an 
appropriate legal framework and practical guidelines to deal with 
this issue. 
 
3. Pricing goals 
 
As direct price controls are removed there is a need to establish 
guidelines for determining pricing decisions. In the case of 
monopolies, the impact of various pricing methods (cost plus mark-
up, average or marginal cost pricing) needs to be examined so that 
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the Commission has clear directions on how to set prices. 
 
4. Price determination 
 
There is a need to establish a mechanism whereby monopoly prices 
are regulated. In some countries the Monopoly Commission would 
not act until a monopolist had set prices. The Commission then 
reviews those prices (by holding hearings) to decide on their 
appropriateness. In still other cases (particularly for public utilities) 
the corporation would have to apply to the Commission for any rate 
change. Given that the definition of monopoly is yet to be decided, it 
is necessary to establish the most appropriate approach to pricing. 
Such issues as how costs and the appropriate rate of return on 
capital, as well as the capital base to be used in such computations, 
have to be fully explored. 
 
5. Any other pertinent issues 
 
The approach envisaged is in two stages. First, there is need for a 
team to study the Zimbabwe situation in light of the above issues. Its 
report should take, say, four months to complete and should provide 
information on what exactly are the current monopoly areas and 
how best to deal with them while maintaining efficiency. The 
personnel required is a team of three experts in regulation of 
industry. 
 
The team’s report, when approved, should be the basis for 
constituting the Commission’s terms of reference, scope of work 
and operational method as well as preparing the necessary legal 
framework. Because of its importance, the Government would retain 
the right to ask for a proposal submission from the team put forward 
to do the study. It is suggested that the Government moves 
expeditiously. 
Source: Ministry of Industry and International Trade, Zimbabwe. 
 
 
The need to protect the consumer against the exploitative 
practices of large firms in monopoly or dominant positions was therefore 
foremost in the mind of the Ministry of Industry and Commerce when it 
mooted the idea of the adoption of competition policy and law in 
Zimbabwe. The initial suggestions within Government circles were 
therefore that competition policy in Zimbabwe should specifically deal 
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with monopolistic practices, particularly those that lead to high prices of 
consumer goods109.  
 
It was therefore not surprising that one of the strongest lobbyists 
for the adoption of competition policy and law in Zimbabwe was the 
Consumer Council of Zimbabwe (CCZ). While the CCZ has the mandate 
of consumer welfare and protection, it does not have the necessary 
legal powers of enforcement since Zimbabwe does not have a 
comprehensive consumer law under the administration of that consumer 
watchdog110. The CCZ therefore saw the adoption of competition policy 
and law and the establishment of a competition authority in Zimbabwe 
as providing the necessary “teeth” in protecting consumers. 
 
Zimbabwe formally adopted competition policy and law in 1996 
with the enactment of the Competition Act [Chapter 14:28]. The Act 
however only came into force in 1998, the same year that its 
implementation authority, the then Industry and Trade Competition 
Commission, was established. 
 
The Competition Act of Zimbabwe covers all the four main 
forms of RBPs: (i) horizontal restraints; (ii) vertical restraints; (iii) abuse 
of dominant position; and (iv) anti-competitive mergers. It prohibits any 
business practice that “restricts competition directly or indirectly to a 
material degree”. As a general rule, therefore, restrictive practices are 
considered under the Act using the ‘rule of reason’ since the materiality 
of the practice on competition has to be determined. Certain restrictive 
practices that are termed ‘unfair business practices’ in the Act are 
however outrightly, or per se, prohibited and are considered to be 
criminal offences subject to fines and/or imprisonment. Such practices 
include: (i) misleading advertising; (ii) false bargains; (iii) distribution of 
commodities or services above advertised price; (iv) undue refusal to 
distribute commodities or services; (v) bid rigging; (vi) collusive 
                                                 
109
 The idea of having a ‘Monopolies and Prices Commission’ in Zimbabwe 
along the lines of the Kenyan model was later dropped for an ‘Industry and 
Trade Competition Commission’ with a wider mandate of dealing with all forms 
of restrictive business practices at the recommendation of the IPC Study Team 
on monopolies and competition policy in Zimbabwe. 
110
 Zimbabwe however has a number of consumer protection legislations that 
address particular concerns, such as the Consumer Contract Act [Chapter 8:03], 
and which are not under the direct administration of the CCZ.  
 102 
arrangements between competitors; (vii) predatory pricing; (viii) resale 
price maintenance; and (ix) exclusive dealing. 
 
It is worth noting that a number of per se prohibited unfair 
business practices under Zimbabwe’s competition law (such as 
misleading advertising, false bargains and distribution of commodities or 
services above advertised price) are typical unfair trade practices that 
are aimed at directly protecting consumers against exploitative practices 
of business firms. 
 
The competition authority of Zimbabwe has, since it effectively 
commenced its operations in 1999, handled over 450 different 
competition cases, involving both restrictive and unfair business 
practices and mergers and acquisitions. The impact in Zimbabwe of the 
competition cases handled by the authority was recently analysed in a 
study on the Socio-Economic Impact of Implementation of Competition 
Policy and Law in Zimbabwe111. The study confirmed for Zimbabwe 
what had been proved elsewhere, i.e. that the effective implementation 
of competition policy and law positively contributes towards general 
economic development. Its revelations on the effects of anti-competitive 
practices on consumer welfare in Zimbabwe are discussed below in the 
context of mergers and acquisitions and restrictive and unfair business 
practices as they are provided for under the Competition Act [Chapter 
14:28]. 
 
6.1. Mergers and acquisitions 
 
The study found that merger control in Zimbabwe produced 
immense benefits to the economy and society. Specific benefits that 
accrued, and are still accruing, from the mergers examined by the 
competition authority included: (i) generation of economies of scale or 
scope, and other synergic efficiencies; (ii) reduction of management 
inefficiencies; (iii) facilitation of research and development; (iv) creation 
and/or retention of employment; (v) development of export markets and 
                                                 
111
 Part I of the study dealt with the impact of the examination of mergers and 
acquisitions. The report on that part of the study was released in November 
2006. Part II of the study, the report of which is currently at the final stages of 
drafting, deals with the impact of the investigation of restrictive and unfair 
business practices. 
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generation of increased export earnings; (vi) promotion of foreign direct 
investment; (vii) continued availability of goods and services on the 
domestic market; and (viii) indigenization or localization of control of 
strategic economic activities. 
 
In particular, it was found that the consummation of those 
mergers that were approved by the competition authority with certain 
conditions aimed at alleviating the identified competition and public 
interest concerns, contributed most to the socio-economic benefits 
accruing to the consumer. By implication therefore, had the mergers 
been allowed to proceed with the identified competition and public 
interest concerns, consumer welfare would have been compromised, 
and even adversely affected. These findings are outlined in Table 3. 
 
 
Table 3: Mergers and acquisitions conditionally approved by the 
competition authority of Zimbabwe 
 
 
Merger of 
Rothmans of 
Pall Mall and 
British American 
Tobacco 
 
This transaction involved the horizontal merger of 
Zimbabwe’s then only two cigarette manufacturers, 
Rothmans of Pall Mall (Zimbabwe) and British American 
Tobacco Zimbabwe Limited to form BAT Zimbabwe, and 
was necessitated by the global merger of the international 
tobacco businesses of British American Tobacco Plc, 
Rothmans International, Compagnie Financière Richemont 
AG and Rembrandt Group Limited.  
 
It was noted that the merger would create a monopoly 
situation in the cigarette making industry of Zimbabwe and 
that, as in any other monopoly situation, consumers would 
be adversely affected through higher prices and/or reduced 
supply of the product, if the monopolist exercises its market 
power. It was however also noted that the merger was 
necessary to save British American Tobacco Zimbabwe from 
collapse since that company was evidently failing. Exit from 
the market of that company would have had adverse effects 
on the consumer due to the disappearance from the market 
of its cigarette brands and reduced choice. Other adverse 
effects would have included increased unemployment and 
reduced export earnings. The merger was therefore 
approved on the following conditions: 
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• that the merged party should dispose of its surplus 
cigarette making machinery to third parties interested 
and able to enter the cigarette manufacturing industry 
within a reasonable period of time; and also 
• that the merged party should not increase the prices of 
its cigarettes without first justifying the price increases to 
the competition authority, as long as the monopoly 
situation created in the cigarette manufacturing industry 
remained in existence.  
 
The conditions were accepted by the merging parties, who 
signed a formal undertaking to that effect with the 
competition authority. The disposal of the merged party’s 
surplus cigarette making machinery was done within six 
months of the signing of the undertaking, and the purchaser 
of the machinery started producing cigarettes for both the 
domestic and export markets within 12 months. That broke 
the monopoly situation created by the merger, and 
accordingly released the merged party from the price 
surveillance condition. 
 
The Competition Commission’s price monitoring and 
surveillance role in the cigarette manufacturing industry, 
though short-lived since the monopoly situation created by 
the merger was eliminated within two years by new entrants, 
helped in ensuring that consumers were not exploited by the 
merged party’s excessive pricing of its products. Four 
requests for cigarette price increases were submitted to the 
Commission for approval during the two-year period and two 
were rejected for lack of justification.  
 
The merged party’s surplus cigarette making machinery was 
purchased by a company called Cut Rag Processors (Pvt) 
Limited, which used the machinery to start producing new 
Remington Gold and Oxford cigarette brands for both the 
local and export markets in 2001. The brands are in four 
variations: the ‘Virginia Blend’, the ‘American Toasted’, the 
‘Light’ and the ‘Menthol’ varieties. During the first five years 
of its existence, the production capacity of the company 
grew by more than 20 times through the procurement of 
additional machinery. The company now produces about 
120 million cigarettes per month, of which about 10 million 
are for the local market. The company also employs 295 
permanent employees. 
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The introduction of the new Remington Gold and Oxford 
cigarette brands on the local Zimbabwean market gave 
consumers a wider choice of products. It also brought fierce 
competition to the dominant BAT Zimbabwe cigarette 
brands, which was to the benefit of consumers, such that 
BAT Zimbabwe lodged a complaint to the Competition 
Commission that its market share was being eroded by Cut 
Rag Processors’ engagement in unfair business practices 
(see outline of the case in Box 6 below on preliminary 
investigation into allegations of restrictive and unfair 
business practices in the cigarette distribution industry). 
 
A review of the merger in 2006 also revealed that the 
transaction had ensured the continued existence on the 
market of the former British American Tobacco Zimbabwe 
Limited’s Kingsgate and Berkeley cigarette brands, which 
are very popular with the smoking consumers but whose 
disappearance from the market was imminent before the 
merger. BAT Zimbabwe also confirmed the attainment of 
economies of scale in production as a result of the merger 
as evidenced by increased production efficiencies and 
machine utilization due to the use of one plant for the two 
companies. The merger however did not result in the stability 
of cigarette prices on the local market as had been 
envisaged, but this was mainly because of other 
macroeconomic constraints. The merger also directly 
resulted in 4,061 job losses (255 managerial employees, 
3,643 non-managerial employees, and 163 contract 
workers), but that was not unexpected given the horizontal 
nature of the transaction. 
 
More importantly for future competition in the relevant 
market, and thus increased consumer welfare and 
protection, entry barriers into the cigarette making industry 
were removed. As a result, another new entrant other than 
Cut Rag Processors, a company called Savanna Tobacco 
Company, started producing the Pacific brands of cigarettes, 
which are becoming increasingly popular with consumers, in 
competition with both BAT Zimbabwe and Cut Rag 
Processors. 
 
 
The Coca-
Cola/Cadbury-
Schweppes 
 
This transaction involved the acquisition of Cadbury-
Schweppes beverage brands by The Coca Cola Company. 
The Cadbury-Schweppes beverage brands acquired 
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Merger included international brands and local brands such as the 
Mazoe and Calypso brands. 
 
It was noted that The Coca Cola Company was only 
interested in the Cadbury-Schweppes beverage brands, and 
not in the Schweppes’ bottling plant in Zimbabwe, which 
would have been allowed to disintegrate after the merger, 
resulting in loss of jobs. The future of the local Mazoe and 
Calypso beverage brands was also in doubt since the 
practice of The Coca Cola Company elsewhere had been to 
‘cold store’ the local beverage brands it acquired so as to 
remove competition to its international brands. Removal from 
the market of the local Mazoe and Calypso brands would not 
only have adversely affected the consumer because of the 
popularity of the brands but would also have prejudiced the 
local suppliers of the raw materials used in the production of 
those brands of beverages. 
 
The merger was therefore approved on the following 
conditions, which were accepted by The Coca Cola 
Company and formalized in an undertaking: 
 
• that The Coca Cola Company also acquire the 
Schweppes bottling plant in Zimbabwe as a going 
concern, modernize it, and establish an appropriate 
local shareholding structure to oversee the operations of 
the new company to be formed before disposing of it to 
interested indigenous entrepreneurs; 
• that The Coca Cola Company maintain the local Mazoe 
and Calypso beverage brands on the Zimbabwean 
market and develop them into regional brands with 
wider distribution; and 
• that The Coca Cola Company promote and develop 
Zimbabwean suppliers of raw materials required to 
produce the local beverages brands. 
 
As per the Competition Commission’s condition, The Coca 
Cola Company acquired the Schweppes bottling plant in 
Harare and modernized it to state-of-the-art condition, thus 
prevented it from imminent closure and loss of employment. 
That also not only ensured the continued availability on the 
domestic market of the local Mazoe and Calypso beverage 
brands, which are immensely popular with the consumers, 
but also facilitated the expansion of the market into 
neighbouring countries such as Zambia, South Africa, 
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Botswana and Malawi. 
 
The continued operation of the Schweppes bottling plant 
also guaranteed the viability of local raw material suppliers 
such as Mazoe Citrus Estates with resultant employment 
savings. It has also provided the necessary countervailing 
power against the possible exploitative and exclusionary 
practices of the dominant players in the beverages industry 
such as Delta Beverages. 
 
 
Acquisition of 
Portland 
Holdings Limited 
by Pretoria 
Portland 
Cement 
Company 
 
This transaction involved the acquisition of Portland Holdings 
Limited (Porthold), the holding company of Zimbabwe’s 
largest cement manufacturers, by the Pretoria Portland 
Cement Company Limited (PCC) of South Africa. 
 
It was noted that the cement manufacturing industry in 
Zimbabwe was highly concentrated, with only two other 
players, Circle Cement and the Sino-Zimbabwe Cement 
Company. Local production of cement was failing to meet 
demand, resulting in product shortages and high prices. 
There were strong suspicions that the intentions of PCC 
after acquiring Porthold were to close down the cement plant 
to supply the Zimbabwean market from its operations in 
South Africa. That would have exacerbated the cement 
supply situation in Zimbabwe with adverse effects on the 
consumer. Job losses would also have been substantial.  
 
It was however also noted that the merger had substantial 
pro-competitive elements. Circle Cement, the second largest 
cement manufacturer in Zimbabwe, had recently been 
acquired by Lafarge of France in an offshore deal with the 
Blue Circle Group of the United Kingdom. Lafarge had also 
acquired cement plants in Zambia and Malawi, and was thus 
becoming a dominant player in the regional cement market. 
The acquisition of Porthold in Zimbabwe by PCC, also a 
strong regional player, was therefore seen as providing the 
necessary countervailing check against the exercise by 
Lafarge of its market power and any abusive practices on 
the Zimbabwean cement market. 
 
The merger was therefore approved on condition that PCC 
gave the competition authority an undertaking to honour its 
commitment to maintain Porthold’s cement plant as a going 
concern and to continue producing cement in Zimbabwe. 
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The major post-merger benefit of the transaction to the 
consumer is that Porthold’s Unicem brand of cement is still 
being offered to the Zimbabwean consumers as a 
competitive choice to the Lafarge cements. In the five years 
from the time of the merger in 2001, Porthold increased its 
cement production from about 260,000 metric tonnes to 
about 350,000 metric tonnes, of which 70 per cent is for the 
domestic market. The employment levels in the company 
however decreased from 730 to 620, a direct consequence 
of the horizontal nature of the merger and other 
macroeconomic constraints facing Zimbabwean companies 
as a whole. 
 
The merger did not alter the structure of the Zimbabwean 
cement industry since the acquiring party, Pretoria Portland 
Cement Company Limited of South Africa, was not a player 
in that industry before the merger. Basically, there are still 
three major players involved in the production of cement in 
Zimbabwe: Porthold, Lafarge Cement (formerly Circle 
Cement) and the Sino-Zimbabwe Cement Company. The 
merger did not change much in terms of local competition – 
Porthold is still the largest player in the market, with Sino-
Zimbabwe being the smallest. Regardless of the highly 
concentrated nature of the industry, no complaints of anti-
competitive practices or conduct in the industry, either of a 
unilateral or coordinated nature, have been referred to the 
Competition Commission for investigation since the 
conclusion of the merger.  
 
Acquisition of 
Zimtile by PG 
Merchandising 
 
This transaction involved the acquisition of the operating 
assets of Gestap (Private) Limited, trading as Zimtile, by PG 
Merchandising. Zimtile was a concrete roof tile 
manufacturing and supply company. PG Merchandising is 
part of the PG Group, which is involved in the manufacture 
and supply of various building materials, including roofing 
timber. 
 
While it was noted that the transaction did not raise serious 
competition concerns in the form of substantially lessening 
competition in the relevant markets, it was however also 
noted that Zimtile had a practice of tying its supply of roof 
tiles to the consuming public to the use of its own tile-
mounting enterprise. The consumer was therefore prevented 
from using other cheaper tile mounters of his/her choice. It 
was therefore felt that if that practice was to be extended 
after the merger to include the supply of PG Merchandising’s 
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roof timber, the consumer would be vulnerable to 
exploitation. 
 
The merger was therefore approved on condition that the 
merging parties give the Competition Commission a formal 
undertaking not to engage in tied or conditional selling 
involving their products following the merger. 
 
A number of stakeholders that were consulted by the 
Commission during its examination of the merger had 
expressed serious concerns over the transaction. The 
concerns included the possibility of PG Merchandising, a 
major manufacturer and distributor of roofing trusses, 
controlling and monopolizing the roofing market through its 
acquisition of Zimtile, a leading manufacturer and distributor 
of concrete roofing tiles, and the merged entity perpetuating 
Zimtile’s practice of tied and conditional selling on a wider 
scale. Within three years of the implementation of the 
merger, however, Turnall Fibre Cement, a competitor of 
Zimtile and a major supplier of asbestos roofing sheets to 
PG Merchandising, which had expressed major concerns 
over the merger, submitted that its earlier fears of 
monopolization and conditional selling on the part of the 
merged entity had been allayed since no serious competition 
concerns had arisen. Costain Zimbabwe (Pvt) Limited, a 
construction company that had also expressed concerns 
over the dominance to be created by the merger, submitted 
that the concerns it had expressed then were largely 
mitigated by the entry of new players into the roofing 
material industry. 
 
The review of the merger in 2006 also confirmed that most of 
the perceived benefits of the merger were realized: (i) Zimtile 
was now involved in exporting, selling 10 per cent of its 
production of roofing tiles in regional markets, due to PG 
leadership and a 30 per cent increase in the production of 
the tiles was achieved as a direct result of the merger; (ii) 
employment had remained stable; (iii) roofing tiles were now 
available on all PG distribution sites nationwide instead of 
just from Zimtile’s two distribution centres in the country’s 
major towns of Harare and Bulawayo; and (iv) consumers 
were now being offered a wider range of roofing materials 
and a full roofing package, comprising roofing timber and 
trusses and roofing tiles, under one roof. Zimtile’s previous 
anti-competitive practice of tied and conditional selling was 
also stopped, as confirmed by the Competition 
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Commission’s undercover monitoring of the practice.  
 
 
Proposed 
merger of 
Colcom 
Holdings and 
Cattle Company 
Holdings 
 
This transaction involved the proposed merger of Colcom 
Holdings Limited, a meat processing company, and Cattle 
Company Holdings Limited, a cattle auctioning and slaughter 
company, to create a new company called CC Holdings. 
 
Colcom Holdings controlled a number of subsidiary 
companies in the meat processing industry, which operated 
businesses such as pig breeding and rearing, abattoirs, 
meat wholesaling and retailing, production of smoked and 
canned meat products and manufacture of sausages and 
pies. The Cattle Company Holdings also had a number of 
subsidiary companies operating in businesses such as cattle 
auctioning, cattle slaughter and retailing of beef, and 
processing of cattle hides to wet-blue state. Even though the 
transaction affected a number of different relevant markets, 
only the animal slaughter market and the meat processing 
market raised serious competition concerns. Colcom 
Holdings was dominant in the slaughter pigs market, with a 
60 per cent share of the market, as well as in the processed 
pork market, with 90 per cent of the market. Cattle Company 
Holdings also dominated the slaughter cattle market. 
 
The issue of joint dominance to be created by the merging 
parties in the supply of beasts for slaughter was of particular 
concern to both the competition authority and the 
stakeholders consulted. Previous attempts by both merging 
parties to eliminate effective competition in their respective 
markets by acquiring their closest competitors were noted 
with concern. The likelihood was therefore high that the 
merged entity could engage in anti-competitive practices, 
such as: (i) manipulating prices in the meat industry, and 
unilaterally raising them to levels not related to market 
forces; (ii) foreclosing the supply of cattle to competitors; and 
(iii) preventing new entrants or creating barriers to entry into 
the relevant markets; all to the detriment of the consumer. 
 
 
The competition authority therefore made it a condition that 
the merging parties should divest from the cattle 
auctioneering business if the merger was to be approved. 
The merging parties could not accept that condition and 
decided not to proceed with the transaction. 
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It can be assumed that by not accepting the Competition 
Commission’s merger approval conditions, which were 
aimed at removing the likely anti-competitive practices that 
were inherent in the transaction, the merging parties were 
bent on increasing their market share through engagement 
in such practices. It is therefore highly likely that had the 
merger been allowed to proceed without the intervention of 
the Competition Commission, its likely competition concerns 
could have adversely affected consumer welfare and 
protection: (i) the merged entity could have unabatedly 
exploited its acquired market power in the vertically 
integrated market, from cattle selling to cattle slaughter to 
meat processing and retailing, by excessively pricing its 
goods and services to the disadvantage of the consumer; (ii) 
the merged entity could also have foreclosed supplies of 
cattle and processed meats to its competitors, again to the 
disadvantage of the consumer; and (iii) the merged entity 
could have abused its dominance of the integrated market 
by engaging in exclusionary practices aimed at removing or 
deterring competition to the disadvantage of the consumer. 
 
 
Acquisition of 
Shashi Private 
Hospital by 
Premier 
Services 
Medical 
Investments 
 
This transaction involved the acquisition by Premier Services 
Medical Investments (PSMI) of a private hospital in the town 
of Bindura, the capital of the Mashonaland Central Province 
of Zimbabwe. PSMI is the investment arm of the Premier 
Service Medical Aid Society (PSMAS), Zimbabwe’s largest 
medical aid society in terms of members. The target firm, 
Shashi Private Hospital, was the only private hospital in 
Bindura. 
 
It was found that Shashi Private Hospital was failing, mainly 
due to lack of adequate capital and an exodus of qualified 
medical personnel from Bindura to Harare, Zimbabwe’s 
capital city. The hospital’s exit from the market was therefore 
imminent. Its acquisition by the better resourced PSMI would 
therefore save it from closure, to the benefit of the 
consumers in Bindura. 
 
Serious concerns were however expressed over the vertical 
relationship to be created between a health-care provider 
and a health insurer, which could be abused by PSMAS to 
the detriment of the consumer. PSMAS had a history of 
directing its members to health institutions owned by PSMI 
at the threat of reduced service provision if the members did 
not do so. That had left members of PSMAS with no choice 
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of health-care providers. 
 
The merger was therefore approved on condition that 
PSMAS, the parent company of the acquiring firm, give an 
undertaking that it would not abuse its dominant position in 
the health insurance services sector by engaging in 
restrictive practices of an exclusionary and/or exploitative 
nature, such as directing its members to Shashi Private 
Hospital and favouring Shashi Private Hospital in the 
handling of its members’ claims. 
 
The conditions placed by the Competition Commission on 
the approval of this merger achieved the desired results of 
checking the discriminatory behaviour of PSMAS through the 
use of its PSMI-run medical centres. Soon after the 
conclusion of the merger, PSMI instructed all its medical 
centres throughout the country not to engage in 
discriminatory practices against non-PSMAS members. A 
competing medical centre in the Bindura area, Ponai Medical 
Centre, which had expressed concern over the merger that 
there could be delays in the processing by PSMAS of the 
Centre’s medical aid claims to discourage the Centre from 
accepting PSMAS members so that they would patronize 
Shashi Private Hospital, confirmed that neither PSMAS nor 
PSMI were engaged in such anti-competitive practices. The 
conditional approval of the merger therefore enhanced 
consumer choice of medical centres, which choice had been 
limited by PSMAS’ anti-competitive practices. 
 
Ponai Medical Centre did submit that the merger resulted in 
a noticeable drift of consumer patronage from the Centre to 
Shashi Private Hospital of about 50 per cent. That was 
however because of the much improved post-merger 
services offered by Shashi Private Hospital, which Ponai 
Medical Centre had to match in order to remain competitive. 
The same sentiments were expressed by Shamva Rural 
Hospital and Trojon Mine Clinic, which operate in the same 
geographic market as Shashi Private Hospital. The merger 
therefore intensified competition in the relevant market, 
which resulted in better and improved service to the 
consumer by all the market players. 
 
For Shashi Private Hospital, which was failing before its 
acquisition by PSMI, the merger resulted in the setting up of 
an X-ray facility at the institution, which was the only one in 
the entire Mashonaland Central Province. A pharmaceutical 
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drug dispensing facility was also set up at the institution such 
that there is now access to medicinal drugs from within 
compared to the period before the merger when patients had 
to source the drugs from as far away as Harare, which is 
about 90 kilometres from Bindura. Also due to economies of 
scale in the production using PSMI facilities, it has been 
established that the drugs are relatively cheaper at Shashi 
Private Hospital than in other medical centres in the relevant 
market. Laboratory services were also put in place at Shashi 
Private Hospital with new machinery installed. Unlike the 
situation before the merger when blood samples had to be 
taken to Harare for analysis, the whole process is now being 
conducted at the institution. Blood samples from Ponai 
Medical Centre and Trojan Clinic are now also being 
analysed at the Shashi Private Hospital laboratory services 
centre. In terms of employment, the merger resulted in two 
additional doctors being engaged at Shashi Private Hospital 
to bring the total number of doctors to three. A number of 
jobs of other medical staff were also saved as there was an 
imminent retrenchment at the time of the takeover. 
 
All the above benefited the consumer. However, of more 
direct benefit to the consumer, the merger helped patients 
that are members of the medical aid insurance scheme 
under PSMAS in as far as the eradication of the cash up 
front practice by health-care providers was concerned. 
Patients at Shashi Private Hospital are no longer being 
required to pay cash up front for their treatment, and this has 
acted as a cost-saving buffer for complicated cases. For 
example, a caesarean section would cost a patient a 
shortfall of over Z$100 million even on medical aid at some 
centres in Harare but at Shashi Private Hospital, where the 
doctor and the anaesthetist are employees of PSMI, there is 
no need to pay such cash up front. 
  
 
Acquisition of 
Zimboard by PG 
Bison 
(Mauritius) 
 
The transaction involved the disposal by PG Industries 
(Zimbabwe) Limited of one of its subsidiaries, Zimboard 
Products, which made timber products, particularly particle 
board, for the furniture manufacturing industry, to a new 
wholly-owned subsidiary and the invitation to PG Bison 
(Mauritius) Limited to take up equity in the new subsidiary.  
 
It was noted that the merger would result in the injection by 
PG Bison of foreign capital that was critical for the continued 
viability of Zimboard’s operations. Discontinuation of those 
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operations would not only result in reduction of competition 
in the relevant market, but would also have serious effects 
on employment and export earnings. 
 
It was however also noted that PG Bison is linked to 
Steinhoff Africa Limited of South Africa, a furniture 
manufacturing and distribution company that had recently 
entered into a furniture making joint venture in Zimbabwe 
with one of Zimbabwe’s major furniture manufacturers. The 
vertical relationship to be thus created between the local 
furniture manufacturing concern associated with PG Bison 
through Steinhoff Africa and PG Industries’ new subsidiary to 
take over the operations of Zimboard could be used to 
exclude competition in the furniture manufacturing industry 
through the discriminatory supply of particle board. This 
could lead to higher furniture prices to the consumer.  
 
The merger was therefore approved on condition that the 
merging parties gave an undertaking that the merged entity 
would not discriminate against local furniture manufacturing 
companies and enterprises other than those associated with 
PG Bison/Steinhoff Africa in the supply of particle board or 
any of its other products used in the furniture manufacturing 
industry. 
 
Concerns over the merger that led to the imposition of the 
conditions on its approval had been expressed by furniture 
manufacturers, notably Bowline Furniture and J W Wilson 
(Pvt) Limited. The concerns had stemmed from the fact that 
PG Bison was part of the Steinhoff Group of South Africa 
that already had an interest in Zimbabwe in the form of 
Lifestyle Furnishers, a rising furniture manufacturer, with 
fears that competitors in the downstream furniture 
manufacturing industry could be denied supplies of essential 
particle board and fibreboard from Zimboard in favour of 
Lifestyle Furnishers. In the event of that happening, 
consumers would be harmed from lack of effective 
competition in the market. Two years into the merger, both 
Bowline Furniture and J W Wilson confirmed that the market 
for particle board and fibreboard was not foreclosed to them, 
and that Lifestyle Furnishers is not receiving any unfair 
favours from Zimboard in terms of raw material supplies. 
 
The parties to the merger had a natural incentive to give 
preferential treatment to companies in their group of 
companies to ensure the Group’s viability and profitability. 
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The Competition Commission’s approval condition of the 
merger was therefore effective in ensuring that Zimboard 
does not unfairly favour Lifestyle Furnishers, and its 
associated company, against its competitors. That 
maintained and protected competition in the relevant market 
to the benefit of the consumer. 
 
Most of the other perceived benefits of the merger were also 
realized. Plant uptime, product quality and capacity 
utilization at Zimboard were substantially increased. 
Interested stakeholders confirmed that there was a 
noticeable improvement in terms of quality of the products 
offered by Zimboard following the merger. Production levels 
also increased by about 100 per cent, resulting in more 
products for both the domestic and export markets. In just a 
year, Zimboard’s turnover increased from Z$23 billion to 
Z$266 billion. The company’s operating profit also increased 
to Z$15 billion, all thanks to its partnership with the PG Bison 
Group. 
  
 
Merger of Total 
Zimbabwe and 
Mobil Oil 
Zimbabwe 
 
This transaction involved the horizontal merger of Total 
Zimbabwe and Mobil Oil Zimbabwe through the acquisition 
of Mobil Oil by Total Zimbabwe.  
 
It was noted that there were larger players than the merging 
parties in the relevant market in the likes of BP&Shell and 
Caltex. The merger would therefore not reduce or lessen 
substantially the degree of competition in the relevant 
market. It was however also noted that stakeholder concerns 
had been expressed over the fate of the business 
arrangements that Mobil Oil had with other small players in 
the industry, such as hospitality/supply/dealership 
arrangements, whose termination as a result of the merger 
would not only prejudice the affected small players but would 
also have adverse effects on the consumers. The fate of 
excess depots and service stations to arise from the merger 
was also of great concern to stakeholders, who felt that they 
should not be scrapped but should be used to maintain 
competition in the industry for the benefit of the consumer.  
 
The merger was therefore approved on condition that Total 
Zimbabwe gave the competition authority a written 
undertaking that: (i) it would honour all current agreements 
that Mobil Oil had with other industry players, including 
hospitality arrangements, supply arrangements, and 
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dealership arrangements, to ensure the maintenance of 
competition in the relevant market; and (ii) it would dispose 
of all excess depots and service stations to arise from the 
merger to interested entrepreneurs. 
 
The Commission’s conditions on the approval of the merger 
were accepted and executed by Total Zimbabwe. All the 
hospitality, etc., agreements and arrangements between 
Mobil Oil and other industry players were maintained, thus 
preventing the affected players from exiting the market. The 
process of disposing of the merged entity’s excess depots 
and service stations is still ongoing, but over 20 service 
stations countrywide have so far been disposed of to 
interested entrepreneurs. The benefit to the consumer is that 
the service stations are still offering an essential service to 
the motoring public, and distributing a wider choice of 
petroleum products than just Total/Mobil products. 
Source: Competition and Tariff Commission, Zimbabwe. 
 
6.2. Restrictive and unfair business practices 
 
The report on the second part of the study on the socio-
economic impact of the implementation of competition policy and law in 
Zimbabwe, dealing with the impact of restrictive and unfair business 
practices, is still to be released but its findings are relevant. The study 
found a lot of evidence confirming the adverse effects of anti-
competitive practices on consumer welfare, which are discussed using 
case studies on some of the investigations undertaken by the 
competition authority into the practices. 
 
The competition authority of Zimbabwe, like most other such 
authorities in developing countries, has found it extremely difficult to 
prove the existence of private domestic cartels, even when the adverse 
effects on consumers of such conduct are evident on the market. The 
main reason has been failure by the competition authority to obtain 
concrete documentary evidence of the existence and conduct of the 
cartels. Zimbabwe also does not have a leniency program in place to 
entice cartel members to break rank and supply the requisite evidence. 
However, in one case involving unfair business practices in the dry-
cleaning and laundry services sector, the competition authority was 
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lucky in that the relevant association of dry-cleaners, the Dry Cleaning 
and Laundry Employers Association of Zimbabwe, actually admitted 
during the investigation’s public hearings that it set prices for its 
members and periodically circulated to the members detailed price lists 
on the various items of clothing and fabric that require dry-cleaning or 
laundry. The Association also supplied copies of minutes of its 
meetings, which gave details of workings and formulae used in arriving 
at the uniform prices. The competition authority was lucky in that case to 
have easily obtained the evidence proving the existence of the cartel 
from the perpetrators themselves only because the Association thought 
that what it was doing was normal business112, and was not aware, at 
that stage, that the practice of price fixing was in serious breach of the 
country’s competition law.  
 
The problem of collusive and cartel-like behaviour, rather than 
of pure cartelization, is however prevalent in Zimbabwe. The relative 
smallness of the economy breeds the creation of oligopolistic structures 
and facilitates conscious parallelism, or tacit collusion113, which lead to 
price leadership. The competition authority has dealt with a number of 
cases involving collusive and cartel-like behaviour in various areas, 
such as the financial services sector, particularly the banking sector, the 
cement industry, the legal services sector, and the medical services 
sector, with limited success. One such case is outlined in Box 4. 
                                                 
112
 That was hardly surprising since during the pre-ESAP times of price controls, 
the Government of Zimbabwe actually encouraged industries to form 
associations for the purposes of members agreeing on uniform prices for price 
control determination. 
113
 As noted by R.S. Khemani and D.M. Shapiro in Glossary of Industrial 
Organisation Economics and Competition Law, compiled for the OECD in 1991, 
“Collusion does not necessarily have to involve an explicit agreement or 
communication between firms. In oligopolistic industries, firms tend to be 
interdependent in their pricing and output decisions so that the actions of each 
firm impact on and result in a counter response by the other firm(s). In such 
circumstances, oligopolistic firms may take their rivals’ actions into account and 
coordinate their actions as if they were a cartel without an explicit or overt 
agreement”. 
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Box 4: Full-scale investigation into complaints of restrictive and 
unfair business practices in the cement industry 
 
In March 2000, the Competition Commission concluded a full-scale 
investigation into complaints from the trade and the general public that 
restrictive and unfair business practices in the cement industry were 
leading to shortages and excessive prices of cement in the Zimbabwean 
market.  
At that time, four companies were involved in the production and 
distribution of cement in Zimbabwe: (i) Portland Holdings Limited 
(Unicem) of Bulawayo; (ii) Circle Cement Limited of Harare; (iii) 
Zimbabwe Cement Company (ZimCement) of Norton; and (iv) Techniks 
(Pvt) Limited of Gweru. Only Unicem and Circle Cement were involved 
at all stages of cement production, from the quarrying of limestone to 
the production of cement clinker to the final product. The other two 
companies were more involved in blending operations. The construction 
of new cement plant under a joint venture between the Industrial 
Development Corporation (IDC) and a Chinese company was nearing 
completion in the small Midlands town of Lalapanzi.  
The cement industry was highly concentrated, with a Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) of 4,602. The combined market share of the two 
largest players in the industry, Unicem and Circle Cement, was over 90 
per cent, with Unicem controlling 60 per cent of the market and Circle 
Cement controlling 31 per cent.  
Preliminary investigations into the complaints that had established a 
prima facie case for the full-scale investigation had found circumstantial 
evidence pointing to the following: (i) that there seemed to be a price-
fixing and market-sharing arrangement between Unicem and Circle 
Cement; (ii) that both Unicem and Circle Cement were hindering the 
construction of the new Sino/IDC cement plant in Lalapanzi by refusing 
to supply cement for the construction; (iii) that Circle Cement insisted on 
using its own trucking subsidiary company to transport cement bought 
by its customers; (iv) that Circle Cement demanded cash up front from 
its customers on placement of orders, yet it took a long time in delivering 
the product; (v) that Circle Cement levied its customers to fund its 
expansion project; (vi) that Unicem discriminated among its customers 
in the supply of cement, a commodity then in short supply on the local 
market; and (vi) that while cement was in short supply on the formal 
market, large quantities were being sold on the informal market by 
backyard cement dealers.  
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Stakeholders consulted during the investigation included the Consumer 
Council of Zimbabwe. Evidence gathered confirmed that Unicem and/or 
Circle Cement were engaged in some of the alleged restrictive 
practices, particularly those of an abuse of dominance nature, such as: 
(i) distribution of cement in a discriminatory and unfair manner; (ii) 
imposing unfair and exploitative payment conditions on their customers; 
and (iii) withholding supplies of cement to the formal market in favour of 
the informal market. No evidence was however found that the cement 
companies were preventing or delaying the entry into the cement 
industry of the Sino/IDC joint venture by withholding supplies of cement.  
Also, no evidence was found that Unicem and Circle Cement were 
colluding in price fixing or market sharing. What was found was that the 
homogeneous nature of the product made the costs of its production 
more or less similar amongst the different producers. Unicem, the 
market leader, also set the price, which was followed by the other 
market players without covert agreements. Regarding market sharing, it 
was found that the nature of the product was also such that transport 
costs effectively restricted its distribution to areas close to its production 
points. Unicem operated from Bulawayo, and therefore its natural 
geographic market was the Matebeland Province and the nearby 
Midlands Province. Likewise, Circle Cement operated from Harare and 
its natural geographic market was the Mashonaland Province and the 
nearby Manicaland Province. However, during periods of acute cement 
shortages in either of the cement company’s natural markets, the other 
company’s products were also found to be in short supply in the market.  
The Commission issued cease-and-desist orders against Unicem and 
Circle Cement on the identified restrictive practices in the cement 
industry.  
 
Source: Competition and Tariff Commission, Zimbabwe. 
 
 
The anti-competitive practices in the cement industry that were 
identified by the competition authority’s investigation had been 
adversely affecting the consumer by aggravating shortages of cement, 
and raising prices of the essential commodity on the market. The 
adverse effects were either direct to the consumer or through the use of 
cement for industrial purposes, including construction of roads and 
bridges under public projects. Cases of abuse of dominance, 
monopolization, have also been prevalent in Zimbabwe.  
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The competition impact study found that abusive practices of 
firms in monopoly or dominant positions have had profound adverse 
effects on Zimbabwean consumers.  
 
Some of the abuse of dominance cases investigated by the 
competition authority that illustrate this point are outlined in Boxes 5–7. 
 
The anti-competitive practices in the coal industry had led to 
serious shortages of coal for both industrial and domestic use. 
Companies like Hunyani Pulp & Paper Division, in the paper packaging 
industry, Zimbabwe Iron and Steel Company, in the steel making 
industry, and Delta Corporation, in the beverages industry, all submitted 
that the coal shortages that arose from the restrictive practices had 
caused them serious loss of production on a number of occasions. The 
coal-induced production problems experienced by various industries 
impacted negatively on the welfare of the consumers who had to endure 
the resultant shortages and high prices of the affected basic 
commodities. 
 
The consumer was directly affected by the anti-competitive 
practices in the coal industry by being denied normal supplies of coal for 
household heating and cooking purposes.  
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Source: Competition and Tariff Commission, Zimbabwe. 
 
Box 5: Full-scale investigation into allegations of restrictive and 
unfair business practices in the coal industry 
 
The Commission in November 2001 concluded a full-scale investigation into 
allegations of restrictive and unfair trade practices in the distribution of coal on 
the Zimbabwean market. The allegations had been referred to the Commission 
for investigation by a company called RAE (Pvt) Limited that had complained 
that it was being unfairly prevented by Wankie Colliery Company (WCC), the 
country’s sole coal producer, from entering the coal distribution industry as a 
Coal Merchant. 
 
The allegations that were brought to the attention of the Commission were that: 
(i) WCC was putting barriers to entry into the coal distribution industry by not 
applying its requirements for appointment as a Coal Merchant in a fair and 
transparent manner; (ii) WCC was unfairly allocating coal, particularly the 
popular ‘washed peas’ grade, amongst the appointed Coal Merchants; and (iii) 
WCC was abusing its monopoly position in the supply of coal on the local 
market by arbitrarily imposing exorbitant coal price increases. 
 
The investigation found that WCC was indeed abusing its monopoly position in 
the coal supply industry. While the Colliery had clear criteria and guidelines on 
the appointment of Coal Merchants, it was allowing the bad blood created 
between its management and RAE (Pvt) Limited to influence its treatment and 
determination of that company’s application. The requirements placed on RAE’s 
applications were more stringent than those in the guidelines and those placed 
on the applications of other recently appointed Coal Merchants. WCC had also 
incorporated zoning provisions in its Memorandum of Agreement with the 
appointed Coal Merchants that divided the Zimbabwean market amongst the 
merchants, thus allowing them to effectively operate as monopolists in their 
allocated markets. It was also selling its popular ‘washed peas’ coal grade on 
condition that buyers also buy the other less popular grades that they did not 
want. 
 
On the basis of its findings, the Commission ordered WCC: (i) to resume and 
complete within 30 days its consideration of RAE (Pvt) Limited’s application for 
appointment as a Coal Merchant on the basis of its Requirements for 
Appointment as Coal Merchant already submitted to RAE (Pvt) Limited; (ii) to 
remove the anti-competitive zoning provisions in its Memorandum of Agreement 
with the appointed Coal Merchants; and (iii) to cease and desist from the 
restrictive practice of tied and conditional selling of its coal products.  
 
The Commission also made recommendations to the Ministry of Mines and 
Energy to seriously consider establishing a sector regulator in the coal industry 
to regulate the monopoly situation in that industry. 
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Box 6: Preliminary investigations into allegations of restrictive and 
unfair business practices in the cigarette distribution industry 
 
In October 2001, the Commission received a complaint from British 
American Tobacco Zimbabwe (Holding) Limited (BAT Zimbabwe) that a 
new entrant into the cigarette manufacturing industry, Cut Rag 
Processors, was engaging in restrictive and unfair trade practices in the 
distribution of its new Remington Gold cigarette brands by not printing 
on its cigarette packs the correct health warning clause that had been 
agreed with the Ministry of Health in 1995. The health warning clause 
agreed with the Ministry reads “Smoking May Be Hazardous To Health”, 
while that on Cut Rag Processors’ cigarette packs reads “Tobacco 
Seriously Damages Health: Underage Consumption Prohibited”. 
 
In response to BAT Zimbabwe’s complaint, Cut Rag Processors 
counter-complained that BAT Zimbabwe was attempting to drive it from 
the market by persuading retailers to remove its products from the 
shelves on the strength of a written directive to Cut Rag Processors 
from the Minister of Health to stop selling its cigarettes until it printed the 
agreed health warning clause on its cigarette packs.  
 
The Commission investigated BAT Zimbabwe’s allegations against Cut 
Rag Processors as constituting ‘misleading advertising’, which is a 
prohibited unfair business practice under the Competition Act, while Cut 
Rag Processors’ allegations against BAT Zimbabwe were investigated 
as constituting abuse of dominant position.  
 
The background to the case was that a merger in 2000 of Rothmans of 
Pall Mall (Zimbabwe) Limited and British American Tobacco (Zimbabwe) 
Limited to form BAT Zimbabwe created a monopoly situation in the 
Zimbabwean cigarette manufacturing industry. The otherwise beneficial 
merger was therefore conditionally approved by the Commission subject 
to the merged party disposing of its surplus cigarette making machinery 
to third parties interested in entering the cigarette manufacturing 
industry. The merged BAT Zimbabwe fulfilled that condition by 
auctioning its surplus machinery to Cut Rag Processors who, in August 
2001, used the machinery to start producing its new cigarette brand 
called ‘Remington Gold’ for both the local and export markets. The entry 
of Cut Rag Processors into the cigarette manufacturing industry broke 
BAT Zimbabwe’s monopoly position in that industry. The industry was 
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however still highly concentrated, with an HHI of 9,224. BAT Zimbabwe 
still dominated the market, with a market share of 96 per cent, while Cut 
Rag Processors’ share of the market was only 2.5 per cent. Imports 
accounted for the remaining 1.5 per cent of the market.  
 
The Commission found that the health warning on Cut Rag Processors’ 
cigarette packs was not misleading, nor did it place Cut Rag Processors 
in an unfair competitive position vis-à-vis BAT Zimbabwe. The warning 
was stronger than the one agreed in 1995 between BAT Zimbabwe and 
the Ministry of Health, and correctly informed the consumer of the health 
consequences of smoking cigarettes. It was also noted that BAT 
Zimbabwe itself was distributing on the local market imported cigarettes 
with a health-warning clause similar to the one being used by Cut Rag 
Processors, which had been approved for international use.  
 
On the other hand, the Commission found that BAT Zimbabwe was 
using the Ministry of Health’s directive on the health-warning clause, 
and abusing its position as the major supplier of cigarettes on the local 
market to persuade retailers to remove Cut Rag Processors’ cigarettes 
from the shelves. That constituted attempts at predation aimed at driving 
Cut Rag Processors out of the market. The predatory actions against 
Cut Rag Processors were also seen as BAT Zimbabwe’s subtle 
attempts at nullifying the conditions attached to the Commission’s 
approval of the BAT/Rothmans merger in 2000. In that regard, it was 
noted that BAT Zimbabwe had reluctantly agreed to the condition. At 
that time, the Chief Executive Officer of BAT Zimbabwe had been heard 
to comment that he should “not be expected to assist in the formation of 
a competitor”. 
 
Therefore, while the Commission dismissed BAT Zimbabwe’s 
allegations against Cut Rag Processors, it issued a cease-and-desist 
order on that company against its predatory actions against Cut Rag 
Processors. 
  
Source: Competition and Tariff Commission, Zimbabwe. 
 
BAT Zimbabwe’s anti-competitive practices in the cigarette 
distribution industry of Zimbabwe had serious implications for consumer 
welfare. Had that company managed to drive Cut Rag Processors out of 
the market, the consumer could have been deprived of a cigarette 
brand, Remington Gold, which was gaining popularity in the local market 
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for its price and quality, and also a strong foothold in the South African 
export market.  
 
The exit of Cut Rag Processors from the market would also 
have returned BAT Zimbabwe to the monopoly position it used to hold, 
thus depriving the consumer of the benefits of competition. 
 
Kadoma Textiles’ anti-competitive practices had the effect of: (i) 
restricting the distribution of textile fabric offcuts to only preferred 
customers; (ii) increasing the prices of the offcuts through the creation of 
a distribution chain that had multiple profit mark-up levels; (iii) 
preventing the distribution of the offcuts by the most economical or 
efficient means; and (iv) preventing or restricting entry into the fabric 
offcuts industry. The practices not only denied members of fabric-trading 
cooperatives a livelihood from loss of business, but also adversely 
affected the final consumers. It was submitted that at one time, 
Mutinhimira Fabrics, one of Kadoma Textiles’ preferred customers, was 
supplied with 3,788 kg of offcuts, including the popular ‘distorted fents’ 
type, while members of at least three different cooperatives were 
supplied with only 14 kg of the less popular strip types. It was also 
submitted that while Mutinhimira Fabrics was able to access the offcuts 
at Z$260 per kilogram, the material was being sold to the cooperatives 
at Z$700 per kilogram.  
 
The final consumers of the fabric offcuts, i.e. poor workers who 
buy the material to make clothes, including school uniforms, and 
bedding materials for themselves and their children, were therefore 
short-changed by the resultant higher prices of the otherwise cheap 
waste product. 
 
The competition authority of Zimbabwe has also investigated a 
number of cases involving unfair business practices that directly harm 
the consumer, such as misleading advertising, false bargains and 
distribution of commodities or services above advertised price. These 
can also be referred to as ‘unfair competition practices’ to distinguish 
them from anti-competitive practices since they may not directly reduce 
or lessen competition in a relevant market, nor fall under the strict 
categories of abuse of dominance or anti-competitive agreements. Box 
8 gives details of such an investigation. 
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Box 7: Full-scale investigation into allegations of restrictive and 
unfair business practices in the textile fabric offcuts industry in 
the Kadoma area 
 
In September 2006, the Commission concluded a full-scale 
investigation into allegations of restrictive and unfair business practices 
in the textile fabric offcuts industry in the Kadoma geographic area. The 
allegations, which were brought to the attention of the Commission by a 
cooperative of fabric merchants through the Ministry of Special Affairs 
Responsible for Anti-Corruption and Anti-Monopolies in the Office of 
The President and Cabinet, were that there was an exclusive fabric 
offcuts supply arrangement between Zimbabwe Spinners and Weavers 
Limited, trading as Kadoma Textiles, and a company called Power Mark 
(Pvt) Limited, which was owned by the Managing Director of Kadoma 
Textiles, under which Power Mark had exclusive access to fabric offcuts 
produced by Kadoma Textiles.  
 
Textile fabric offcuts are by-products from the manufacture of fabric and 
are regarded as waste material after failing to meet the necessary 
quality and specification standards. The offcuts however have 
commercial value since some of them are large enough, or can be 
sewed together, to make garments or other fabric products.  
 
Kadoma Textiles is the only company that manufactures textile fabric, 
and therefore produces the fabric offcuts, in Kadoma, a town situated 
about 150 kilometres west of Harare. Offcuts constitute about 0.1 per 
cent of the company’s entire production of fabrics. Barriers to entry into 
the textile industry are very high. The production process is very capital 
intensive, with most of the capital requirements being imported at high 
foreign currency cost.  
 
The Commission’s investigation included stakeholder hearings into the 
matter. It was confirmed that Kadoma Textiles did have an unwritten 
arrangement with Power Mark under which all fabric offcuts produced 
by Kadoma Textiles were sold exclusively to Power Mark. In turn, 
Power Mark had a written agreement with another company called 
Mutinhimira Fabrics under which that company acted as Power Mark’s 
exclusive agent in sales to other fabric traders and to the general public 
of the fabric offcuts obtained from Kadoma Textiles. That created a 
chain of vertical distribution, whereby fabric offcuts would move from 
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Kadoma Textiles to Power Mark and to Mutinhimira Fabrics and finally 
to other traders and the public. At each level in the distribution chain 
there was a profit mark-up, which resulted in higher prices to traders 
and consumers. Power Mark subsequently stopped operations but the 
arrangement that it had had with Kadoma Textiles was continued with 
Mutinhimira Fabrics. 
 
A consent agreement was negotiated between the Commission and 
Kadoma Textiles under which the textile manufacturer agreed to: (i) 
stop the practice of selling exclusively to Mutinhimira Fabrics or to have 
any other exclusive arrangement with any other enterprise or 
organization; and (ii) to ensure that there was equal and unrestricted 
access to textile offcuts by all interested parties through its retail shops. 
However, while Kadoma Textiles opened up its supply of offcuts to 
other fabric traders and the general public through its retail outlet in the 
town of Kadoma, it transpired that certain of its favoured customers, 
who included Mutinhimira Textiles and some of its senior employees, 
continued to get preferential supplies of the offcuts from the factory mill 
in terms of quantity and quality, as well as price, of the material.  
 
The Commission therefore ordered Kadoma Textiles to ensure that 
there was equal and unrestricted access to textile fabric offcuts by all 
interested parties at all stages in the distribution chain from the mill to 
the retail shops in a non-discriminatory manner in terms of prices, 
quantities and variety. 
 
Source: Competition and Tariff Commission, Zimbabwe. 
 
 
 
 
Box 8: Preliminary investigation into suspected unfair business 
practices in the cooking aids industry 
 
In September 2005, the Commission undertook an investigation into 
advertisements placed in the national newspapers by Nestlé Zimbabwe 
warning the public of the appearance on the market of some relish mix 
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(cooking aids) packaged in packets purportedly originating from Nestlé. 
It was indicated in the newspaper advertisements that the fake product 
was of a poor quality and not suitable for human consumption. The 
packets used for packaging the product, while bearing Nestlé’s Maggi 
relish mix trade name, were also of a small 15 g size, instead of Nestlé 
Zimbabwe’s normal 75 g packet for that product.  
 
The Commission investigated the complaint as ‘misleading advertising’, 
an unfair business practice prohibited under the Competition Act, since 
the alleged conduct was aimed at misleading the consumer to believe 
that the product was a genuine Nestlé product. 
 
In its investigation, the Commission found that while the packaging in 
question was indeed a Nestlé Zimbabwe packaging that was no longer 
in use, having been discontinued in 2003, the contents were not a 
genuine Nestlé product. It was also found that a woman had actually 
been arrested by the police for producing and distributing the fake 
product but had been released after paying an Admission of Guilt fine. 
The woman had confessed that she produced the product at her house 
in one of Harare’s high-density suburbs using her own rudimentary 
recipe and ingredients, and packed them for distribution in Nestlé 
Zimbabwe’s Maggi relish mix packets that she had bought in reels from 
the streets. Soon after her release, the woman was rearrested for the 
same offence, and was awaiting trial at the time of the Commission’s 
investigation having been charged under the Brands Act. 
 
It was also found that the practice was spreading, with some of the fake 
products being distributed in other towns throughout the country. 
Another woman was also arrested by the police for the practice, and 
again charged under the Brands Act.  
 
Since penalties under the Competition Act for unfair business practices 
such as misleading advertising are harsher, and therefore more 
deterrent, than those under the Brands Act, the Commission submitted 
its findings and the evidence gathered during the investigation to the 
Attorney General’s Office to strengthen the cases against the arrested 
perpetrators.  
 
Source: Competition and Tariff Commission, Zimbabwe. 
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The misleading advertising case involving food relish mix that 
was investigated by the competition authority of Zimbabwe had serious 
implications for consumer protection and welfare. The investigated 
practice harmed consumers not only in terms of poor quality product, 
but also, more seriously, in terms of threats to human health. The fake 
product was produced in an unhygienic environment using unspecified 
and untested ingredients. The discarded Nestlé packaging that was 
used for packing the product was also picked up from the rubbish 
dumpsites.  
7. Conclusion 
 
The effects of anti-competitive business practices on developing 
countries and their development prospects are serious and can, to some 
extent, be quantified. This has been done through analysing the adverse 
effects of anti-competitive practices on consumer welfare and 
protection. The analysis has largely been based on the practical 
experience of Zimbabwe, which is a typical developing country whose 
experiences in the matter can be considered as representative of the 
situations in most other developing countries.  
 
From Zimbabwe’s experience, conditions placed on the 
approval of mergers can effectively be used to address not only 
competition concerns but also other public interest concerns, including 
consumer concerns, which have long-term implications for competition. 
In the case of Zimbabwe, the merger approval conditions have not only 
been used to address particular competition concerns in the transaction, 
to enable the consummation of otherwise beneficial mergers, but have 
also been used to realize other public interest benefits, including: (i) 
employment creation and/or maintenance (the Rothmans of Pall 
Mall/British American Tobacco merger (to some extent), the Coca-
Cola/Cadbury-Schweppes merger, and the Zimtile/PG Merchandising 
merger); (ii) continued availability of goods and services on the domestic 
market (the Rothmans of Pall Mall/British American Tobacco merger, 
the Coca-Cola/Cadbury-Schweppes merger, the Zimtile/PG 
Merchandising merger, the Shashi Private Hospital/PSMI merger and 
the Zimboard/PG Bison merger); (iii) promotion of foreign direct 
investment (the Coca-Cola/Cadbury-Schweppes merger, the 
Porthold/Pretoria Portland Cement merger, and the Zimboard/PG Bison 
merger); (iv) indigenization and localization of economic control (the 
Rothmans of Pall Mall/British American Tobacco merger, the Coca-
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Cola/Cadbury-Schweppes merger, and the Total Zimbabwe/Mobil Oil 
Zimbabwe merger). Other public interest benefits realized from the 
mergers included enhanced consumer welfare through better quality 
and a wider range of products   (Rothmans of Pall Mall/British American 
Tobacco merger, the Zimtile/PG Merchandising merger, the 
Zimboard/PG Bison merger and various other mergers that have not 
been outlined in this essay, such as the Innscor Appliances/WRS 
merger and the Delta Beverages/Mr Juicy merger). 
 
In the area of RBPs, the Competition Commission’s remedial 
orders on the identified anti-competitive practices have also addressed 
myriad competition and public interest concerns that inhibit 
development. The orders have included: (i) cease-and-desist orders on 
the RBPs (the Cement Distribution case, the Coal Distribution case, and 
the Cigarette Distribution case); (ii) orders on the removal of entry 
barriers (both of a behavioural and structural nature) (the Coal 
Distribution case and the Kadoma Textiles case); and (iii) orders to 
prosecute violators of provisions of the Competition Act that are 
specifically aimed at protection of the consumer (the Cooking Aids 
case). The Commission has also made recommendations to the 
relevant Government authorities on the addressing of particular 
competition concerns in other public policies with the aim of promoting 
competition, and thus ultimately consumer welfare and protection, for 
the facilitation of economic development. 
 
Zimbabwe is one of the few countries in Eastern and Southern 
Africa, together with Kenya, Malawi, South Africa, Tanzania and 
Zambia, which has a competition law in place, and the authority to 
implement the law. It has therefore been able to benefit from the 
effective enforcement of competition rules. 
 
Also shown is that there is a positive interface between 
competition and consumer welfare and protection, and the analysis 
undertaken has not identified any conflicts between the attainment of 
competitive markets and consumer interests.  
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THE ROLE OF COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN 
ALLEVIATING POVERTY – THE CASE OF ZAMBIA 
 
Thulasoni Kaira* 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Definitions of poverty are normally debatable but have 
increasingly taken an economic rationalization approach where a 
standard quantifiable figure of “less than a dollar a day” has been used 
as the rule of the thumb. Arguments may arise as to the determination 
of poverty levels in a country and the variables thereto, more so when 
such determination has been done by foreign expertise. Some of the 
more developed countries refuse to accept the existence of poverty in 
their countries; while the lesser developed countries usually 
acknowledge its existence but often tend to argue against higher 
statistics thereto. This is because poverty is an embarrassing 
phenomenon to acknowledge. A discourse on causes of poverty would 
also produce varying answers ranging from wrong Government policies 
to “laziness” of the poor. Whichever the case and whatever the answers 
to the many more questions that may be posed about poverty, the 
presence of some less or extreme levels of poverty is a reality in almost 
each country and denial in any context and to any extent would likely 
impede the efforts to address the issue. Inevitably, poverty alleviation 
and/or eradication is a subject and source of wealth for a lot of other 
people who study the phenomenon in less developed countries either 
through research organizations or through personal individual 
consultancies. For this reason, poverty is big business anywhere, more 
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so in Africa. Evidently, the way to a poor man’s mouth is through a rich 
man’s hand. 
 
Whatever the causes of poverty, the solution to alleviating them 
would ordinarily have to lie in pragmatic policy interventions. Precisely, 
there is a need to know who the poor are and where they are to be 
found. For example, as far back as 1998, in a report for the Zambia 
Central Statistical Office (CSO)114, it was shown that 84.4 per cent of the 
small-scale farmers (who are concentrated in the countryside) were 
living in extreme poverty. This was at a time when the overall national 
poverty levels were at 84 per cent. According to this same study, the 
population living in the high-cost areas experienced a significant 
increase in their poverty level between 1996 and 1998, but they 
continued to have the second smallest incidence of poverty next to the 
large-scale farmers. On the whole, life was good for the large-scale 
farmers. 
 
The prevalence of high poverty levels in less developed 
countries such as Zambia is not only embarrassing but one that requires 
serious attention in terms of feasible or result-oriented policy formulation 
as well as realising the intended objectives and/or refocusing the same. 
Dealing with poverty in the Third World is a mammoth task that often 
appears to dog the most prudent of policies, competition policy 
notwithstanding. 
 
 A casual observation shows that where there is stable political 
leadership, there is likely to be sustainable macro-economic indicators, 
which are a prelude to any meaningful poverty eradication efforts. There 
would appear to be some indications of such positive strides in countries 
within the region such as Namibia, Botswana, Mauritius, and to a 
notable extent, Zambia and South Africa. 
 
The road to poverty reduction in Zambia was ably formulated 
under the auspices of the Ministry of Finance and National Planning in 
the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper –PRSP (2002). An outline 
representation of its implementation is given in Appendix 1. The PRSP 
considered poverty in the following ways: 
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 Income perspective: A person is poor if his/her income falls below a 
defined moneymetric poverty line, e.g. $1 a day. 
 Basic needs perspective: A person is poor if he/she falls short of the 
material requirements for minimal acceptable fulfilment of human 
needs. This concept goes beyond the lack of income. 
 Capability perspective: A person is poor if he/she lacks certain basic 
capabilities to function. Such ‘functionings’ range from physical ones 
such as adequate food, clothing, and shelter to more complex social 
achievements such as participation in the life of the community. The 
merit of the capability approach lies in its ability to reconcile the 
notions of relative and absolute poverty. Relative deprivations in 
incomes and material requisites can lead to absolute deprivation in 
capabilities. 
 
A truly holistic measure of poverty needs to encompass 
elements from all three perspectives. The PRSP recognised that the 
traditional measures (such as the headcount index) that capture only 
income deficiency are simply not adequate. One such holistic measure 
is the Human Poverty Index (HPI), developed by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP)115. The HPI, which intends to gauge 
a broader notion of ‘human poverty’ as opposed to just income poverty, 
appears to be a composite index that measures deprivation in three 
broad dimensions: deprivation of a long and healthy life measured by 
the percentage of newborns not expected to survive to 40 years of age; 
deprivation of knowledge measured by illiteracy; and deprivation in 
economic provisioning measured by the percentage of the population 
lacking access to health services and safe water as well as the number 
of children who are moderately or severely underweight. 
 
Even the HPI, however, does not measure all aspects of 
poverty. It excludes, for instance, lack of political freedom and personal 
security and the inability to participate in decision making and in the life 
of the community. Notably, the Government acknowledged in the PRSP 
that these facets of poverty are of course not easy to measure. 
 
While the PRSP has been implemented in some measure, its 
success is a subject of continued debate. In an attempt to contribute to 
this debate, this study analyses the causes of poverty in Zambia and its 
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location, what is being done to address poverty, and how competition 
law and policy has and/or can be used to address poverty, before 
presenting conclusions.  
 
In the context of competition law and policy, it is essential to 
hypothesize that any poverty alleviation efforts have to create wealth 
(i.e. through efficiencies), create jobs (i.e. through new entry), and/or 
reduce prices (through competition). Where competition enforcement 
efforts do not lead to these results, then the existence of this law should 
be questioned and answers given as to why these results are not self-
evident. There is a public demand that all institutions that depend on the 
taxpayer for their existence must be able to demonstrate their benefit to 
the general public, more so in terms of facilitating the creation of wealth. 
In the conclusion, there is an attempt to explain any observed failures of 
competition law and policy to function as an effective tool for poverty 
alleviation strategies. 
 
2. Literature review on interface between competition policy 
and law and poverty alleviation 
 
It is now common knowledge in the domain of the average 
competition student that the primary objective of competition policy is to 
enhance consumer welfare by promoting competition. Economic 
efficiency is generally enhanced by encouraging competition, and thus 
one of the key links between competition policy and development has 
been the role that competition policy plays in increasing economic 
efficiency. The efficient use of resources is especially important in the 
development context where resources are particularly scarce. Less 
developed countries such as Zambia would fall into this category. 
 
The main static effects of competition are to reduce the ability of 
firms to raise prices above marginal cost and to ensure that firms 
produce at the lowest possible costs. The dynamic consequences of 
competition can include incentives to innovate, to imitate, and to invest 
in the development of new technologies and know-how. Competition 
policy reinforces economic efficiency by preventing or providing 
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remedies for market structures and business practices that weaken the 
degree of inter-firm rivalry in markets116. 
 
While the above statements appear quite abstract, there are 
some scholars and experts who have attempted to actually directly link 
competition policy and law implementation efforts to poverty reduction 
per se. For instance, Fox (2007)117 submitted that market tools are a 
very important part of the panoply of tools needed to address world 
poverty and that they should be used liberally. These market tools 
include market-freeing measures that reduce prices. They also include 
antitrust priority setting that targets conspiracies that raise the price of 
staples, such as milk, bread, transportation and utilities, helping the poor 
as well as those who are better off. Perhaps the critical challenge to the 
traditional efficiency advocacy for competition law and policy was best 
rephrased by Fox when she asked this pertinent question: If you were a 
policy maker in a country whose principal economic problem was deep 
systemic poverty, aggravated by corruption, cronyism, selective statism, 
weak institutions, and often unstable democracy, what is the 
foundational perspective on which you would formulate your country’s 
antitrust law? In particular, would you choose a foundational principle 
that trusts liberalization and free enterprise (“first model”) or would you 
choose a foundational principle that centrally takes account of the 
opacity, blockage and political capture of your markets, and includes 
some measure of helping to empower people economically to help 
themselves (“second model”). In the face of the disparities in wealth and 
opportunity to the harm of some of the poorest people caused by 
globalization, Fox considered the second model to be the other path 
through which developing countries can use competition law to ensure 
that the free market policies do not disproportionately advantage the 
already advantaged in every game played. It is clear than even in the 
face of liberalization, developed countries liberalized where convenient 
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and resisted liberalization where inconvenient. Fox attempted to link 
deep systemic poverty to inequality in world trade. 
 
Freeing the markets has been shown to hold great economic 
benefits for developing and transition countries. For this, Fox is 
convinced that antitrust can help, although she is mindful of the form 
such an antitrust law should take. 
 
Khemani has observed that the World Bank’s Global Economic 
Prospects Report (2003) points to the pro-growth and pro-poor benefits 
of competitive markets. Research conducted for the report indicates that 
economies with competitive domestic markets generally tend to have 
higher levels and rates of growth in per capita income. Entry of firms 
plays an important role in the competitive process and such economies 
also have lower rates of poverty and attract more domestic and foreign 
investment. Accordingly, these research findings are considered to be 
consistent with the theory that barriers to competition impede 
innovation, growth and prosperity118. While enactment of a competition 
law does not necessarily result in competition, Khemani has 
acknowledged that with a competition law in place, it signals to firms 
and markets that certain business behaviours and commercial practices, 
as defined in the law, are illegal. It confers rights and obligations on 
transacting parties and provides for due process to resolve disputes and 
obtain relief from anti-competitive practices. Findings from the World 
Economic Forum’s The Global Competitiveness Report 2006–2007 
provides further evidence of the importance of competition, and 
competition law and policy, in fostering higher incomes, broad-based 
markets (less dominant firms) and global competitiveness. 
 
The Department for International Development (DFID)119 has 
recognized that fair competition in markets is crucial for economic and 
social development, and for reducing poverty yet anti-competitive 
practices diminish the opportunities for innovation and growth, making 
consumers worse off. Recognition is made (p. 38) of the contribution 
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that competitive markets can make to economic growth and to poverty 
reduction. 
 
The development of the micro, small and medium-sized 
enterprises (MSMEs) may also appear to be one area where 
competition law and policy may facilitate growth and thus reduce 
poverty. Hallberg120 has observed that imperfectly competitive markets 
for products produced by SMEs are certainly a distortion that creates a 
bias against small firms. In addition, imperfect competition in markets for 
products and services used by SMEs (for example, financial markets) 
can discriminate against them. The first-best solution would be to deal 
directly with the market failure (e.g. enforcing competition policy). 
 
Hallberg argued that SME promotion is justified on the grounds 
of the greater efficiency of small firms, their contribution to a more 
equitable distribution of income, and their role in generating 
employment. However, she was sensitive to the fact that empirical 
evidence supporting these claims was very mixed. The real reason that 
developing country governments should be interested in SMEs was not 
because of the benefits of smallness, but because “they are there”, and 
account for a large share of employment. 
 
3. The poverty levels in Zambia 
 
According to the latest statistics from the Zambia CSO, Zambia 
has a population of about 11 million. Of this population, about 500,000 
are formally employed while the rest are either children, retirees, or are 
self/informally employed. A walk in the streets of Lusaka, more so in the 
unplanned settlements (or “compounds” as they are commonly referred 
to), shows a large proportion of the self-employed, notably women. 
These are arguably the visible urban poor. Those in rural settlements 
are considered to be arguably worse off121 because of the volatile nature 
                                                 
120
 Kristin Hallberg, Small and Medium Scale Enterprises: A Framework for 
Intervention, Small Enterprise Unit, Private Sector Development Department, 
The World Bank, May 21, 1999. 
121
 On the other hand it may be argued that although materially poorer, those in 
rural areas, in the absence of drought and animal disease, are better off in that 
they are spared the squalor of urban settlements which are often incubation 
spots for disease and societal rot. 
 140 
of their economic lifelines, e.g. crop yield and livestock rearing may be 
susceptible to drought and disease. 
 
While poverty levels in Zambia remain unacceptably high, there 
has been tremendous progress made in terms of macroeconomic 
stability since 2002, which has had positive effects on the 
microeconomic variables. While there is a lot to be done in terms of 
developing a culture of competition in public procurement and private 
business dealings, there is still a lot that has been done in terms of 
realigning the economy from a State-controlled economy to a market 
economy.  
 
Table 1 shows the relatively commendable growth rates that 
have been achieved since 2000, with relatively higher growth rates 
registered since 2002 onwards. 
 
Table 1: Key macro-statistics 1996–2006 
 
Source: CSO, National Accounts Statistics. 
 
With the growth rate, the poverty levels appear to have also 
diminished, as shown in Table 2: 
 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Total GDP 
at current 
prices 
(ZK’billion) 
3,950.2 5,140.2 6,027.9 7,477.7 10,071.9 13,132.7 16,260.4 20,479.2 
 
25,997.4 
 
32,456.3 
 
38,676.5 
 
Total GDP 
at 
constant 
(1994) 
prices 
(ZK’billion) 
2,328.1 
 
2,404.9 
 
2,360.2 
 
2,412.7 
 
2,499.0 
 
2,621.3 
 
2,707.9 
 
2,846.5 
 
2,999.2 
 
3,155.9 
 
3,343.3 
GDP per 
capita at 
current 
prices 
(kwacha) 
444,059 564,127 645,869 782,201 1,028,587 1,301,621 1,562,085 1,906,038 2,344,290 2,836,723 3,278,034 
GDP per 
capita at 
constant 
(1994) 
prices 
(kwacha) 
261,707 263,935 252,886 252,384 255,213 259,806 260,138 264,930 270,450 275,830 283,365 
GDP 
growth 
rate at 
constant 
(1994) 
prices 
6.9 3.3 –1.9 2.2 3.6 4.9 3.3 5.1 5.4 5.2 6.2 
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Table 2: Poverty trends 1991–2006 
Total/Residence 1991 1993 1996 1998 2004 2006 
Zambia 70 74 69 73 68 64 
Rural 88 92 82 83 78 80 
Urban 49 45 46 56 53 34 
Source: CSO, Living Conditions Monitoring Survey V (2006). 
 
 
Despite the liberalization and commercialization of the economy 
from 1991, the biggest challenge to Zambia’s efforts to reduce poverty 
have been years of high inflation in the 1990s. It was not until 2002, 
when the “New Deal” policies122 of the present Government were 
announced, that Zambia appeared to show great strides in this regard, 
which culminated in a single-digit figure in 2006. With reduced inflation, 
this has seen interest rates decrease and provided affordable finance 
capital to business, more so the SME segment that provides critical 
supply linkages to the growing mining industry.  
 
Graph 1 shows the inflationary trend from December 2006 to December 
2007. 
 
Graph 1: Inflation rate December 2006 to December 2007 
 
 
While stabilisation of inflation has been a significant success 
story of the New Deal policies – and admittedly other macro-economic 
                                                 
122
 At his inaugural Presidential speech in January 2002, current President Levy 
Mwanawasa, enunciated “New Deal” policies that he promised his government 
would follow in order to change the economy and reduce poverty levels. 
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statistics show some good news – the figures would appear to still be far 
from the reality on the ground in so far as extreme poverty levels are 
concerned. A consideration of those that are poor shows that they are to 
be found somewhere in the  
 
- small informal businesses sector (largely street vendors and 
market traders), and 
- agriculture sector (largely the rural areas, where the poverty 
levels are about 80 per cent). 
 
It would be in these areas that competition law should show 
itself active in ensuring that any interventions yield efficiencies that 
trickle downstream. 
 
4. Why there is still extreme poverty in Zambia 
 
Having identified where the majority of the poor are, it is a 
natural consequence to ask the question: Why do we have poverty, 
especially extreme poverty? Various reasons have been advanced by 
both Government and external development partners on the causes of 
extreme poverty levels in Zambia. Whatever the causes, they should be 
the primary mischief that competition law and policy should, directly, 
and/or indirectly, be engaged actively and otherwise to resolve. Various 
writings including those of the CSO and the PRSP (pp. 28–29) have 
posited hypotheses as to why there is poverty in Zambia. These have 
been considered as follows: 
 
4.1. Lack of economic growth  
 
At the time that the PRSP was being drafted and finalized (in 
2002), the economic reality of Zambia was uninspiring in many ways. 
This was perhaps true at the time of formulation of the PRSP, when the 
economy was marginally growing. The trend has been different since 
2002. For now, this has been sustained above 5 per cent and it is hoped 
that policy stability shall continue. However, much of the growth is 
attributed to the discovery of new mines and the increased copper 
prices as a result of the high Chinese demand. Bottlenecks such as 
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HIV/AIDS continue to be a toll on the human capital although there has 
been a drastic reduction.  
 
Significant poverty reduction requires a substantial injection of 
resources into poverty reduction activities and that is not possible 
without growth. In its absence, there can be little increase in domestic 
resources either through savings or tax revenues. Fortunately, there has 
been a remarkable improvement in macroeconomic statistics from 2002, 
with a reducing trend in inflation and an increasing trend in GDP. For 
instance, Table 3 shows that international reserves have increased by 
almost 50 per cent between 2006 and 2007, which is exceptionally good 
for Zambia considering where it is coming from. 
 
Table 3: International reserves 2006–2007 
 
International 
reserves 
December 
2007 
(ZK billion) 
December 
2006 
(ZK billion) 
End-period 
exchange rate 
Dec. 2007: 
US$1=ZK3,845 
Dec. 2006: 
US$1=ZK4,407  
Gross official foreign 
assets 
7,251 5,334   
Foreign currency 
reserves 
4,110 3,054   
 SDRs holdings 38 59   
IMF reserve position 3,086 2,220   
 Other foreign assets 17 1  
Source: adapted from CSO, Zambia National Summary Data Page, External Sector 
2007123.  
SDRs - Special Drawing Rights; IMF - International Monetary Fund. 
 
 
4.2. High inequality  
 
Increased economic development inevitably leads to more 
wealth for the wealthy and/or more money for those who are able to 
exploit the opportunities. The prospects for growth as well as the 
subsequent impact of any growth on poverty reduction are thwarted by a 
                                                 
123
 Figures on http://www.zamstats.gov.zm/extern.php captured on 3 March 
2008. 
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high level of inequality. Rural-urban, interprovincial, and inter-social 
strata disparities are already evident from the tables presented so far. 
Another crucial conclusion of empirical research has been that a 
historically unequal situation might perpetuate itself unless changed by 
government policy, such as asset redistribution. 
 
It is possible for competition law and policy to influence or 
facilitate measures that would be aimed at expanding the base of 
entrepreneurship through modification and/or outright prohibition of anti-
competitive arrangements by dominant firms and trade associations. 
The provisions for small business promotion in the Australian Trade 
Practices Act 1974 provide a relevant model that countries such as 
Zambia may also opt to include in their legislations. 
 
4.3. Debt burden  
 
Another major factor that has reduced resources for poverty 
reduction is the heavy debt burden, which has exerted a significant 
crowding-out effect on social expenditures. Over the years up to 2003, 
debt service has on average accounted for 10 per cent of the GDP, 
while all the social sectors together have accounted for only 5 per cent. 
With Zambia reaching the “Highly Indebted Poor Countries” (HIPC) 
benchmarks set by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), debt relief 
has come as a major boost to economic activity as it has freed 
resources. Overt evidence of this has been a strengthened local 
currency and reduced interest rates due to less Government borrowing 
from the domestic financial institutions. 
 
Considering that not more than three years ago the country had 
an external debt of over US$6 billion (ZK24 trillion), a reduction to US$1 
billion (K4 trillion) lays good ground for using resources for development 
rather than for debt serving. 
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Table 4: External debt 2006–2007 
 
Source: adapted from CSO, Zambia National Summary Data Page, External Sector 
2007124. 
 
4.4. Excessive external dependence  
 
The absence of growth and the huge debt burden have made 
external funding a necessity. External funding constituted, for instance, 
89 per cent and 84 per cent, respectively, of the total spending in the 
water and sanitation sectors in 1995 and 1996, compared to 31 per cent 
in 1990. In 2001, 53 per cent of the national budget was expected to be 
funded from outside. 
 
By 2007, this was reduced to about 30 per cent, which is a 
commendable drop within a period of five years. It is likely that the trend 
is going to be downwards although such dependence may easily 
fluctuate in higher realms where international factors adversely affect 
the balance of payments, e.g. oil prices. 
                                                 
124
 Ibid. 
External debt December 
2007 
(ZK 
billion) 
December 
2006 
(ZK 
billion) 
End-period exchange rate 
Dec. 2007: US$1=ZK3,845 
Dec. 2006: US$1=ZK4,407  
Total debt 
(stock) 
3,923 4,350   
 Official debt 
(stock) 
3,496 4,077   
 Multilateral 2,392 2,336   
 Bilateral 1,104 1,741   
 Private debt, 
incl. 
parastatals 
(stock) 
427 273  
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4.5. Other causes 
 
Other causes include inappropriate prioritization; inadequate 
social safety nets; and HIV/AIDS, and rural-urban migration. CSO 
statistics show that rural-urban migration has led to congested urban 
areas, overburdened social amenities and a pressure on jobs that has in 
turn led to a burgeoning informal sector. Migrants formally of an 
occupation in agriculture, fisheries and animal husbandry accounted for 
the highest percentages in all provinces compared to other occupations. 
In Eastern Province they accounted for 46 per cent followed by Luapula 
at 39 per cent and Western Province with 36 per cent (CSO, 2003). 
 
5. What needs to be done to address poverty in Zambia? 
 
It is evident that most of the poor in Zambia are in the 
agricultural sector. Thus, policy interventions in agro-related industries 
would likely have the greatest impact on improving the extreme levels of 
poverty. It is already a known fact that agriculture is expected to be a 
key sector for the future development of the Zambian economy, together 
with mining and tourism. This perhaps is true for most of sub-Saharan 
Africa. Infrastructural issues normally come to mind in terms of 
accessing the rural with farming implements as well as the rural farmer 
accessing markets with his harvest. Transportation of agricultural inputs 
and outputs is a major constraint each year, a constraint that the 
unscrupulous and opportunistic trader has taken advantage of to abuse 
the rural farmer. The condition of rural roads is of key importance to 
farmers as is wider agricultural and regional development, especially in 
trying to bring subsistence or marginally commercial farmers into the 
cash economy125. The competition law would ordinarily come in handy 
to ensure that the bidding process for such critical infrastructure is not 
marred by anti-competitive practices such as bid rigging or collusive 
tendering126. 
 
                                                 
125
 United Nations, Zambia Country Profile, Johannesburg Earth Summit, p. 89, 
2004. 
126
 Section 9 of the Competition and Fair Trading Act, CAP 417 of the Laws of 
Zambia. 
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In the 2006 Living Conditions Monitoring Survey (V), 
households were asked to indicate which developmental projects they 
would like provided or improved in their communities. The results show 
that 30 per cent of the respondents desired projects related to road 
infrastructure. Provision or improvement of education facilities was the 
second preferred project with 18 per cent of the households followed by 
health facilities with 13 per cent. The least desired projects were credit 
facilities, employment issues, police/security facilities, and sanitation at 
one per cent each (CSO, The Monthly, 2007). 
 
Even the rural poor know that infrastructure development will be 
a decisive factor in their socio-economic transformation. The role of 
competition policy in infrastructural development is critical to its success. 
The bid-rigging or collusive tendering instances would be minimized in 
the wake of competition for public works. This has actually been a major 
problem in capital-intensive projects such as road and bridge 
construction where contractors are given a contract to do the same job, 
one after the other fails to complete it. The following section shall deal 
with how competition has been used in agro-related sectors to stimulate 
or sustain wealth creation. 
 
6. Using the competition law and policy to deal with poverty 
 
A competition law has a specific sphere of operation and 
objectives that may in many ways contribute to the alleviation of poverty 
by ensuring that failing firms are taken over by more vibrant competitors 
or new entrants. The competition law may also be used to break cartels 
that constrain freedom of trade and business expansion as is shown 
later in a poultry case study. Further, this law may also be used to 
ensure that there is no exclusive dealing that is anti-competitive and that 
leads to the failure of other market actors to penetrate markets and/or 
thrive competitively. It is in, inter alia, these areas that a competition 
authority would directly and/or indirectly contribute to wealth 
maintenance and wealth creation, which are key to any strategy to 
alleviate poverty. 
 
The United Nations system in Zambia has recognized the role 
of competition law in economic development. The Zambia Country 
Profile notes that the Competition and Fair Trading Act regulates the 
 148 
market to ensure fair trading practices and prevent market domination 
through the Competition Commission127.  
 
The report noted that the Ministry of Commerce, Trade and 
Industry has come up with initiatives to foster industrial development, 
including: 
 
 promoting institutionalized consultative dialogue with the 
business community 
 regional and multilateral agreements 
 bilateral agreements 
 competition policies – promote fair trading 
 investment promotion 
 a privatization programme 
 establishing export processing zones. 
 
The PSRP does not mention promotion of competition in any 
precise way. However, on its p. 62 there is an outline of Industrial 
Development Programmes for Poverty Reduction, of which the basic 
principles and goals were adopted from the 1994 Industrial, Commercial 
and Trade Policy128. In order to align manufacturing growth to poverty 
reduction, it is necessary to ensure a strategic focus on poverty both in 
the medium and long term in the manufacturing growth strategy. In this 
regard, the following vision was to guide Zambia’s industrial 
development over the next 25 years129: 
 
“To attain a dynamic, competitive, and environmentally 
sustainable industrial sector in both urban and rural areas as a means of 
reducing poverty through sustained economic growth and employment 
creation.” 
 
In order to attain this vision, the specific objectives for 
manufacturing development were presented as to: 
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 United Nations, Zambia Country Profile, Johannesburg Earth Summit, 
Country Profile Series, CP2002-Zambia, p. 79, 2002. 
128
 Competition Policy has been given prominence in a revised Draft Industrial, 
Commercial and Trade Policy, which is yet to be adopted. At the time of writing 
this report, the Ministry of Commerce, Trade and Industry had set up a 
committee to draft a distinct and comprehensive national competition policy. 
129
 Per 2004 Industrial, Commercial and Trade Policy. 
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 Promote investments in both urban and rural areas that 
primarily utilize local raw materials. 
 Encourage output and employment expansion in the sector by 
promoting growth in manufactured exports especially in areas 
where Zambia has comparative advantage. 
 Promote growth in small- and medium-scale enterprises. 
 Promote an enabling environment and even the playing field 
with respect to competing imports, efficient utilities in energy, 
transport and telecommunications, skills training, science and 
technology development, and a legal and regulatory framework 
that is conducive to the growth of manufacturing. 
 
The 2004 Industrial, Commercial and Trade Policy, however, 
lacked programmes targeted at poverty reduction and did not give 
concrete indications as to how to involve the poor and the 
disadvantaged in manufacturing activities aimed at stimulating growth 
and reducing poverty. The policy also lacks strategies for encouraging 
new investments, establishing competitiveness in industry, and 
economic diversification. Efforts to establish strategic export niches also 
need strengthening. Cross-cutting issues of gender, the youth, 
HIV/AIDS, environment, and energy will form a critical pillar to attaining 
industrial development130. 
 
While competition policy has been tacitly mentioned in various 
policy documents in Zambia, the enactment of the Competition and Fair 
Trading Act in 1994 was a major milestone in having a comprehensive 
law that dealt with improving the “efficiency of production and 
distribution of goods and services”131. It is a general expectation that 
one of the key objectives of competition policy and law is to preserve 
and promote competition as a means to ensure the efficient allocation of 
resources in an economy. This preservation and promotion of 
competition should result in tangible (and not hypothetical) growth, 
equitable distribution, and lower prices and adequate supplies to 
consumers. For a developing economy handicapped by resource 
                                                 
130
 An acknowledgment made in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, 2002. 
131
 One of the statements in the preamble to the Competition and Fair Trading 
Act, 1994. 
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constraints, efficient allocation of resources is absolutely essential to 
enable optimum utilization of limited resources132.  
 
Addressing the ills brought about by market power (i.e. control 
of abuse of dominant position) is a likely good starting point to ensure 
that the benefits of competition accrue to all the market actors. This 
would thus maintain business momentum, jobs, and wealth creation, 
which are cardinal to poverty alleviation. 
 
To illustrate the contribution of competition law enforcement 
efforts in alleviating poverty, the following key areas are identified where 
interventions appear to have yielded positive results in Zambia: 
 
 The cotton sector 
 The horti- and floricultural sector 
 The poultry sector 
 The beef sector. 
 
These sectors are deliberately chosen because they are 
agricultural based, an area where 80 per cent of the poor find their 
socio-economic livelihood. Therefore, efforts aimed at improving 
efficiencies, equitable market benefits, grass-root growth in these 
sectors are most likely to have the greatest impact in alleviation of 
poverty.  
 
6.1. Interventions in the cotton industry 
 
The Commission was moved to intervene in a major case in the 
cotton industry after an article that appeared in the Post of Saturday, 28 
October 2006 entitled “Katete women farmers call for review of cotton 
contract”. The complainants contemplated “to fight unfair trade 
practices” in the Zambian cotton industry133. The women134 alleged that 
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 World Bank & OECD, A Framework for the Design and Implementation of 
Competition Law and Policy, Washington D.C., 1999. 
133
 In Competition Assessment Framework – An operational guide for identifying 
barriers to competition in developing countries, January 2008, at page 42, DFID 
has recognized that contract farming is not necessarily either good or bad for 
farmers, or for competition. The system can be mutually beneficial to the farmer 
and the company purchasing the output. It can be particularly useful for higher 
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multinational companies stole their money during the 2005/2006 cotton-
marketing season by reducing the price of grade A cotton from the 
previous ZK1,220 per kilogram to ZK850135. 
 
The ginners through the Zambia Cotton Ginners Association 
contended that the low prices were as a result of the strong kwacha 
experienced in 2005. The farmers were reported to have claimed that it 
was unfair for the ginners to transfer the burden of the kwacha’s 
appreciation onto the local farmers, and appealed to the Government 
through the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives to investigate such 
issues and ensure that there was equity and fairness in the business. 
One of the strategies proposed for the following season was that 
outgrower agreements should be entered into between farmers and 
ginners and the elimination of third parties who previously appeared to 
gain more than the farmers. 
 
The Zambia Competition Commission had been closely 
monitoring the developments and growth of the cotton industry through 
its interventions pertaining to mergers and acquisitions as well as other 
industry-related anti-competitive trade practices since 1998. The matter 
of cotton contracts has been an issue that has been of concern since 
the liberalization of the economy in 1991 and the sale of the then State-
owned enterprise LINTCO to Lonrho Cotton.  
 
After considering the market dynamics, the Commission’s view 
was that all economic activity has to translate into economic efficiency 
and ultimately enhance the welfare of the citizens. It was observed that 
despite growing cotton under contract for some time, the socio-
economic welfare of most of the contract cotton farmers did not appear 
to show that the benefits accrued to farmers, whose poverty levels have 
remained high. 
 
Since the initiation of major agricultural reforms in the early 
1990s, Zambian cotton production and processing has grown rapidly 
and now ranks as one of the most important sources of crop income 
                                                                                                            
value crops, and can provide the farmers with access to reasonable terms for 
finance, technical information and markets. However, there are sometimes 
situations where the terms imposed by the buyer are unnecessarily restrictive. 
134
 Women are reckoned to account for 51 per cent of the population in Zambia. 
135
 US$1 = ZK4,000. 
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among small farmers and agribusiness firms in key agricultural 
production regions of the country136. The subsequent report by the Food 
Security Research Project (FSRP) under the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Food and Fisheries revealed that cotton production in Zambia has 
doubled since the dismantling of the cotton parastatal monopoly 
LINTCO and the introduction of outgrower programmes supported by 
private agribusiness firms in the mid-1990s. In spite of these 
achievements, the cotton sector was still faced with the following key 
challenges: 
 
 Sustaining and building upon previous success and remaining 
competitive in the face of a projected long-term decline in world 
cotton prices as well as shorter price cycles;  
 
 Bringing about more transparent practices and less volatility in 
prices for farmers;  
 
 Maintaining agribusiness firms' provision of supply inputs and 
extension of support to smallholder farmers to achieve 
productivity growth while addressing ginners' and other firms' 
problems with farmer loan repayment; and  
 
 Financing necessary investments in agricultural research and 
extension systems to achieve long-term productivity growth in 
an environment where the public sector is not likely to provide 
these investments. 
 
The Commission’s findings showed that the outgrower schemes 
under the smallholders are a critical strategic link to the 
merchants/ginners. Large-scale commercial farms do not necessarily 
have all the land they need to meet market demand for their produce in 
the rainy season. Neither would it be profitable for them to have large 
areas of land lying fallow in seasons when the market demand is low. It 
has thus been acknowledged that it is more economic to meet the 
expansion/contraction cushion effect by utilizing the services of small- 
and medium-scale farmers who have the ability to change crops quickly. 
For this reason, it is a matter of course that the ginners invest heavily in 
                                                 
136Key Challenges and Options Confronting Smallholder, Agribusiness and 
Government Leaders in Zambia's Cotton Sector, Food Security Research 
Project (FSRP) Team 2000. 
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the crop and do what is in their power to recover their cost. However, 
such recoveries do not appear to be effected in an equitable manner. 
The ginners ruthlessly attempt to recover all their fixed and variable 
costs as well as ensure a profit even where the farmers themselves are 
left with nothing. To attain this, the ginners engage court-certified bailiffs 
to salvage the little chattels that the farmers may have and/or threaten 
them with blacklisting them from future financing arrangements137.  
 
The outgrower scheme principally creates a monopsony buyer, 
who determines the price at the signing of the outgrower contract. In 
2006, market share estimates showed a duopolistic market of which 
Dunavant held 53.49 per cent and Cargill Cotton held about 30 per cent, 
with the rest fragmented amongst five on-and-off players. The two-firm 
concentration ratio (CR2) was 83.49 per cent. 
During the same period, the cotton farmers found their feet in 
the name of the Cotton Association of Zambia (CAZ), which advised all 
its member farmers not to collect inputs from ginners for the 2006/7 
farming season before the price for the commodity was agreed upon. 
With the Commission knocking on its door, Dunavant was reported to 
have increased its 2006/7 planting price at ZK1,000/kg for grade ‘A’ 
seed cotton from the ZK850/kg offered during the 2005/06 marketing 
season. The company further reduced the input prices to ZK36,000 per 
pack from the ZK40,000 set for the previous farming season and 
promised to revise the ZK1,000 price if circumstances changed 
positively at harvesting time138. 
 
In the ensuing unfair pricing complaints in the agricultural 
sector, under the headline “Peasant Farmers Call for Better 2007 Crop 
Marketing Strategy” the Post reported that the National Association for 
Peasant and Small-Scale Farmers of Zambia (NAPSFZ) had called on 
                                                 
137
 The world prices for cotton are an important element in the pricing of the 
seed cotton at the local level. James Tefft in his paper entitled Building on 
Successes in African Agriculture; Mali’s White Revolution: Smallholder Cotton 
from 1960 to 2003 has noted thus “subsidies to cotton farmers in the United 
States currently depress world prices by about US$0.11 per pound. If these 
subsidies were removed and the price increase transmitted to Malian farmers, 
the typical farm would increase earnings”.  
138
 Business Post , Tuesday 14 November 2006, “Dunavant Raises 2006/2007 
Pre-Planting Cotton Price”. 
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government to come up with a better crop marketing strategy for the 
2006/7 farming season139. 
 
According to a report that was subsequently produced by the 
Commission140, the outgrower schemes have the potential to greatly 
contribute to reducing poverty and contribute to the efforts being made 
by Zambia as a country to achieve the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) but the current (lower) prices in these outgrower schemes 
undermine this potential. The MDGs represent a global partnership that 
has grown from the commitments and targets established at the world 
summits of the 1990s. Responding to the world’s main development 
challenges and to the calls of civil society, the MDGs promote poverty 
reduction, education, maternal health, gender, equality, and aim at 
combating child mortality, AIDS and other diseases141.  
 
 
Source: The Business Post, Tuesday, 12 December 2006. 
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Table 5: “Dunavant pledges not to reduce prices next year”  
 
Dunavant assured farmers of no reductions in prices next marketing season (2006/7), 
regardless of the performance of the local currency and world market situations.  
 
Mr Richard Laurin, the company’s chairman based in Geneva Switzerland, 
explained the circumstances to price changes in the previous marketing season and 
apologized for a sharp decline in prices after the kwacha appreciated against the 
US dollar. During meetings with farmers in Sinazongwe, Mobola and Monze, Mr 
Laurin repeatedly assured the farmers that the guaranteed pre-planting price of 
ZK1,000 per kilogram of seed cotton would not be reduced as was the case during  
the previous marketing season. 
 
Mr. Laurin is reported to have admitted that in 2005 Dunavant had announced that 
they would buy a kilogram of seed cotton at ZK1,220 but after the kwacha 
appreciated, the price of cotton came down to ZK850. The paper reported that Mr. 
Laurin admitted this and said that it was his personal failure. Mr Laurin apologized to 
the farmers for the situation. 
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The Commission reviewed the imbalance of power in the 
negotiation of prices of cotton in outgrower schemes. Multinational 
entities such as Dunavant and Cargill Cotton were actually 
disproportionately benefiting, compared to the farmers, whose economic 
gains were stagnant against the huge profits that the merchants were 
making. Not surprisingly, the cotton association and Dunavant could 
well afford to offer ZK 1,120 per kilogram of grade seed cotton this 
marketing season142. The offer price of ZK1,120 included an additional 
ZK50 per kilogram premium for deliveries up to 14 July 2007. 
 
In the same period, Cargill Cotton also took steps to correct its 
pricing system. The input prices for the 2006 planting season were 
reduced by 28 per cent year on year making Cargill’s complete input 
package cheaper than that of any other ginner. This dramatic reduction 
in input costs was part of a conscious effort by Cargill Cotton to offset 
the impact of low global cotton prices on the incomes of small-scale 
Zambian farmers. In line with its previously stated strategy to pay a 
competitive seed cotton price, Cargill Cotton announced a buying price 
for the 2007 crop of ZK1,120/kg, an increase of 32 per cent over the 
previous year. Considering the reduced input cost, Cargill Cotton 
reported that their farmers were to enjoy the largest increase in net 
revenue in comparison to other cotton farmers throughout the country. 
This was to give the average farmer an additional net income of 75 per 
cent compared to the previous year143. It was a desirable outcome that 
the ginners were finally using higher promised returns to the farmers as 
a competitive advantage. 
 
What began as an ordinary newspaper article and an 
investigation by the Commission ended up being one of the biggest 
poverty alleviation stories in the Zambian agricultural sector, with the 
cotton association calling on the farmers it had previously dissuaded to 
encourage them to grow cotton144. Cargill Cotton had become a 
founding member of the Zambia Cotton Outgrower Association 
(ZCOPA), which aimed to provide an industry-wide forum to promote 
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cotton production and enforce sanctity of contract with a stated goal to 
eradicate the practice of side-marketing. 
 
In its report, the Commission made recommendations that 
included continuous monitoring of this very dynamic industry by bringing 
to the attention of the relevant stakeholders that include, inter alia, the 
Cotton Association of Zambia, the Government, the Ginners Association 
of Zambia and the National Association for Peasant and Small-Scale 
Farmers of Zambia, the following advisory opinions: the ginners and the 
smallholders should come up with a mechanism for sharing the risks 
that may arise due to the appreciation of the kwacha, the fall in the 
world prices and other production risks involved in the cotton industry. 
 
In addition, better access by farmers to information on market 
trends, including the pre-planting price for cotton. Such information 
could be provided by the CSO and the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Cooperatives, thus making it easily accessible. Efforts are also required 
to improve farmers' marketing skills, coupled with the cultivation of long-
term relations between the farmers and the ginners. This could be 
achieved by holding seminars, workshops and field days whereby 
farmer associations (such as CAZ) and ginners associations will 
interact.  
 
Furthermore, it was also recommended that the existing cotton 
cooperatives, such as the Cotton Development Trust, be strengthened. 
If the objectives of the cooperatives were well formulated, they could 
benefit both the farmer and the ginners. The following objectives were 
recommended for the cooperatives:  
 
(i) To encourage members to be thrifty and to establish a fund 
from which could be given loans for agricultural purposes. 
(ii) To encourage farmers to adopt modern farming methods. 
(iii) To help farmer members market their produce at lucrative 
prices as well as helping them process their produce if 
necessary. 
(iv) To supply members with agricultural equipment and seeds. 
 
At the time of writing this report, all the parties had reached 
what appeared to be a “win-win” arrangement where principally the 
ginners were not to pass on their losses to the farmers, notably the 
smallholder “peasant” farmers. The Commission has continued to 
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monitor the situation through information links with the cotton 
association and the Zambia National Farmers Union. It is likely that with 
the formation of distinctive formal associations to represent their 
interests, the cotton farmers will have a better platform through which to 
express and/or channel their grievances.  
 
6.2. Horticultural sector 
 
At the point of merger and acquisition notification, the mandated 
competition authority is given an opportunity to influence the structure of 
markets through structural undertakings and/or influence behaviour of 
market players through behavioural undertakings aimed at ensuring that 
a particular player does not abuse its market power vis-à-vis other 
players, notably smaller players. This inherently assists in assuring that 
small businesses can exist in their niche markets and that they are not 
unduly encumbered when trying to access markets. 
 
On 6 December 2004, Agriflora Limited (Agriflora) and 
Chalimbana Fresh Produce Limited (Chalimbana)145 (herewith referred 
to as “the parties”) submitted a joint notification to the Zambia 
Competition Commission for the transfer of controlling ownership of 
Agriflora to Chalimbana. At the time, Agriflora was highly in debt and on 
the verge of being declared bankrupt by the creditors. Its expatriate 
Chief Executive Officer even fled the country, leaving the company in a 
serious limbo146. 
                                                 
145
 At the time, Chalimbana was reported to be a start-up company with the 
major shareholder being Plantation and General Investments Plc (UK) (P&G) 
and Arthur Gregory Barnes of Khal Amazi Farm of Lusaka as the minority 
shareholder. P&G is majority owner of Khal Amazi Limited - a rose-growing farm 
in Lusaka. In Malawi, P&G is involved in horticultural, floricultural products, dairy 
farming, wheat and maize farming. Chalimbana shall engage in similar activities 
in Zambia.  
146
 Agriflora Limited started operating in 1994. By 2001/2002 it had 22 hectares 
of roses and 1,000 hectares of vegetables. Agriflora had processing factories 
with 7000 tonnes capacity of fresh produce per year, drip irrigation systems and 
a refrigerated transport fleet. It had an outgrower scheme that had over 3,000 
workers. There are about 25 players in the market. Agriflora had the largest 
market share of 80 per cent while the second was York Farm. The market share 
for the other competitors including York Farm was 20 per cent. 60 per cent of 
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Agriflora was mainly involved in the growing of fresh vegetables 
and flowers for the export market. In the case of The Acquisition of the 
Assets of Agriflora by Chalimbana Fresh Produce Limited147, the 
Commission authorized the takeover of the assets of Agriflora by 
Chalimbana on the basis of assurances from Chalimbana that the 
takeover was envisaged to provide the continuity of the viable and 
lucrative business of Agriflora, with supply linkages to the small to 
medium scale farmers. Agriflora needed to be revitalized in order to 
revamp the business and assure the continuity of the outgrower 
scheme. Therefore, the takeover was necessary to keep the vibrant 
business going, with the assurance that: 
 
 “the transaction will create 3000 jobs; contribute to Government 
revenue through taxes; contribute to national economic development 
through foreign exchange in export earnings; and put Zambia on the 
world map through horticultural and floricultural produce from Zambia 
selling on the international market”.  
 
The takeover has contributed to a thriving flori- and horticultural 
export market that is somehow managing to compete with the regional 
market leaders, South Africa and Zimbabwe. The resuscitation of 
operations and repositioning of Agriflora after the takeover authorization 
by the Commission has seen the enterprise continue to forge linkages 
with small-scale farmers in the horti- and floricultural industries.  
 
The role of Agriflora148 in the sector is perhaps exemplified 
through the USAID captioned story in Table 6: 
 
                                                                                                            
the produce for Agriflora was vegetables while flowers accounted for 40 per cent 
of Agriflora’s exports. 
147
 Zambia Competition Commission, Staff Paper No. 211, February 2005. 
148
 The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) of the World Bank 
issued a US$3.6 million guarantee to the Industrial Development Corporation of 
South Africa Limited (IDC), of South Africa, to cover its US$4 million equity 
investment in Zambia's Agriflora, the second largest food production company in 
the country, Keith Nuthall, June 2003, http://www.just-
food.com/article.aspx?ID=90513.  
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Source: USAID, Human Resources Development Project (HRDP) Newsletter 
April/May 2000 – Success Stories 
http://www.usaid.gov/regions/afr/success_stories/zambia.html  
 
A further success story with linkages to the horticultural sector 
was the Commission authorization of the takeover of the assets of the 
previously State-owned and privatized Sunripe Products Limited, whose 
Table 6: Irrigation technology: small-scale farmer enters international 
export business 
On retirement from the Zambian Civil Service in 1988, Mike Phiri settled on his 
four-hectare smallholding just 60 kilometres from the capital, Lusaka. Since any 
type of pension is negligible in Zambia, Mike cultivated his land during the rainy 
season producing enough corn to feed his family. Occasionally, he grew 
vegetables for subsistence. He lived simply, well aware that given the low local 
maize prices, he would be losing money if he tried to grow maize or other crops 
for the local market. In March 2000, everything changed. Under a new loan 
scheme, the Zambia Agribusiness Technical Assistance Centre (ZATAC) would 
supply irrigation equipment for the production of baby corn, runner beans, and 
mangetout peas. The vegetables would be contracted for sale to the 
country's largest horticultural exporter, Agriflora Ltd. The firm, near the 
Lusaka International Airport, had over the years exported a wide range of 
fresh vegetables to Europe. Interested in expanding production beyond its 
own farms, Agriflora saw the attractiveness of working with various 
smallholders in the vicinity of its pack house located just outside the 
airport. This would only be possible if the small producers overcame the 
constraint of rain-dependent agriculture and were organized by some 
other organization to act as a group. At ZATAC's request, CLUSA, with their 
group-mobilizing techniques, began working with the small farmers. 
Within three months, Mike's drip irrigation equipment was installed by ZATAC 
while Agriflora Ltd. installed a small refrigeration warehouse next to his house. 
By September 2000, nine months after his irrigation equipment was installed, 
Mike had delivered 1.3 tons of fresh vegetables to Agriflora and received 
US$1,500 payment for the produce. Over the next 12 months Mike's net income 
target was US$4,000. Mike remarked, "Things have moved very fast. We are 
very happy with ZATAC. Both my neighbours and I have been occupying this 
land for over a decade. We did not know that we would one day be in the 
international export business. The vision of ZATAC and Agriflora in mounting 
this project is simply phenomenal. We have now broken clear of the vagaries of 
seasonal agriculture. We grow crops all year round for the European market and 
we receive an all year round income". 
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primary business was food processing and canning. Following 
numerous bidders and a blockage by the Commission to have the 
assets relocated to South Africa, the Commission eventually authorized 
the takeover of the assets by Fresh Pikt Limited, which has since 
resuscitated the plant and restored linkages with the smallholder 
farmers. The company produces 18 different canned products which 
include baked beans, mixed beans, pineapple chunks, tomato puree, 
tomato and onion mix and whole peeled tomatoes149. Table 7 shows the 
current economic lifeline role that Fresh Pikt is playing in the economy, 
more so as it relates to small-scale farmers: 
 
 
Source: Times of Zambia, Wednesday, 6 February 2008. 
                                                 
149
 Times of Zambia, Monday, 3 March 2008. 
Table 7: Fresh Pikt out to fight poverty in rural areas 
 
Most rural communities in Zambia are hard-working, a trait honed out of 
decades of subsistence existence on the land where survival has been a 
function of production from the land…One of the companies that are turning 
around this gloomy scenario, at least on the current scale is Fresh Pikt. 
 
In an effort to encourage citrus fruit production, Fresh Pikt Limited has just 
signed a contract with farmers in Mwinilunga for the supply of 40 tonnes of 
pineapples to its Lusaka plant on a weekly basis. The development would 
enable more than 1,000 farmers in the area to expand both the pineapple 
production and earnings from their produce. 
 
Choice Nuts Zambia Limited, a sister company to Fresh Pikt, has set up a 
network to access the abundant groundnuts from Eastern Province which it 
exports after treatment at its Lusaka plant. The company will this season 
export over 2,000 tonnes of raw dried groundnuts worth approximately US$2 
million. 
 
Both Fresh Pikt and Choice Nuts are companies that have shown a practical 
approach to a quick way of tackling poverty in the rural areas. 
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6.3. Poultry sector 
 
The poultry sector is one of the largest employers in the country 
and is highly fragmented downstream, with a large informal sector 
thereof. The industry has increased from 16 million birds in 2000 to 
about 26 million in 2007, with enquiries and orders for mainly processed 
eggs and hatching eggs coming from as far away as the Comoros 
Islands, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, Tanzania and 
Uganda among other countries in the region150. 
 
Interventions by the Commission have assisted in creating, 
maintaining, and sustaining competition and employment. This has been 
done in several ways as explained in the following paragraphs. 
 
During a series of meetings involving management of the then 
largest day-old chick supplier in Zambia, Hybrid Poultry Farm Zambia 
Limited (Hybrid Poultry), and the Zambia Association of Manufacturers 
(ZAM) with the Zambia Competition Commission  in the second quarter 
of 1999, it was revealed that Hybrid Poultry and Galaunia Holdings 
Limited (Galaunia) had earlier agreed to effect a sale of a farm 
(Mariandale Farm) and a poultry processing factory thereon to Galaunia, 
subject to agreed exclusive dealing clauses and conditions (Galaunia 
was the largest customer for Hybrid Poultry and specialised in raising 
day-old chicks to table broilers). Upon this discovery, the Commission 
advised the parties to notify the said exclusive agreements for 
assessment under Section 7151 of the Competition and Fair Trading Act. 
In January 2000 Hybrid Poultry notified the said agreements152. 
 
Through this agreement Hybrid Poultry was to sell to Galaunia 
its Mariandale Farms comprising fixtures and fittings, stock-in-trade 
                                                 
150Times of Zambia, 14 November 2007, quoting Matthews Ngosa, Chairman of 
the Poultry Association of Zambia. See also quoted at 
http://www.thepoultrysite.com/poultrynews/13331/zambian-poultry-attracts-
world-market. 
151
 Which states that: “Any category of agreements, decisions and concerted 
practices which have as their object the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition to an appreciable extent in Zambia or in any substantial part of it are 
declared anti-competitive trade practices and are hereby prohibited”. 
152
 Zambia Competition Commission, Annual Report, 2000. 
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(chickens) and the goodwill of the business and the premises subject to 
anti-competitive terms. The Commission was concerned that Hybrid 
Poultry required Galaunia to only purchase day-old chicks from itself. 
Further, Galaunia was also required to offer Hybrid Poultry right of first 
refusal should it intend to resell Mariandale Farm. Galaunia was also not 
allowed to raise any type of poultry at the farm, apart from broiler 
chickens, including the provision not to go into the business of a chicken 
hatchery. The parties also agreed that Galaunia was to be accorded the 
right of first refusal in the event that Hybrid Poultry sold some of its 
shares. In return, Hybrid Poultry was given the first right of refusal to 
participate in an outgrower scheme in the event that Galaunia came up 
with one. These are highlighted in Table 8 below:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The Sale and Purchase Agreement between Hybrid Poultry Farms Limited and Galaunia 
Farms Limited. 
 
 
In another agreement pertaining to the formerly Hybrid Poultry 
owned Poultry Processing Company Limited that was purchased by 
Galaunia, it contained restrictive clauses. Principally, in the sale of the 
poultry factory, the parties agreed that they would keep out of each 
other’s business, i.e. that Hybrid Poultry would not set up a poultry 
Table 8: Salient clauses from the sale and purchase agreement between 
Hybrid Poultry Farms Limited (HPF) and Galaunia Holdings Limited: 
Clause 11: The consideration, selling price, Hybrid Poultry property was 
US$250,000 for the goodwill, chattels, chickens and premises, payable on 
completion. 
Clause 13: That Galaunia would not raise any type of poultry on Mariandale Farm 
other than broiler chickens. 
Clause 14: That Galaunia and any subsidiary or associate company would not 
enter into the business of a chicken hatchery or breeder broiler production in 
Zambia. 
Clause 15: That Galaunia would only procure its day-old chick requirements 
exclusively from Hybrid Poultry. 
Clause 16: That Galaunia shall purchase DOC from Hybrid Poultry at short notice. 
Clause 17: That Galaunia shall have the exclusive right to collect all chicken 
manure from HPF chicken houses located in the Lusaka-Chisamba area at a cost 
of US$0.30 per 90-kg bag. 
Clause 19: That Galaunia should give Hybrid Poultry the right to first refusal to 
purchase, within five years of completion date, should it decide to sell the 
business. 
Clause 21: Should Galaunia develop and implement an outgrower scheme to 
grow broiler chickens, Hybrid Poultry shall be given the first refusal to participate 
 163 
processing factory and that in the event that Galaunia intended to sell 
the factory, Hybrid Poultry was to be accorded the right of first refusal. 
The poultry processing factory was viewed as a third-stage downstream 
operation after the Hybrid Poultry hatchery and the broiler farms under 
Galaunia. This was a vertically integrated and restrictive arrangement 
that had been a complete foreclosure of the Zambian poultry market. 
These are highlighted in Table 9 below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: The Sale and Purchase Agreement.) 
 
 
In defence of the agreements, Hybrid Poultry argued before the 
Commission that the terms of the agreement did not restrain competition 
nor did they have any adverse effect on trade or the economy in 
general. The condition for Galaunia to buy day-old chicks exclusively 
from Hybrid Poultry was arguably there in order to “protect” the chicken 
industry as a whole in the country. According to Hybrid Poultry, the 
nature of the product was such that genetically, the day-old chicks of 
two or more different breeds could not be put together at the same 
chicken run. This was purportedly for fear of an outbreak of disease. 
Table 9: Restrictive clauses in the sale and purchase agreement of the 
poultry processing company 
 
Clause 11: The purchaser agrees that should it within five years of the completion 
date wish to dispose of the business then it will give the Vendor right of first refusal 
to purchase the Business at cost plus the value of any improvements that the 
purchaser has made to the Business such value to be mutually agreed failing which 
to be assessed by a registered valuation surveyor mutually appointed by the head 
of the Valuation Surveyors Institute of Zambia. Should the Vendor not exercise its 
right to purchase the Business within 30 days then the Purchaser will be at liberty 
to dispose of the Business to any other person. 
 
Clause 12: In the event that the Management buy-out (MBO) wishes to sell its 
shares to the vendor then the Purchaser shall be accorded the right of first refusal 
to purchase the shares from the MBO. Should the Purchaser not exercise its rights 
to purchase the shares within 30 days then the MBO will be at liberty to sell the 
shares to any other party. 
 
Clause 13: The Vendor hereby agrees that it and its subsidiaries and associates 
will not at any time in the future in Zambia enter into the business of processing or 
selling of frozen chickens of any type except in collaboration with the Purchaser as 
mutually agreed in writing.  
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While this was scientifically arguable, the exclusive dealing effectively 
excluded competition as Galaunia could not buy day-old chicks from 
Hybrid Poultry’s only formidable competitor at the time, Tamba Chicks. 
 
At the time, it was evident from the Commission's analysis that 
Hybrid Poultry was a dominant firm both in the quantitative and in the 
qualitative sense in the relevant product market.  
 
6.3.1. Market shares for day-old chick suppliers 
Hybrid Poultry – 60 per cent  
Tamba Chicks  – 30 per cent 
Others   – 10 per cent 
6.3.2. Major buyers 
 
Table 10 shows the major buyers of day-old chicks in 1999. The 
position of Galaunia was significantly higher than that of its nearest rival, 
who trailed at 10,000 chicks per week: 
 
Table 10: Major buyers of day-old chicks - 1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: ZCC Assessment Report on the proposed takeover of Tamba Chicks  
by Hybrid Poultry Farms Limited. 
Company  Chicks per week % 
Galaunia (Diamondale & 
Mariandale) 
42,000 24% 
Eureka 10,000 6% 
Jonken  5,000 3% 
Mapepe  5,000 3% 
Others (11,000 farmers) 115,500 65% 
Total 177,200   
 165 
Galaunia was by far the most important customer for day-old 
chicks in the country. Hybrid Poultry’s exclusive deal was a source of its 
dominance to which Galaunia was tied. These agreements led to higher 
prices of day-old chicks for Galaunia, and affected the operations of 
Tamba Chicks and effectively constrained entry both upstream and 
downstream. 
6.3.3. Effects of the agreements 
 
The parties seemed to have taken advantage of their dominant 
market positions upstream and downstream where either party was 
dominant. The parties were, both by motive and concerted practices, 
excluding competition both in the day-old chicks, table birds (broiler) and 
broiler chickens markets. 
 
The signing of these exclusive supply arrangements adversely 
affected the operations of the other only notable day-old chicks supplier 
at the time, Tamba Chicks Limited. The problem went so far as to have 
Tamba Chicks facing liquidity problems and its owner decided to sell the 
company to avert actual liquidation. During the same investigations, the 
Commission discovered that Hybrid Poultry had used its economic 
power to facilitate a loan for Tamba Chicks, which facilitation compelled 
Tamba Chicks to sign a “Right of First Refusal” with Hybrid Poultry in 
the event that Tamba Chicks was put up for sale. The Commission 
nullified these agreements under Sections 7 and 9 of the Competition 
and Fair Trading Act. When Tamba Chicks was finally advertised for 
sale, the Commission blocked the bid by Hybrid Poultry and instead 
allowed a new entrant, Ross Breeders, who is still around and providing 
the relevant market checks and balances in the industry that are 
desirous to the Commission. 
 
The result of the competition intervention is that the general 
downstream industry has grown to more than ten notable players, with 
almost a new entrant every year. Ross Breeders has been able to 
sustain and in many ways outcompete Hybrid Poultry in the day-old 
chicks segment. Ross Breeders is reckoned to have about 50 per cent 
market share now, with Hybrid Poultry trailing at about 40 per cent. 
 
Currently, the poultry industry is the largest livestock industry in 
Zambia and is very competitive. The sector has seen an inflow of high 
investment and the market players in the industry have benefited from 
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rapid returns on their investments. With barriers to entry such as that 
instigated by Hybrid Poultry in the 1990s gone, there are reasonably low 
start-up capital costs especially in the broiler segment with production 
cycles of 6 to 7 weeks. The numbers of broiler chicks marketed have 
increased from 16 million birds in 2000 to about 26 million in 2007. As 
for the pullets, 1.7 million pullet layer chicks are marketed per annum 
and populations of pullet layers inlay stands at 1.25 million per 
annum153. A phenomenal growth of 30 per cent has been experienced 
since liberalization, and growth is envisaged to reach 50 per cent in the 
next two years due to increasing demand from international markets.  
 
This segment has seen intensive investment on aggregate and 
has allowed for generation of income in the economy standing at 
Zambian Kwacha 195.7 billion (about US$ 51,578,947)154. 
Approximately 24.4 million broiler chickens are produced per annum – 
15.86 million and 8.54 million in the formal and informal sectors, 
respectively. Of the broilers sold at wet markets, 65 per cent are 
dressed while 35 per cent are live chickens155. Large producers of 
chickens are promoting broiler contracts in collaboration with small-
scale farmers to meet the demand for processed chickens on the 
market and these have helped this sector to grow at an astonishing rate 
with both formal and informal providers156.  
 
Since 1999, the market has seen a number of entrants in the 
day-old chicks sector. Hybrid Poultry has repositioned itself over the 
years following the entry of a vigorous competitor, Ross Breeders, who 
took over the assets of Tamba Chicks. Both entities claim to have a 
larger market share than the other. The figures in Table 11 are based on 
a survey by the Commission as well as sales figures registered by the 
Poultry Association of Zambia: 
 
                                                 
153
 Poultry Association of Zambia, 2008. 
154
 US$1=ZK3,800. 
155
 Ibid., 2007. 
156
 Zambia Competition Commission, A Study of Competition in the beef, poultry 
and dairy retail sector in Zambia (financed by the International Development 
Research Centre (IDRC) of Canada), January 2007. 
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Table 11: Day-old chicks market shares - 2007  
 
Producer Brand name Market share 
Hybrid Cobb/Bovans 40% 
Ross Breeders Ross 35% 
Bokomo Ross/Lonhman 20% 
Panda Hubbarb 5% 
Total 100% 
Source: Figures estimated from Zambia Competition Commission Survey 2006,PAZ 2007 
report as well as findings from survey157. 
 
As regards the processed chicken segment, the competition is as shown 
in Table 12: 
Table 12: Market shares for processed chicken brands 
 
Producer Brand name Market share 
Hybrid Verino 25% 
Galaun Holdings Crest 20% 
Zambeef Zamchick 15% 
Eureka Chickens Eureka 10% 
Savannah Chickens Savannah 5% 
Zambezi Nkuku Zambezi Nkuku 5% 
Informal sector Traditional 20% 
Total 100% 
Source: Figures estimated from Zambia Competition Commission Survey 2006,PAZ 2007 
report as well as findings from survey158. 
 
6.4. Beef sector 
 
Cattle ranching is one of the most lucrative rural businesses and 
occupations in most of the countryside, notably in Southern and 
Western provinces. It is thus a source of livelihood for most of the rural 
dwellers that constitute part of the 80 per cent of the population that falls 
into the poverty bracket. Besides the natural hazards of animal disease 
outbreaks, most of the traditional cattle owners are vulnerable to 
commercial traders, abattoirs, and processors. The market is 
                                                 
157
 Ibid. 
158
 Ibid. 
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predominantly under the control of one dominant firm, Zambeef. As 
observed in a recent Commission report, the Zambian beef sector has 
large economic potential for the country. Not only has it been a major 
source of employment in the formal context, but it has also been a 
source of income for the informal sector159. 
 
The socio-economic role of cattle in the traditional sector dates 
back to the pre-colonial days. In this sector cattle has multiple roles. 
Cattle ownership has always been regarded as a symbol of family 
wealth. It is known from Zambian history that tribes such as Tongas 
(Southern Province), Lozis (Western Province), Chewas (Eastern 
Province), Namwangas and Mambwes (Northern Province) were 
traditional cattle keepers. As far back as 1993, it was estimated that 
about 70 per cent of the Zambian cattle is found in this sector, which 
underlines its importance160. The areas where such cattle is found 
actually have registered high poverty levels. Table 13 shows the areas. 
 
 
Table 13: Overall and extreme poverty by residence and province, Zambia, 1998 
 
Residence 
Overall poverty Extreme poverty 
Rural 83 70 
Urban 56 36 
Central Province 77 63 
Copperbelt Province 65 47 
Eastern Province 80 66 
Luapula Province 81 69 
Lusaka Province 52 34 
Northern Province 81 67 
North-western Province 76 63 
Southern Province 76 60 
Western Province 89 78 
Source: CSO: Living Conditions in Zambia, 1998. 
 
Table 13 shows that there are higher levels of poverty in the 
provinces where traditional cattle ranching is practiced. This is of 
                                                 
159
 Ibid. 
160
 Chindo Hicks, The role of Zambian cattle populations in socio-economic 
development, Royal Veterinary and Agricultural University, Department of 
Animal Science and Animal Health, Bülowsvej 13, 1870 Frederiksberg C. 
Denmark.  
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concern when taking into account that the growth that entities such as 
Zambeef have achieved from buying cattle from the same provinces, 
notably in Southern Province and Western Province, where poverty 
levels are relatively higher161. Furthermore, the market shares in 
processed beef show the imbalance of economic power even amongst 
the market players, as shown in Table 14. 
 
 
       Table 14: Market shares in the beef sector 
 
Beef producer Brand name Ownership status 
Market 
share 
Zambeef Zambeef Publicly owned 65% 
Galaun Holdings Luscold Privately owned 10% 
Northern Zambezi 
Traders 
Pama Privately owned 7% 
Dar Farms King Quality Privately owned 3% 
Best Beef Company Best Beef Privately owned 3% 
Savannah Beef Savannah Privately owned 2% 
Others Traditional Privately owned 10% 
Total 100% 
Source: Figures estimated from Zambia Competition Commission Survey 2006 and from 
primary data collected.  
 
As shown in Graph 2, the prices of the various beef products 
have actually continued to rocket since 1993, and have made Zambeef 
in particular one of the most prosperous enterprises in the Zambian 
economy162. The same cannot be said of the “Others” in the chain.  
 
                                                 
161
 Which posted a 26 per cent growth in turnover in 2006 with US$55 million, 
with a net profit of US$8 million (which increased by 78 per cent from 2005). For 
Zambian-owned companies, this is in the blue-chip category. Source: Zambeef 
Annual Report 2006. 
162
 Zambeef Products PLC Group is a major agribusiness whose core activity is 
the production, processing, distribution and retailing of beef, chickens, eggs and 
dairy products through its own retailing network throughout Zambia and Nigeria. 
It has since expanded into Ghana (trading under the name “Master Meats”). The 
conglomerate controls key abattoirs in major cow-belts. It slaughters 60,000 
cattle per annum and produces 12,000 grain-fed cattle per annum from its 
feedlots. It had a turnover of US$56 million (ZK223 billion) in 2006 – 2006 
Annual Report.  
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Graph 2: Prices of selected beef products 1993 to 2007 
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Source: Central Statistical Office.  
Thus, the Commission has been vigilant in its consideration of 
matters in the sector driven by Zambeef. In the assessment of The 
proposed takeover of Rumcortin Meat Processors by Zambeef Products 
PLC163, the Commission was concerned with allegations that Zambeef’s 
strategic objective in taking over the Rumcortin abattoir, which was the 
only usable abattoir in the Southern and surrounding Western Province 
areas, was to have the abattoir certified as the only one that meets the 
national and/or international Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) 
standards or other such specifications. In effect, this was feared to lead 
to a situation where all the other competing abattoirs in Livingstone and 
surrounding areas would be closed, especially during animal disease 
outbreaks. Such a situation would lead to entrenching Zambeef’s 
monopoly position in the major cattle belt in the country. Similar 
allegations were made during cattle disease outbreaks in Mongu 
(Western Provincial capital) in the late 1990s and in Namwala (key 
cattle area in Southern Province) and surrounding areas in 2004/2005. 
                                                 
163
 Zambia Competition Commission, Staff Paper No. 267. 
 171 
Zambeef was alleged then to have monopolized the cattle trade by 
insisting that all cattle slaughtered at the only abattoir in the area (which 
it controlled) had to be sold to them. The carcasses were then 
transported by Zambeef in refrigerated trucks for processing. Other 
commercial competitors would also be put in a difficult position to deal 
with a vertically integrated operator who had first access to the best 
cattle brought for slaughter. 
 
It was with this background in mind that the Commission 
required undertakings from Zambeef to address the competition and 
unfair trading concerns. While it was understood that Rumcortin was not 
operational, the Commission was aware of both the financial, technical 
and vertically aligned abilities of the Zambeef conglomerate to turn the 
company around and make it viable. The Commission supported efforts 
made to resuscitate a failing firm while at the same time it was desirous 
to ensure that the resuscitated firm was not used to prevent, restrict or 
distort competition leading to the exit of other market players and/or 
create a barrier to entry for prospective players. The long-term effects of 
the latter scenario were likely to lead to market stagnation and the 
desired holistic investment results not being attainable. 
 
Further, through the competition law’s objective of expanding 
the base of entrepreneurship and ensuring that no single entity unduly 
dominated, through abuse or acquisition of a dominant position of 
market power, the Commission has advised the parties to provide 
undertakings essentially to guarantee third-party access to the abattoir 
in the event that it is the only abattoir permitted to operate. The 
Commission was also concerned about the livelihood of the rural poor 
whose primary source of wealth was cattle. Zambeef gave undertakings 
to the Commission as shown in Table 15. 
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Table 15: Undertakings given by Zambeef Products PLC to the Zambia 
Competition Commission 
 
 
1. In the event of a major disease outbreak and upon formal written 
notification by the relevant authority, if Rumcortin Abattoir is declared to be 
the only SPS certified abattoir and all other slaughter facilities in the 
relevant geographic area/district are closed, Zambeef shall allow third-party 
access to the Rumcortin abattoir on an objective criteria and without 
discrimination. 
 
2. For third-party access to the abattoir in a period of disease outbreak, 
Zambeef will charge an access fee set at a reasonable economic and 
competitive rate that takes into account the prevailing rates for similar 
services, which rates shall be negotiated entirely between Zambeef and the 
third parties. 
 
3. Zambeef shall not insist on third-party cattle slaughtered at the abattoir to 
be sold to Zambeef but shall allow the cattle owners/traders to exercise 
their freedom of trade. 
 
4. The first priority for slaughter and storage of carcasses in the cold room will 
always be for Zambeef cattle. However, Zambeef will make efforts to 
consider third-party slaughter and storage as provided above. 
 
5. Zambeef shall appoint a senior management official within its ranks who 
shall be the “Trade Practices Compliance Officer” and who shall liaise with 
the Commission from time to time on matters of compliance with the 
undertakings and/or the Competition and Fair Trading Act, 1994, CAP 417 
of the laws of Zambia. 
Source: Memorandum of Undertakings given by Zambeef Products PLC to the Zambia 
Competition Commission, February 2007. 
 
 
The Commission has thus continued to monitor the situation 
and ensure that Zambeef adheres to the undertakings through regular 
contact with the compliance officer. The undertakings afford ease of 
access to this key facility in the cattle-belt and principally, guarantee the 
freedom of trade of the village level and other small scale farmers. A 
good return on their cattle investment is a step in alleviating the levels 
and effects of poverty.  
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6.5. Tobacco sector 
 
The tobacco industry is one of the most lucrative sectors in the 
Zambian agriculture sector. As in the cotton sector, it is dominated by 
multinational merchants who operate outgrower schemes. Competition-
related interventions in this sector are thus necessary in order to ensure 
that the rural poor are not exploited in the pricing and distribution of the 
tobacco they grow under contract. During the latter months of 2005, the 
Commission was handling the merger of Dimon Incorporated (Dimon) 
and Standard Commercial Corporation (Stancom) into Alliance One164. 
The Commission raised concerns about the possible anti-competitive 
trade practices in the industry that would arise as the two merging firms 
were going to create a monopoly undertaking with a likely chance of 
abuse. Stancom was at the time the third largest independent leaf 
tobacco merchant in the world while Dimon was the world’s second 
largest dealer, both of which had operations in more than 30 countries. 
The merger was to create the second largest tobacco merchant in the 
world, and the largest in Zambia, i.e. actually a monopoly. 
 
The Commission thus demanded undertakings that would 
address the competition concerns that had been raised during the 
investigations. Alliance One contracted lawyers from America who 
responded and disputed the finding of the Commission that Alliance 
One was going to be a monopoly undertaking, since there were other 
players in the Zambian tobacco industry. The Commission argued in 
turn that under the Zambian competition legislation, a monopoly was a 
firm with at least 50 per cent market share and since Alliance One was 
going to have 55 per cent market share, this raised competition 
concerns.  
 
Employing its usual analytical framework, the Commission had 
defined the general relevant market as the processing, storage, shipping 
and marketing of leaf tobacco, but the actual relevant product market as 
made up of flue-cured, burley and oriental tobacco.  
 
The main competition issue of the Commission was that there 
appeared to be no effective countervailing power from the leaf tobacco 
farmers in the outgrower schemes who were under contractual 
arrangements with Stancom and Dimon. The merger into Alliance One 
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meant that the farmers would have no choice of contract between the 
two, despite the presence of other alternative merchants already 
existing in the market. The Commission further argued that the merger 
of Stancom and Dimon would definitely result in the removal of a 
vigorous competitor from the market. Apart from Stancom (40 per cent) 
and Dimon (15 per cent), the rest of the market (45 per cent) was made 
up of a fragment of small to medium-sized leaf tobacco dealers who 
were not likely to offer effective competition to the merged entity. 
 
After being convinced of the monopoly status of Stancom in the 
tobacco industry in Zambia and likely competition issues affecting the 
outgrower farmers, the parties finally agreed to give the undertakings 
outlined in Table 16. 
 
Table 16: Undertakings given by Alliance One on the occasion 
of the merger between Stancom and Dimon 
 
1. Alliance One shall continue to use multiple transportation providers and 
shall not engage in exclusive dealing in the relevant market without seeking 
the express authorization of the Zambia Competition Commission. 
2. Alliance One shall continue to promote and develop better tobacco farmers 
through the outgrower scheme and encourage local entrepreneurs. 
3. After the merger approval, Alliance One shall identify a suitable senior 
officer who shall act as a Fair Trade Compliance Officer with the 
Commission on competition and fair trading matters. 
 
Source: Undertakings given by Alliance One to the Zambia Competition Commission, 
2005 
 
 
This case demonstrated the use of undertakings or 
commitments from the industry as one of the enforcement tools 
available to a competition authority to ensure that the gains of market 
liberalization are not unduly concentrated in one entity. There would 
appear to have been no incidence of complaints on prices since 2005. 
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7. Conclusions 
 
The role that competition law and policy plays in poverty 
alleviation cannot be overemphasized. While there is no claim that such 
a law and policy would be the “cure-all” in terms of poverty as found in 
countries such as Zambia, it is a major step in combating extreme 
poverty levels as has been evidenced in the Commission’s interventions 
in the cotton, poultry and other sectors. 
 
There is a need to identify areas where poverty levels are high 
and to use appropriate interventions in those areas, and perhaps with 
more than ordinary vigilance and focus. There is a lot to be done by the 
Commission and perhaps said by the public in terms of the contribution 
of competition law and policy in their daily lives. While some results may 
not be tangible, others are clearly tangible. 
 
The effective implementation of competition law and policy 
clearly assists in the attainment of efficiencies in the production of goods 
and services as has been demonstrated through the prohibition of 
cartels and attempted anti-competitive acquisitions in the poultry sector 
in Zambia. There is of course need for in-depth research that would 
empirically show whether or not the changes explained in the 
horticultural, poultry, beef and tobacco industries in Zambia are solely 
due to competition enforcement efforts. It is not likely that competition 
law enforcement is the only force behind the resuscitation of some 
sectors, but there is a strong correlation shown in the intervention 
against the cartel activities of Hybrid Poultry and the opening up of the 
day-old chicks market as well as the broiler segment to more entrants, 
which have in turn created employment and, through outgrower 
schemes, facilitated the continued growth of the micro and small 
enterprises. 
 
This is perhaps even more so in the horticultural sector, where a 
firm that was almost on the verge of collapse was resuscitated through 
an acquisition authorized by the Commission and vertical linkages 
created with small-scale farmers (Fresh Pikt and Agriflora). 
 
As a way forward, there would be need to have deliberate 
provisions in a competition legislation that support small business 
growth and development, as explicitly provided for in the Trade 
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Practices Act 1974 of Australia. For developing countries, the growth of 
the micro and small businesses into medium, larger and perhaps even 
into more formalized business organizations would provide a better 
base for industrial renaissance. Competition law and policy may be 
effectively used in this regard, contemporaneously with other pro-
business/pro-consumer policies.  
 
Suffice it to state that it remains a highly debatable though 
saleable idea in Zambia that the implementation of competition law and 
policy actually does contribute to poverty alleviation. To sale this idea, 
there would be need to raise the extremely low levels of competition 
law-policy culture that exist at policy formulation stage. The visibility of 
the competition authority and its programs and achievements must be 
self-evident, even to the “small” citizen striving to sell cotton or cattle in 
the rural areas. This is no easy task and Zambia may not be unique in 
this regard. 
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Antitrust, Economic Development and POVERTY:  
The Other Path 
 
Eleanor M. Fox∗ 
 
“Technocrats may be inclined to ignore distributional issues,  
but no one else will.” 
Harvard Institute for International Development, 1991165 
 
Abstract 
 
Developed countries often insist that antitrust only exists for 
aggregate efficiency and consumer welfare and that any broader focus 
will protect small competitors and mire the economy in inefficiencies. 
Developing countries retort that their antitrust must also address issues 
of distribution and power.  
 
This study argues that developing countries do and must ask a 
broader question than whether conduct decreases aggregate consumer 
or total wealth. While antitrust should not be used to protect inefficient 
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Davids against Goliath, it may and should be used to empower Davids 
against Goliath by opening paths of mobility and access. Indeed, 
enhanced mobility tends to produce efficiencies in societies in which the 
economic opportunity of masses of people has been suppressed. An 
antitrust law for developing countries that values mobility, access and 
efficient development of the economy, while not protecting small firms at 
the expense of consumers, is ‘The Other Path’ of this study, which 
articulates principles, factors and strategies that give content to the 
other path.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
This study is about competition, antitrust law, poverty and 
economic development. It asks: What is the foundational perspective 
that should inform competition law in developing countries? 
Important scholarship argues that context matters in designing 
and applying competition law and its supporting institutions for 
developing countries166. This literature commonly begins with the model 
of antitrust law of industrialized countries. It then asks what changes are 
warranted by context such as weak institutions, lack of funding, high 
barriers, and weak capital markets. This study takes a next step. It 
advocates the need for placing a developing country’s antitrust in the 
broader context of development economics. In doing so it argues for the 
relevance of developing countries’ plight in the storms and bargains of 
world trade and competition, which often result in the marginalization of 
the weakest economies. 
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 Ground-breaking work has been done by William Kovacic. For example, 
William Kovacic, Capitalism, Socialism, and Competition Policy in Vietnam, 13 
Antitrust 57 (1999); Getting Started: Creating New Competition Policy 
Institutions in Transition Economies, 23 Brook. J. Int'l L. 403 (1997); The 
Competition Policy Entrepreneur and Law Reform in Formerly Communist and 
Socialist Countries, 11 Am. U.J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 437 (1996); Designing and 
Implementing Competition and Consumer Protection Reforms in Transitional 
Economies: Perspectives from Mongolia, Nepal, Ukraine and Zimbabwe, 44 
DePaul L. Rev. 1197 (1995); Competition Policy, Economic Development, and 
the Transition to Free Markets in the Third World: The Case of Zimbabwe, 61 
Antitrust L. J. 253 (1992); William E. Kovacic & Robert S. Thorpe, “Antitrust and 
the Evolution of a Market Economy in Mongolia”, in De-Monopolization and 
Competition Policy in Post-Communist Economies 89 (Ben Slay, ed., 1994). 
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Spokespeople for developing countries often express the need 
for an antitrust paradigm different from that of the developed world167. 
Spokespeople for the developed world tend to argue for universal 
norms168. Moreover, they commonly describe antitrust as “for 
efficiency”169, meaning no antitrust enforcement unless the transaction 
is, by some measure, inefficient. 
 
This study takes a different starting point. It treats as the central 
condition a deep systemic poverty, aggravated by corruption, cronyism, 
selective statism and privilege, weak institutions, and often unstable 
democracy170. It asks, for such economies: what is the most congenial 
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 See Ajit Singh, U.N. Conf. On Trade & Dev., Competition and Competition 
Policy in Emerging Markets: International and Developmental Dimensions 
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 See, e.g., Makan Delrahim, The Long and Winding Road: Convergence in 
the Application of Antitrust to Intellectual Property, Remarks at George Mason 
Law Review Symposium (Oct. 6, 2004), in 13 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 259 (2005) 
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 By one common formulation, antitrust is only for efficiency. One common 
formulation of the efficiency standard is that antitrust law should proscribe only 
that which does a disservice to consumers and is inefficient, as judged by output 
limitation. Business conduct other than hard-core cartels is presumed efficient; it 
is argued that, apart from cartels, the law should proscribe only conduct that has 
an output-limiting outcome and is not a legitimate business response to 
consumers. There are alternative ways to regard efficiency and how to achieve 
it. One major alternative focuses on preserving the structure and forces of 
competition, positing that the process of competition is most likely to create 
incentives to compete and invent. Diversity and openness are thought to 
promote knowledge and experimentation and to function as a feedback 
mechanism that facilitates adaptation and dynamic change. See Wolfgang 
Kerber, Competition, Experimentation, and Legal Rules and Institutional 
Framework (Dec. 2, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); see 
also Eleanor Fox, What is Harm to Competition? Exclusionary Practices and 
Anticompetitive Effect, 70 Antitrust L. J. 371 (2002).  
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 Mark Dutz and R. Shyam Khemani wrote on the “tyranny of predatory vested 
interests”: These factors (high market concentration, high barriers to entry, high 
ownership concentration and weak corporate governance) tend to reinforce one 
another and give rise to inflexible, inefficient industrial and financial market 
structures. They also have adverse implications not only for fostering effective 
competition and competitiveness, but also for governance at both the state and 
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foundational perspective on which to formulate antitrust law? In 
particular, would this cohort of countries be best served by a 
foundational principle that trusts liberalization and free enterprise (“first 
model”), or would it be served by a foundational principle that centrally 
takes account of the opacity, blockage and political capture of markets, 
and includes some measure of helping to empower people economically 
to help themselves (“second model”)? There are, of course, other 
formulations. There are also formulations within the formulations171. 
 
There are trade-offs, whatever model is applied. I would be 
clear at the outset that protectionism is not a desirable option, whether 
in terms of protecting small firms from efficient competition or protecting 
domestic firms from foreign competition. The inquiry of this study is how 
to make the market work for the good of development, and not to 
suppress it. If suppression is politically inevitable, then that is an 
obstacle that will tend to defeat the enterprise. 
 
The choice of models is not uncomplicated. Even if the second 
model (recognizing empowerment and distributional concerns) might in 
the abstract seem more legitimate to a developing economy than the 
first (emphasizing the virtues of aggregate efficiency and non-
intervention as the means to produce it), the first model is a path well 
travelled, and reinventing a path is difficult and costly. Moreover, the first 
model offers some clear and relatively simple rules without risking the 
                                                                                                            
corporate levels – and for the persistence of an anti-competitive nexus mutually 
supporting vested interests between incumbent firms and government, with 
some of the earned rents used to entrench market power by buying government 
favouritism. Since firms tend to be large in size and few in number, they have 
organizational and financial advantages in influencing legislation and regulation. 
Mark Dutz & R. Shyam Khemani, Competition Law & Policy: Challenges in 
South Asia 11 (2007). 
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 For example, one mainstream perspective assumes that markets work well 
and that government interventions work badly (neo-liberal assumptions). At the 
other end of the continuum, analysts may acknowledge that market structures 
may be “skewed in favour of entrenched elites with inequitable distributions of 
wealth with social stratification drawn along racial or ethnic lines”, a situation 
that competition law might exacerbate. Taimoon Stewart, Julian Clarke & Susan 
Joekes, Competition Law in Action: Experiences from Developing Countries iv 
(2007), available at http://www.idrc.ca/en/ev-111677-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html. 
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costs of error from too much intervention and costs of political forays 
inherent in a grant of excessive discretion to officials. 
 
The study concludes by suggesting that reliance on markets is 
critical for economic welfare; that extreme neo-liberal principles that 
animate much of antitrust law in this age of “modernization”172 are not 
necessary for efficiency and could run contrary to it; and that developing 
countries are likely to be served by exploring a path that is most 
sympathetic to their context. 
 
This study is written at a time when “convergence” is repeatedly 
referenced as an imperative objective of antitrust in a globalized world. 
Convergence implies universal standards, or at least universal norms 
implemented in common ways. The phrase “universal standards” 
normally refers to the standards of the United States and Europe,173 
which have become the dominant models for the world. This study 
suggests that developing countries should nonetheless consider the 
benefits of a perspective of their own before considering the virtues – 
which there are – of convergence. It further suggests that substantial 
convergence can be achieved and will naturally occur even in the face 
of varying perspectives. 
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 Both the United States and the European Union have launched commissions 
or projects to consider how competition law should be modernized. Moreover, in 
the United States, successive Supreme Court opinions have narrowed the 
purview of US antitrust law. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. 
PSKS, Inc., 2007 WL 1835892 (US June 28, 2007); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-
Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1069 (2007); Volvo Trucks N. 
Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 US 164 (2006); Tool Works Inc. v. 
Independent Ink, Inc., 547 US 28 (2006). 
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 This is the case even while the standards of the United States and Europe 
are changing, as institutions in both jurisdictions embark on “modernization” 
projects, and as the United States Supreme Court successively narrows the 
scope of the law. Yet with the economic rise of China and India, one might 
expect the American and Euro-centric centre of gravity to shift, and to do so in 
ways not predictable today. 
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2. The choice 
 
Approximately one hundred nations in the world have adopted 
antitrust laws. Perhaps a quarter of these nations are developing 
countries. Yet other developing countries have not adopted antitrust 
laws; some are considering doing so. 
 
By one perspective, all of these nations should adopt antitrust 
laws174, and all of these nations should adopt the developed world’s 
framework: free markets and antitrust in the service of unleashing 
markets and pursuing aggregate efficiency. Much like the developed 
countries, developing economies are often riddled with cartels and other 
restraints that obstruct their markets and hurt their people. Many are 
peppered with monopolistic abuses, especially by state-owned and 
privileged enterprises – more than are developed countries. 
Globalization has lowered barriers and paved the way to the efficiency 
benefits from markets and, it is argued, liberalization and antitrust 
should work hand in hand to anchor these benefits175. 
 
This study argues that developing countries require a larger 
canvas. The canvas includes the dire economic conditions of developing 
countries and the treatment they receive from the world community. 
Developing countries often see free-market rhetoric and aggregate 
wealth or welfare goals as inappropriate to their context because of the 
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 Compare A.E. Rodriguez and Mark D. Williams, The Effectiveness of 
Proposed Antitrust Programs for Developing Countries, 19 N. C.J.Int’l L. & Com. 
Reg. 209 (1994) (arguing that antitrust law is largely inappropriate for 
developing countries and that the liberal effects of the law will be overwhelmed 
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T. Freeman, A Response to “The Effectiveness of Proposed Antitrust Programs 
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that antitrust law and advocacy will benefit consumers). 
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 Efficiency is usually seen as the measure of antitrust benefits. At this point I 
do not raise differences between consumer welfare and total welfare in 
measuring efficiency. I stress aggregate concepts – whether defined in terms of 
all consumers or all consumers and producers: Do the winners win more than 
the losers lose? And if so, should we disregard distributional consequences? 
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tendency of free-market policies to disproportionately advantage the 
already advantaged in every game played176. 
 
This does not imply that antitrust for developing countries would 
or should look dramatically different from a developed country’s 
antitrust. There are reasons why it might look much the same, as I 
develop below; but there are also reasons why the perspective might 
differ from the neo-liberal one that currently informs many antitrust laws 
of developed countries – a perspective that has “relatively little 
resonance for the great majority of the population that is poor”177. 
 
3. The competition challenge 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
Putting poverty, marginalization, cronyistic control, and dire 
economic conditions at the centre of the universe, we ask: First, to what 
extent will competition and the market help developing countries 
develop efficiently for the good of their people? Second, to what extent 
will antitrust law help? Third, if antitrust law is adopted, what form of 
antitrust law? 
 
3.2. To what extent will competition and the market help? 
 
Freeing up the market has been shown to produce great 
economic benefits for developing and transitional countries. The 
converse approach, command and control, so ill served Russia and 
Eastern Europe that the systems fell of their own weight178. 
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 See Nancy Birdsall, Inequality Matters: Why Globalization Doesn’t Lift All 
Boats, Boston Rev., Mar.–Apr. 2007, at 7; Francis Fukuyama, Keeping Up with 
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 Fukuyama, supra note 12. 
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 A third option – among others along the continuum – is a combination of 
competition and industrial policy. Some commentators argue that industrial 
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Hernando de Soto, in The Other Path, eloquently demonstrates 
the benefits of tearing down barriers to free market participation. He 
catalogued and studied the barriers, such as dense licensing 
requirements, that excluded the poorest Peruvians from Peru’s market 
system, relegating them to their own informal economy. Alienated by the 
exclusion and their dismal lives, many joined the terrorist organization 
Shining Path. To counter the Shining Path and its destructive forces, de 
Soto proposed another path (“el otro sendero”) that would tear down the 
barriers to participation in the recognized economy, give people hope 
and opportunities, and enable the poor to participate in markets on their 
own merits. Regarding matters of government regulation, The Other 
Path179 is a blueprint for building the ladder of mobility. It envisions a 
society that values mobility; that opens the door to inclusion, from the 
                                                                                                            
policy in Japan and Korea put those nations on a sound footing before they fully 
exposed their businesses to the winds of competition. Others observe, however, 
that vibrant competition within the borders of both nations co-existed with 
government-managed external competition; and these commentators credit the 
countries’ successes to the market and not to its suppression. See Working 
Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, Study of 
Issues Relating to a Possible Multilateral Framework on Competition Policy, pp. 
168–257, WT/WGTCP/W/228 (May 19, 2003), available at 
http://www.jmcti.org/2000round/com/doha/wg/wt_wgtcp_w_228.pdf; see also Ajit 
Singh, Multilateral Competition Policy and Economic Development: A 
Developing Country Perspective on the European Community Proposals (paper 
presented at the fifth session of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on 
Competition Law and Policy, Geneva, July 2–4, 2004, available at 
http://www.networkideas.org/feathm/aug2003/MCP.pdf (developing countries 
often query whether they should follow the model of Japan and Korea). 
Free markets are regarded with some scepticism by the new left in several 
South American countries, wherein the populace complains that it has not seen 
the benefits of liberalization. The economic, social and political reforms in Latin 
America beginning in the 1980s had not delivered their promises of economic 
growth and there was resentment among the people because the reforms had 
not reduced poverty and inequality. This produced a populist shift towards 
socialism, returning more power to the state and rolling back whatever 
achievements were made. See Jorge Castañeda, Latin America’s Left Turn, 
Foreign Affairs, May–June 2006, at 28. 
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 Hernando de Soto, The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third 
World (1989). 
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poorest up; and it proposes to do so for the pragmatic reason of building 
a better society. 
 
The counter-viewpoint – embrace of government control and 
indifference to the plight of the excluded – blocks the market through 
excessive regulation, privilege, and cronyism. The powerful insiders 
protect their friends at the expense of the public and often at the 
particular expense of the poor. This was the story of Telmex in Mexico. 
Owned by a close friend of each successive president, Telmex was 
guaranteed a monopoly price for incoming cross-border telecom 
connections. The monopoly price was guaranteed at the expense of 
poor Mexicans who migrated to the United States for work and whose 
telephone lifeline was to Mexico180. The entrenched system likewise 
deprived the aspiring new-entrant Mexican entrepreneurs of the right to 
price-compete against Telmex for incoming calls181. Thus, it exploited, it 
excluded, and it stymied opportunity. 
 
Hence, not only does globalization tend to stack the deck 
against a critical mass of developing countries and those people who 
are least able (least educated, skilled and moneyed, and lacking 
infrastructure) to ride the wave of globalization’s opportunities182, but it 
                                                 
180
 Not only do the poor suffer from prices that are too high, but they suffer from 
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Pascal Lamy recounts the bias in the prior trade rounds against developing 
countries. He notes the persistence of “economic colonization” and the 
developing countries’ “bitter” “potion” of intractable adjustment problems. 
Developing countries’ problems of adjustment to the onrush of free trade are 
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also allows cronyistic governments to block upward mobility and 
entrench the condition of the poor. 
 
3.3. Antitrust: can antitrust help and in what form? 
 
3.3.1. Mobility 
 
Just as de Soto would remove government regulatory barriers in 
deprived economies, a contextualized antitrust law can remove the 
roadblocks erected by powerful market actors, public and private. Both 
liberalization and antitrust can tear down the barriers facing the people 
who are the least well off. They can invite these often alienated 
individuals into the economic system, giving them hope, dignity and self-
worth. 
 
Antitrust law attacks artificial obstructions that market players 
create. But nations disagree about what acts constitute artificial 
obstructions. Are they only acts that shrink the size of the pie, decrease 
aggregate wealth, and are allocatively inefficient183? Or are they also 
acts that block the channels of mobility, keeping worthy actors down and 
moats wide184? If the latter, obstructions can be seen in more human 
terms and perhaps antitrust policy and its language can be better 
aligned with efficient development185. 
                                                                                                            
particularly serious “because [trade openings] often hit larger parts of the 
population and because the countries have little capacity to handle the much 
needed accompanying policies to assist the victims of globalization.” Id. at 6, 7, 
10. Moreover, developing countries usually lack safety nets, and the lack of 
safety nets means that job loss causes severe hardship. Further, the promised 
benefits of market openings are harder to capture: the time and costs to market 
(e.g. trucking goods to a port) can overwhelm gains. 
183
 It is important for an antitrust agency to identify and target anti-competitive 
acts that shrink the pie. I do not imply the contrary. 
184
 See Eleanor Fox, What is Harm to Competition? Exclusionary Practices and 
Anticompetitive Effect, 70 Antitrust L. J. 371 (2002). 
185
 Protecting mobility and opportunity on the merits need not and should not 
imply protecting inefficient competitors from competition or handicapping 
efficient firms. See Eleanor Fox, We Protect Competition, You Protect 
Competitors, 26 World Competition 149 (2003); see also Dutz & Khemani, supra 
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There are good reasons why mobility factors should play a role 
in the antitrust laws of developing countries. The countries look to the 
marketplace to give firms, including smaller and younger firms, a fair 
chance to compete on the merits of their products and services, free 
from artificial and unnecessary foreclosing restraints by powerful firms. 
Empowerment to engage in markets free of unnecessary business 
restraints by firms with substantial market power is the counterpart to de 
Soto’s vision of empowerment to engage in markets free from 
unnecessary and unjustified government restraints. Undue market 
restraints, whether public or private, retard efficient development. They 
also tend to harm allocative efficiency and surely do not advance it. To 
the extent that “efficiency” as the goal of antitrust implies disregard of 
distributional values, this may be a contradiction in terms in developing 
countries, where severe distributional inequities are depriving the 
marketplace of the talents and energies of the majority of the population. 
Aggregate efficiency, turning its back on maldistribution and severe 
economic inequities, is probably not the centrepiece that most 
developing countries are likely to choose. 
 
3.3.2. Assessing local problems before adopting law 
 
Law making should come from within, not without. Legislation 
should respond to contextual problems that need to be solved. Ideally, 
law is not generated by outsiders who proclaim “we have this law and 
you should, too”186. It is important for each country, or regional 
                                                                                                            
note 6.  See Michael Boudin, Antitrust Doctrine and the Sway of Metaphor, 75 
Geo. L. J. 395 (1986), for a discussion as to the power of metaphor. 
186
 The two clauses need a link. Does the outsider claim that the law is needed 
to solve negative externalities visited on the outsider, as in pollution: “Your 
smokestacks are polluting us”? Does the outsider claim that its businesses pay 
a cost and to be fair the insider’s businesses should pay the same costs? Does 
the outsider claim: “If only you will make your laws like ours, our businesses will 
find it easier to make more money in your backyard”? Or is the outsider 
altruistic; a paternalistic Good Samaritan: “We know this is good for you; we 
“offer” it to you”? 
See Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean Francois Richard, Economic 
Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect, 47 Eur. L. Rev. 165 (2003), 
 190 
groupings of like countries, to take stock; to assemble the facts: who 
within the country is harmed by what practices? How can such harm be 
prevented? And at what cost? 
 
Professors Jenny and Evenett, and the Consumers Unity & 
Trust Society (CUTS) under the leadership of Pradeep Mehta, have 
done noteworthy work to build the databases that may help to answer 
these questions. The data show that: 
 
• In many developing countries, seller cartels target basic 
necessities of the people, including dietary staples. In Peru, 
poultry farms and their trade association conspired to eliminate 
competitors and prevent entry. In Zambia, the dominant producer 
of day-old chickens required the biggest buyer to stay out of the 
production market, and the buyer agreed to the requirement. 
• Evidence of buying cartels is rampant. These include cartels that 
exploit small farmers and producers such as coffee producers in 
Kenya and Latin America, cotton, tea and tobacco growers in 
Malawi, milk processors in Chile, and fish processors near Lake 
Victoria. 
• Cartels, boycotts, and non-compete agreements have been 
detected and prosecuted in the milling and baking, milk and 
sugar markets. Beer mergers in highly concentrated beer 
markets have threatened to exploit buyers in Namibia, Turkey, 
Malawi, Kenya and Tanzania. 
• In Kenya, owners of minivans garnered monopolies over 
lucrative routes. They teamed up with criminal gangs, not only 
overcharging for simple and necessary van transportation but 
also terrorizing the travellers. Also in Kenya, the fertilizer 
manufacturers organized a secret bidding cartel in their tenders 
to the government buying authority, impoverishing the farmers 
who needed increasing supplies. 
• In many countries, vertical agreements tie up scarce inputs and 
scarce channels of distribution. 
• In Turkey, the two dominant telecommunication firms had sole 
control of the infrastructure necessary to provide national 
roaming capability for a GSM mobile telephone service and 
refused to allow access to would-be new entrants. Typically, 
                                                                                                            
for a discussion of the problems of legal transplants when the law is not adapted 
to the country’s conditions. 
 191 
dominant firms deny small firms access to essential facilities 
such as telecom and electricity infrastructure187. 
Press stories add to the data daily. In Mexico, half of the people live on 
US$4 or less a day, and many survive on tortillas and beans. From 
December 2006 to January 2007, the price of corn soared, and the price 
of the tortilla rose by 35 cents a pound. The New York Times reported: 
“The crisis has hit hardest for the poorest Mexicans, who may spend 
more than a quarter of their daily salaries on tortillas”188. It has displaced 
poor tortilla makers, who have lost up to 40 per cent of their business, 
since the people are compelled to buy and eat less. While the price 
shock arose first from extraneous causes, the giant Mexican tortilla 
                                                 
187
 See Frederic Jenny, Anticompetitive Practices in Developing Countries: 
Lessons from Empirical Evidence (May 23–24, 2005) (unpublished paper 
presented at First National Competition Seminar, Amman, Jordan) (on file with 
author); Frederic Jenny, Anti-Competitive Agreements: Meaning and Examples, 
Caribbean Dialogue, July–Sept. 2004, at 1 (anti-competitive practices in Trinidad 
and Tobago, Kenya, Lebanon, Indonesia and other smaller economies; Kovacic, 
supra note 2; Simon J. Evenett, U.K.’s Dep’t for Int’l Dev., Links between 
Development and Competition Law in Developing Countries (2003), available at 
http://www.evenett.com/reports/dfidpaper.pdf; Ana Maria Alvarez, Simon J. 
Evenett & Laurence Wilse-Samson, “Anti-Competitive Practices and the 
Attainment of the Millennium Development Goals: Implications for Competition 
Law Enforcement and Inter-Agency Cooperation”, in Implementing Competition-
Related Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements: Is It Possible to Obtain 
Development Gains? 60 (2007). The latter chapter documents numerous other 
specific restraints in health, education, financial services for low-income earners, 
infrastructure and housing, and food. Id. at 65–77.   See also Pulling 
Up Our Socks (Consumer Unity and Trust Society Centre for Competition, 
Investment & Economic Regulation, Rajasthan, India), Feb. 2003 (report based 
on the 7-Up Project analysing competition problems in seven developing 
countries – Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and 
India); Pradeep S. Mehta & Nitya Nanda, Competition Policy, Growth and 
Poverty Reduction in Developing Countries, http://www.competition-
regulation.org.uk/conferences/southafrica04/mehta&nanda.pdf (last visited June 
30, 2007). For examples of abuse of dominance violations in Latin American 
countries, see Russell W. Pittman and Maria Coppola Tineo, Abuse of 
Dominance Enforcement under Latin American Competition Laws, March 2006, 
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=888186. 
188
 James C. McKinley Jr., Cost of Corn Soars, Forcing Mexico to Set Price 
Limits, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 2007, at A12. 
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makers took advantage of the situation “hoarding supplies to drive 
prices up even more”, according to Mexican officials189. 
 
Mexico’s monopolies thrive even under the free market regime 
of President Calderon. Jorge Castañeda, Mexico’s former foreign 
minister, wrote: “The monopolist control of practically every walk of 
Mexican life is in place”. Huge monopolies that exclude and exploit 
dominate the country – in oil, electricity, fixed line and mobile telephone, 
television, cement, banks, bread, and tortilla production190. The case of 
Mexico is not unique to the developing world. It is typical. 
 
In sum, the people of developing countries are seriously 
impacted by cartels and monopolistic practices. These practices include 
those that raise consumer prices and input prices to their businesses, 
which exclude or build hurdles to their outputs, and foreclose domestic 
suppliers. They do so by all means: coercive practices such as boycotts, 
covenants not to compete, price manipulation, and predation. They 
shore up their power to do so by mergers. Anti-competitive practices are 
rife in areas of physical and business necessity, such as milk, soft 
drinks, beer, chicken, sugar, cotton, paper, aluminium, steel, fertilizer 
chemicals, telecommunications, cement and other construction 
materials, transportation including trucking, shipping and port access, 
industrial gases, banking, insurance, coal and electricity. Many of the 
practices are local; many of these are facilitated by the country’s own 
government; and many others are offshore, targeting the vulnerable 
developing countries. Many of the harmful practices are illegal under the 
standards of the industrialized countries. A critical mass is not, or is 
unlikely to be proved illegal, under these standards. 
 
3.3.3. A perspective 
 
We are (let us suppose) policy makers who live and work in a 
developing country and we have at heart the welfare of our community. 
Half of our fellow citizens live in abject poverty. A third of the citizens are 
farmers. We have extractive natural resources. We have a slender 
                                                 
189
 Id. 
190
 Jorge Castañeda, Mexico Needs to be Freed from Unhealthy Monopolies, 
Fin. Times, Feb. 5, 2007, at 13. 
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manufacturing industry with potential for growth. We have cotton and 
lumber. Our citizens are extraordinary craftspeople. Most of our people 
do not have enough food to eat. State-owned monopolies dominate our 
infrastructure industries. The education system is poor and sometimes 
barely existent. Disease and corruption are rampant. A decade ago in 
an expanding economy we glimpsed possibilities to move up the ladder 
so that at least our children could have a better life. After opening our 
markets, the richest two per cent have better lives. A fraction of others 
who have had sufficient education and training now fortunately embrace 
opportunities opened by globalization, including opportunities from 
outsourcing. But the overwhelming majority of our people have seen no 
gains. They see a bigger wealth gap: no ladder and a wider moat191. 
 
What do we want? 
Of course we want food, medicine, necessities at lower prices, 
education and training, and infrastructure. We want a better chance to 
fend for ourselves; to participate in the economic enterprise; to have a 
real opportunity to make a living. Do we need and want antitrust? And if 
so, what type of antitrust? We want to explore what antitrust can do for 
us, assuming that we have enough money and trained people to staff 
the office and enforce the law. 
 
We believe that antitrust law can help – if we can obtain 
sufficient funding and access the necessary information to find and 
prosecute cases; if we can get jurisdiction over the violators, who may 
be offshore; if we legally and practically have sufficient enforcement 
power; and if reasoned agency decisions will be upheld by the courts, 
and within a reasonable period of time. Antitrust can deter the harmful 
practices catalogued above, and in doing so it can empower people to 
participate in the market on their merits. 
 
Assuming that we want antitrust, what kind of antitrust do we 
want? 
We have looked at the anti-cartel law of industrialized countries. 
We find it strong and attractive in principle although we worry about our 
ability to prove cartel agreements even when we are confident they 
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 See Lamy, supra note 18. There may be gains but they are not perceptible to 
the majority of the poor; and the gains are unequally distributed to the wealthy or 
the otherwise (e.g. educationally) advantaged. 
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exist. Moreover, our country’s economy is run by monopolists more than 
cartels. 
 
For monopolization and abuse of dominance, we look at the 
United States’ recent monopolization jurisprudence192. We observe that 
US law has a narrow scope for dominant-firm violations: It is not 
concerned itself with excluded or marginalized competitors. It is 
concerned that antitrust law might be overly aggressive and might chill 
efficient conduct by dominant firms. It is in theory concerned with 
consumers who are overcharged; yet it tends to strike the balance in 
favour of freedom for dominant firms on the theory that the incentives of 
dominant firms are aligned with consumer interests, and antitrust duties 
discourage firms from inventing and investing193. It does not experience 
at all the problem that haunts us the most: abusive conduct, by state-
owned and privileged monopolies, that suppresses competition on the 
merits. 
 
Moreover, government policy papers and commissions focus on 
whether it is too easy to prove that a firm has dominant power and 
whether safe harbours for monopoly-firm conduct are too few and too 
narrow194, rather than mapping out the mine fields of anti-competitive 
conduct. 
 
Verizon v. Trinko195 illuminates the perspective that non-
intervention against the dominant firm is the best prescription for 
economic welfare. Verizon was the incumbent local telephone service 
provider in the north-eastern United States, and it owned elements of 
the local telephone loop, which connected long-distance calls to the 
local area. When competition among local telephone service providers 
became technologically feasible and economical, the United States 
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 See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., Inc., 127 
S. Ct. 1069 (2007); Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 
LLP, 540 US 398 (2004). 
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 See R. Hewitt Pate, “The Common Law Approach and Improving Standards 
for Analyzing Single Firm Conduct”, in 2003 International Antitrust Law & Policy: 
Fordham Corporate Law Institute, Chap. 12, p. 195 (Barry Hawk, ed. 2004) 
(supporting the minimalist approach). 
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 See Report and Recommendations of the Antitrust Modernization 
Commission (April 2007), especially Chap. 1.C. Exclusionary Conduct.  
195
 540 US 398 (2004). 
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deregulated the market and invited local competition into each 
geographic area. Rivals entered. They needed access to the local loop, 
which a federal statute required the incumbent to assure. Verizon, 
however, wanted to keep its own customers from defecting to the new 
entrants. Therefore it interrupted its rivals’ access to the local loop so 
that it – by definition – would provide better service196. The Supreme 
Court held that the conduct did not violate the antitrust laws197. 
 
Before the Court, plaintiffs had argued that Verizon was guilty of 
strategic manipulations accomplished by many “small” acts, such as 
disrupting local loop connections, and that in this way Verizon 
“threatened [the rivals] with ‘death by a thousand cuts’”198. This is a 
metaphor sometimes used in civil rights cases to describe the 
thousands of everyday slights that work synergistically to keep the 
marginalized marginalized. 
The US Supreme Court embraced the metaphor and turned it 
against the plaintiffs:  
 
“[T]he identification of [a thousand cuts] would surely be a 
daunting task for a generalist antitrust court. Judicial oversight 
under the Sherman Act would seem destined to distort 
investment and lead to a new layer of interminable 
litigation…”199. 
 
                                                 
196
 The Court assumed these alleged facts to be true because the case before 
the Court arose on Verizon’s motion to dismiss the complaint. 
197
 The Court would have preferred to leave the problem to the regulatory 
agency, and to the regulatory statute that prohibited the conduct, but the statute 
declared that antitrust law was not pre-empted. Therefore, by necessity, the 
Court’s opinion went beyond the regulated industry context. The Court 
expressed a general principle of non-interference with the monopolist’s freedom 
of action 
198
 Brief for the State of New York et al. as Amici Curiae, in Support of 
Respondent at 10, Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 
LLP, 540 US 398 (2004) (No. 02-682). 
199
 The Court held that a dominant firm’s use of leverage to gain advantages in, 
but not to monopolize, the local telephone market was not an antitrust violation. 
“Mere” leveraging by a monopolist that will not lead to a new monopoly is not of 
US antitrust concern. Trinko, 540 US at 414, n. 4. 
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Verizon’s everyday abuses were put beyond the reach of 
antitrust.  
For developing countries, death by a thousand cuts would seem 
to be a reason for antitrust accountability, not against it. The concept 
describes the perpetuated condition of the powerful against the 
powerless. 
 
We want a law against cartels, monopolistic practices, and 
abuses of dominance that prevent dominant firms from using their 
power and leverage to fence out powerless firms. We want a law 
against mergers that create or reinforce the power to exploit and 
exclude. Moreover, we want a strong law that tackles restrictive and 
market-blocking acts by state-owned enterprises – problems that are 
exponentially greater in developing countries than in, for example, the 
United States. 
 
We would not want to use the law to undermine efficiency. We 
would guard against inefficient applications by limiting principles200. But 
our main problem today is not how to widen the safe harbours for 
exclusionary acts of monopolists; it is how to break through blocked and 
opaque markets to create competition and competitive opportunity. 
 
4. Observations on the design of appropriate law 
 
Developing countries face countless dilemmas and 
opportunities in formulating their substantive principles. Some are 
telescoped above. Here are eight: 
 
1. Developing countries face markets that are much less 
dynamic and open than markets in developed countries. 
Moreover the markets are pockmarked by state intervention 
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 For example, we might choose a principle that must not harm consumers 
through antitrust enforcement. 
Law that protects the openness of markets and access of market players on 
merit does not inherently protect inefficiencies, and law that ignores the values 
of openness and access can protect the power of the dominant firm. See 
Eleanor Fox, Monopolization, Abuse of Dominance, and the Indeterminacy of 
Economics: The US/EU Divide, 2006 Utah L. Rev. 799 (2006). 
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and control. Whether the intervention is through state 
measures, state-owned enterprises, or enterprises licensed or 
privileged by the state, these enterprises are likely to run on 
principles of privilege, preference, and cronyism201. These 
factors have major implications regarding error costs. If the 
competition agency is relatively independent, resourced, and 
capable, more intervention, especially against market blocking 
and discriminatory action202 by state-owned or state-privileged 
enterprises, might promise more gains and fewer costs than 
abuse-of-dominance intervention in developed economies203. 
 
2. Most developing countries have insufficient resources to run 
their competition offices. They are short of staff, and 
especially short of economists. This suggests that bright-line 
rules might be needed, whether they tip in the direction of 
more or less aggressive enforcement. Much developed 
country analysis, such as that suggested by the US Supreme 
Court in California Dental Association204, might be too 
complex and of uncertain application. Focused analysis with 
fewer factors in play is more appropriate205. 
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 See John Fingleton, “De-Monopolizing Ireland”, in European Competition 
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 Cal. Dental Ass’n v. F.T.C., 526 US 756 (1999) (holding that dentists’ rules 
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the output of dental services, and that the probability of output limitation must be 
the subject of detailed inquiry). 
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 See the dissenting opinion of Justice Breyer, relying on experience and 
theory to conclude that rules against advertising discounts raise prices.  Id. at 
782. See also Justice Breyer’s dissent in Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc., 
v. PSKS, Inc., supra note 8.  
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3. In view of insufficient resources and expertise, and faced with 
putative violators much bigger than their own country, the 
agency may be tempted to rely on presumptions in its favour, 
e.g. that a certain high market share presumptively proves 
dominant or substantial market power. Presumptions that shift 
a burden to the putative violator are very helpful and indeed 
important when the basis for inference is a good proxy and 
when the respondent gets a fair chance to rebut. Thus, if the 
market is well defined, the next good constraint is far from the 
market boundary, and the respondent has occupied 80 per 
cent or more of the market for many years (implying barriers 
to entry), a simple presumption and shift of the burden makes 
sense206, and may enable the agency to get on with its project 
to prove abuse. However, a much lower share (e.g. less than 
40 per cent) does not by itself tend to support an inference of 
substantial market power. The agency – to do its job – must 
examine other factors, and must listen sympathetically to the 
respondent’s story that it has no power. 
 
4. Apart from the observations above, each nation must make 
important decisions regarding the degree of antitrust 
intervention. It faces conundrums. For example, excessive 
pricing, especially after price controls are removed, may be a 
pressing problem, especially as to the price of necessities. But 
easily triggered antitrust intervention may lead to price control 
by another name and undermine the effort to prime markets 
and make them work. Low, especially below-cost, pricing 
might seriously threaten local firms and undermine their 
chance to take root. But intervention against low pricing 
deprives the people of one of the most important benefits of 
competition. Moreover, whether the low price is truly below 
cost might be difficult or impossible to ascertain. The nation 
might want to fashion a rule, such as that of the United States 
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 This is so even if developed countries’ laws require the agency to engage in 
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Developments, vol. 1, pp. 234–36 especially at note 39 (5th ed. 2002). This 
problem – proof of substantial market power – is currently under discussion in 
the International Competition Network. 
 199 
or of the European Union, to avoid intervening against low 
pricing. 
 
 
5.  A legitimate abuse-of-dominance law would be copious 
enough to prohibit unjustified foreclosing restraints, without 
the need of a plaintiff to prove output effects across the whole 
market. But as a corollary, law that seriously respects the right 
of the underdog to compete on the merits should also 
seriously respect the right of an alleged violator to prove: my 
conduct responded to consumers and served the market. 
Whatever the presumptive rule of violation for foreclosure, the 
careful agency will want to listen seriously to a pro-market, 
pro-competition defence. 
 
6. While there is high value to a nation in formulating its own law, 
nations will also appreciate the benefits of following a 
blazoned path. Anchoring new law in existing jurisprudence 
promises greater legal certainty and other efficiencies. If one 
adopts “dominant” law, one need not reinvent the wheel. One 
can take account of international norms while enhancing the 
ease of foreign investment. The challenge is to understand 
when foreign law is appropriate law and when it is not207. 
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7. Insufficient resources and expert staff are likely to be 
complicated by political pressures to refrain from doing what is 
right (e.g. sue to enjoin an anti-competitive joint venture that is 
half-owned by the government or the president’s friend). 
Agencies in all nations face political pressures, but those 
faced by agencies in developing countries are likely to be 
exponentially more severe, and the independence and ability 
of the agency to resist them are likely to be low. The question 
here is not one of law by practical politics. The prescription is: 
learning how best to deflect the anti-market and harmful 
political demands – a subject on which agencies – mature and 
young – should engage208. 
 
8. For efficiency and growth, developing countries must always 
adjust to the changing dynamics of markets and competition. 
All principles and rules should be consistent with the 
imperative of flexibility and adjustment and should avoid the 
temptation to try to hold back the tide of change. 
 
5. Correlatives 
 
The perspective suggested above concerns antitrust proper – 
the substantive rules and principles of antitrust law. A number of 
additional considerations and conditions are necessary to make the law 
useful and meaningful209. 
 
                                                 
208
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First, exemptions must not be overly broad. Antitrust operates 
only within the area carved out for it. Exemptions and immunities, 
including untouchable market actors who may be favoured by the state, 
can so shrink this area as to lose most of antitrust law’s promised 
benefits. In that spirit, including within the coverage of antitrust law 
regulated industries and state enterprises that operate in a commercial 
capacity can be significantly advantageous to developing countries. 
Often the industries most important to the people are regulated and 
each is dominated by a state-owned monopolist. These industries 
include infrastructure industries such as energy, communications, and 
transportation. Exclusion of the market actors in these markets from 
antitrust is not only a recipe for cronyism and exploitation210, but it is 
also a recipe for a tiny antitrust domain211. 
 
Second, the competition agency must be as independent as 
possible, free from political interference, lest the government and its 
politicians commandeer antitrust and confine it to a not-too-meaningful 
realm. 
Third, institutions, ideally the competition agency should be well 
funded and sufficiently staffed with educated and trained personnel. The 
leaders and staff should not be corrupt. Appellate channels should be 
provided. Appellate institutions, too, should be staffed by well-qualified 
and non-corrupt individuals. Due process should be assured in all 
proceedings. The workings of the institutions should be transparent and 
their agents accountable. Their decisions and judgements should be 
published and accessible. Well-functioning institutions are more 
important to trade and competition than is the convergence of the laws 
of various nations212. 
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Fourth, advocacy is a critical tool. Commonly, the most serious 
restraints are government measures, often procured by vested interests. 
Moreover, “corporate elites . . . [tend to] resist policy reforms…”213. The 
competition agency can play an important role in calling attention to anti-
competitive and unproductive state measures and their costs to society. 
It can be the nation’s “strongest public voice on promoting competition 
and articulating the competition perspective”214. 
 
More generally, education and adequate health care are sina 
qua non for effective participation in the economic system.These are 
difficult requirements to fulfil. If crucial elements are missing, wise policy 
makers might choose not to adopt antitrust at all. 
 
6. The developed country’s duty of cooperation 
 
Developing countries are hurt by international cartels and 
practices and are vulnerable to them. The violators know that 
developing countries have few resources to devote to antitrust (if any, 
after they serve other human priorities). Offshore firms direct exploitative 
practices at developing countries, often by acts taken and agreements 
made on their home shores215. 
                                                 
 
213
  Dutz & Khemani, Competition Law & Policy, supra note 6, at 
12. 
 
214
  Id. at 28. Dutz and Khemani noted: “[E]ffective competition 
advocacy can help create an environment where, over time, enforcement 
strengthens the role of markets by reducing government interventions and 
concomitant regulatory burdens. Thus advocacy may not just be a complement 
to enforcement, but an essential first step in expediting full, effective 
competition. Given that competition authorities typically lack sufficient political 
capital and reputation in their early years, and that policy-generated obstacles to 
competition are often maintained by support from powerful vested interests, 
initial advocacy efforts should focus on public restraints whose removal is 
subject to less debate, or [on projects] that directly benefit entrepreneurs, 
exporters, and other stakeholders who can be counted on to provide strong 
backing and support. Special attention should be paid to initiatives that directly 
or indirectly benefit as broad a base as possible”. Id. at 28–29. 
215
  See Frederic Jenny, “Globalization, Competition and Trade Policy: Issues 
and Challenges”, in Towards WTO Competition Rules 3 (Roger Zäch, ed., 
1999). 
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These anti-competitive practices launched from distant shores 
are likely to be beyond the practical reach of developing countries. To 
solve this problem, the European Union has proposed a helpful 
framework216, which could be (or might have been) implemented in the 
context of the WTO, but could also be implemented as a stand-alone 
project. 
 
In the spirit of the EU proposal, developed countries with mature 
antitrust laws can and should help developing countries, especially 
when the developed country’s own nationals are the violators of clear 
and shared principles of antitrust217. The developed countries can and 
should revise their laws, extending jurisdiction so as to make hard-core 
export cartels illegal218.  
 
An environmental convention provides a model and is a 
testament to political possibility. This is the Basel Convention on the 
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their 
Disposal219, which the United States has signed. Under the Basel 
Convention, if a signatory country prohibits the import of hazardous 
wastes, all other signatories must make illegal the shipment of 
hazardous wastes to that country. The United States and other 
developed countries could and should adopt this model for hard-core 
export cartels, which are the hazardous wastes of antitrust. 
 
                                                 
216
  Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, 
World Trade Organization, Communication from the European Community and 
Its Member States, WT/WGTCP/W/184 (Apr. 22, 2002). 
217
  It has been estimated that for 19 selected products, the value of cartel-
affected imports to developing countries in 1997 was US$51.1 billion, and that 
the price of these imports by reason of the price-fixed overcharge was elevated 
by at least 10 per cent. Margaret Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, Contemporary 
International Cartels and Developing Countries: Economic Effects and 
Implications for Competition Policy, 71 Antitrust L. J. 801, 813–16 (2004). 
218
  See Eleanor Fox, Testimony Before the Antitrust Modernization 
Commission, Hearing on International Issues in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 15, 
2006), available at www.AMC.gov; see also Special Committee on International 
Antitrust, ABA Antitrust Section, The Special Committee’s Report 83–90 (Sept. 
1, 1991). 
219 
 Mar. 22, 1989, 1673 U.N.T.S. 125. 
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Failing that, the United States and other developed countries 
should amend their antitrust laws to provide jurisdiction for the discovery 
of documents and testimony from knowledgeable people regarding 
lawsuits against them and other nationals launched abroad. This should 
include subpoena power when the developed country’s citizens are the 
alleged victimizers of the people of developing countries220. 
 
In antitrust law and enforcement, in the absence of international 
law, the world demands a cosmopolitan vision and a willingness by 
developed nations to accept responsibility for the harms they cause221. 
 
7. Networks 
 
Networking is a new world order222. Antitrust networks exist223. 
They tend to be dominated by developed nations because developed 
nations’ experience is deeper and longer; developed nations are likely to 
be heavier users of networks224; they have more resources – people 
and money – to devote to the project; and the network may provide a 
virtual forum to export their law. As a result, the agendas tend 
predominantly to reflect the interests of developed countries225. 
                                                 
220  Fox, supra note 54. 
221 The evolving case law of the United States does not demonstrate this vision 
and it does not reflect generosity of spirit. Instead it shows a retreat and puts the 
United States on a track towards solipsism and Balkanization. See F. Hoffmann-
La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran, 124 S. Ct. 2359 (2004) (holding that foreign buyers 
in worldwide conspiracy cannot invoke US antitrust laws unless they are harmed 
by the effect in the US); Intel Corp. Microprocessor Antitrust Litigation, 452 F. 
Supp. 2d 555 (D. Del. 2007) (holding that US plaintiff complaining about 
worldwide anti-competitive strategies of US defendant cannot invoke 
defendant’s foreign acts as part of the mosaic). 
222 Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, Foreign Affairs 183 
(Sept.–Oct. 1997). 
223 See D. Daniel Sokol, Monopolists Without Borders: The Institutional 
Challenge of International Antitrust in a Global Gilded Age, 4 Berkeley Bus. L. J. 
41 (2007), also available as a working paper, Univ. of Wis. Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 1034. See text at notes 178–94, 287–92. 
224
 Id., text at notes 226–29. 
225
 For example, the International Competition Network’s first project was 
convergence of procedures for pre-merger notification – an issue of concern to 
multinational corporations. Subsequent projects have stressed substantive 
merger standards and coordination of cartel procedures. Technical assistance 
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Developing nations need their own networks to explore their own 
interests more centrally. Regional trade groupings can serve as a 
platform for this objective226. A worldwide developing-country 
competition network could supplement the International Competition 
Network227. 
 
Developing nations themselves are diverse. They share certain 
characteristics and do not share others. The situation and 
characteristics of India are not the same as those of Benin228. 
Communications and cross-fertilizations through the network can begin 
to sort out differences as well as to crystallize commonalities. 
8. Conclusion 
 
Developing countries deserve an antitrust law that fits the facts 
of their markets and responds to their conditions and needs. They 
deserve a law so designed and so characterized that their peoples will 
embrace it as sympathetic and legitimate, rather than reject it as foreign. 
If there is an appropriate symbol for a developing country’s 
antitrust, it is not neo-liberalism, which may imply a widening moat. It is 
the rising ladder. Antitrust can be seen as the complement to Hernando 
de Soto’s The Other Path. 
 
The antitrust law of developing countries is likely to incorporate 
the lion’s share of developed countries’ antitrust principles. It is, 
however, likely to embody a different set of default presumptions about 
how well markets work, while incorporating a mandate and perspective 
of inclusiveness. Developing countries have a choice. 
 
                                                                                                            
for developing countries is, however, also on the agenda. See International 
Competition Network Home Page, 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org (last visited June 30, 2007). 
226
 See UNCTAD, 2007: Implementing Competition-Related Provisions in 
Regional Trade Agreements: is it possible to obtain development gains? United 
Nations. New York and Geneva.  
227
 UNCTAD is one important forum that has specific regard for the interests of 
developing countries. Competition law is one of its many missions. 
228
 See Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing 
and What Can be Done About It (2007) (distinguishing the conditions and the 
plight of the poorest 20 per cent of the world). 
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COMPETITION POLICY AND POVERTY ALLEVIATION: 
THE CASE OF PAKISTAN 
 
Joseph Wilson229 
 
 
 
These “Trusts” (monopolies, in fact) 
Must starve the needy; 
They from the poor life’s blood exact 
With death not speedy, 
Bread, iron, coal, [cement, sugar] and such they seize, 
For who dare cow them? 
And they’ll keep up the price of these– 
And other matters if they please, 
While YOU allow them!230 
 
 
                                                 
229
 Member, Competition Commission of Pakistan. The views expressed in this 
study are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 
Competition Commission of Pakistan or any of its individual members. The 
author wishes to thank Ms. Shasita Bano, Ms. Syeda Batool and Ms. Hina 
Sarafaraz for their research assistance. 
230
 http://wakeupfromyourslumber.blogspot.com/2005/12/poverty-amidst-
plenty.html 
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1. Introduction 
 
The relationship between a poor man and a monopolist dates 
back to time immemorial231. However, the first law to control the conduct 
of a monopolist was only drawn up in 1867232. During the last century, 
mankind has made astronomical advances in every aspect of human 
endeavour including proliferation of competition laws in the last decade, 
yet over 1 billion people in this world live on less than US$1 a day, and 
almost half of the world’s population (2.8 billion) lives on less than US$2 
a day233. On the other hand, the three richest people in the world have 
more wealth than 600 million people living in the world’s poorest 
countries234. Poverty or income inequality is pervasive in both developed 
and developing countries 235. Recognizing poverty as a social problem, 
the world leaders met in Copenhagen in 1995 at the United Nations’ 
World Summit on Social Development and for the first time committed to 
eradicate poverty in the world236. Since Copenhagen, the nations of the 
world reiterated their commitment again in 2000 through the Millennium 
Declaration to “spare no effort to free ... fellow men, women and children 
from the abject and dehumanizing conditions of extreme poverty”237. In 
2002, the World Summit on Sustainable Development again stressed 
the need to alleviate poverty238. 
                                                 
231
 See http://www.henciclopedia.org.uy/autores/Laguiadelmundo/Usury.htm 
(The practice of usury – lending money and accumulating interest on the loan – 
can be traced back 4,000 years. But it has always been despised, condemned, 
restricted or banned by moral, ethical, legal or religious entities). 
232
 Joseph Wilson, Globalization and the Limits of National Merger Control 
Laws, at p. 65 (Kluwer Law International, 2003). The first antitrust law was 
passed by the State of Maryland. (footnotes omitted). 
233
 UN HDR, 2003. 
234
 http://www.christianaid.org.uk/stoppoverty/trade/facts/index.aspx 
235
 World Summit for Social Development Programme of Action – Chapter 2: 
Eradication of Poverty (Para. 19) (accessed 2 March 2008) (also available as a 
PDF in report A/CONF.166/9 – Report of the World Summit for Social 
Development): ( It occurs in all countries: as mass poverty in many developing 
countries, pockets of poverty amid wealth in developed countries). 
236
 Id. 
237
 United Nations Millennium Declaration, A/RES/55/2, (18.9.2000) 
238
 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/636/93/PDF/N0263693.pdf?Op
enElement 
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Since then national governments, both at national and 
international levels, international donor agencies, non-governmental 
organizations and the private sector have taken initiatives to combat 
poverty. Any policy to eradicate poverty, argues Amartya Sen, “must 
focus on creating environments in which people have the opportunities 
to ‘lead the lives they have reason to value and to enhance the real 
choices they have’”239. Coincidentally, enhancing real choices is also a 
core element of “consumer welfare”, which is the rationale (put 
simplistically) of competition policy and law240, and of classical trade 
theory241.  
 
Competition policy forms a part of broader economic policies 
that are used as tools to improve and sustain the engines of growth that 
preserve the health of a nation; improve the welfare of the people; and 
reduce poverty242. The WTO and its 151243 member nations agree that 
the goal of international trade is to increase standards of living across 
                                                 
239
 Mary-Ellen Boyle and Janet Boguslaw, Business, Poverty and Corporate 
Citizenship: Naming the Issues and Framing Solutions, 6/22/07 J. Corp. 
Citizenship 101; 2007 WLNR 13760904 quoting Amartya Sen, Development as 
Freedom at 293 (Anchor Books/Random House, New York, 1999). 
240
 Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox, 61 (Basic Books Inc., New York, 
1978); (Consumer welfare as defined by Judge Robert Bork, means all things 
that are good for consumers, such as low prices, innovation, and choices.) 
241
 Erik Johansen, I Say Antitrust; You Say Anticompetitive: Why Bridging the 
Divide Between U.S. And EU Competition Policy Makes Economic Sense, 24 
Penn St. Int’l L. Rev. 331 at 335 ( 2005): 
(It is choice. It is access to information. It is the availability of consumption 
alternatives; the ability, if one is so inclined, to walk to the corner store and to 
choose from among 200 different types of cheese. Quoting: Raj Bhala, 
International Trade Law: Theory & Practice 1–6 (2nd ed. 2001); and Economics 
Focus: Chasing the Leader, Economist, Feb. 8, 2003, at 70.) 
242
 Fox, Eleanor M., Economic Development, Poverty, and Antitrust: The Other 
Path. Southwestern Journal of Law and Trade in the Americas, Vol. 13, 101 at 
108–9, 2007. (Market tools are a very important part of the panoply of tools 
needed to address world poverty and should be used liberally. These market 
tools include market-freeing measures that reduce prices. They also include 
antitrust priority setting that targets conspiracies that raise the price of staples, 
such as milk, bread, transportation and utilities, helping the poor as well as 
those who are better off.) 
243
 With the accession of Ukraine on 16 May 2008, the membership of the WTO 
will reach 152. 
 210 
the globe244. The phenomenon of globalization marked by trade 
liberalization and foreign direct investment, among others, can be 
harnessed and used efficiently only if there is sound competition policy 
and law in place.  
 
Competition policy and law provide a necessary framework that 
supports and complements measures aimed at alleviating poverty. 
Competition policy, where it exists, hovers over all economic activity 
within a country, promotes rivalry among businesses, and keeps a 
check on rent-seeking and anti-competitive practices, which could stall 
any poverty-alleviation programmes245. 
 
Section 2 discusses the definition of poverty, reviews the 
objectives of international trade, foreign direct investment and 
competition policies, and their role in poverty alleviation. Section 3 
overviews the competition regime in Pakistan and takes account of the 
Competition Commission of Pakistan’s intervention in cases that have a 
direct bearing on the poor population of the country. It also reviews the 
state of competition in public utility sectors. This study concludes that a 
competition regime embodying modern competition law principles and 
having the objective of preserving competition in the market, thereby 
enhancing consumer welfare and allocative efficiencies, can serve as an 
important tool in alleviating poverty in developing countries.  
2. Poverty and competition policy 
2.1. Poverty defined 
 
Various scholars and organizations have attempted to define 
poverty246. The World Summit for Social Development defines poverty 
                                                 
244
 http://www.wto.org./english/thewto_e/whatis_e/inbrief_e/inbr00_e.htm; (The 
goal is to improve the welfare of the peoples of the member countries). 
245
 William E. Kovacic, Institutional Foundations for Economic Legal Reform in 
Transition Economies: The Case of Competition Policy and Antitrust 
Enforcement, 77 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 265, 281 (2001). 
246
 Boyle and Boguslaw, supra note 11, provide an account of definition by 
various scholars, e.g. Poverty occurs because of restricted/inadequate access 
to the opportunities and resources necessary for health, safety, and well-being 
(Shapiro and Wolff 2004). The conditions that characterize the impoverished 
status are not limited to insufficient income; also lacking are social and public 
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broadly to include “lack of income and productive resources sufficient to 
ensure sustainable livelihoods; hunger and malnutrition; ill health; 
limited or lack of access to education and other basic services; 
increased morbidity and mortality from illness; homelessness and 
inadequate housing; unsafe environments; and social discrimination and 
exclusion”247. It defines “absolute poverty” as a “condition characterized 
by severe deprivation of basic human needs, including food, safe 
drinking water, sanitation facilities, health, shelter, education and 
information. It depends not only on income but also on access to social 
services”248. In 2001, the World Bank in its annual World Development 
Report included vulnerability and exposure to risk as well as 
voicelessness and powerlessness in the concept of poverty249. 
 
Poverty can be simply defined as social disadvantage vis-à-vis 
various necessities of life. Poverty is usually measured through a 
consensus based on the minimum income question, which is used to 
derive the “Poverty Line”250. In Pakistan, the official poverty line is based 
on consumption, i.e., the caloric norm of 2,350 calories required by an 
adult in a day, and on minimum non-food requirements. The poverty line 
was set at Rs.673.54 (US$12.6) per month/per adult in 1998–99, which 
rose to Rs.723 (US$11.9) in 2000–01, and to Rs.878 (US$14) in 2004–
05251. The current poverty line in Pakistan, which is around US$14 a 
month, is below the dollar-a-day standard, which sets the poverty line at 
US$30 a month. 
                                                                                                            
services and investments in education, primary health care, water, sanitation, 
transportation and energy. Poverty is aggravated by the lack of natural 
resources necessary for well-being and often by environmental degradation 
(Sen 1999; UN 2000). 
247
 World Summit for Social Development Programme of Action – Chapter 2: 
Eradication of Poverty (Para. 19) (accessed 2 March 2008) (also available as a 
PDF in report A/CONF.166/9 – Report of the World Summit for Social 
Development); Since 1990, the World Bank’s annual World Development Report 
(WDR) identified poverty not only in its income dimension but also in terms of 
low achievements in education and health status , World Bank, WDR 1990. 
248
 Id. See also, Sen supra note 239. 
249
 World Bank, World Development Report, 2001. 
250
 Peter Saunders, Defining Poverty and Identifying the Poor, Reflections on 
the Australian Experience, SPRC Discussion Paper No. 84 (1998): 
http://www.sprc.unsw.edu.au/dp/dp084.pdf 
251
 Pakistan Poverty Reduction Paper, available at www.finance.gov.pk. The 
conversion in US dollars is made using the exchange rate prevalent during the 
period in question. 
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Poverty is intensified by unemployment, labour market 
inequalities, an “unequal distribution of power, and by limits on 
political participation”252. From the definitions above, the dimensions of 
poverty that competition policy can directly and indirectly address are: 
access to social services, unemployment, labour market inequalities, 
unequal distribution of power, and vulnerability. A competitive market 
demands multiple service providers for the provision of social services 
and other sectors hitherto in the exclusive control of the state. 
Competition law by ensuring fair market play encourages trade, which in 
turn can generate employment, and reduce labour market inequalities. 
Competition law also prohibits and penalizes abuse of dominant position 
(unequal distribution of power), and it provides a shield to vulnerable 
persons against artificial price hikes and other anti-competitive practices 
affecting prices. 
 
Poverty may be classified into three different categories: 
 
1. Extreme/absolute/chronic poverty: households cannot meet 
basic survival needs. 
 
2. Moderate/transitory poverty: basic needs are barely met; 
people must often forgo education and health care. The smallest 
misfortune (health issue, job loss, etc.) threatens survival. 
 
3. Relative: household income level is below a given proportion 
of average national income; people lack access to quality health care, 
education and prerequisites for upward mobility253. 
 
While the three categories require different types of 
interventions, the responses often complement one another254. Of the 
three categories, the moderate or vulnerable poor are directly affected 
with the enforcement or lack thereof of competition laws. 
 
                                                 
252
 Boyle and Boguslaw, supra note 239, quoting Nef (1999); Mani (2004); and 
Page and Simmons (2000).  
253
 Id. developing on the model by Jeffrey Sachs, (2005: 20): See also Chronic 
Poverty Research Centre: 
http://www.chronicpoverty.org/pdfs/PolicyBriefs/CPRC_PB6.pdf. 
254
 Id. 
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Reporting on the causes of poverty in Pakistan, an ADB report 
of 2002 noted that poor governance255 was the key underlying cause of 
poverty during the 1990s256. Poor governance had contributed to the 
“declining competitiveness of the Pakistan economy in the increasingly 
skill-based global economy”257. The report also noted that there are 
“strong linkages between pro-poor growth on the one hand, and human 
development [and] good governance” on the other. To promote pro-poor 
economic growth, it recommended “structural reforms in key sectors 
through promoting deregulation, privatization, and the creation of an 
enabling environment for private sector foreign investments”258. While 
the deregulation and privatization processes were started in the early 
1990s in Pakistan, the enabling environment encouraging foreign 
investment requires a sound and well-entrenched competition regime –- 
which ensures free entry and exit, and a level playing field for foreign 
investors –- came into being only in 2007 through the promulgation of 
the Competition Ordinance, 2007. 
 
2.2. Millennium Development Goals and Pakistan’s initiatives 
to alleviate poverty 
 
The first goal on the list of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) is to “reduce by half the proportion of the world’s population 
living on less than US$1 a day between 1990 and 2015”259. Pakistan 
subscribes to the Millennium Declaration and has taken various 
initiatives to alleviate poverty, in addition to addressing other MDGs. 
 
Pursuant to the Millennium Declaration, the government of 
Pakistan produced an Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy (IPRS) Paper 
in 2000. The IPRS aimed at improving growth, human development, 
governance, and reducing the vulnerability of the poor to shocks. In 
                                                 
255
 Governance is defined as the manner in which power is exercised in the 
management of a country’s social and economic resources in development. 
Asian Development Bank, 1995: Governance: Sound Development 
Management Policy, Globalization and Poverty. 
256
 Poverty in Pakistan: Issues, Causes and Institutional Responses, at p. 2 
(Asian Development Bank, July 2002; Publication Stock No. 070302). 
257
 Id. at p. 3. 
258
 Id. at p. 5. 
259
 UN 2000.  
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December 2003, the final Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) 
was completed and published260. The PRSP was based on four pillars: 
(i) achieving high and broad-based economic growth while maintaining 
macroeconomic stability; (ii) improving governance; (iii) investing in 
human capital; and (iv) targeting the poor and vulnerable. To implement 
the Strategy, the Ministry of Finance set up a PRSP Secretariat, which 
is responsible for implementing and monitoring the progress made 
under the PRSP. The PRSP Secretariat is assisted by a research centre 
called the Centre for Research on Poverty Reduction and Income 
Distribution. Additionally, the Planning Commission of Pakistan also 
provides support to the Ministry of Finance in meeting the obligations 
under the PRSP261. 
 
The Strategy is part of the Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Facility given by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank to the government. The donor agencies have created a “Pakistan 
Poverty Reduction Support Credit (PRSC) Technical Assistance Trust 
Fund” under which funding for technical assistance may be granted to 
the newly constituted Competition Commission of Pakistan. 
 
The vulnerable or transitory poor (pillar 4 of the PRSP) are a 
target of the government’s initiative to reduce poverty. The government 
has established two micro-credit banks and a few other institutions 
responsible for making direct transfers to the poor. Some of these are: 
Khushali Bank; The First Micro Finance Bank Ltd., SME Bank, Pakistan 
Poverty Alleviation Fund (PPAF), Social Safety Nets, Food Support 
Programme, Pakistan Centre for Philanthropy262. 
 
Creating access to employment is a sine quo non for alleviating 
poverty. The government of Pakistan has encouraged gender-support 
programmes in rural areas and in services within the urban centres. As 
a result, female unemployment rate has dropped from 12.8 per cent in 
2004 to 9.4 per cent in 2006. The steepest decline was recorded in 
Balouchistan, where the unemployment figures fell from 29.2 per cent in 
2004 to 7.1 per cent in 2006. Females are encouraged to seek 
employment in non-traditional sectors, such as police and air force, and 
                                                 
260
 Accelerating Economic Growth and Reducing Poverty: The Road Ahead. 
Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan, December 2003. 
261
 Id. 
262
 Id. at p. 138. 
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the financial institutions are directed to offer credit to female 
entrepreneurs to encourage small and medium enterprises.  
 
Since the implementation of the PRSP, Pakistan has witnessed 
a growth in its gross domestic product (GDP), from 1.8 per cent in 
2000–01 to more than 7 per cent since 2004263. During 2004–05, 
“agriculture, which has the strongest immediate impact on rural poverty, 
grew by 7.6 per cent, manufacturing by 12.5 per cent, and services by 
7.9 per cent”264. The fiscal deficit of the country has reduced from 8.8 
per cent of the GDP in 1990–91 to 3 per cent in 2003–04, and the 
“government intends to keep it around 3.5 per cent until the financial 
year 2008”265. 
 
In 2006–07, the three-year Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Programme I (PRSP-I) came to an end. During this period, the pro-poor 
expenditure was increased from Rs.167.25 billion in 2002–03 to 
Rs.452.4 billion in 2005–06. National initiatives, in addition to global 
growth have contributed in the alleviation of poverty in Pakistan. The 
percentage of the population living below the poverty line – the 
headcount ratio – has declined from 31 per cent in 2002 to 17 per cent 
in 2006266. 
 
The PRSP II covering the period 2008 to 2010 is being finalized 
and is based on the following seven pillars:  
i) Drivers of economic growth and macroeconomic 
stability; 
ii) Crafting a competitive advantage; 
iii) Harnessing the potential of people; 
iv) Financial deepening and economic development; 
v) World-class infrastructure; 
vi) Effective governance and management, and 
vii) Targeting the poor and vulnerable267. 
 
                                                 
263
 Pakistan Economic Survey, 2006–07 at p. 53. available at 
http://www.finance.gov.pk/survey/survey.htm. 
264
 Akhtar Mahmood, “Linkages between Trade, Development and Poverty 
Reduction: The Case of Pakistan”, at 135 in Trade-Development-Poverty 
Linkages Vol. I (Jaipur Printers, Jaipur); CUTS International, 2008. 
265
 Id. at p. 136. 
266
 http://www.sbp.org.pk/reports/annual/arfy07/Chp-8.pdf 
267
 Pakistan Economic Survey, supra note 263, at 53. 
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The three additional principles added in the PRSP II are i) 
crafting a competitive advantage, ii) financial deepening and economic 
development, and iii) world-class infrastructure. Effective governance, 
among others, is a principle which continues to be part of PRSP I and II. 
An important section in the governance structure is the efficient and 
well-crafted competition policy and law. Under the PRSP I, the 
government of Pakistan designed a new competition policy and 
Competition Ordinance, 2007, which was promulgated on 2 October 
2007. The Competition Ordinance is discussed more in detail in Section 
3. 
 
2.3. International trade, foreign direct investment, 
competition policy and poverty 
 
The underlying objectives of promoting international trade, 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and competition policy have a common 
theme, that is, to “increase world wealth” or alleviate poverty by 
“opening markets to foreign goods, services, and capital”268. Examining 
                                                 
268
 Kevin C. Kennedy, Foreign Direct Investment and Competition Policy at the 
World Trade Organization, 33 Geo. Wash. Int’L. Rev. 585 (2001); see also 
OECD, Trade and Competition Policies: Exploring the Ways Forward (1999); 
WTO Secretariat, Synthesis Paper on the Relationship of Trade and 
Competition Policy to Development and Economic Growth, WT/WGTCP/W/80 
(Sept. 18, 1998); Michael J. Trebilcock, Competition Policy and Trade Policy, 
Mediating the Interface, 30 J. World Trade 71 (1996). 
 Prof. Kennedy has succinctly described the relationships between international 
trade, foreign direct investment and competition polices: “These three policies 
can be mutually reinforcing when pursued with the common goal of encouraging 
cross-border competition. For example, a liberal trade policy has as its goal the 
elimination or lowering of barriers to trade in goods, opening foreign markets to 
goods from abroad, and bringing competition to bear on domestic producers. A 
liberal trade policy thus can have a significant impact on competition and on 
markets. To the extent trade liberalization reduces entry barriers to foreign 
markets, it gives domestic firms less ability to engage in anti-competitive 
behavior. Similarly, to the extent that domestic firms tie up channels of 
distribution in local markets and thereby block market access to imports, a 
liberal investment policy can eliminate such anti-competitive practices by 
permitting foreign firms to own distribution networks in the local market. In 
theory, then, trade, investment, and competition policies ought to work in 
harmony. Their shared goals and objectives suggest teaming rules against 
private anti-competitive behavior with rules on the elimination of government 
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the link between trade and poverty, one study concludes that: “while 
there is no simple one-to-one relationship between trade and poverty, 
the evidence seems to indicate that trade liberalization is generally a 
positive contributor to poverty alleviation — it allows people to exploit 
their productive potential, assists economic growth, curtails arbitrary 
policy interventions and helps to insulate against shocks”269. 
 
Competition policy aims to promote business rivalry and 
allocation of resources in which consumer welfare is maximized270. It 
provides the basic framework that ensures the success of liberalization 
processes271. It is reported that countries with an effective competition 
regime have a “high level of competition in local market”, which in turn 
has a direct effect on the “levels and rates of growth in per capita gross 
domestic product”272. The growth in per capita GDP is taken as the 
primary indicator of poverty reduction. 
 
However, to ensure that effective competition regime pans out 
as it should, there is a need to foster a competition culture in the 
developing countries. “A culture of competition in this context refers to 
the awareness of the business community, governmental agencies, 
non-governmental agencies, the media, the judiciary, and the general 
public, of the rules of competition law, and their overall responsibility to 
ensure that such rules are observed in the interest of competition and 
overall economic development…The lack of such a culture has plagued 
                                                                                                            
barriers to international trade and investment”. Id., at p. 585. 
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David, Håkan Nordström, LAlanWinters (1999) at p. 6. 
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practically all young agencies”273. Young agencies should make 
competition advocacy an integral part of their functions, so that 
competition culture may be developed, which will help facilitate the 
implementation of the competition policy and law. 
 
A properly designed competition regime embedded in a well-
nurtured competition culture, would make antitrust enforcement 
effective, which will prevent and arrest anti-competitive practices 
adversely impacting poverty in the following, among others, manner: 
 
i) Collective price fixing – raising prices artificially thereby 
harming poor consumers; 
ii) Restricting the supply/output of essential commodities in the 
market and thereby depriving the consumers of the basic 
necessities; 
iii) Bid rigging: especially in government contracts for 
infrastructure projects. Bid rigging raises the cost of state 
projects thus misappropriating public funds, which could be 
used for other development and poverty reduction projects. 
iv) Tied selling – forcing people to buy items they do not need, 
thus depriving them of their scarce funds. 
v) Cartels in essential supplies, e.g. wheat, sugar, cooking oil, 
cement, etc. 
 
As an illustration of one of the above anti-competitive activities 
adversely affecting competition and thereby development processes, a 
World Bank Report noted: “Procurement irregularities have been a 
significant problem in Pakistan, in large part due to a weak regulatory 
framework that discouraged due diligence in contract awards and stifled 
open competition. Specific problems have included inadequate bidding 
documents, inadequate response time to bidders, prequalification as a 
means of restricting competition, price negotiations, lack of independent 
complaints handling process, and irregularities in inspections or 
measurements”274. 
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Competition Policy 
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Conference, Cape town, South Africa, 3–5 May 2006. 
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 The World Bank Group, Report No. 35718-PAK, at p. 26 
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While Pakistan established the Pakistan Procurements 
Regulatory Authority (PPRA) to regulate all public sector procurements, 
a sound antitrust enforcement is essential to curb the bid rigging and 
other above-mentioned anti-competitive practices, which affect 
consumers, more so those living close to the poverty line. 
 
3. The competition regime in Pakistan 
 
The Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Ordinance of 
1970275 (MRTPO), was the principal instrument forming the competition 
regime in Pakistan until October 2007, when it was repealed and 
replaced by the Competition Ordinance of 2007(“the Ordinance”)276.  
 
3.1. Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Ordinance, 
1970 
 
The MRTPO was drafted with the objective of preventing an 
undue concentration of economic power in the hands of the few. The 
substantive provisions of the MRTPO proscribed i) undue concentration 
of economic power; ii) growth of unreasonable monopoly power; and iii) 
unreasonably restrictive trade practices277. The MRTPO did not have 
promotion of business rivalry or efficient allocation of resources as its 
objective. As such, the MRTPO did not provide the necessary legal 
framework that could ensure that the liberalization process, which 
started in early 1990s, does not fail. Thus, there was a need to reform 
the competition policy and law with a view to effectively harness 
international trade, and FDI, and also to bring it in line with the globally 
accepted competition policy norms and practices.  
 
3.2. The Competition Ordinance, 2007 
 
In order to strengthen good governance in Pakistan, the Ministry 
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 Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices (Control and Prevention) 
Ordinance, 1970 (Pakistan) (Published in the Gazette of Pakistan, 
Extraordinary, Feb. 26, 1970) [hereinafter MRTPO]. For a commentary on the 
MRTPO see Joseph Wilson, At The Crossroads: Making Competition Law 
Effective in Pakistan, 26 NW. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 565 (2006). 
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 Preamble and Section 3 MRTPO supra note 275. 
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of Finance, under the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper put forward for 
legislation a competition Bill, which was promulgated by the President of 
Pakistan as the Competition Ordinance on October 2, 2007. The 
objective of the Competition Ordinance is “to provide for free 
competition in all spheres of commercial and economic activity, to 
enhance economic efficiency and to protect consumers from anti-
competitive behaviour”278. While the term competition279 is not defined in 
the Ordinance, and rightfully so280, it means promoting business rivalry, 
as enhancing economic efficiency and protecting consumers are 
separately mentioned. The triad mentioned in the preamble holistically 
captures the norms and objectives of contemporary competition 
regimes.  
 
The Ordinance applies to all undertakings, whether 
governmental or private, and to all actions or matters that have the 
effect of distorting competition within Pakistan. The Ordinance prohibits 
abuse of dominant position281; agreements that have the object or effect 
of preventing or reducing competition within the relevant market282; and 
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 For definitions of competition, see Webster’s New World Dictionary of the 
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 Id., Section 4. 
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shall make a decision in respect of the production, supply, distribution, 
acquisition or control of goods or the provision of services which have the object 
or effect of preventing, restricting or reducing competition within the relevant 
market unless exempted under Section 5 of this Ordinance. (2)  . . . (3) Any 
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deceptive marketing practices283. The Ordinance introduced pre-merger 
notification, and a two-phased merger clearance regime284. The 
substantive test for merger clearance is the substantial lessening of 
competition by creating or strengthening a dominant position in the 
relevant market285. 
The Ordinance provides for the establishment of a Competition 
Commission of Pakistan (CCP)286. The CCP is comprised of five 
members including the Chairperson287. Apart from implementing the 
substantive provisions of the Ordinance, the functions of the 
Commission includes conducting studies of different sectors with a view 
to promoting competition, and engaging in competition advocacy for 
promoting a competition culture288. 
                                                                                                            
agreement entered into in contravention of the provision sub-section (1) shall be 
void. 
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 Id., Section 10. 
10. Deceptive marketing practices:- (1) No undertaking shall enter into 
deceptive marketing practices. 
(2)  The deceptive marketing practices shall be deemed to have been 
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(a) the distribution of false or misleading information that is capable of 
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(c) false or misleading comparison of goods in the process of advertising or 
packing; 
(d) fraudulent use of another’s trademark, firm name, or product labeling or 
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All matters under the Ordinance are decided in the first instance 
by a single member of the CCP or its authorized officer. Appeal against 
the order of a single member, or authorized officer, may be preferred 
before a bench comprising of no less than two members of the 
Commission. The order of the appellate bench can be appealed against 
before the Supreme Court of Pakistan289. 
 
In case of contravention of any provisions of the Ordinance, the 
Commission may impose a penalty of up to Rs.50 million (around 
US$850,000) or an amount not exceeding 15 per cent of the annual 
turnover of the undertaking290.  
3.2.1. Antitrust enforcement  
 
In a short span of less than four months since the CCP was 
constituted, the Commission has initiated suo moto actions, and has 
acted on complaints, which have direct impact on consumers. 
3.2.1.1. Banks’ cartel: fixing interest rates 
 
The Pakistan Banks’ Association (PBA) advertised on 5 
November 2007 in the daily press that “under the auspices of Pakistan 
Banks’ Association, all scheduled banks introduced the Enhanced 
Saving Account (ESA)” for all saving accounts with a maximum deposit 
of Rs.20,000291. Under the ESA, small account holders will get a fixed 
interest of 4 per cent per annum. The Competition Commission took 
notice of the advertisement and issued notices to PBA and 41 banks 
under Section 30 of the Competition Ordinance, 2007 requiring them to 
explain their position regarding jointly introducing a financial product and 
                                                                                                            
(c) holding open hearings on any matter affecting the state of competition in 
Pakistan or affecting the country’s commercial activities and expressing publicly 
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fixing profit rates, which prima facie violates Section 4 of the 
Ordinance292.  
 
The banking sector in Pakistan is still concentrated, despite a 
large number of banks entering the market in the last decade293. The top 
five local banks294 enjoy 80 per cent of the market share of the banking 
sector. These banks are charging high lending rates, and passing only a 
portion of the profits on to their depositors on whose money they make 
the profits. The banking spread in Pakistan is among the highest in the 
world, and Pakistan’s banking sector has enjoyed the highest profits in 
the Asia-Pacific region.  
 
 On April 10, 2008, the CCP issued its order against the bank 
cartel requiring PBA to desist from collusive price-fixing and imposed a 
penalty of Rs. 30 million on it and Rs. 25 million each on seven leading 
banks295. Fixing the interest rates, apart from killing the competition, 
directly impacts the account-holder’s potential to save, and thus 
enhances his/her vulnerability. Such conduct is clearly adversely 
affecting the efforts to alleviate poverty in the country. It is hoped that 
the order of the CCP will restore competition in the market for small 
depositors, thereby giving them a choice to opt for banks offering high 
interest and low lending rates. 
 
3.2.1.2. Bahria University: the tying case 
 
Bahria University, run by Pakistan Navy and having campuses 
in Karachi and Islamabad, imported 4,500 laptops in 2006 to sell to 
students. However, when the laptops were not sold as expected, the 
University administration made it mandatory for all new entrants to 
purchase the computers296. The price of the laptops in the market is 
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around Rs.40,000.00 (US$650.00) whereas the university is charging on 
a lump-sum basis Rs.56,000.00 (US$903.00) or in the case of payment 
by instalment it costs Rs.17,000.00 (US$275.00) per semester for four 
semesters (a total of US$1,100.00) or Rs.10,650/- (US$171.00) per 
semester for eight semesters (a total of US$1,374.00). The University 
intends to continue this practice while the stocks last297.  
 
The CCP took notice of this practice, after picking it from the 
press, and initiated an inquiry as the practice is violating Section 3(3)c of 
the Ordinance, which prohibits “tie-ins”, that is where the sale of goods 
or services is made conditional on the purchase of other goods or 
services.  
 
The practice of tie-in was putting an unnecessary burden on the 
poor students by: i) forcing them to purchase a laptop even if they 
already have one; and ii) selling the laptops at a price that is at least 45 
per cent more than the market price in the case of a lump-sum purchase 
and over 100 per cent more in case of purchase by instalments. This 
anti-competitive practice is clearly a tax on students, who wish to 
improve the human capital thereby reducing the incidence of poverty. In 
response to the CCP’s notice, the University has voluntarily agreed to 
stop the practice of mandatory purchase of laptops immediately. It is 
hoped that this will send a signal to others to abstain from engaging in 
activities that unduly burden the captive, often vulnerable, customers. 
 
3.2.1.3. The colas: exclusive dealing case 
 
Murree Brewery Company Limited (MBCL), a local producer of 
alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages, complained against McDonalds, 
Kentucky Fried Chicken (KFC), and Pizza Hut for exclusive dealing with 
cola companies and selling only cola drinks at their outlets, thereby 
refusing to deal with it and other local beverage manufacturers.  
 
McDonalds, KFC, and Pizza Hut together enjoy the dominant 
position in the foreign fast-food restaurants market. Their refusal to deal 
with MBCL forecloses a local competitor from the relevant market. 
Keeping efficiencies flowing from exclusive dealing aside, such 
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agreements by restricting competition indirectly restrict an undertaking’s 
potential to grow thereby limiting potential employment opportunities, in 
addition to limiting choices to consumers. Competition law by prohibiting 
agreements restricting competition indirectly ensures that opportunities 
for growth and potential employment are not stifled, and thus contributes 
towards alleviating poverty. 
 
3.2.2. Intervention in essential commodities sectors 
 
The CCP has made interventions, either at its own behest or at 
the request of the government, in certain essential commodities markets 
with a view to preventing artificial price hikes and supply shortages. 
3.2.2.1. Cement industry: an entrenched cartel! 
 
Cement costs form a significant portion of a country’s 
infrastructure development budget. A price hike in the cement sector 
may lead to the reallocation of funds for the purchase of cement instead 
of some other developmental work. In Pakistan, a sudden upsurge in 
cement prices by all the cement companies was (again)298 observed in 
February 2007. The prices were increased from Rs.220~230 to 
Rs.275~360 per 50-kg bag indicating a cartel-like behaviour. 
 
The government of Pakistan took notice of this sudden rise in 
prices and the Cabinet Division instructed the erstwhile Monopoly 
Control Authority (MCA) to initiate an enquiry. The MCA established a 
committee to conduct an in-depth special enquiry under the provisions 
of the MRTPO. The Committee took statements and viewpoints of all 
stakeholders including the general public by soliciting information 
through newspapers. The MCA was however unable to effectively 
investigate the cartel, as the MRTPO did not have provisions for 
leniency and inspection of premises. 
 
Continuing the work undertaken by the MCA, the Competition 
Commission using the powers299 to forcibly inspect premises inspected 
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the offices of All Pakistan Cement Manufacturers Association (APCMA) 
in Lahore on 24 April, 2008 and recovered reasonable evidence against 
APCMA for its alleged role in price fixing and output restrictions. The 
CCP has issued notices the office bearers of APCMA, and the case is 
now under investigation300. 
 
This was the first time that the Commission has forcibly 
inspected the offices of an association. The forced inspection has sent a 
strong signal to businesses to desist from anti-competitive practices, 
which hitherto were considered normal business practice. 
3.2.2.2. Liquefied petroleum gas: the supply shortage 
 
Liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) is manufactured during the 
refining of crude oil, or extracted from oil or gas streams as they emerge 
from the ground. There are ten producers of LPG including five 
refineries and other exploration companies in Pakistan. According to an 
estimate, 15 million households use LPG for cooking and heating 
purposes, as no other source of fuel is available to them. In Azad 
Jumma and Kashmir (AJK) and northern areas of Pakistan the only fuel 
available to people is LPG. In 2000, the government deregulated the 
sector allowing producers to fix wholesale prices. Consequently the 
distributors and dealers set their prices for retail sales. 
 
In January 2008, there was a severe shortage of LPG: against 
the demand of 4,000 million tons per day there was a supply of only 
1,700 million tons per day. Although, demand for LPG is usually high in 
the winter season, it was speculated that producers agreed to create a 
price hike by limiting supply. It is observed that over the last 18 months 
the price of LPG has skyrocketed to a 300 per cent increase301. 
 
The CCP took notice of this astronomical price hike and 
requested the Oil and Gas Regulatory Authority, the sector regulator, to 
take cognizance of the matter. Higher prices of LPG directly affect 15 
million vulnerable households. In addition to household consumption, a 
large proportion of people in the northern or mountain areas are 
engaged in the restaurant profession, and use LPG for cooking. The 
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non-availability of LPG directly affects their source of earning, forcing 
them to live on their savings, if any, and thus pushing them towards 
poverty.  
 
3.3. Competition in public utilities 
 
The government of Pakistan liberalized and opened up markets 
for public utilities such as telecommunication, electric power, oil and gas 
in the early 1990s. The liberalization and fostering of competition has 
been more successful in the telecommunications sector than in other 
industries. 
3.3.1. Telecommunications sector 
 
Pakistan started opening up the telecommunications sector in 
1991 with the corporatization and then privatization of the state-owned 
Pakistan Telegraph and Telephone Department (PTT) into the Pakistan 
Telecommunication Corporation. In 1996, the sector was reorganized 
through the Pakistan Telecommunications (Re-organization) Act, which 
also provides for the establishment of the Pakistan Telecommunication 
Authority (the “Authority” or PTA)302. 
 
Under Sections 4(c) and 6(f) of the 1996 Act, it is the function of 
the Authority to promote and protect the interest of the consumers303. 
Pursuant to Section 4, the Protection of Telecom Consumers Regulation 
2006 was promulgated with the aim of making efficient use of the 
benefits of a competitive environment, where a consumer is free to 
choose among operators and their services. Regulation 4 and other 
provisions of the Consumer Regulation proscribe the operators from 
colluding, engaging in anti-competitive practices and abusing the 
dominant power that would undermine consumer interests, thereby 
discouraging investment and/or the provision of quality services.  
 
Section 4(d) of the 1996 Act mandates the Authority to “promote 
the availability of a wide range of high quality, efficient, cost-effective 
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and competitive telecommunication services throughout Pakistan”. 
Section 6(e) complements the duty to promote competition by requiring 
the Authority to ensure that “fair competition in the telecommunication 
sector exists and is maintained”. In 2006, the Act was amended by 
giving the Federal Government powers to make rules for “preventing, 
prohibiting, and remedying the effects of anti-competitive conduct by 
licensees”304. The rules are, however, yet to be made. 
 
In order to maintain fair competition in the telecommunications 
market, the Authority regularly monitors the market to ascertain players 
with Significant Market Power (SMP). An operator is presumed to be an 
SMP when it has a market share of more than 25 per cent of a particular 
telecommunication market305. Once an SMP is determined, the Authority 
incorporates provisions prohibiting anti-competitive practices in their 
licences306.  
 
To encourage market entry further, the Telecom De-regulation 
Policy of 2003 (TDC) and the Mobile Cellular Policy of 2004 were 
formulated to attract new entrants in the fixed and mobile 
telecommunications sectors, respectively. The TDC was formulated 
pursuant to the commitment made under the WTO agreement 
liberalizing trade in basic telecommunications services, known as the 
Fourth Protocol to the GATS307. The Agreement called for the opening 
of “markets to competition for domestic and foreign telecommunications 
network operators and service providers”308. The liberalization of the 
telecommunications industry has attracted sizeable FDI in the country. 
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Total Foreign Direct Investment in Telecom Sector 
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Post deregulation (2004), the growth of FDI in the telecom 
sector has been phenomenal, contributing 54.11 per cent to the total 
FDI of US$3521 million in 2005–06. The consistent growth in investment 
has resulted in a better infrastructure and generated employment in the 
sector.  
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In 2005, two new mobile service providers, Telenor and Warid, 
launched their operations and investment by them resulted in significant 
job creation in the sector. In 2005–06, 183,063 jobs were created which 
were in addition to the 417,135 created in 2004–05. The figures indicate 
both direct and indirect employment generated each year. The telecom 
sector has contributed Rs.77.1 billion to the national exchequer in 2005–
06. This figure is 15 per cent higher than that of the previous year. The 
contribution to the government coffers is increased by 100 per cent 
since the liberalization took place in 2003–04. The telecom sector is still 
attracting large investments and is contributing to the economy through 
the creation of employment thereby alleviating poverty. 
 
In addition to attracting FDI, and creating employment, the rates 
(tariffs) of mobile telecommunication services in Pakistan are among the 
lowest in the world. All these benefits can fairly be attributed to pro-
competitive legislation and its effective implementation by the regulator. 
 
Despite the commendable growth of telecommunications in 
Pakistan, it should be mentioned that 70 per cent of Pakistan’s total 
population resides in rural areas, where the total teledensity is a little 
less than 2 per cent309. Eighty million people in Pakistan have no access 
to telecommunication services. In Punjab, the most densely populated 
province, 41 per cent of villages, and in Balochistan, the least densely 
populated province, 94 per cent of villages, are without access to 
telecommunication services310. The rapid rise in mobile cellular 
penetrations, mostly concentrated in the urban areas, is widening the 
rural–urban divide, and the benefits are not reaching the poor masses. 
 
However, in late 2007, the Universal Service Fund Company 
awarded contracts to the mobile operators for rolling out networks in 
remote rural areas311. It is hoped that with the funding from Universal 
Service Fund, the poor population living in rural areas will now have 
access to the telecommunication services and the benefits that comes 
with it. 
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3.3.1.1. The jurisdiction of CCP over regulated sectors 
 
The CCP has jurisdiction over competition issues in the 
telecommunications and other regulated sectors, in addition to the 
powers conferred on the sector-specific regulators.  
 
i. Mobilink: tying case 
 
The CCP is currently reviewing an instance of probable abuse 
of dominant position, in the form of tying. Mobilink, the dominant mobile 
service provider, is being investigated as possibly tying the purchase of 
a BlackBerry handset with its Internet and e-mail services. At the time, 
when the matter was initiated, Mobilink was the only service provider 
offering BlackBerry services in Pakistan. The issue was that if a 
BlackBerry subscriber wished to switch to another service provider for 
better voice telephony services he/she would then lose access to 
Internet and e-mail services offered by Mobilink.  
ii. PTCL: abuse of dominance/deceptive marketing 
 
In another matter affecting poor customers, the CCP has 
initiated a suo moto inquiry under abuse of dominance and deceptive 
marketing provisions of the Ordinance, against the Pakistan 
Telecommunications Corporation Limited (PTCL), the dominant fixed-
line service provider, for activating, without first seeking the consent of 
the subscribers, the “Pakistan Package” on all accounts. Under the 
Pakistan Package, a fixed fee of Rs.200 is charged on all accounts for 
making none to up to 5,000 minutes of long-distance calls. A large 
section of the population, mostly the poor, does not want the Pakistan 
Package and has considerable difficulty in getting it deactivated by the 
PTCL. It is reported that 1.6 million subscribers got the Pakistan 
Package deactivated. While Rs.200 (US$3.2) is a negligible amount, it 
is equal to 22.8 per cent of the monthly livelihood of someone living on 
the poverty line in Pakistan. 
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The above two instances highlight the role that the CCP is 
playing in arresting and preventing anti-competitive activities in the 
regulated sectors.  
 
3.3.2. Electric power sector 
 
Pakistan is currently faced with serious electric power crises . The 
power crisis has been so severe during the period December 2007 to 
February 2008 that every 30 minutes there was a power outage in 
almost all parts of the country, including the capital city of Islamabad. 
Many areas of certain cities were often without any electricity, gas or 
water for an entire day in the extremely cold weather. There is a clear 
disparity between the demand and supply of electric power. Pakistan 
requires around 11,000 megawatts per day, while supply is around 
8,000 megawatts per day. The power shortage is further exacerbated by 
power losses, which stood at 22.1 per cent in 2006–07 as against 22.8 
per cent in 2005–06. The country is facing a shortfall of around 3,000 
megawatts per day, which is expected to increase to 5,000 megawatts 
during the upcoming summer. There is a dire need for a quantum leap 
in electricity generation to fill the gap between demand and supply. 
 
The power generation sector was liberalized in 1995 with the 
formulation of the 1995 Power Policy. The liberalization process 
succeeded in attracting considerable FDI and temporarily addressed 
Pakistan’s power shortage problems. The 1995 Power Policy was a step 
forward in government’s long-standing commitment to reform and 
restructure Pakistan’s power sector. As part of the restructuring process, 
the state-owned Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) 
was vertically and horizontally unbundled. The unbundling entailed the 
separation of generation, transmission and distribution functions, which 
resulted in three state-owned generation companies (GenCos) meant 
for privatization at a later stage, a National Transmission and Dispatch 
Company (NTDC) and eight312 distribution companies. WAPDA provides 
electric power to all of Pakistan, except Karachi, which is catered for by 
the Karachi Electric Supply Corporation (KESC). To regulate the 
                                                 
312
 In June 2002, the Peshawar Electric Supply Company (PESCO) was 
divested to create a new company, Tribal Electric Supply Company Limited 
(TESCO), for supply to tribal areas of PESCO. As of now there are nine DisCos. 
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unbundled and corporatized electric power sector, the National Electric 
Power Regulatory Authority (NEPRA) was established in 1997.  
 
Pakistan has a long way to go before realizing the goal of providing 
“safe, reliable, efficient and affordable electric power to the electricity 
consumers”313 throughout the country. The power sector reform and 
restructuring is marred by the slow privatization process. As of today, 
only KESC has been privatized, while efforts to privatize distribution and 
generation companies have not yet materialized. To meet the demand, 
supply of electric power is encouraged by waiving the licence 
requirement for generation companies, as was done in India. The 
monopsony of the NTDC (the sole buyer of electric power in the market) 
should be broken, so that the competitive process may get off the 
ground. 
 
Electric power is the lifeblood for an economy and its development. The 
recent power crisis has affected the whole of the economy, and stalled 
the development processes. The poor supply of electricity has adversely 
affected the manufacturing industry. The increase in production costs of 
electricity has increased the manufacturing costs. Furthermore, 
electricity has not reached all parts of Pakistan. There is a considerable 
rural area where there is no electricity. The non-availability and/or 
expensive electric power have affected the whole range of poverty-
alleviating activities. 
 
The CCP under its mandate to conduct sectoral studies has 
commissioned a study on the electric power sector. Once the study is 
complete, it is hoped that the CCP will make its recommendations 
known to the NEPRA and the government so as to achieve the next 
phase of the liberalization process – thus paving the way for introducing 
competition in the sector. 
4. Conclusion 
 
Poverty in all its shapes, sizes and scope is prevalent all around globe. 
It “is the worst form of violence”314 against mankind. The world’s nations 
have recognized this evil, and have come together on various occasions 
                                                 
313
 http://www.nepra.org.pk/index.htm 
314
 Quote by Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, 
http://thinkexist.com/quotations/poverty/ 
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to form strategies to fight it. The Millennium Declaration’s primary goal is 
to eradicate poverty. Pakistan designed its Poverty Reduction Strategy 
and is now in its third phase. There has been a considerable increase in 
the pro-poor expenditure, and the number of people living below the 
poverty line has decreased from one-third of the total population to less 
than one-fourth315. Good governance remains the primary principle 
guiding poverty-alleviation programmes. In order to improve 
governance, Pakistan reformed its competition regime by enacting a 
new law and establishing a new Competition Commission − a 
commendable step. 
 
A carefully crafted competition regime embedded in a well-nurtured 
competition culture acts as a fertile soil for trade liberalization, foreign 
direct investment, and other economic policies which have the objective 
of promoting sustainable development, and enhancing the welfare of the 
citizenry. The vulnerable poor, who form the major portion of developing 
countries’ population, are more susceptible to fall into poverty by price 
hikes and other shocks generated by anti-competitive practices. 
Competition law proscribes and obstructs those practices. Moreover, 
competition fosters economic growth, thereby creating opportunities of 
employment – the essential tool for alleviating poverty316.  
 
With the competition law now in place in Pakistan, and the Competition 
Commission becoming active by taking actions against cartels, and 
other anti-competitive practices, it is hoped that the new regime will lend 
support to the poverty alleviation programmes and activities thereby 
enhancing their efficacy in reducing poverty. 
 
                                                 
315
 Pakistan Economic Survey, supra note 263, at p. 53. 
316
 A Chinese proverb seems fitting here: give a man a fish, you feed him for a 
day; teach a man to fish; you feed him for a lifetime. The underlying 
presumption, however, is that the person knowing how to fish will actually go 
and fish for himself! 
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THE EFFECTS OF ANTI-COMPETITIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES ON 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THEIR DEVELOPMENT 
PROSPECTS 
 
PART C: 
 
 
 
Competition Issues in  
Commodity Markets 
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FROM IVORIAN COCOA BEAN 
TO FRENCH DARK CHOCOLATE TABLET 
 
PRICE TRANSMISSION, VALUE SHARING AND 
NORTH/SOUTH COMPETITION POLICY317 
 
Bruno Dorin* 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Faced with the downward trend in agricultural 
commodity prices, farmers in the North have acquired 
standards and organizations that define, defend and promote 
on markets the multiple (health, taste, territory, environment-
related, etc.) qualities with which their food products may be 
endowed. And what if farmers in the South were to follow their 
example, with just as much public backing? The question is 
worth asking, especially by organizations such as the Centre 
de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique 
pour le Développement (CIRAD), which is already involved in 
characterizing various tropical products, or establishing North–
South production contracts for "organic" or "fair-trade" 
products. But should this siphon off the majority of future 
development aid, notably to African agriculture? Must, or can, 
international bodies be convinced that this is a particularly 
effective way of raising agricultural incomes in the South? The 
answer is yet to be given, but in order to define it, it was 
suggested to us that we focus on a case study, the cocoa-
chocolate commodity chain, analyse value formation and 
distribution within it, then simulate the possible benefit that 
                                                 
317
 Final report translated from the original version in French. 
*
 Economist at Centre de coopération internationale en recherche 
agronomique pour le développement, Avenue Agropolis, 34398 
Montpellier Cedex 5, France. Tel: +33-(0)4-67615800. 
http://www.cirad.fr 
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might be derived by African producers from respecting the 
standards or specifications that we were to propose. 
 
This 7-month study318 thus set out to analyse price 
transmission and value sharing throughout the cocoa-
chocolate commodity chain, beginning here in the Côte 
d'Ivoire and ending in France. This first stage, which was novel 
in itself since there were no references on which to base it, 
was however not followed by the suggested second stage: we 
barely touch upon the subject of standards and quality, and 
even less so simulate the effect of possible changes in the 
matter. Yet, this was not for want of delving into the subject, 
but due to three major obstacles that discouraged us from 
spending any more time on these issues. The first was 
technical: it was impossible in the allotted time to obtain price 
differentials (or readiness to pay) depending on various 
qualities, a prerequisite for any serious quantitative study on 
the subject. Mere acquisition of series of prices for the few 
products manufactured along the cocoa-chocolate commodity 
chain was already no mean feat. The second obstacle was 
more to do with intuition, shared by numerous economists, to 
which this study might have finally devoted itself to developing 
and demonstrating: a proactive quality policy involves specific 
costs (characterization, organization, promotion, certification, 
control, etc.) whose importance is often considerably 
underestimated, and which restricts it a priori to environments 
that are predisposed or clearly limited in size. Lastly, and 
especially, the following question: what better quality for a 
cocoa from the Côte d'Ivoire, with which western industrialists 
and consumers seem to be perfectly happy at the moment, 
since it is by far the most imported cocoa bean in the world, to 
                                                 
318
 From 19 August 2002 to 18 February 2003, with funding from the 
Ecopol programme (CIRAD's AMIS department), and from 10 March 
to 9 April 2003, with funds from USDA/ARS for support to the "Global 
Cocoa Programme" made available to the CIRAD cocoa programme 
(Tree Crops Department) and to IPGRI. It should also be noted that 
the armed conflict that broke out in the Côte d'Ivoire on 19 September 
2003 ruled out any possibility of local surveys. 
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produce a "generic" chocolate earmarked for mass 
consumption? Moreover, without this Ivorian reference, could 
other chocolates (and beans) be distinguished between and 
fetch a higher price from a minority of consumers ready to pay 
for "something else"?  
 
Granted, the Côte d'Ivoire, like the other countries in 
the South, will be required in any event to offer a "better-
quality" cocoa, since the technical, technological and 
organoleptic demands of importing countries are now being 
extended to the health, environmental and even social fields. 
The rules of the game are changing, even within the recipe for 
chocolate, when they were already having difficulty being 
applied by smallholders. These new rules imposed by the 
industrialized nations inevitably lead to higher production 
costs, often totally at the expense of producers in the South, 
since firms and consumers in the North do not pay for such a 
difference in quality, or only with great difficulty, or within such 
limited frameworks as "organic" and/or "fair" trade. In such a 
context, a North–South transfer appears to be warranted, and 
therefore deserves to be encouraged. But it will at best, and 
we feel, only be able to cover the additional costs incurred in 
respecting western quality demands; it will in no way 
sustainably raise the income of African cocoa farmers; at 
most, it will prevent their being sidelined by rivals from south-
east Asia or elsewhere. Unless the issue at hand is to invent 
and somehow impose standards and signs of quality that 
enable countries in the South to capture a share of the value 
and modify relations between stakeholders. If such is the 
case, is the approach focusing on "quality" – very much a 
buzzword in France – the most politically adept and the most 
economically efficient? Moreover, would it not bring us back to 
the attempts at fair trade, in the hope of changing the structure 
of world trade by brandishing equity and solidarity as the main 
argument? As we feel that this perspective is bound to fail for 
the time being (condemned to marginal markets), we have 
explored a different avenue, that of competition regulations 
and policies, which we feel can more effectively convince and 
rally the support of decision makers and donors today, and 
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effectively bolster the incomes of small farmers such as 
Ivorian cocoa producers. As we shall also see later, this is 
without taking into account the fact that a quality policy in 
agriculture can be considerably limited by a competition policy: 
another reason to show a keen interest in the latter before 
designing and implementing the former. 
 
Section 5 outlines the stakes of a new international 
competition policy, an option that we feel it is important to 
defend just as energetically as a quality assistance policy. Just 
before that (Section 4), we present the results that persuaded 
us to follow this avenue (analysis of price transmission and 
value sharing within the cocoa-chocolate commodity chain 
from 1992 to 2001), after providing a few technical, economic 
and political data required for the demonstration and for its 
clear understanding (Sections 2 and 3). 
 241 
2. Cocoa basics 
 
2.1. A sequence of processes 
 
The cocoa tree (Theobroma cacao) and its cultivation 
encompass a few major particularities: 
 
- varieties divided into three large families: criollo, 
forastero and trinitario, 
- an ecological requirement: the equatorial zone, 
- a favourite location: under forest shade, 
- well-known diseases: black pod rot, witches' 
broom, swollen shoot virus, etc., 
- labour requirements for setting up and maintaining 
the plantation, harvesting, bean fermentation and 
drying, 
- crop variations between years (depending on the 
climate) and also during the year, with the main 
crop usually from October to March (and the so-
called "mid-crop" in the other months of the year), 
- delicate storage: in a tropical climate, production 
cannot be stored for more than 3 months without 
damage, 
- an economic lifespan of around 40 years 
(maximum productivity between 8 and 12 years). 
 
Consequently, cocoa is traditionally sown or planted 
after thinning and/or felling of a tropical forest, followed by the 
installation of temporary shade from food crops (plantain, taro, 
pigeon pea, papaya, cassava, etc.) to protect young cocoa 
trees from direct exposure to sunlight. After 3 to 5 years' 
growth and upkeep (adjustment of the final shade, pruning, 
phytosanitary treatments, etc.), harvesting of the pods (ovoid 
cavity containing 30 to 40 seeds in a mucilaginous pulp) can 
begin. Once the pods have been opened, the seeds are 
cleaned, fermented and dried to give cocoa beans. The dry 
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beans are roasted, then ground and cleaned to give a "liquor" 
("mass", "paste"), part of which is used, after pressing and 
alkalizing, on the one hand to make chocolate powder (for 
breakfast products, ice creams, etc.) from the oilcakes 
obtained, and on the other hand to make cocoa butter. Cocoa 
butter mixed with cocoa liquor during conching gives – with 
sugar or even milk – "couverture" chocolate. When this so-
called "couverture" (dark or milk) is not manufactured by 
chocolate makers themselves, they rework it (tempering, 
moulding or coating with or without the addition of vanilla, 
hazelnuts, raisins, etc.) to make the many chocolate products 
now available on the market. 
 
Chocolate manufacturing today is structured around 
three major operators (apart from those linked to trade): the 
cocoa grower, who produces the bean; the grinder/butter-
maker (between which a greater distinction existed in the 
past), who processes the bean into cocoa butter, chocolate 
powder and, increasingly, couverture; the chocolate maker 
(Figure 1), who virtually no longer handles cocoa beans like 
before. Each of these operators uses a cocoa product, whose 
volume can be converted into bean equivalent (Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Bean equivalent conversion factors 
 
Sources: Pontillon (1997:24) for Food and Agriculture Organization FAO 
 
FAO 
Ivorian 
authorities 
Cocoa liquor 1.25 1.25 
Cocoa powder and 
oilcake 
1.18 1.25 
Cocoa butter 1.33 1.25 
Chocolate-based 
products 
- 0.55625 
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Figure 1: The chocolate flow chart 
 
Forest
COCOA GROWER Thinning + Partial burning (family plantation option)
Felling + Plantain or other (modern plantation option)
Planting (sowing, grafting or cutting) under temporary food crop shade
 with (option) coconut, areca palm, oil palm, pulses, etc.
Other crops Cocoa tree
Pruning, Weeding, Fertilization (option)
Treatments against parasites
Harvest (main and mid-crop)
Pod
Cortex Pod opening
Cleaning
Fermentation (on leaves or in boxes)
Drying (with sun and/or wood-fired dryer)
TRADER Bean
(middlemen, wholesaler, exporter…)
GRINDER Cleaning
Mixing of origins (option)
Shelling (after roasting for chocolate)
Alcalizing (powder option)
(before or after roasting-grinding)
Roasting
Grinding
TRADER (option) Mass / Liquor / Paste
BUTTER MAKER
Refining (butter option)
Alcalizing (option)
Blending (chocolate option)
Heating, Pressing
TRADER (option) Oilcake Butter
CHOCOLATE MAKER Filtering, Deodorization
Alcalizing (option) Blending/Refining
(and POWDER MAKER) Bolting, Tempering Sugar, Vanilla (option) Conching
Grinding Milk (option) Tempering, Moulding
Almonds, Nuts…(option)
Powder Vegetable fat (option) Chocolate
Breakfasts Tablets
DISTRIBUTOR Ice creams Pharmaceuticals Bars
CONSUMER Flavouring bases Cosmetics Sweets
…/… …/… …/…
 
 
 
2.2. Production in the South, tasting in the North 
 
2.2.1. Supply 
 
The cultivation of cocoa, which originated in Latin 
America (grown by the Mayas and sacred beverage of the 
Aztecs), really took off in the 1920s in the Portuguese, British 
and French colonies of West Africa (Sao Tome, Ghana, 
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Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Cameroon). Today, the entire continent 
provides two-thirds of the world supplies (almost 2 out of 3 
million tonnes), with the Côte d'Ivoire alone providing over 40 
per cent of world supplies (it overtook Ghana as the world's 
leading producer in 1977). However, a third major production 
zone has been thriving in south-east Asia since 1990, with 
estates in Malaysia, but especially Indonesia (Figure 2). The 
position of this third major zone could be strengthened in the 
coming decades through the development of new plantations 
in Vietnam. 
 
Over the last 20 years, world supply and demand319 
have virtually doubled, in a context of highly volatile prices 
(Figure 3). With intensified production in the 1980s, particularly 
in south-east Asia, there was surplus production in the 
commodity chain for some time (22 out of the last 30 years), 
but the current concern is rather the opposite320: farming 
systems exploiting new forest zones have reached their 
growth limit, the current plantations are tending to age rather 
than being renewed, diseases are developing, whilst demand 
remains strong in the European Union and the USA (Figure 4) 
and new markets, such as those in Eastern Europe and the 
Far East, are becoming established. 
 
                                                 
319
 Measured here as the volume of ground beans. It is also possible 
to use consumption statistics published by certain organizations 
(FAO, CAOBISCO, etc.), but they would not effectively represent 
cocoa consumption in its entirety (with biscuit making, dairy products, 
etc.). Foreign trade statistics can also be used, but the conversion 
coefficients that have to be used in that case are arguable; with those 
of the FAO, and with net import volumes for cocoa beans (IC), liquor 
(IL), butter (IB), oilcake and powder (IP): Consumption = IC + (1.25 x IL) 
+ (1.33 x IB) + (1.18 x IP). 
320
 According to ED&F Man, in 2002/03 there was apparently a 
production shortfall again (of 110,000 t) compared to grindings, for 
the third year running. 
 245 
Figure 2: Bean production by country (1961–2001) 
Source: data from FAO (2002). 
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2.2.2. Demand 
 
Be it in bars, tablets, balls, spreads or powder, plain or 
flavoured and/or incorporated in other confectionery, poured or 
coated over enrobable fillings321, chocolate is consumed today 
in very diverse forms, multiplied by a range of presentations, 
alongside niche products which are also on the rise (aromatic, 
organic or fair-trade chocolates). However, clear preferences 
for some of these types exist from one country to another 
(Table 2), even though bars seem to be increasingly the most 
                                                 
321
 "Fillings" which themselves fall into various categories: "fondant" 
(mixture of sugar dissolved in a little water and glucose syrup, which 
may be coloured or flavoured with vanilla, orange or lemon), "praline" 
(mixture of sugar, finely ground roasted almonds or hazelnuts, to 
which a small quantity of cocoa and cocoa butter is added), 
"ganache" (mixture of melted chocolate, cream, butter and full-fat 
milk, flavoured or not with vanilla or alcohols). 
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widely appreciated. For instance, the Spanish are particularly 
fond of drinking chocolate, whilst the Germans and Italians are 
great consumers of chocolate spreads. In France, where the 
preference is (unlike in the USA or the UK) for products 
somewhat richer in cocoa than in other ingredients such as 
sugar, it is the tablet that reigns supreme: in 2000, chocolate 
tablets alone generated a turnover of 4.6 billion francs322, 
almost half of which was for milk chocolate (Figure 5). 
Chocolate consumption is also seasonal, with major peaks at 
festive times such as Christmas, Saint Valentine's Day, Easter 
or Halloween323. Lastly, it is not limited to food uses, since 
chocolate now seems to be used for skincare (Brieu, 2002)324. 
It is true that cocoa butter is already used to make soaps and 
cosmetics325, and also in traditional medicines such as 
remedies for burns, chills, dry lips, fevers, malaria, 
rheumatism, snake bites and other wounds (CNUCED, 2003). 
For their part, the husks and pulp obtained further upstream in 
the process can be used as animal feed, or for fertilizer, 
alcohol, or pectin production326. 
 
                                                 
322
 Household chocolate and sugar confectionery consumption 
reached 33.6 billion francs the same year, though no distinction could 
be made between the shares of these two sectors, which INSEE 
groups under the NAF code 15.8K. 
323
 The Halloween confectionery market alone apparently amounts to 
2 billion dollars in the USA (35 per cent of annual sales). 
324
 Some Parisian beauty parlours apparently now propose 100% 
chocolate treatments for the face and hands. In Hershey, 
Pennsylvania, a town entirely devoted to chocolate, a spa centre was 
opened in 2001, proposing a range of original treatments: cocoa and 
whipped cream baths, coating in chocolate lotion, cocoa butter 
massage, etc. 
325
 1% of cocoa butter production apparently went to the cosmetics 
industry at the end of the 1990s 
(www.icco.org/questions/cosmetics.htm). 
326
 See in particular www.icco.org/questions/byproducts.htm. 
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Figure 3: Bean supply and demand (1950–2001) 
Source: data from ED&F (2002) and ICCO (2002b). 
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Note: 2001/02 and 2002/03: projections ED&F Man. 
 
 
Figure 4: Domestic cocoa production (1992/93–2000/01) 
Source: data from ED&F (2002) and ICCO (2002a). 
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Figure 5: French production of chocolate end products (1999–
2000) 
Source: data from XERFI (2001). 
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Table 2: World consumption of chocolate-based products (1998) 
Source: based on Aryal (2000:78-79). 
 
 
 TOTAL 
(kg/inhab
/year 
Unfilled 
tablets 
Filled 
tablets and 
bars 
Chocolate 
sweets and 
confectione
ry 
White 
chocolate 
Cocoa-
based 
candies 
Cocoa 
powder 
Chocolate 
spreads 
Switzerland 10.16 3.99 2.91      
Germany 9.81 1.50      1.15 
Belgium 9.68  3.52      
Denmark 8.94 2.57  2.75     
UK 8.65 2.04 3.15      
Norway 8.58 0.44 0.42    0.39  
Ireland 8.29  1.69  8.92    
France 6.94 1.93  1.67     
Australia 6.04   1.81  1.83   
USA 5.53  2.65      
Sweden 4.95 1.58  2.43     
Netherlands 4.73        
Finland 4.02  1.42 1.58     
Spain 3.41 0.85     1.56  
Italy 3.33   0.59  0.76  0.57 
Brazil 2.05     1.25   
Japan 1.92   0.68  0.51   
 
 
2.3. Small family farms and multinationals 
 
2.3.1. Cocoa producers 
 
At the end of the 1990s, the number of cocoa 
producers worldwide was estimated at 14 million, two-thirds 
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concentrated in Africa (10.5 million)327, primarily in the Côte 
d'Ivoire (3.6 million on at least 600,000 farms)328. Whilst large 
estates can be found in countries such as Malaysia or Brazil, 
most producers are smallholders, since 90 per cent of world 
production apparently comes from farms of under 5 hectares 
(De Lattre-Gasquet et al., 1998): on these small family farms, 
labour remuneration (the main cocoa production cost) is much 
more flexible than on estates (Hanak Freud et al., 2000), as 
Malaysia realized too late when prices slumped at the 
beginning of the 1990s329. 
 
Cocoa growing was introduced into the Côte d'Ivoire 
via Ghana in the east and south-east of the country (a pioneer 
front where oil palm and rubber development has now taken 
over), then spread to the centre-west, where the largest 
quantity is now produced (36 per cent); the latest pioneer 
fronts are located in the south-west and west330. The two 
driving forces behind this development were the possibility 
(nowadays virtually exhausted) of opening up new plantations 
in forest zones after slashing and burning, along with available 
labour – primarily of Burkinese origin (Baoule in the west) – 
which was encouraged to settle through particular ownership 
rights331 (now contested). 
 
Despite the vitality of this "foreign" population, and the 
relatively young cocoa plantings (almost 70 per cent of them 
are under 30 years old), there has been virtually no 
                                                 
327
 For a breakdown of this estimate by country, see 
http://www.icco.org/questions/smallholders.htm. 
328
 Which apparently provides a livelihood for 6 million Ivorians, i.e. 
40% of the population. 
329
 The cocoa trees, which were also attacked by pod borers, were 
finally pulled up to make way for new rubber and oil-palm plantations. 
330
 It is consequently on the savannah highlands in the north (where 
most of the country's Muslim population is settled) that most of the 
Ivorian sorghum and cotton are grown. 
331
 According to Félix Houphouët-Boigny, Ivorian President from 1960 
to 1993, "la terre appartient à celui qui la met en valeur" (land 
belongs to the person who develops it). 
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productivity gain, and the increase in Ivorian cocoa production 
is primarily down to the incorporation of increasing quantities 
of land and labour (Daviron et Losch, 1997). There are various 
explanations for these low Ivorian yields (around 500 kg of 
beans/ha/year, whereas hybrids can produce at least double 
or three times that figure with fertilization and irrigation): 
smallness of the farms (84 per cent of production comes from 
farms of under 5 ha), ageing producers (80 per cent are over 
55 years old), limited adoption of, or training in, new 
techniques (for replanting, pest control, post-harvest 
processing, etc.), difficult access to cheap credit, volatile 
prices from one year to the next, neglect of the plantation 
when prices are too low, etc. 
 
These cocoa farmers are represented on a national 
level by ANAPROCI (Association Nationale des Producteurs 
de Café-Cacao de Côte d'Ivoire) and FIPCC (Fédération 
Ivoirienne des Producteurs de Café et de Cacao), and on an 
international level by the CPA (the Cocoa Producers Alliance). 
The latter, like the ICCO (the International Cocoa 
Organization), may be involved in the work undertaken by a 
dozen scientific and technical organizations involved to 
varying degrees in monitoring or supporting Ivorian cocoa 
cultivation (CNRA, CIRAD, ANADER, etc.). 
 
2.3.2. Cooperatives, middlemen, wholesalers 
 
The collection and transportation of beans to 
processing units near export ports is an operation that is as 
crucial as it is tricky, since the dispersal of smallholders in 
remote areas (forests) is combined with poor road 
infrastructures (developing country) and the need to bring out 
production rapidly (quality deteriorates more rapidly in tropical 
countries).  
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In the Côte d'Ivoire, beans are collected and 
transported by cooperatives332 (or GVC), which may export 
directly (COOPEX, PMEX, etc.), but particularly, and 
increasingly (82 per cent in 2000/01 as opposed to 68 per cent 
in 1998/99) by middlemen (pisteurs in French), who are 
frequently of Lebanese origin333, working for wholesalers 
(traitants in French) often of the same origin, who provide 
them with vans and with cash to pay producers for their crop. 
 
The credit needed by cocoa producers for cultivation, 
but also to school their children (the new term begins before 
the main crop) also seems to depend increasingly on these 
middlemen/wholesalers. The loans granted are then repaid 
when yields are delivered, at interest rates that are obviously 
higher than those practised by public services (when such 
services are available). 
 
Wholesalers, who are based in the main towns of the 
south, are independent, or themselves funded by exporters. In 
2000/01, 550 were accredited by GPEX (Groupement 
Professionnel des Exportateurs de Café-Cacao)334, which cost 
each of them 100,000 CFA francs for that season, alongside 
the licence fee of 400,000 CFA francs they have to pay in 
each department where they operate (Jacquet, 2001). 
 
2.3.3. Conditioning plants, exporters 
 
Near the export ports (Abidjan or San Pedro), 
conditioning plants which are often export units, buy beans 
from wholesalers and make them conform to market standards 
and requirements: pre-cleaning and stone removal, re-drying 
                                                 
332
 Particularly dynamic in the east and centre-south zones, where 
their collection share was 48 per cent and 27 per cent, respectively, 
in 2000/01. 
333
 Or Malian, or Burkinese. 
334
 A dissident organization, UNOCC, was founded in 2000/01. 
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where necessary, etc. If quality proves to be inadequate, such 
purchases may be subject to discounts335. 
 
Beans earmarked for export are then dispatched in 
containers once three formalities have been completed: (1) 
batch checking, which was contracted out in 2000/01 to 
accredited private companies (SGS, Cornelder, Veritas) at a 
cost of 1,900 CFA francs/ton; (2) phytosanitary inspections, at 
a cost of around 1,000 CFA francs/ton, at the expense of the 
exporter; (3) payment of taxes, of which DUS (Droit Unique de 
Sortie, export duty) is the main component: 140,000 CFA 
francs/tonne of beans in 2000/01 (Jacquet, 2001). 
 
At the beginning of 2000, there were around 40 
accredited export companies, which could be classed into 
three categories (Jacquet, 2001): (1) traditional local 
exporters, whose market share fell from 43 per cent in 
1997/98 to 10 per cent in 1999/00; (2) exporters associated 
with international trading houses, which, for their part, are 
developing their operations (48 per cent of exports in 
1999/00); (3) exporters linked to international bean processing 
groups (42 per cent), the largest three being ADM, Barry-
Callebaut and Cargill, who are integrating an increasing 
amount of upstream collection and conditioning units, whilst 
also developing local bean-grinding activities. 
 
2.3.4. Grinders, butter makers 
 
More than half the beans ground today worldwide are 
ground in the European Union and the USA (Figure 6), and by 
five major grinding companies: ADM (Archer Daniels Midland), 
Barry-Callebaut, Cargill, Hamester and Blommer336.  
                                                 
335
 Too high a number of beans per 100 g (i.e. over 100), moisture 
content over 8 per cent, lack of fermentation, or too many defective 
beans (notably mouldy). 
336
 Chocolate makers such as Nestlé also grind large volumes of 
beans, though they are not specialized in this activity. 
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In the Côte d'Ivoire, the first processing factories had 
been set up, with Government encouragement, to process 
"off-standard" beans or small beans (primarily mid-crop). In a 
fiscal environment that remains propitious to such local 
processing (BNETD, 2001), these capacities (350,000 t at the 
end of 2002) have been strengthened with international 
groups337 that have embarked upon vertical integration, buying 
up trading firms, and buying and installing factories in 
producing countries.  
 
All in all, the Côte d'Ivoire today processes almost a 
quarter of its beans to export semi-finished products338 with 
higher added value, as do Brazil and Malaysia. It nonetheless 
remains that such processing can in theory barely be 
extended beyond couverture chocolate, since even 
manufacture of the latter – if it is to be adapted to the different 
tastes of consumer countries – requires blends of origins, 
which are less risky and costly to make in the major chocolate-
consuming zones. 
 
                                                 
337
 Bean-processing capacities at the end of 2001, apparently 
employing barely more than 900 people (Jacquet, 2001): 
100,000 t/year for SACO (Barry-Callebaut), 100,000 t/year for MICAO 
(Cargill), 75,000 t/year for UNICAO (controlled by ADM's SIFCA) and 
75,000 t/year for CEMOI Côte d’Ivoire. 
338
 2000/01 exports (April to March) from the Côte d'Ivoire according 
to ICCO (2002): 122,924 t of mass, 56,360 t of powder and press 
cake, 45,018 t of butter and 3,900 t of chocolate, local production of 
the latter being sold more on the domestic market, since it remains 
difficult and costly for a bean-producing country to supply chocolate 
incorporating various origins to meet the various tastes of the main 
consumer countries. 
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Figure 6: Bean grinding per region (1993–2001) 
Source: data from ED&F Man (2002). 
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Note: 2001/02: projections ED&F Man. 
 
2.3.5. Chocolate makers, distributors 
 
The move towards concentration and 
internationalization is also speeding up among chocolate 
makers. A distinction can be made between two markets on 
this level: (1) a captive market with groups such as Cadbury, 
Kraft Foods (Philip Morris), Mars or Nestlé, which above all 
produce chocolate for their own product range; (2) an open 
market on which groups such as ADM, Barry-Callebaut or 
Cargill sell powdered or couverture chocolate (via traders such 
as Euro Distribution Alimentaire in France, or not) to chocolate 
makers-confectioners, who do not produce their own 
chocolate, or not enough to meet their requirements (with 
surpluses on one or other of these markets figuring in 
transactions between them). Among food industrialists, there 
are also international companies specialized in the production 
of fine or "prestige" quality chocolates, the leaders being Lindt, 
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Peter's Chocolate Company (Nestlé group) and Valrhona 
(CNUCED, 2001). 
 
With this concentration of the profession, the fabric of 
the French chocolate and confectionery industry339 is now 
dominated by a few foreign groups owning powerful brands (
                                                 
339
 111 companies employing more than 20 people each and/or with 
a turnover of more than 35 million francs in 1999, i.e. 5.2 per cent of 
the total turnover of the agrifood industries in France, and 5.6 per 
cent of salaries in the branch (XERFI, 2001). Alongside these 
companies, there are SMEs that, unable to compete with the major 
brands through advertising, capitalize on the good reputation of 
French products representative of a certain lifestyle. It remains that 
the French chocolate-making industry stands out on the whole 
through the increasing share accorded to semi-finished products, 
which seem today to account for half the tonnages. Indeed, through 
its geographical position, France is a worthwhile production rear base 
for foreign groups. 
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Table 3). In fact, colossal advertising budgets340 are necessary 
for their promotion, particularly as supermarket own brands, 
such as Carrefour or Auchan, are now coming to the fore 
(more than 15 per cent of the French market value for 
chocolate tablets in 2000).  
 
With stiff competition between brands, but also the 
rising influence of particularly competitive substitute segments 
such as biscuits and sugar confectionery, chocolate 
industrialists are having to regularly deploy new strategies, 
which now follow two major trends. The first is to seek new 
market niches by sophisticating chocolate tablets (notably with 
biscuit), by offering products in bite-size versions (to adapt to 
"nomadism" or "snacking" trends), by umbrella marketing 
campaigns at certain key times of the year (Christmas, Easter, 
etc.: event marketing, as particularly well achieved by 
Ferrero). The second trend is to use distribution circuits other 
than the currently all-powerful hyper- and supermarkets 
(Figure 7), notably the "long circuit" via bars-tobacconists 
(34,000 in France), bakery-cake shops (32,000), petrol 
stations (17,000), newspaper kiosks (32,000) or vending 
machines (527,000), supplied by wholesalers such as Eda, 
SFP or Altadis Distribution, through which manufacturers such 
has Haribo have succeeded well (XERFI, 2001). 
 
                                                 
340
 In 2000 for example, Ferrero spent no less than 222 million francs 
on communication: a winning strategy since the Italian chocolate 
maker's turnover jumped by 10 per cent. Likewise, Nestlé reaped the 
benefits of its support for the Lion brand (37 million francs), since 
sales increased by 6 per cent on the chocolate snack market in 2000 
(XERFI, 2001). 
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Table 3: Groups dominating the French chocolate and 
confectionery industry (2001) 
Source: according to XERFI (2001). 
 
Group Country Consolidated 
turnover 2000 
(Billions of FF) 
Main companies 
controlled in 
France 
Main brands 
Nestlé Switzerland 343,0 Nestlé France After Eight, Crunch, 
Frigor, Galak, 
Kit Kat, 
Quality Street, 
Lanvin, Lion, 
Menier, Smarties… 
Kraft Foods 
(Philip Morris) 
USA 188,9 Kraft Foods 
France, 
Kraft Foods 
Strasburg, 
Kraft Jacobs 
Suchard Rheims 
Côte d’Or, Daim, 
Milka, Suchard, 
Toblerone… 
Mars 
Incorporated 
USA 108,9 Masterfoods Bounty, Mars, 
Maltesers, 
Milky Way, M&M’s, 
Snickers Twix… 
Cadbury-
Schweppes 
UK 47,6 Cadbury France Cadbury, 
Hollywood, 
Kiss Cool, Krema, 
La Pie qui Chante, 
Malabar, Poulain… 
Ferrero Italy 25,6 Ferrero France Ferrero Rocher, 
Kinder, Mon Cheri, 
Nutella, Rafaello… 
CSM Netherlands 17,9 Lami Lutty 
France… 
… 
Barry 
Callebault 
Switzerland 10,1 Barry Callebault 
France 
… 
Lindt and 
Sprungli 
Switzerland 6,9 Lindt and 
Sprungli France 
Caffarel, Ghirardelli, 
Lindt… 
Cemoi France 2,3 Cantalou, Chocolaterie Aiguebelle, 
Chocolaterie d’Aquitaine, Chocolaterie 
de L’Abbaye Suisse Normande, 
Chocolaterie Moulin d’Or, 
Chocolaterie Real, Phoscao 
 
 
 259 
Figure 7: Market shares of the chocolate distribution circuits in 
France (2000) 
Source: data from XERFI (2001), 
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2.3.6. Traders 
 
The cocoa-chocolate commodity chain is subject to 
multiple transactions, due to the distance between production 
and consumption sites, but also because of the various 
products and processes required to make the end product. For 
beans, the most important trading centres are futures (and 
options) markets in London (LIFFE) and New York (NYBOT) 
(see Section 3.4), which make cocoa one of the most traded 
agricultural commodities in the world. These marketplaces are 
the focus of a multitude of dealers, which the 
concentration/integration policy implemented by the major 
downstream operators is tending to short-circuit today 
(integration of trading activities, as is also the case for French 
sugar mills and refineries). This trend is not without influencing 
price formation, which also depends on public policies. 
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3. From stabilization to liberalization 
 
3.1. National stabilization boards and funds 
 
As Daviron and Losch reminded us (1997), the 
general frame of reference for post-war policies up to the 
1970s was that of development economics, in which economic 
prosperity was built on a Nation-State scale. In substance, in 
the Côte d'Ivoire as in other countries, national or international 
funding agencies encouraged (1) the improvement of such a 
development framework in terms of infrastructures (roads, port 
facilities, energy, hydraulics) and legislation (based on a 
transfer of regulations largely established during the colonial 
period); (2) the creation of productive bases and improvement 
of market functioning; (3) the stabilization of farmers' incomes, 
the latter being considered as essential for productive 
investment and social order (Daviron et Losch, 1997:10-11). 
 
In this context, two major systems of marketing and 
commodity chain supervision were adopted in west and 
central Africa by cocoa-producing countries: stabilization 
boards and funds. Marketing boards were set up in countries 
such as Nigeria (up to 1986) or Ghana. They were 
characterized by the existence of a parapublic organization 
with a monopoly in domestic and international marketing. 
When cocoa was bought from a producer, it became the 
property of the board, which took charge of it throughout the 
commodity chain, after fixing prices at the different stages for 
the entire crop year. For their part, stabilization funds (caisses 
de stabilisation in French) were adopted in countries such as 
Cameroon or the Côte d'Ivoire. Like the boards, they fixed 
domestic and export prices. However, physical routing of the 
merchandise – from producers to export ports – was ensured 
by private operators accredited by the fund (CNUCED, 2003).  
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The domestic stabilization of prices and internal 
securing of purchases/sales that these systems allowed, went 
hand in hand – as with CAISTAB in the Côte d'Ivoire – with 
systems of territorial equalization, quality control and export 
management (futures sales, regulation between exporters and 
conditioning units, etc.), along with operating aid and 
investment in the commodity chain, be it through credit (to 
cooperative structures in particular), the creation and 
maintenance of roads or tracks, or the funding of technical 
assistance or research organizations (SATMACI, IRCC, 
IDEFOR, etc.). These systems also made it possible to apply 
sometimes extremely large levies: the Ivorian CAISTAB 
supplied up to 30 per cent of the State's special investment 
budget up to the end of the 1970s (Daviron et Losch, 1997:14-
15). 
 
These substantial levies, along with their sometimes 
highly dubious use, did not argue in favour of maintaining such 
stabilization systems, whose inefficiency was also increasingly 
criticized (see Section 3.3), even without counting such 
unfortunate strategies as the "cocoa war" entered into by 
ageing President Félix Houphouët-Boigny at the end of the 
1980s. Indeed, rather than raising the bidding by blocking 
supplies of Ivorian products to the world market, it became 
necessary several months later to inform producers that the 
price per kilo had been halved. The Ivorian stabilization 
system was completely dismantled by commodity chain 
liberalization in August 1999 (see Section 3.3). The "barème" 
principle persisted between those two dates; it fixed a 
minimum price for producers as well as reference export 
prices at each stage of the commodity chain. Consequently, 
when a cocoa sale was made, the exporter had to 
compensate the stabilization fund for any difference between 
the actual sale price and the reference price, if the former was 
higher than the latter (the so-called "repayment" operation). 
On the other hand, when world prices were lower than the 
reference price, CAISTAB compensated exporters by granting 
them a payment (known under the generic term of "support") 
corresponding to the difference. 
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3.2. International stabilization agreements 
 
Between 1972 and 2001, there were six successive 
cocoa agreements. It took no less than 16 years and countless 
meetings to establish the first with, one year later, the 
International Cocoa Organization (ICCO) to manage it. That 
agreement was based on a quota system, combined with a 
buffer stock. The quota system granted quotas to each 
producing country, which varied in line with prices. However, it 
was never necessary to apply the agreement as prices 
remained above the fixed target range throughout its duration. 
Nevertheless, the contribution of 1 cent per pound helped to 
establish a fund of around US$80 million. The second 
agreement, concluded in 1975, was based on the same 
system, but did not work any better than the previous one, as 
the USA (the world's leading consumer) did not agree to take 
part. However, the "kitty" rose to US$ 230 million. A third 
agreement saw the light of day in 1980, in a very different 
context, as the market then had a surplus and prices were 
declining. The quota system was abandoned to the benefit of 
a buffer stock that could reach 250,000 tonnes. But this 
measure was barely more operational: the stock proved to be 
less than the surplus, funding resources were inadequate, and 
neither the USA nor the Côte d'Ivoire took part. Moreover, 
currency exchange fluctuations had not been taken into 
account. A fourth agreement was then reached in 1986, after 
two years' work under the aegis of UNCTAD. It, too, was 
based on a buffer stock of 250,000 tonnes, with the possibility 
of withdrawing 120,000 tonnes. But it remained powerless to 
stabilize prices above the reference level of 1,600 SDRs per 
ton: in January 1990, the ICCO indicator fell to 900 SDRs 
(Jouve et Milly, 1990:120-121).  
 
In 1993, when the fifth agreement was concluded, the 
decision was taken to liquidate the buffer stock by selling 
4,250 tonnes per month until it ran out, which occurred in 
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March 1998 (CCI, 2001:148-154). In reality, that agreement 
heralded the one concluded in 2001, to which the European 
Union and 40 cocoa-importing or -exporting countries adhered 
(except Indonesia): the forsaking of any ambition to intervene 
on the market in the short term, in favour of a sort of forum 
that monitored market trends, in order to ensure a balance 
between supply and demand in the medium and long terms. In 
2001, this capitulation led to the announcement of the 
following objectives: (1) promote international cooperation in 
all sectors of the world cocoa economy; (2) provide an 
appropriate forum for the discussion of all issues concerning 
all sectors of that economy; (3) help to strengthen the national 
economies of member countries; and (4) contribute towards 
the balanced development of the world cocoa economy, 
notably by promoting a sustainable cocoa economy, research 
and application of its results, collection, analysis and 
dissemination of relevant statistics, and consumption of 
chocolate and cocoa-based products (CNUCED, 2001).  
 
Pending the results of generalizing so-called "modern" 
price-risk management tools to developing countries (see 
Section 3.4), would not STABEX be the only way left to 
compensate for the harmful effects of world commodity market 
instability? This unique system of export stabilization (for 
agricultural products) was in fact proposed by the European 
Commission right from the first Lomé Convention in 1975. It 
provides African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries (now 
numbering 77) with substantial resources (13 per cent of the 
European Development Fund allotted to the ACP States over 
the 1995–2000 period, i.e. 1.8 billion European Currency Units 
(ECU)) to fund their agricultural sectors – without directly 
intervening on the market – when they are thrown into difficulty 
by a decline in their export earnings. In this way, a reference 
level is fixed by country, and when losses in export earnings 
are seen, STABEX guarantees a transfer of financial 
resources to the benefiting country that is equal, at most, to 
the difference between the effective value and the reference 
level.  
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Of course, STABEX has evolved since the first Lomé 
Convention. It only intervenes today in the form of donations, 
with the so-called "principle of reconstitution" by the ACP 
States being abandoned in 1990. Moreover, it was in return for 
the abrogation of that principle that the European Union 
obtained the same year the concession that the way resources 
were used would be subject to an agreement with each ACP 
Government. This framework of "mutual obligations" also 
involves suspensive clauses whose respect by the ACP States 
governs the different instalments ("tranches"). This was a 
major change signifying the end of direct, undifferentiated, 
non-negotiated transfers, which is not without causing 
tensions alongside those linked to the inadequate amounts 
available in periods of severe price depreciations. In fact, 
these frameworks of "mutual obligations" extended not only to 
supporting agricultural producers341, but also the privatization 
of commodity chains and the restructuring of national 
compensation bodies, in other words the development of the 
free-market economy in ACP countries (Simon, 1999).  
 
Be that as it may, it is clearly along those lines that the 
Cotonou Agreement signed in June 2000 envisaged a radical 
reform of commercial relations between the two regions. 
Indeed, it was regretted that the Lomé Conventions did not 
prevent the marginalization of ACP countries in world trade, or 
enable diversification of their exports that are still too often 
concentrated on a small number of agricultural products. It 
was also felt necessary, perhaps first and foremost, to comply 
with the commitments made at the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), since the latter does not authorize trading relations 
that are discriminatory and non-reciprocal, a provision that 
was extended to agriculture in 1994. Consequently, the 
European Union proposes setting in place Economic 
Partnership Agreements (EPA) between 2008 and 2020 with 
the ACP countries, which would then be grouped in regional 
                                                 
341
 In the Côte d'Ivoire, STABEX has thus facilitated access to the 
banking system for around a hundred producer organizations, or, in 
Cameroon, the distribution of "farmer cheques". 
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blocks (SOLAGRAL, 2002). In other words, it involves setting 
up free-trade areas, a new development paradigm that has 
been pushed to the fore for the last 20 years or so. 
 
3.3. Market liberalization 
 
The post-war self-centred growth model actually fell 
into crisis in the 1970s: the oil shocks forced the industrialized 
nations to broaden their market in order to settle the 
increasing bill for a raw material that they now largely 
depended on, and therefore open up much more to world 
trade and its advantages (theory of comparative advantages) 
than they had done in the past. This multilateral opening up 
led to ever more condemnation and dismantling of direct 
public intervention in domestic and international trade for 
goods and services (intervention now qualified as "trade 
distortion"), the outcome of which was the establishment of the 
WTO in 1995. Naturally, for public development aid, it was 
then no longer a matter of contributing to the construction of 
self-centred national economies, but of promoting the effective 
insertion of territories on the international scene, since from 
now on, it was on this that improved growth and living 
standards depended (Daviron et Losch, 1997:18-19).  
 
The free market has reigned for many years in the 
cocoa sector of countries such as Brazil, Indonesia and 
Malaysia. However, the international move towards 
liberalization led countries such as Nigeria and Cameroon to 
completely restructure the organization of their commodity 
chain in the 1990s. It was in 1999 for the Côte d'Ivoire a vast 
privatization, flanked some time later with new coordinating 
bodies: a Coffee and Cocoa Regulation Authority (ARCC, 
2001), a Coffee and Cocoa Bourse (BCC, 2001), an Inter-
ministerial Commodities Committee (CIMP, 2001), a 
Regulation and Control Fund (FRC, 2002) and a Coffee-
Cocoa Markets Information Programme (PRIMAC).  
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Nevertheless, the question of projects to secure 
agricultural income remained. In 2001, the Ivorian national 
coffee and cocoa producers association (ANAPROCI) 
suggested the restoration of a stabilization system based on 
the calculation of a Mean Forward Sale Price (PVAM – Prix de 
Vente Anticipé à la Moyenne)342, maybe not having completely 
realized that forward sales have strongly diminished since 
liberalization: by increasingly integrating upstream operators, 
the main buyers need less and less to turn to futures markets. 
In a document dated 23 July 2002, the Ivorian BCC proposed 
for its part a new trading system that is in practice similar to 
the one that existed before 1999, except that it does not 
include any programme on futures sales made after the main 
cocoa crop343. This system was to be completely in place by 
                                                 
342
 "Sales are forward sales (even before the product is available). 
Sales are spread over 33 months. For the first 21 months, these are 
futures sales, and the final 12 months are given over to spot sales 
(depending on the state of the market when the transaction takes 
place). In this way, prices are smoothed for producers, whose 
remuneration does not vary. However, the BCC could benefit from 
any improvements, such as an upturn in world prices, to fund 
foregone earnings in the case of a price drop" (Le Jour, N°1946, 
13/09/2001). 
343
 The following was thus proposed (Dow Jones Newsletter, 
14/08/2002): (1) a Minimum Farm-gate Price (MFP) fixed by an inter-
professional committee of experts within the BCC (the 2001/02 
season was thus marked by the introduction of such a price: see 
Section 4.2.1); (2) a Reference CIF Export Price (REP), which is the 
MFP incremented by collection and transport costs; (3) a Safety 
Reserve, fixed at the beginning of each season by various 
representatives of the profession, with a fixed share, and a variable 
share provided by exporters when the REP is higher than the MFP 
(or even by levying a "variable reserve tax" on production); (4) an 
Intervention Mechanism which could take various forms when the 
market price tended to fall below the REP: a) introduction of 
preventive insurance against the price risk, by using the futures and 
options markets, for example, b) adjustment of the level of fixed 
reserves, or of variable reserves, c) payment (via exporters) of 
compensation or a subsidy to cocoa farmers when the REP falls 
below the MFP; (5) a Guarantee Fund intended to improve access to 
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October 2003, but a year earlier, on 19 September 2002, a 
deep and bloody crisis broke out in the country344, which it is 
tempting to link to the over-radical liberalization of the Ivorian 
economy, notably in the cocoa sector. Whilst the issue is 
worth investigating (Losch et al., 2003), one certainty remains: 
this liberalization has discouraged rather than encouraged 
systems to secure agricultural income, apart from one, the 
futures and options markets, to which Ivorian small-scale 
cocoa producers do not yet have direct access. 
 
3.4. Futures and options markets 
 
When trade with Europe and the rest of the world 
intensified in the 16th century, veritably giving birth to 
international trading at a distance, purchases and sales with 
deferred deliveries became established and developed, along 
with the associated risks. In order to protect oneself from 
losses or damage to merchandise in transit, it gradually 
became possible to take out insurance, or to receive letters 
guaranteeing the execution of the contract. But it was not until 
the 20th century that it became possible to (personally) protect 
oneself from price fluctuations, which were considerable for 
agricultural products (Habert, 2002): the first formally 
organized cocoa exchange was created in New York in 1925 
in the wake of a stock exchange boom and crash (this 
exchange merged in 1978 with that for coffee and sugar, then 
in 1998 with that for cotton, to form NYBOT), with London 
following in 1928 (exchange now forming part of LIFFE)345. 
                                                                                              
credit for small and medium-sized exporters (private or cooperatives), 
so that the latter can purchase larger volumes of cocoa. 
344
 On 19 September 2002, armed conflict broke out in the Côte 
d'Ivoire, splitting the country in two, with "rebel' troops of the Ivorian 
Patriotic Front (MPCI) in the north, and the forces of President 
Laurent Gbagbo in the south. 
345
 Cocoa exchanges were also created in Amsterdam and Paris, but 
the volume of their activities never equalled that of NYBOT and 
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These futures contracts and markets transfer the price risk 
(unexpected rise or fall between the order and delivery) from 
those who do not accept it ("arbitrage dealers": traders, 
processors, chocolate makers, cocoa producers, etc.) to those 
who accept it and are called "speculators". The latter in fact 
wager on the market in line with the elements at their disposal, 
hoping to gain more than they lost in "arbitrage" operations 
(purchases and sales on paper that might lead – in 1% of 
cases at the most in normal circumstances – to delivering or 
taking delivery of the product)346 and "compensation" 
operations (payment of the difference between the market 
value and the transactional value), which, all in all, means that 
to each loss there corresponds a gain (zero sum game). 
Purchasing options ("calls") and sales ("puts") completed this 
system for cocoa at the end of the 1980s. These are 
conditional futures contracts enabling an operator to reserve 
the option to request the performance of an agreed operation, 
or its cancellation, subject to the immediate payment of a 
premium (known as the "option price").  
 
Thus, in modern merchandise trading, there exists 
today a clear distinction between the futures market and the 
"physical market", with the first shifting ten times more 
volumes (on paper) than the second (great liquidity which is 
also the guarantee of offering a counterpart at any given time). 
The physical market (also called the "real" market, "cash" 
market or "spot" market) deals in cocoa beans or cocoa 
products of given grades and origins, whose quantities, 
delivery times, packaging, prices (usually taking the futures 
market for a reference) and payment conditions are mutually 
                                                                                              
LIFFE, which were virtually comparable for this commodity in the 
1980s and 1990s. 
346
 The term "arbitrage" is also used to mean the settlement of 
disputes (e.g. about quality) outside the usual legal system. Such 
arbitrage is usually ensured under the aegis of cocoa trading 
associations. In extreme cases (refusal by one of the parties to 
comply), it becomes enforceable through legal channels (CCI, 
2001:93–95). 
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negotiated between the different buyers and sellers, based on 
standard contracts or market rules pre-established by 
international cocoa trading associations (CAL, CMAA, FCC). 
Conversely, the futures market is a restricted market (only the 
least attractive cocoas for users are supplied to the 
exchange), on which an individual must use the services of a 
middleman to buy or sell commodities. This involves a 
standard contract that can be bought or sold at a given place 
(NYBOT or LIFFE), during predetermined price quotation 
times, on the trading floor (NYBOT) or in front of computer 
screens (LIFFE since the end of 2000). In the futures contract, 
only the price and delivery month (March, May, July, 
September or December) are negotiable, as all the other 
elements are standardized and not negotiable (quantity by 10-
tonne batch, delivery to the warehouse of the port on the 
consumer market, quality in compliance with the classifications 
established by each exchange, transactions in US dollars for 
NYBOT and pounds sterling for LIFFE, etc.). Moreover, 
futures contract trading assumes the availability of sufficient 
financial means to honour contractual obligations (obligations 
first of all involving payment of a security deposit, an "initial 
provision" generally equivalent to 10 per cent of the contract 
market value). These means must be made available to a 
middleman ("broker" or "commission agent", who is a member 
of the clearing office), who takes responsibility for contract 
performance (reverse operation or delivery) on behalf of the 
operator in respect of the other party (CCI, 2001:73-85).  
 
Jouve and Milly summed up well the advantages and 
disadvantages of the futures market (Jouve et Milly, 1990:115-
120) namely, for the advantages: (1) cost reductions 
throughout the commodity chain since, by limiting their risk 
margin (money gained by speculators is lost by other 
speculators), middlemen also limit their commission; (2) more 
flexible and more efficient management of market flows insofar 
as paper and physical can be dissociated in time; (3) 
transparency in operations through the immediate publication 
of quotations; and (4) theoretically more difficult price 
manipulation by large operators, even if "squeezes", like the 
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one Antony Ward347 was recently accused of, may still more or 
less severely affect the smooth functioning of the markets. 
However, this guarantee of efficiency and transparency entails 
a certain number of limits or drawbacks: (1) in the short term, 
the futures market can increase instability, even though it does 
not modify long-term price trends; (2) producers always find 
themselves in the role of speculators, since they can choose 
at any moment to sell or not to sell: they optimize their 
speculation but do not eliminate it all the same; (3) resorting to 
arbitrage is not free of charge (registration fees, brokerage, 
exchange taxes, etc.); and (4) the options system encourages 
traders and industrialists to speculate, which somewhat 
amplifies the role of futures markets, increasing its 
disadvantages. We are tempted to add a fifth point to this last 
list: futures markets do not locally encourage the production, 
differentiation and recompense of quality, since in order to 
function they rely on the maximum homogenization of batches 
(by national origin as this is difficult on a world scale, hence 
premiums by batches – positive or negative – depending on 
the producing country), which, moreover, is done more to 
meet a low rather than a high standard (only the least 
attractive cocoas are delivered to the exchange).  
 
Lastly, Jouve and Milly concluded as follows: "In any 
event, the futures market remains a relatively neutral 
                                                 
347
 Antony Ward, alias "Chocfinger", 42 years old, former director of 
Phibro, has run the Armajaro trading company (London) for the last 
four years with Richard Gower. He apparently took delivery of large 
quantities of cocoa beans over the last two years, at a time when 
prices doubled (from £stg600/t to around £stg1,300/t). After his 
purchase in the summer of 2002 of at least 150,000 tonnes of cocoa 
(over 5 per cent of world production and three-quarters of the 
quantities supplied in July 2002 to the London futures market), he 
seemingly possessed 15 per cent of world stocks. Suspected of 
operating a "squeeze" (forcing prices to rise and selling at the high 
price to pocket a gain estimated in this case at US$90 million ), or 
even of funding the conflict that broke out in the Côte d'Ivoire on 19 
September 2002 to multiply his stake, he is apparently backed by the 
American insurer AIG, or the Commodity Arbitrage Fund AIG DKR. 
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instrument, reproducing market facts much like a barometer. 
The ideal of price stability can always be dreamt of. As that 
ideal is very far off, theoretical and even utopian, price 
instability has to be lived with, given the continual instability 
between supply and demand. In this context of instability, the 
existence of a representative futures market is undeniably a 
positive factor. Though it can no doubt seem paradoxical that 
the world cocoa price is determined by speculators on markets 
in which only paper circulates. Nevertheless, let us not forget 
that old traders' saying "physical is always right!".  
 
The "relatively neutral" nature of the futures market in 
terms of supply and demand would undoubtedly deserve 
greater discussion348, as would its "undeniably positive" nature 
faced with price instability349. In the meantime, and in a context 
now free of public interventions, let us take a look at price 
formation and transmission within the commodity chain, and to 
which "market facts" they lead. 
4. Price transmission and value sharing 
 
Price and income structuring in the cocoa-chocolate 
commodity chain is difficult to assess, given the myriad types 
of end product (tablets, bars, sweets, creams, ice creams, 
drinking chocolate, etc.) and its variable combination of semi-
finished cocoa-based products (liquor, butter, powder), and of 
other incorporated raw materials (sugar, milk, vanilla, fat, 
hazelnuts, raisins, etc.). There is also the problem of data: (1) 
                                                 
348
 We have already begun them by noting that the development of 
futures markets is not neutral towards the production and delivery of 
quality products. We could continue in another register: a "squeeze", 
like the one by Antony Ward – be it real or the figment of a very 
extravagant imagination, shows that it cannot be ruled out that such 
an operation may – in its extreme limits – lead to the abrupt 
destructuring of the economy of a country such as the Côte d'Ivoire, 
which is definitely not neutral towards worldwide cocoa supply and 
demand, in the short and long terms. 
349
 See Section 4.4.3 to carry on this discussion. 
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downstream companies – often multinationals (ADM, Barry-
Callebault, Mars, Nestlé, etc.) – conceal rather than divulge 
their recipes, costs and marketing prices; (2) upstream 
producing countries – primarily developing countries – do not 
usually have any sophisticated economic observatories. All 
this is combined with the unfortunately well-known fluctuation 
in cocoa prices, hence the ambiguity of working on annual 
means. In short, the exercise we are attempting here is as 
daring as it is novel, and we hope it will provoke reactions and 
suggestions likely to come closer to reality than here. 
 
4.1. Hypotheses and methodology 
 
Ours is a rough analysis in more ways than one, even 
though certain biases were lessened by carrying it out over 
several years (1992–2001). First of all, it in fact stops at a 
relatively unsophisticated end product (the dark chocolate 
bar), which, it is worth remembering, is a rare chocolate 
product to which a VAT rate of 5.5 per cent is applied, 
whereas all the others are hit with 19.6 per cent tax in 
France350. Secondly, it is restricted to a transaction area (the 
Côte d'Ivoire => northern Europe => France), which 
correspondingly reduces the scope of the analysis, even 
though this area is in itself not insignificant in the world 
                                                 
350
 Under current French legislation, where the normal VAT rate is 
19.6 per cent (20.6 per cent from 1 August 1995 to 31 March 2000), 
products earmarked for human consumption are subject – as 
authorized by the sixth European Directive on VAT – to the reduced 
rate which stands in France at 5.5 per cent since 1982 (at least 5 per 
cent according to the European Directive). However, this principle 
includes exceptions, for 2 per cent of food products (Biron et 
Boucher, 2000) which, apart from alcoholic drinks, are chocolate, 
confectionery, margarines and caviar. However, for chocolate, there 
is an exception to the exception (i.e. the possibility of applying the 
reduced rate): (dark) chocolate and household (dark) chocolate, if in 
bar or stick form (e.g. the "Napolitain" dark chocolate square is taxed 
at 5.5 per cent, but if it is round it is taxed at 19.6 per cent), along with 
household milk chocolate, if presented in the same forms. 
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chocolate economy. Lastly, it is based on the following 
hypotheses. 
 
(1) The data and calculations given in Table 4 lead to fair 
estimates of the prices of the different products, given that: 
• the FOB price for exported Ivorian cocoa beans is not 
available after 1996 (IMF, 1998), leading this price series to be 
ruled out, which is a pity since it would have made it possible 
to evaluate the FOB-to-CIF cost which is not provided by 
BNETD (BNETD, 2000); 
• ED&F Man (2002) supplies series of mean annual prices 
(£stg/t) for butter ("Top 4 Dutch") and powder (unspecified 
origin), but not for liquor or couverture chocolate, which led us 
to opt for estimating the unit price of all these goods using the 
same database, i.e. by dividing a sum of annual import values 
within Europe, supplied by Eurostat (EUROSTAT, 2002)351 by 
the sum of the corresponding volumes. For butter and powder, 
the difference between these evaluations (Table 4) and the 
prices published by ED&F Man varies considerably from one 
year to the next (effect of arbitrage on the futures markets?), 
and is substantial on average for powder352 (which by chance 
does not enter much into this study). 
 
Table 4: Values used, their source and their estimation method 
Variable 
 
Source Estimation method 
Price paid to producer 
(the Côte d'Ivoire) 
BNETD, 2000, 
2001, 2002 
Weighted average according to 
quantities collected by zones (5) 
and by operators (middlemen or 
cooperatives) 
Price, factory entrance 
(the Côte d'Ivoire]) 
BNETD, 2000, 
2001, 2002 
Weighted average depending on 
quantities collected by department 
(44 dealers or cooperatives 
                                                 
351
 More detailed data than UNCTAD's TRAINS data: HS to 8 figures 
rather than 6. 
352
 Between +25% (1992 and 1999) and –11% (1997) for butter 
(average of +5% from 1992 to 2001), between +44 per cent (1995) 
and –3 per cent (2001) for powder (average of +18 per cent over the 
period in question). 
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Variable 
 
Source Estimation method 
surveyed in all in 1999/00) 
Processing and export 
(the Côte d'Ivoire) 
Calculated Difference between CIF price and 
factory entrance price incremented 
by compulsory levies 
 
Compulsory levies 
(the Côte d'Ivoire) 
 
BNETD, 2000, 
2001, 2002 
 
Levies for the State, but also 
professional (13% of total in 
2000/01) 
CIF price of imported 
bean 
(Netherlands, 
Germany) 
Calculated with 
EUROSTAT, 
2002 
Annual imported Values over 
Quantities. Product code: 
HS 18010000353. Origin: the Côte 
d'Ivoire. Reporting countries: 
Netherlands + Germany (64% of 
volumes imported from the Côte 
d'Ivoire by the EU from 1992 to 
2001). Ivorian beans entering the 
EU are not subject to customs 
duties. 
Price of liquor 
(France, Belgium, 
Germany) 
Calculated with 
EUROSTAT, 
2002 
Annual imported Values over 
Quantities. Product code: 
HS 18031000354. Origin: EU. 
Reporting countries: France + 
Belgium-Luxembourg + Germany 
(66% of within-EU import volumes 
from 1992 to 2001).  
Price of butter 
(Germany, Belgium, 
France) 
Calculated with 
EUROSTAT, 
2002 
Annual imported Values over 
Quantities. Product code: 
HS 18040000355. Origin: EU. 
Reporting countries: Germany + 
Belgium-Luxembourg + France 
(67% of within-EU import volumes 
from 1992 to 2001). 
Price of powder 
(Germany, France, 
Belgium) 
Calculated with 
EUROSTAT, 
2002 
Annual imported Values over 
Quantities. Product code: 
HS 18050000356. Origin: EU. 
Reporting countries: Germany + 
France + Belgium-Luxembourg 
(56% of within-EU import volumes 
from 1992 to 2001). 
                                                 
353
 HS 18010000: cocoa beans, whole or broken, raw or roasted. 
354
 HS 18031000: cocoa paste (excl. defatted). 
355
 HS 18040000: cocoa butter, fat and oil. 
356
 HS 18050000: cocoa powder, not containing added sugar or other 
sweetening matter. 
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Variable 
 
Source Estimation method 
Price of sugar 
(Belgium, Germany, 
France) 
Calculated with 
EUROSTAT, 
2002 
Annual imported Values over 
Quantities. Product code: 
HS 17019910357. Origin: EU. 
Reporting countries: Belgium-
Luxembourg + Germany + France 
(52% of within-EU import volumes 
from 1992 to 2001). 
Price of couverture 
(France, Germany, 
Netherlands, Belgium) 
Calculated with 
EUROSTAT, 
2002 
Annual imported Values over 
Quantities. Product code: 
HS 18062010358. Origin: EU. 
Reporting countries: France + 
Germany + Netherlands + Belgium-
Luxembourg (77% of within-EU 
import volumes from 1992 to 2001). 
Price of chocolate bars 
(France) 
Calculated with 
INSEE, 2002 
Price reconstituted from: (1) the 
INSEE annual index (100 = 1998) of 
the consumption price of "chocolate 
tablet" (product code 011821) for 
the whole of France (mainland + 
overseas departments), (2) the retail 
price, without tax, of a "standard" 
tablet of dark chocolate in 2001 
VAT 
(France, Europe) 
CAOBISCO, 2002 5.5% (in France only on dark 
chocolate in bar or stick form, all 
other chocolate products being 
taxed at 19.6%) 
 
(2) Ivorian average prices and levies expressed by cocoa 
season (Pc: October to September) need to be converted into 
calendar years (Pn: January to December) in order to be 
properly compared with all the other average prices expressed 
per calendar year (from CIF bean to chocolate tablet); this 
conversion can be done considering that:  
• 40 per cent of cocoa volumes produced are bought from 
producers and delivered to conditioning factories from October 
                                                 
357
 HS 17019910: white sugar, containing in dry state>= 99.5 per cent 
sucrose (excl. flavoured or coloured). 
358
 HS 18062010: chocolate and other food preparations containing 
cocoa, in blocks, slabs or bars weighing > 2 kg or in liquid, paste, 
powder, granular or other bulk form, in containers or immediate 
packings of a content > 2 kg, containing >= 31 per cent, by weight. 
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to December, hence the average price paid by each of these 
two operators over the calendar year can be estimated by Pn = 
(0.40*Pc) + (0.60*Pc–1); 
• levies (taxes) are mostly deducted at the export stage, for 
which payments are better distributed throughout the year: Pn 
= (0.30*Pc) + (0.70*Pc–1). 
It should be noted that this operation backs up another 
hypothesis we put forward, and which is fairly conventional in 
economics, namely virtually instantaneous price transmission, 
which with a time period of one year, and futures and options 
markets that are also well developed, is far from being totally 
aberrant (thus, it is considered here, for example, that an 
increase in bean price in 1999 can lead to an increase in the 
price of a tablet of chocolate the same year). 
 
(3) The Côte d'Ivoire does not gain value through local 
processing of beans into liquor, butter and powder, which is 
not true in reality, since it now processes a quarter of its beans 
locally, though primarily via multinationals (see Sections 2.3.3, 
2.3.4). 
 
(4) A study of chocolate value formation/distribution359 
requires that the various prices or taxes be expressed in the 
same unit360, and the ECU (now the euro) proves to be a good 
compromise when compared to practices361, as well as for 
                                                 
359
 The term "value" used here should be understood to mean 
"commercial value", along with values that are incorporated or not in 
that commercial value: an old and vast economic debate, for which J. 
Généreux provides a few elements in his bestseller (Généreux, 
2001). 
360
 Unfortunately, the lack of data prevents us from applying the 
surplus accounts method here (see in particular Dorin et al., 2001: 
Formation and distribution of productivity gains in Indian agriculture, 
Economie Rurale, 263, May–June), though it would have enabled a 
more complete and less limited analysis than what was actually 
carried out. 
361
 Prior to 1999, according to the French trader Touton, French 
Ivorian bean purchases were mostly paid for in French francs, and 
probably in pounds sterling or US dollars for other European 
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limiting the effect of European currency exchange rates prior 
to 1999: when data are not expressed in this unit (particularly 
Ivorian data), the conversion rates provided by EUROSTAT 
(2002)362 are used to convert them. 
 
(5) Value formation/distribution can be understood in two 
main ways, by the commercial value of the products derived 
from one tonne of beans (Table 5), or by the value of the 
different commercial forms that make up – with taxes and 
other levies – the retail price of one tonne of dark chocolate 
bar (Table 6). 
 
(6) One tonne of beans provides 800 kg of liquor, or 
400 kg butter and 400 kg of powder (at 10–12 per cent fat 
content). Thereafter, bean processing results in a loss of 
matter throughout the process of (only) 20 per cent (hull and 
water), at the grinding stage (Table 5, Table 6). 
 
(7) A dark chocolate tablet is made with couverture 
chocolate363 containing 50 per cent liquor364 and 11 per cent 
                                                                                              
countries; since 1999, the euro has taken over for African cocoa 
purchases, except in cocoa-importing countries such as the UK 
(which  have not been included in the scope of our study for that 
reason, among others), and exporting countries such as Ghana 
(which apparently receives payment increasingly in US dollars rather 
than in pounds sterling). 
362
 For CFA franc conversion into euro, we used the ECU/French 
franc conversion rate, multiplied by 50 up to 1993, then by 100 from 
1994 onwards (devaluation in January 1994). 
363
 Which is not always the case (tablet manufactured directly with 
mass, without added cocoa butter, unless it is meant to be "fondant"), 
but this assumption makes it possible to enhance the analysis, by 
bringing out the value added through couverture manufacture, without 
affecting the final price of the chocolate in any way. 
364
 Itself containing 50 per cent cocoa butter. 
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butter365 (Table 6), themselves made from beans of 
exclusively Ivorian origin. 
 
(8) The cocoa content of a dark chocolate tablet is 61 per 
cent (Table 5, Table 6), a percentage considered to most 
effectively represent a market where it varies, in France, from 
50 to 99 per cent; the remainder (39 per cent) is solely 
composed of sugar (which is not always the case). 
 
 
Table 5: Calculation of the value of products manufactured from 
one tonne of beans 
 
Bean, farm gate (the Côte 
d'Ivoire): 
V’Farm = PFarm gate 
Bean, factory entrance (the Côte 
d'Ivoire): 
V’Factory = PFactory entrance 
Imported bean (Europe): V’Import = PImport 
Liquor (Europe): V’Liquor = PLiquor * 0.8 
Butter + Powder (Europe): V’Butter&Powder = (PButter * 0.4) + (PPowder * 0.4) 
Couverture (Europe): V’Couverture = (PCouverture / 0.61) * 0.8 
Tablet (France): V’Tablet = (PTablet / 0.61) * 0.8 
 
 
 
Table 6: Breakdown of the value of a tablet of dark chocolate 
Bean production (the Côte 
d'Ivoire): 
V’Prod = (PFarm gate / 0.8) * 0.61 
Bean collection and export 
(to Europe): 
V’Import = ((PImport / 0.8) * 0.61) – 
V’Prod – V’Collect – V’FactExp – V’TLevies 
- of which coop. & 
middlemen (the Côte 
d'Ivoire): 
V'Collect = ((PFactory / 0.8) * 0.61) – 
((PFarm gate / 0.8) * 0.61) 
- of which factories & 
exporters (incl. transport): 
V'FactExp = ((PImport / 0.8) * 0.61) – 
V'Prod – V'Collect – V'Levies 
                                                 
365
 i.e. a total of 36 per cent cocoa butter, with the legislation allowing 
the name "couverture" for products whose cocoa dry matter content 
exceeds 35 per cent (ditto for dark chocolate) with more than 31 per 
cent butter (18 per cent for dark chocolate). 
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- of which levies (the Côte 
d'Ivoire): 
V’Levies = (VLevies / 0.8) * 0.61 
Liquor and butter 
production (Europe): 
V’Grinding = ((0.11*PButter) + 
(0.50*PLiquor)) – ((PImport / 0.8) * 
0.61) 
Sugar (Europe) V’Sugar = PSugar * 0.39 
Couverture production 
(Europe): 
V’Couverture = PCouverture – 
((0.11*PButter) + (0.50*PLiquor) – 
V’Sugar) 
Tablet manufacture and 
distribution (France): 
V’Tablet = PTablet – PCouverture 
VAT: V’VAT = PTablet * 0.055 
 
 
(9) Cocoa percentage weight (61 per cent) corresponds 
to the monetary value of the cocoa in a tablet, which is 
ambiguous in several ways: the value of the chocolate is 
based more on the cocoa it contains than on the other main 
ingredient, namely sugar, and that value itself depends on 
other factors (bean selection, industrial know-how, reputation, 
etc.). 
 
(10) This 61 per cent dark chocolate tablet was sold in 
France for €8/kg exclusive of tax in 2001 (i.e. 5 French francs 
per 100 g tablet)366. 
 
(11) The total VAT deducted throughout the commodity 
chain amounts to 5.5 per cent of the value exclusive of tax of 
the dark chocolate tablet sold in France; a hypothesis which is 
both low, since the VAT applied to cocoa-based products 
(liquor, butter, couverture) is 6 or 7 per cent in the other 
                                                 
366
 Nielsen’s data, for example, would probably make it possible to 
specify this value a little more precisely. In mid-December 2002, in a 
hypermarket in Montpellier, tablets at 51–52 per cent cocoa 
fluctuated between €6.65 (Meunier) and €8.60 (Lindt Noir) per kg 
inclusive of tax, and those at 72 per cent between €8.10 and €12.40, 
with Cemoi organic chocolate at 60 per cent cocoa costing €9.40. 
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countries considered (Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands) 
(CAOBISCO, 2002:21), and high, since no European tax is 
levied on imported beans. 
 
(12) An analysis at constant prices can be carried out on 
Ivorian and French values, using as the deflator for the Côte 
d'Ivoire the harmonized consumer price index with 1996 as 
base year (BCEAO, 2003) and, for France, the household 
consumer price index with 1995 as base year (INSEE, 
2003)367; prior to use, each of these indexes was adjusted to 
the 1992 base year to facilitate subsequent comparisons. 
 
                                                 
367
 The INSEE general consumer price index (CPI) could also have 
been used, but on the organization’s internet site at least, the CPI 
base 100 in 1998 was not calculated prior to that date, and the base 
100 for 1990 was not calculated after December 1998. 
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4.2. Results and comments 
 
4.2.1. Exported beans 
 
BNETD reports (BNETD, 2000, 2001, 2002) and data 
from 1995/96 to 2001/02, expressed in current CFA francs per 
cocoa season (October to September) – hence effectively 
incorporating the price surge confirmed in June 2002 (Figure 
12)  – provide initial information on value formation/distribution 
for one kilogram of beans CIF (Figure 8), even though this CIF 
value was unfortunately368 derived by BNEDT from the ICCO 
monthly index on the London and New York exchanges 
(BNETD, 2002:15). 
 
1. In 1999/00, the year the commodity chain was liberalized, 
the current farm-gate bean price was virtually halved, then 
rose again, slightly exceeding in 2001/02 the level reached 
3 years earlier (+3.5 per cent compared to 1998/99)369 
(Figure 8). After abolition of the “barème” and the 
indicative price paid to cocoa growers, producer income 
instability deteriorated by a much stronger variation in 
                                                 
368
 In fact, this CIF price is not specific to the Côte d'Ivoire, even less 
so for a delivery to Amsterdam as we subsequently considered 
(Section 4.2.2). This CIF value considerably affects the estimation of 
the share of conditioning factories and exporters, since that share is 
calculated by deducting from the value all the compulsory levies, 
along with the factory gate price. For the latter, it should also be 
noted that its value fluctuated in the pages of the last two BNEDT 
reports for the 2000/01 season: between 415 and 423 CFA francs/kg; 
we have opted here for 415. 
369
 504 CFA francs per kg in 1998/99, 275 in 1999/00, and 522 in 
2001/02. A few days after the end of the 2001/02 season, a record 
(over the previous 17 years) of US$2,405/t was reached on the New 
York futures market on 11 October 2002. However, between 14 and 
18 October 2002, the closing price for cocoa fell suddenly from 
US$2,338 to US$1,910/t, i.e. a drop of 18.3 per cent in 4 days. 
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price according to the collection circuit (middlemen or 
cooperatives), the harvesting zone and the month of the 
year. For instance, in 2000/01, the average farm-gate 
price for that season did not exceed 255 CFA francs/kg in 
the western zone (middleman price), whereas it rose to 
395 in the south-western zone (cooperative price). 
Likewise the farm-gate price for beans was 550 CFA 
francs/kg in February for cooperatives (all zones 
combined), whereas middlemen were only offering 300 in 
June. According to BNETD, the coefficient of variation for 
prices (over 20 per cent) declined slightly during the 
2001/02 season, which was marked by the introduction of 
a minimum price to producers per three-month period370. 
However, BNEDT concluded by highlighting the problem 
of price labelling and the problem of minimum price 
payment by buyers purchasing directly from farms. 
 
2. Over the period in question, bean collection represented 
from 5 per cent (1995/96) to 11.5 per cent (1998/99 and 
2000/01) of the ICCO CIF price (4 to 9 per cent of the CIF 
Amsterdam price – see Section 4.2.2). It is not possible to 
see any clear trend here as to the effects of liberalization. 
However, it has to be said that liberalization caused 
problems for cooperatives, whose collection share 
slumped, despite the better prices paid to producers 
(average differential with middlemen of +30 CFA francs/kg 
in 2000/01): in 1998/99, they handled 32 per cent of the 
volumes produced, as opposed to 24 per cent in 1999/00 
and only 18 per cent in 2000/01 (though retaining 50 per 
cent in the eastern zone). In fact, the new law on 
cooperatives and payment outstanding divided their 
access to guaranteed bank credits by almost 25 (0.64 
billion CFA francs allotted by Fonds de Garantie des 
Coopératives Café-Cacao (FGCCC) in 1999/00 as 
opposed to 15.46 the previous season). So, in the 
absence of bank credit, and faced with the unceasing drop 
                                                 
370
 325 CFA francs per kg from October to December 2001, 475 from 
January to March 2002, and 600 from April to June. 
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in prefunding by exporters who sought to limit their 
financial risks and costs, cooperatives tended only to pay 
producers once they themselves had been paid by the 
exporter (70 per cent of payments in 2000/01 as opposed 
to 34 per cent in 1999/00). This delay was all the more 
regrettable in that the operators who paid at the 
warehouse entrance now offered a premium (5 to 7 CFA 
francs in 2001) compared to the few dealers who still 
granted prefunding against the product (Jacquet, 2001). 
Fortunately, during the 2001/02 season, the gradual 
resumption of operations by FGCCC (0.95 billion in credits 
allotted), and above all the provision of revolving credits by 
exporters, enabled the cooperatives to increase their 
market share from 18 to 25 per cent, thereby returning to 
the 1999/00 level (BNETD, 2002:11-14). 
 
3. Prior to liberalization, the share of compulsory levies was 
tending to decrease (36 per cent of the ICCO CIF price in 
1996/97 as opposed to 19 per cent in 1998/99), while it 
has tended to increase since then (25 per cent in 1999/00 
as opposed to 29 per cent in 2001/02). The main element 
of these levies is DUS, for which the percentage share has 
tended in reality to decrease since liberalization, even 
though it has increased in value: in August 2002, it even 
broke the record of 220 CFA francs/kg (Reuter), which 
was not really a record since, at constant prices, it 
remained around 20 per cent below the 200 CFA francs 
imposed in 1994 (IMF, 1998)371. On the other hand, 
professional levies have increased considerably (98 CFA 
francs/kg in 2001/02, i.e. 10 per cent of the CIF price). 
Most of these levies have in fact been multiplied since 
liberalization, to ensure services that used to come from 
the State. In view of their increases, we can wonder what 
the cheapest and most effective solution in the Ivorian 
context is. 
 
                                                 
371
 This export tax, levied on beans and on other types of exported 
cocoa-based products, was suspended from 1989 to 1993. 
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4. However, the share of conditioning factories (“traitants”) 
and exporters – deduced by difference – has clearly 
shrunk over the last season: after fluctuating at around 17 
per cent of the ICCO CIF price since 1995/96, it suddenly 
fell to 10 per cent in 2001/02. The same trend can be seen 
using the CIF Amsterdam value adjusted to calendar 
years (see Section 4.2.2), which confirms substantial cost 
savings at that level, with the major downstream operators 
(ADM, Cargill, Barry-Callebault, etc.) increasingly 
integrating the upstream operations of the commodity 
chain (buying out or sidelining local operators), thereby 
achieving major economies of scale (big-bag or bulk 
loading, access to international funding that is generally 
more advantageous than local credits, better knowledge of 
the international market, etc.). 
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Figure 8: Distribution of ICCO bean CIF value (1995/96–2001/02) 
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4.2.2. Couverture chocolate 
 
Dark couverture chocolate, which is obtained by 
mixing conching liquor, butter and sugar, is the raw material of 
chocolate makers, if the latter do not make their own. It varies 
in composition depending on the desired end product (average 
adopted here: 50 per cent liquor and 11 per cent cocoa 
butter); for example, groups such as Cemoi-Cantalou have it 
manufactured in Germany and then sell it on or process it 
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(tempering, moulding, coating, etc.) in France372. With our 
price estimations and method (Section 4.1), the breakdown of 
the commercial value of one tonne of dark couverture 
chocolate (Figure 9) prompts the following comments. 
 
1. Between 1992 and 2001, the prices of liquor, butter, 
powder and sugar varied as much as the farm-gate or CIF 
Amsterdam prices373 (coefficient of variation between 12 
and 14 per cent), which was not the case for couverture, 
for which the price was more stable (CV = 2.4 per cent): a 
possible benefit of the futures and options markets, at 
least at this stage of processing.  
 
2. After Ivorian liberalization, the price of couverture, like that 
of its ingredients, fell (it fell below the level of 2,000 euro 
per ton), but unlike beans and liquor (and also sugar), this 
price did not recover in 2001; was that linked to the 
deferred repercussions of the price increases for the main 
ingredients (liquor and sugar), or to the upstream 
integration of grinders and to the economies of scale 
making it possible to offer ever cheaper cocoa butter (–32 
per cent between 1998 and 2001)374? It is difficult to 
answer those questions here, particularly since the drop in 
butter price can also be linked to the larger profits now 
taken by grinders on powder. Indeed, the price of powder 
has clearly increased since 2000 (Figure 10): the countries 
of eastern Europe, where demand for chocolate-based 
                                                 
372
 Such trade within Europe is therefore more of a matter of trade 
within firms, where the prices – which we are measuring here – are 
somewhat minimized in theory. However, the latter incorporate 
transport costs, since CIF values are involved. The same applies for 
our liquor, butter and powder prices, which may explain, for the last 
two products, why our estimations are greater on average than the 
ED&F Man price series (Section 4.1). 
373
 More strictly, the Netherlands and Germany (see Table 4). 
374
 The ED&F estimations, unlike our own, show a price rise for 2001 
(
Figure 10). 
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products is growing, are apparently importing more and 
more to supply their chocolate factories. 
 
3. In 2001, the producer’s share in the value of couverture 
managed to rise to the record level of 25 per cent reached 
in 1998. However, that of dealers and exporters clearly 
decreased, in value and as a percentage. Indeed, many of 
these operators have been pushed out or taken over by 
grinders375 since Ivorian liberalization (see Sections 2.3.3, 
2.3.4). Such upstream integration enables grinders to 
strengthen their income by processing larger volumes of 
beans, as their gross margin per tonne of couverture fell 
below the level of 400 euro in 1997. In addition, if they 
make couverture for chocolate makers (which is the case 
for the largest grinders), it enables them to extract a 
greater unit margin upstream. In fact, prior to liberalization, 
the added value per tonne of couverture (price of the latter 
minus the cost of its ingredients: liquor, butter and sugar) 
steadily declined, from 36 per cent in 1992 (720 euro per 
ton) to 18 per cent in 1998 (381 euro per ton), whereas it 
has clearly been gaining ground since then (27 per cent in 
2001, i.e.  532 euro per ton). It appears quite clearly in all 
cases that the economies of scale achieved in the Côte 
d'Ivoire since liberalization are not completely reflected in 
the price of a tonne of couverture, and that they are of 
greater benefit to downstream operators (grinders) than to 
upstream operators (Ivorian exporters).  
                                                 
375
 Grinders for whom the income derived from butter and powder 
sales has been barely estimated in this study, if at all. 
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Figure 9: Distribution of couverture value (1992–2001) 
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Figure 10: European current prices of beans, butter and powder 
(1980–2001) 
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4.2.3. Chocolate tablet 
 
Integration of the previous gross margins in the value 
of a tablet of dark chocolate inclusive of tax (Figure 11 and 
Appendix 1), as approximate as the latter value might be 
(Section 4.1), shed fundamental light on price transmission 
and value sharing within the cocoa-chocolate commodity 
chain. 
 
1. Whilst bean, liquor, butter and couverture prices fluctuate 
– often substantially – along a stationary or even 
depressive line, conversely, the retail price of a tablet has 
increased from year to year: +2.6 per cent per year on 
average from 1992 to 2001 in current euro, i.e. a gain of 
1,550 euro per tonne in 10 years (+1 French franc per 
100 g tablet). A similar trend can be seen for all French 
chocolate-based products. On the other side of the border, 
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in Germany where BDSI376 publishes a retail price index 
for milk chocolate tablet, the upward trend is even greater, 
but only since May 1996 (Figure 12). Prior to that, the 
price of a German tablet of milk chocolate was tending to 
fall, probably due to the upheaval of restructuring in the 
country after reunification between West and East in 
1990377. In terms of supply and demand, this upward 
consumer price trend is not surprising, at least in the most 
recent years. In fact, the intensification of cocoa 
production in the 1980s (notably in south-east Asia) had 
long left the commodity chain in a situation of surplus 
production, while that is no longer the case today: since 
2000, there has been a production shortfall (tapping into 
stocks to meet demand) and, as that shortfall is somewhat 
set to increase in the coming years (cf. Section 2.2.1), 
prices are logically rising. 
 
2. It can nonetheless be wondered why such an upward 
trend barely benefits the operators bearing most of the 
costs of chocolate making, from the cocoa producer to the 
couverture manufacturer. Since 1999 in particular, when 
the Ivorian cocoa sector was liberalized, European 
consumers have continued to pay more for their chocolate 
products (in France and even more in Germany, even if 
chocolate seems to be cheaper there378) while the price of 
                                                 
376
 Bundesverband der Deutschen Sübwarebindustrie (Bonn), 
association of the German confectionery industry. 
377
 Adaptation of West Germany to a lower buying power in East 
Germany, but possibly also supplies of cheaper milk in the East. In 
any event, German milk imports from the rest of the European Union 
(EUROSTAT) occurred at virtually stable prices from 1992 to 2000: 
between 0.32 and 0.34 ECU/kg for code HS 040120 (milk and cream 
of a fat content by weight of > 1 per cent but =< 6 per cent, not 
concentrated nor containing added sugar or other sweetening matter) 
which was the most frequently imported dairy product (614,150 t in 
1990) (NB: there was a somewhat downward price trend for other 
imported types of milk). 
378
 In December 2001, a (100 g) tablet of milk chocolate of the Milka 
brand only cost 0.6 euro (apparently exclusive of tax). 
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the raw material is clearly falling (couverture and even 
more so imported cocoa beans) (Figure 9). Must this be 
blamed on the increasing costs of advertising and of 
product differentiation that incites the consumer society, or 
on the increasing profits of distributors, which we are 
unable to measure here379? On this last point, it should be 
noted that distributor profits are not apparently dropping, 
and even seem to be rising since, according to BDSI, 
German industrial prices (wholesale prices) for some 
chocolate-based products rarely exceeded in 2001 the 
record levels reached in 1998 or 1999, while retail price 
inflation continues (Figure 13). 
 
 
                                                 
379
 This distributor profit would currently seem to be fluctuating 
between 19 and 33 per cent in France, but this remains to be 
confirmed. 
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Figure 11: Distribution of chocolate tablet value (1992–2001) 
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Figure 12: Current price indexes for beans and chocolate-based 
products (Jan. 1990–Oct. 2002) 
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Figure 13: German industrial prices for some chocolate-based 
products (1995–2001) 
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3. The share of the tax-inclusive price of a tablet of dark 
chocolate going to Ivorian cocoa producers has, in any 
event, not increased: after descending below the 5 per 
cent limit in 2000 (the lowest level over the decade 
considered), it rose to almost 6 per cent in 2001, while it 
managed to drag itself up to 7 per cent just before 
liberalization (Figure 11). Which prompts further questions: 
why is cocoa cultivation, which employs and provides a 
livelihood for more people than in the rest of the 
commodity chain, unable to capture a greater share of the 
value of the end product, even after liberalization which 
was primarily supposed to be of benefit to it? Moreover, 
how is it possible to explain that research and public 
authorities still concentrate virtually all their resources on 
trying to improve the performance of cocoa cultivation, 
when the prospects for improving income in that activity 
(and thereby eventually its production techniques) lie more 
surely in downstream reforms, since it is there that virtually 
all the value is created and/or captured (more than 94 per 
cent in 2001 taking the example of a dark chocolate 
tablet)?  
 
4. In 2001, the VAT levied by European countries throughout 
the dark chocolate tablet manufacturing chain was around 
420 euro per tonne, i.e. virtually double the Ivorian levies 
on beans (228 euro per ton). Ivorian and European levies 
combined therefore amount to 647 euro per ton, i.e. 8 per 
cent of the price paid by consumers, and therefore more 
than that received by a cocoa producer (under 6 per cent, 
i.e. 475 euro per ton). 
 
4.2.4. In other words 
 
The above results can be backed up or, conversely, 
moderated by expressing them in other ways. 
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1. Might the decision to carry out the analysis in French 
francs, rather than euro have affected our conclusions? 
Apparently not, since in a comparison of value in euro 
(Figure 14) with that in French francs (Figure 15) for a 
given quantity of beans during various stages of its 
processing – another way of expressing the results (see 
Section 4.1 and Table 5) – there are very few perceptible 
differences, the most notable being for the tablet, right at 
the beginning of the period380. 
 
2. However, in 1992 French francs (see Section 4.1), one 
kilogram of chocolate tablet rose from 41.6 to 43.5 French 
francs exclusive of tax between 1992 and 2001, i.e. an 
increase of "only" 4.5 per cent in ten years (over 20 per 
cent in current francs or euro), whereas in 1992 CFA 
francs, the farm-gate price for a kilogram of beans 
increased by 14.3 per cent, from 200 to almost 229 CFA 
francs (Figure 16). However, several points should be 
remembered: (1) this latter price remains lower than that 
prevailing in 1998, just before liberalization (280 in 1992 
CFA francs) and in reality compensates for the record 
loss suffered in 2000 (174 in 1992 CFA francs), (2) 
although Ivorian cocoa producers gained slightly more 
purchasing power in their country in 2001 compared to 
1992, they did not recover the loss after the "cocoa war" 
in 1989/90, when their income was halved (Figure 17), 
and (3) if the farm-gate price is deflated by the French 
consumer price index rather than the Ivorian index, which 
is a way of measuring the gains or losses in cocoa 
producer purchasing power on the international market 
(terms of trade), a drop of 10 per cent is unfortunately 
seen between 1992 and 2001.  
 
                                                 
380
 In US dollars, the trend of the curve is obviously very different, due 
to larger annual exchange variations with the ECU (and the French 
franc), and especially its virtually constant increase over the study 
period. 
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3. Another way of assessing operator losses or gains over 
the study period is to adjust the prices of all foodstuffs in 
1992 to 100, and total up to 2001 the respective price 
decreases or increases compared to this base, after 
deducting for each iteration (year) the cost of cocoa-
based ingredients used in the foodstuff in question381. It 
can then be seen that since 1992, when international 
bean prices were particularly depressed (Figure 10), 
farm-gate beans accumulated a price "disadvantage" of –
22 up to 2001, entailing just as many "advantages" for 
imported beans which totalled a gain of +181. In the 
same way, this price advantage for imported beans 
becomes a disadvantage for products made with them. 
However, with the price rise seen for the latter, this 
disadvantage is more or less well absorbed: loss of –19 in 
10 years for liquor, –88 for butter and powder (combined), 
and –71 for couverture. At the end of the chain, the 
chocolate tablet accumulates an advantage of +114. The 
main gains therefore appear between the farm-gate bean 
and the imported bean, precisely where grinders have 
concentrated their efforts over recent years. If grinders 
indeed prove to have benefited most from this advantage 
(the strategy of capturing it for oneself is logical in any 
case), their downstream disadvantages (liquor, butter, 
powder, or even couverture manufacture) would be 
considerably reduced, leaving cocoa producers with the 
                                                 
381
 Calculation of a sort of "advantages", by referring to the surplus 
account method, with the following differences: (1) the values here 
are not deflated by a general price index, since it is ambiguous to 
choose one when working with products manufactured in different 
countries, (2) it is assumed here that each operator produces the 
same quantities each year, with the same quantities of inputs (no 
productivity gain), and (3) the inputs here are limited to cocoa-based 
products, though many others ought to be included (labour, etc.). This 
therefore amounts here, as in the example of couverture, in deducting 
from the price of the latter the prices for liquor and butter, multiplied 
respectively by the coefficients of composition adopted in this study 
(0.50 for liquor and 0.11 for butter, as couverture is assumed to 
contain 61 per cent cocoa). 
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weakest bill. The line-up in decreasing order of gains 
through simple price variations over the decade would 
then be as follows: distributors and chocolate makers, 
then grinders, and lastly, with losses, agricultural 
producers: a further illustration – if any were needed 
here – of the ability of some distributors and industrialists 
in the North to impose on the South what strongly 
resembles a market power, a power which liberalization –
 all in all – merely seems to have exacerbated. 
 
 298 
Figure 14: Value derived from one tonne of beans in current euro 
(1992–2001) 
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Figure 15: Value derived from one kilogram of beans in current 
French francs (1992–2001) 
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Figure 16: Kilogram of beans and chocolate at constant prices 
(1992–2001) 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
CF
A 
fra
nc
s 
pe
r k
ilo
gr
am
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Fr
en
ch
 fr
an
cs
 p
er
 k
ilo
gr
am
Farm-gate bean, in current CFAF
Farm-gate bean, in 1992 CFAF
Tablet, exclusive of VAT, in 1992 FF
 
 
Figure 17: Kilogram of beans at current and constant prices 
(1967–2001) 
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5. Call for a less restrictive competition policy 
 
5.1. Strengthened policies in the North 
 
Since the mid-1990s, in both the USA and Europe 
(EU), the public authorities have seemed to be increasingly 
called upon, and themselves determined, to intervene in 
markets that have been marked since the 1980s by a vast 
liberalization movement, which has also benefited the 
dominance of certain firms beyond what is tolerable. 
 
In this way, French competition policy has been 
subject to three new laws in five years (Galland and Raffarin in 
1996, New Economic Regulations in 2001), laws followed or 
preceded by major reports, such as the one by the Conseil 
d’Analyse Economique (Rey et Tirole, 2000), and by more or 
less paralysing street demonstrations, such as that by fruit and 
vegetable producers (summer of 1999 and end of 2002) 
protesting against the “back margins” (“marges arrières” in 
French)382 practised by major distributors. The Conseil de la 
Concurrence (1986) – an independent body of the Direction 
Générale de la Concurrence, de la Consommation et de la 
Répression des fraudes (DGCCRF) of the Ministry of 
Economics, Finance and Industry, a French specificity – is 
stepping up its investigations and sanctions (28 issued in 2000 
amounting to a billion francs). The same applies for the EU 
Directorate General for Competition. For example, the latter 
imposed a record fine of 855.23 million euro on a cartel 
established at the end of the 1980s between 13 vitamin C 
                                                 
382
 This practice consists in billing the supplier for the service that the 
major distributors consider they are providing by selling the product in 
question (and ensuring a more or less good position) on their 
shelves. Legally, the product is therefore not sold below its invoicing 
price (which would be a blatant case of dumping, which is strictly 
forbidden and severely punished), whereas in practice, it amounts to 
that, reducing the supplier's margin so much that he may finally not 
even cover his production costs. 
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producers: their European turnover fell at the time from 250 
million euro in 1995 to 120 million in 1998 (Pénard, 2003), 
which provides an idea of the profits that can be derived today 
from dominating certain markets. 
 
The Antitrust Division of the US Justice Department 
has also been stepping up its operations since the 1990s, 
apparently even more so than in Europe. Total fines are 
mounting up heavily (over US$2 billion between 1997 and 
2001 as opposed to 27 million between 1986 and 1996), as 
are prison terms: up to a maximum of 36 months as opposed 
to 30 days previously, to which the Vice-President of ADM was 
effectively condemned for having supported a lysine cartel 
alongside Ajinomoto (Connor, 2003). The investigating powers 
of the FBI have also been extended (particularly to the homes 
of suspected managers), along with the clemency 
programmes which, as in Europe, allow for fine reductions – or 
even total exemption from punishment – for companies 
denouncing a cartel and providing evidence of practices that 
are now clearly defined as criminal383. 
 
This recent intensification of American and European 
competition policies share two other characteristics: they 
above all affect the agrifood sector (vitamins, lysine, citric acid, 
white sugar, etc.), and are primarily applied against foreign 
firms or managers. They also, and perhaps especially, share 
the same doubts about their abilities: (1) the probability of 
uncovering illicit collusion apparently still does not exceed 30 
per cent today in the USA (10 per cent in Europe?); (2) the 
increase in penalties does not always prevent repeat offenders 
(e.g. ADM); (3) the procedures are still having great difficulty 
also ensuring compensation for victims (under 50 per cent are 
apparently compensated in the USA); (4) legal action is 
possible and may be won by the accused; (5) for lack of 
agreements or coordination, firms or managers cannot be tried 
                                                 
383
 It should be noted here that in the USA an individual can call in the 
competition authorities directly, whereas in France, this can only be 
done via a consumer association. 
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in several countries. In other words, illicit agreements or 
collusion between firms can still bring rich rewards, and 
therefore still be practised: for the lysine cartel that was 
dismantled, the total cost of its formation and management 
was estimated at under US$15.7 million , i.e. 4 to 8 per cent of 
its assumed profits (Connor, 2003). 
 
5.2. A theory in practice 
 
Both practice and theory show that a firm in a more or 
less established monopoly position will always tend to propose 
goods at a price above that of a competitive firm, the latter 
consequently appearing to be much better for the collective 
well-being (except for the so-called "natural" monopoly)384. 
This led to the voting of an antitrust law in the USA at the end 
of the 19th century (1890 Sherman Act) to denounce and fight 
monopolies or any agreement between firms on prices or 
quantities. This type of competition policy (opposition to 
certain mergers, dismantling of large companies, regulation in 
company organization, etc.) seems today to have at last taken 
precedence over those introduced with relative difficulty in the 
last century: (1) price administration by making the monopoly 
sell at the marginal cost (sale cost of a company in a 
theoretical situation of pure and perfect competition), with all 
the problems involved in assessing such a cost in the absence 
of any competition; (2) nationalization, i.e. conversion of a 
private monopoly into a State monopoly with civil servants less 
likely to incite a reduction in production costs than private 
shareholders; (3) total non-intervention, with the dubious 
argument that, all in all, market deficiencies are less serious 
than those introduced by State intervention. 
 
                                                 
384
 In the case of a natural monopoly, production costs are such –
 continual economies of scale – that a single producer proves in the 
end to be more efficient than a multitude (example often quoted: rail 
transport). 
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The dismantling of cartels or other forms of collusion 
on prices and quantities therefore seems today to be the 
preferred approach taken by national authorities. The success 
of such an approach – in fact less contested than others – 
nonetheless remains restricted by some application difficulties, 
apart from that linked to the financial and human resources 
required for its effective implementation. The first of these 
difficulties is to delimit in advance the "relevant market" on 
which the behavioural analysis will be carried out, both 
geographically (regional, national, world scale, etc.), and in 
terms of products (Glais, 2003). For example, should butter 
and margarine be considered as two separate markets? Is it 
on the cola market or the vast drinks market that the case of 
Coca Cola should be studied? Dividing economic activity up 
into "industries" as proposed by Marshall (1920), and by 
reference to a product that is representative of a generic need, 
is unfortunately not particularly helpful, insofar as such 
"economic markets" (geographical zone and range of products 
within which prices are linked to each other by the arbitrage 
phenomenon) perfectly tolerate the exertion of a market power 
(with arbitrage enabling at most a reduction in that power). Yet 
it is precisely areas likely to be affected by a market power 
that competition policies do not tolerate. In order to identify 
these particular areas, new market concepts have developed 
on either side of the Atlantic.  
 
In the USA, they have relied since 1982 (and even 
more so since 1992) on the hypothetical monopolist test: over 
a given geographical zone (a zone which should therefore be 
defined more or less arbitrarily), the market corresponds to the 
product(s) such that a (present or future) monopolist of the 
product(s) would probably proceed with a price increase, 
maybe slightly, but significantly (5 to 10 per cent) and not 
transitionally (at least 1 year). This econometric test clearly 
means possessing or gathering statistics to feed it, a major 
constraint aside from the fact that it can be carried out with 
data from a market already subjected to a power, which 
consequently reduces its relevance considerably. The 
drawbacks of this highly quantitative American method have 
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led the European authorities to prefer a more qualitative 
approach to delimit reference markets. This approach discards 
potential competition from the outset, since it attempts to 
evaluate at a given moment the possibilities (or not) of 
substituting a product or service, from the demand side, but 
sometimes also from the supply side (particularly where 
distribution is involved). In this framework, it delimits the 
relevant zone by combining various pieces of information, 
derived in this case from four analyses (alongside the 
conventional analysis of market shares) (Glais, 2003): (1) 
analysis of functional inter-exchangeability, by comparing the 
physical, technical or even taste characteristics of products; 
(2) analysis of reactive inter-exchangeability, to assess – after 
consumer surveys and/or econometric tests – to what extent 
variation in the price of one product might influence that of 
another; (3) analysis of "natural" barriers to substitution, in 
other words of very high investments and/or transaction costs 
that the activity could entail; (4) analysis of geographical 
delimitations, be it in terms of ingredient regulation, production 
quotas, public markets, the bulk-related or unstockable nature 
of the product, substantial price differences, special 
distribution methods, etc. In short, in the USA as in Europe, 
delimitation of the relevant markets is far from being a simple 
matter, and leads in all cases to stormy discussions despite 
the increasing sophistication of the methods intended to limit 
disagreements on this subject. 
 
Moreover, the delimitation of relevant markets is only 
the first stage in a process intended to prevent and repress 
collusion between firms and/or domination abuse. Yet this 
objective, which is as simple as it is ambitious, is bound to 
raise other real difficulties. It first of all raises the question of at 
which stage collusion becomes reprehensible. Between the 
academic case of "pure tacit collusion" (acting in consort 
without any contact) and the severely punished "explicit 
collusion" (cartel), many types of behaviour can be 
condemned (at least suspected) up to the exchange of 
information, or price displaying! Although, on this last point, it 
has been shown that certain temporary price wars could be a 
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way of agreeing on a market share (as in American air 
transportation), competition policies do not extend to such 
cases. They settle for more formal, more "explicit" 
agreements, the problem then being to gather the evidence. 
But in fact that did not turn out to be difficult for the French 
Label Rouge (Red Label), an example that clearly illustrates 
what competition laws can condemn today. Despite its 
recognition by French and European decrees, this Label 
Rouge in the poultry sector was in fact challenged for the four 
following reasons (Raynaud et Valceschini, 2003): (1) quantity 
restrictions through entry regulations/barriers; (2) price 
agreement from abattoirs to distributors; (3) non-competition 
clause between abattoirs; (4) cumulative functions as far as 
certification is concerned. As these practices did not arise from 
the application of some legislation or regulation, an attempt 
was then made to show that they contributed to economic 
progress (production of better quality goods): the competition 
authorities conceded that, but were not convinced by the 
simulation intended to demonstrate at the same time that the 
free market could not lead to the same result. This example 
illustrates a given reasoning. It also strengthens a series of 
questions on current competition policies. 
 
5.3. Pending questions for action 
 
The previous sections primarily set out to show, first of 
all that the public authorities in Europe and the USA were 
concerned about the increasing power of certain firms on the 
markets, and secondly that they were mobilizing their 
competition policy to meet the problems raised by such 
situations, and lastly that those policies fell into a particular 
conceptual framework which, apart from a few application 
difficulties, also raised a few questions. This final section 
endeavours to elucidate some of those questions in order to 
outline the challenges of a true international competition 
policy. 
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5.3.1. What competition policy for developing 
countries? 
 
The international organizations that already 
successfully pushed for market deregulation and liberalization 
20 years ago (World Bank, IMF, OECD, etc.) clearly neglected 
to simultaneously promote and strengthen an international 
competition policy. At the turn of the twenty-first century, the 
fight against the abuse of economic dominance still, in fact, 
falls to States and their own resources, which gives rise to at 
least three more or less associated problems: (1) the risk of 
national policies turning a blind eye to their own firms: do not 
Americans or Europeans today condemn above all those firms 
or managers not of their own nationality (over 80 per cent of 
cases in the agrifood sector according to Connor (2003))? (2) 
the risk of only considering and dealing with complaints from 
residents: are not small farmer demonstrations against major 
French distributors more efficient when they take place in 
France rather than in some supplier country in West Africa? 
(3) the risk of restricting the competition policy to a few 
countries that possess not only the means to implement it 
(financial, human and statistical resources for investigating 
markets and groups of global dimensions), but also the power: 
what clout does the threat of being condemned, boycotted, or 
imprisoned by a small developing country hold when 
compared to Europe or the USA, major economic and political 
powers which themselves already have trouble being 
dissuasive enough in the matter? 
 
This situation is corroborated by the lack of a true 
competition policy within the WTO (Boy, 2003): the WTO is in 
fact limited to promoting the free circulation of goods (the most 
summary way of promoting competition), and in no way to 
preventing and fighting abuses of position that the 
strengthening of free trade is very likely to amplify and 
encourage. Consequently, in the name of competition, it is 
perhaps towards the opposite that the WTO is working in the 
long term. Moreover, in 1994, with the signing of the 
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Marrakech agreements, this international governance was 
extended to agriculture, a sector that had until then been 
exempted from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), due to specificities that we can appreciate today were 
not all assumed. Indeed, the expansion of GATT to agriculture 
meant, among other things: (1) resorting to scientific proof to 
justify the introduction of barriers or regulations in a market, 
which leads to major problems and disagreements when the 
scientific community is unable to demonstrate that certain 
substances such as animal growth hormones or MGOs are not 
harmful for human health or ecosystems; (2) taking an 
approach by product (and brands), and not by manufacturing 
process, whereas it is through the latter that "organic" or "fair-
trade" products are differentiated and appreciated, as well as 
some other products that integrate certain qualities that are 
not restricted to those (phytosanitary) defined by the Codex 
Alimentarius. 
 
The WTO does not therefore offer developing 
countries the means and the powers attached to the national 
competition policies of industrialized nations385, whilst the 
Marrakech Agreements as well as structural adjustment plans 
require them to free the sector on which their economy still 
largely depends. This liberalization of the agricultural 
economies of the South is all the more questionable in that the 
commodities involved would precisely be exported to markets 
where collusion is structurally encouraged or facilitated. As 
explained by Connor (2003), and more so by Pénard (2003), 
certain structural factors and certain company practices are in 
fact propitious to collusion, either by facilitating a convergence 
of views, or by reducing incentives to diverge from an 
agreement. In both cases, there happens to be aspects 
                                                 
385
 To our knowledge, since the liberalization of the cocoa commodity 
chain in 1999 in the Côte d'Ivoire, only one measure has been taken 
to limit abuses of dominant position: for the 2001/02 season, ARCC 
fixed a tonnage ceiling for all cocoa exporters, a ceiling that was 
raised from 42,000 to 50,000 tonnes in mid-December 2002 (BNETD, 
2002:7). 
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inherent to the Ivorian cocoa bean export market: (1) 
uniformity of goods (only one export quality), firm symmetry 
(an oligopsony of multinationals), concentration of supplies 
(three-quarters of cocoa supplies are provided by a few 
African countries), entry barriers (for bean grinding and 
especially the manufacture of highly diverse chocolate-based 
products), information exchanges (professions much better 
organized downstream than upstream); (2) regularity and 
transparency of transactions (via the London and New York 
futures markets), dispersion, regularity and growth of demand 
(current characteristics of the world market for chocolate-
based products), multi-market contacts (multinationals trading 
in or manufacturing other products). The "collective dominant 
position" concept used by European competition authorities in 
the case of the Nestlé–Perrier merger shows that those 
authorities are well aware that certain market structures are 
apt to favour collusion (duopoly, dispersed demand, weak 
technical progress, high entry barriers). But it can be doubted 
that they will one day use the same concept to demonstrate 
that a similar market structure would affect Ivorian cocoa 
smallholders, firstly because the scope of application of Article 
82386 that inspires it (UE, 2002) is limited to the markets of EU 
Member States. 
 
                                                 
386
 Article 82: "Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant 
position within the common market or in a substantial part of it shall 
be prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so far as it 
may affect trade between Member States. Such abuse may, in 
particular, consist in: a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase 
or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions; b) limiting 
production, markets, or technical development to the prejudice of 
consumers; c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent 
transactions with other trading partners, thereby placing them at a 
competitive disadvantage; d) making the conclusion of contracts 
subject to acceptance by the other parties of supplementary 
obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, 
have no connection with the subject of such contracts". 
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5.3.2. What policy against oligopsony powers? 
 
More and more agricultural producers are currently 
being held by a few major firms in a pincer movement (Marette 
et Raynaud, 2003), with the major world seed and 
agrochemical suppliers upstream (AstraZeneca/Norvatis, 
Bayer-Aventis, Monsanto, etc.) and, downstream, the 
emergence of major distributors operating over vast consumer 
zones, such as the French Carrefour or American Wal-Mart 
(the world's leading company in terms of turnover for 2001 
according to Fortune magazine). In both cases, competition 
policies – at least in Europe and the USA – are not failing to 
monitor the phenomenon, which is amplified in the distribution 
field by purchasing platforms set up by the major distributors 
to ensure collective supplies. However, this last point has not 
received all the attention it deserves, insofar as – more 
generally and in slightly overstating things – the aim of such 
checking of concentrations is to protect consumers from 
market powers, and not producers from purchasing powers. 
Yet, as already clearly pointed out in the report by the Conseil 
d’Analyse Economique (Rey et Tirole, 2000), producers also 
need to be protected, notably in cases where they are led to 
make specific investments387 which they would ultimately be 
unable to amortize if distributors subsequently imposed 
inadequate prices on them388 (not to mention other good 
reasons for specially protecting agricultural producers, notably 
                                                 
387
 Like setting up a cocoa plantation. 
388
 To solve this problem, the solution would then consist, according 
to the authors, in rebalancing contracts, and stepping up sanctions in 
cases of violation of the commitments. This is perfectly realistic for 
the particular case of French fruit and vegetable producers, but barely 
so for the more universal case we are examining: agricultural 
producers far from major distributors, not only vertically (numerous 
processes and numerous middlemen before the end product) but also 
horizontally (production in developing countries of foodstuffs 
consumed in industrialized countries), i.e. a case in which the 
possibilities of contractualization, and applying sanctions are severely 
limited, or even ruled out. 
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those that are currently firing the lively debate on the 
multifunctionality of agriculture). 
 
Why such pronounced concern for consumers? 
Probably because competition policies are based on an 
economic theory presenting the same bias. As indeed 
suggested by Alain and Chambolle (2003), traditional 
microeconomic analysis tends to neglect upstream oligopsony 
powers since it automatically models producer-distributor 
relations by a principal-agent relation in which the dominant 
role is assigned to the producer (i.e. power to impose his 
conditions on distributors). Likewise, since Spengler revealed 
the inefficiency of double marginalization in 1950, that same 
literature has focused on the effect of vertical contracts on 
efficiency and total profit of vertical structures, but virtually 
ignores its impact on profit sharing within those structures. Yet 
an imbalance in profit sharing can be harmful to long-term 
social well-being, by threatening the survival of certain 
producers and reducing the variety or quality of products 
available to consumers. However, as early as 1950, the 
negotiation model proposed by Nash (one of the fathers of the 
games theory after J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern) was 
a first step towards endogenization in models of the balances 
of power, and of the negotiating powers, between firms. But it 
was not until 1991 that Shaffer, for example, showed – by 
reversing the conventional within-brand competition model – 
that when producers are in perfect competition with an 
oligopoly of distributors, profit sharing between firms favours 
upstream powers. Some other recent work seems to 
corroborate theoretically what we observe empirically in the 
cocoa-chocolate commodity chain. But as Allain and 
Chambolle (2003) concluded, whilst several questions omitted 
from the vertical analysis are at last starting to be explored 
today, the work still required remains considerable. 
 
Once this work has made some headway, competition 
policies may then perhaps speak more of producers than 
consumers, of monopsonies and oligopsonies than 
monopolies and oligopolies, of a "hypothetical monopsonist 
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test" rather than a "hypothetical monopolist test". Like the 
standard economic theory (neo-classical), they may also 
thereby realize in future that productive efficiency does not 
necessarily rhyme with allocative efficiency and innovative 
efficiency, and that the latter two types of efficiency also have 
good reasons to be encouraged, in a mindset that does not, 
moreover, almost systematically condemn every form of 
agreement on prices or quantities. 
 
5.3.3. What coordination policies? 
 
The founding principle of European competition policy 
is set down in Article 81 of the Treaty establishing the 
Community (UE, 2002): "The following shall be prohibited as 
incompatible with the common market: all agreements 
between undertakings, decisions by associations of 
undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade 
between Member States and which have as their object or 
effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition 
within the common market, and in particular those which: (a) 
directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other 
trading conditions; (b) limit or control production, markets, 
technical development, or investment; (c) share markets or 
sources of supply; (d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent 
transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at 
a competitive disadvantage; (e) make the conclusion of 
contracts subject to the acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according 
to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of 
such contracts". Paragraph 3 of the same article allows for 
exceptions from this general principle389, but the example of 
                                                 
389
 "The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared 
inapplicable in the case of: any agreement or category of agreements 
between undertakings, any decision of category of decisions by 
associations of undertakings, and any concerted practice or category 
of concerted practices, which contributes to improving the production 
or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic 
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the Label Rouge shows how difficult it remains for agricultural 
producer organizations to benefit from mitigating 
circumstances, even when it involves improving the quality of 
a product, or highlighting and guaranteeing a collective know-
how for consumers. In fact, the reinforced application of this 
principle has clearly led to a retreat in the French and 
European models of stakeholder coordination (cooperatives, 
protected designations of origin, labels, etc.) which, it is true, 
can also smack of neo-corporatism.  
 
Yet the theoretical bases of this great principle are not 
as infallible as they might seem. In some clearly identified 
cases, it can firstly be shown, as did Gitaut-Hérault et al. 
(2003) who were particularly interested in judgments by the 
European Court of Justice against inter-professional 
committees in the wine-growing sector (cognac, natural sweet 
wines, etc.), that a group of producers or an inter-professional 
body can adopt a restrictive policy of supplies which is 
optimum for consumers, and which therefore does not 
systematically lead to a slowdown in productivity gains and 
innovation. In other words, such a restrictive policy can prove 
to be optimum from a collective viewpoint, not only in terms of 
quality as shown by Spence in 1975, but also in terms of 
quantity and market prices. This result, which is novel when 
compared to those of the standard monopoly theory, arises 
notably when there exists an inverse relation between quantity 
and quality, production hazards, and consumers expressing 
an explicit preference for quality. Lastly, according to the same 
authors, the more an increase in supplies leads to an objective 
deterioration in quality, the easier it is to justify a decentralized 
supply regulation policy. It would also be worth reflecting upon 
these points in the cocoa-chocolate commodity chain. 
                                                                                              
progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting 
benefit, and which does not: (a) impose on the undertakings 
concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the attainment 
of these objectives; (b) afford such undertakings the possibility of 
eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the products 
in question." 
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A second criticism of the principle, which is more 
fundamental but also less acceptable in the standard theory 
since it undermines its foundations, is based on the major 
question taken up today by so-called "neo-institutional" 
economics: are economic activities (and should they be) solely 
coordinated by the market or within integrated undertakings? 
Are there not, between these two modes of coordinating 
transactions (the company on one side, the market on the 
other), some "hybrid" forms (such as producer groups, etc.)390 
that may sometimes prove to be at least as efficient in 
minimizing costs (and, at the same time, countering 
oligopsony powers)? As Ménard (2003) points out, for the last 
15 years or more (1985) there has existed a model for carrying 
out such an analysis, that proposed by Williamson, who 
attests to the existence of relatively high transaction costs 
(TC) (in any case not zero) depending on the uncertainty (U) 
surrounding a transaction, the frequency (F) of the latter, and 
the degree of specificity (S) of the investments (assets) it 
requires: TC = f(U,F,S). By only considering the last factor 
(specificity of assets) Ménard was led to explain that when 
competition authorities forbid a hybrid arrangement (
                                                 
390
 There is a wide diversity of arrangements involving agreements 
between legally autonomous units which, on the one hand, develop 
transaction networks coordinated by mechanisms other than the price 
system and, on the other hand, pool a set of resources without 
automatically combining their ownership rights, notably networks of 
subcontractors/enterprises/franchises, collective brands, 
partnerships, as practised for example by major Anglo-Saxon 
chambers of lawyers. This diversity leads Ronald Coarse to say that 
the hybrid form is no doubt the dominant form of transaction 
organization in market economies (Ménard, 2003). 
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Figure 18), or impose restrictions on the parties to such an 
arrangement (Figure 19 – move from k2 to k2’), in both cases a 
zone is given up (between k1 and k2) where the hybrid form 
proved to be more effective than the firm or the market in 
reducing transaction costs. In other words, public intervention 
here leads to an increase in transaction costs, which, as a last 
resort, is passed on to consumers. It can therefore be 
wondered why competition policies distinguish so much391 
between all types of organization that cannot be assimilated 
into a single enterprise (such as producers or inter-
professional groups) and those that can be (such as 
multinationals), particularly as they do it whilst denouncing the 
coordination methods actually used by both. Entry selection, 
internal disciplinary rules, quantitative restrictions and internal 
resale price controls effectively structure the organization of 
production just as much within multinationals. That does not 
mean that they and their subsidiaries are accused of 
"collusion", or of "concerted practices in contradiction of Article 
85 of the Treaty of Rome". Lastly, on the pretext of 
encouraging competition, are not current policies under that 
name doing the opposite by discouraging any organizational 
form likely to compete with integrated enterprises? In any 
event, as can be seen, the boundaries between monopoly and 
the exploitation of synergy to reduce costs – an old economic 
science issue – are far from being clarified, which is not 
without its consequences for small agricultural enterprises, 
and for competition policies which are now required much 
more than in the past to structure their environment.  
 
 
                                                 
391
 In reality, competition policies are implemented with greater 
flexibility than transpired here. Notably, they remain subjected to the 
major European economic development policies (like Common 
Market Organizations), or to the modulations suggested relatively 
firmly by governments (case of the Red Label). 
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Figure 18: Case where the hybrid organizational form is not 
allowed 
Source: Ménard, 2003. 
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Figure 19: Case where the hybrid organizational form is 
rendered more expensive 
Source: Ménard, 2003. 
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5.3.4. What price stabilization policy? 
 
Lastly, it is not possible to speak of competition 
policies without touching upon the important question of 
agricultural price stabilization. Moreover, the report by the 
Conseil d’Analyse Economique (Rey et Tirole, 2000) refers to 
it from the first page of its introduction, since it often turns up 
in discussions, notably on fruits and vegetables. In the answer 
provided, the authors first of all emphasize that the price 
slump in a period of high production is inherent in the very 
weak price elasticity of supplies of these products; they then 
feel that the most appropriate solution is to develop futures 
markets or income-insurance, at least for products with a 
sufficiently liquid and established market. This proposal is 
disappointing in more than one way. Firstly, it hardly bursts 
with originality, since the World Bank, in line with lessons from 
welfare economics, has been promoting for some time the 
provision and use of such instruments in developing countries, 
to replace the stabilization funds, boards and other 
agreements often dismantled under its authority in the 1980s 
and 1990s (Section 3). It then turns out, as we have shown, 
that a commodity such as cocoa is as much marked by the 
existence of futures and options markets for several decades, 
as by the great insecurity of its producers' incomes. Of course, 
the champions of such tools can retort that cocoa producers 
do not really have direct access to those markets, and that 
they cannot therefore benefit from them. Agricultural 
producers should therefore be trained and helped to use these 
risk management tools. But is that truly realistic, particularly for 
developing countries? Or else, at what cost collectively and for 
each farmer? Lastly, and above all, how effective are such 
tools? As Daviron and Voituriez (2003) argue, their efficiency 
is, in reality, far from having been demonstrated by the 
economists, thereby placing an even greater burden of 
reflection and intervention on the shoulders of policies – 
particularly competition policies. 
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Daviron and Voituriez start their demonstration with 
several observations: (1) the post-war Keynesian or "self-
centred" development model, which subjugated foreign trade 
to domestic stability objectives, has been succeeded by an 
export-driven growth model; (2) in this move towards trade 
liberalization, collective risk management through stabilization 
has given way to individual and private management through 
financial instruments such as futures or options contracts; (3) 
the crisis seen since 1998 on the cocoa, coffee, rubber, wheat, 
and soybean markets – which are theoretically complete since 
they have acquired insurance institutions and risk transfer 
financial markets – shows, however, that the efficiency of such 
instruments is arguable in the case of an extended price 
depression: the market price may drop below the marginal 
cost of the most efficient producer, whilst no private 
mechanism guarantees remuneration equivalent to the cost of 
production, unless in return for payment of a premium at too 
prohibitive a cost; (4) the allocation problem arising from 
persistent instability on the markets is combined with that of an 
unequal distribution of its costs, which are primarily borne by 
developing countries. 
 
This leads the authors to present a typology revealing 
how economic science has evolved in the possible 
representations of instability, and to what difference in price-
risk management instruments each representation leads: (1) 
cyclical instability around a deterministic trend (upward or 
downward linear trend) calls for public stabilization measures; 
(2) stochastic instability (of the "random walk" type), on the 
other hand, calls for private use of financial tools and opening 
up of the markets; (3) chaotic instability (non-Gaussian 
randomness generated by the market itself and its 
imperfections), however, eludes the latter measures, since 
they are likely to generate more instability than they resolve. 
Thus, depending on the type of instability, economic science 
can demonstrate that a risk management instrument is 
required or should be ruled out. This is an undeniable 
contribution, but which is unfortunately tainted by a major 
limitation, which no one has seemed to care about over recent 
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decades: between deterministic and stochastic trends, 
between randomness and chaos, agricultural price series do 
not reveal any marked particularities. Uncertainty and 
controversy remain, at least between economists since, as 
quite rightly emphasized by Daviron and Voituriez, political 
debates on the subject are prominent through their absence, 
whilst technically they are required and demanded.  
 
One explanation for this paradox probably lies in the 
almost unanimous denunciation today of the cost of public 
intervention on agricultural markets over the last 30 years, 
which is all the more unanimous in that public stabilization 
favoured assurance over incentive (competition), whilst since 
then incentive (competition) has become the cooperation 
yardstick. This said, alternative risk management systems 
suffer from a symmetrical defect: they favour incentive over 
assurance. Yet, as Daviron and Voituriez concluded, since 
incentive is ineffective in the absence of assurance, and 
assurance is not cooperative in the absence of incentive, the 
major two types of instruments, public and financial, rather 
than being opposed and considered as substitutable, seem in 
reality to be complementary. Which, for our part, enables us to 
conclude with a question: when will there be an international 
competition policy which, in order to preserve incentive, also 
takes assurance into consideration, particularly for 
smallholders in the South, since today they bear most of the 
costs of market instability? 
 
6. Concluding summary 
 
In an African country such as the Côte d'Ivoire, cocoa 
cultivation employs over 700,000 farmers, provides a 
livelihood for 6 million people (40 per cent of the population) 
and counts just as much in State earnings (40 per cent of 
budgetary income), the balance of payments (50 per cent of 
exports) and national wealth creation (15 per cent GDP). On 
the world market, it supplies over 40 per cent of world demand 
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for beans. But for how many years will that continue? Indeed 
for some time now, cocoa cultivation has been in crisis, 
whereas demand for chocolate has continued to grow 
worldwide. Chronic price instability is now combined with 
increasing competition from south-east Asia, the difficulty of 
ensuring continued production by farming on newly cleared 
forest, the growing threat of diseases and resistance to 
pesticides, quite rough liberalization of the commodity chain in 
1999, a European directive authorizing the use of cheap 
substitutes for cocoa butter in chocolate, an American drive to 
certify cocoa and chocolate "free of child slavery", dubious 
events on the London and New York futures markets and, 
lastly, on 19 September 2002, the outbreak of a civil war 
dividing the country in two either side of what still remains the 
world's largest cocoa reserve. 
 
This crisis in African cocoa cultivation led us to 
examine price formation and value sharing throughout the 
commodity chain, from Ivorian farm-gate bean to tablet of dark 
chocolate sold in a French supermarket. The main lessons we 
learned from this exercise are as follows: 
 
(1) In 1989/90, the "cocoa war" halved the price of a kilogram 
of cocoa beans paid to Ivorian producers. Since then, up to 
2001, that price barely improved in constant CFA francs; the 
1999 liberalization, rather than helping smallholders to regain 
their purchasing power, seems more to have destabilized their 
working environment (price, credit, etc.). 
(2) The liberalization of Ivorian cocoa seems to be more 
advantageous to middlemen who transport harvests to export 
factories, all the more so since their rivals, the cooperatives, 
now collect fewer beans as they are unable to pay producers 
for their crop immediately (their access to bank credit was 
divided by 25 at the time of liberalization). 
(3) International grinders (ADM, Barry-Calbault, Cargill…), 
making semi-finished products (cocoa liquor, butter and 
powder, or even couverture), are, for their part, increasingly 
incorporating upstream activities (taking over or sidelining 
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Ivorian exporters, dealers and middlemen) to secure their 
supplies and counter the shrinkage of their unit margins. 
(4) On the French market, chocolate makers (Mars, Nestlé…) 
and/or distributors (Carrefour and others) are, on the other 
hand, gaining increasingly more from a tablet of chocolate: 
between 1992 and 2001, unlike the ingredients (bean, liquor, 
butter, couverture, sugar, etc.) its price rose steadily in current 
euro (+2.6 per cent per year on average, i.e. +1,550 euro per 
tonne in 10 years).  
(5) Finally, in 2001, over 70 per cent of the French tax-
inclusive price for a tablet of dark chocolate with 61 per cent 
cocoa went to chocolate makers and distributors (63 per cent 
in 1992), as opposed to less than 6 per cent to Ivorian 
producers (7 per cent in 1992), a share which is not even 
equal to the taxes levied throughout the commodity chain (8 
per cent in 2001), in the Côte d'Ivoire and, above all, in Europe 
(5.5 per cent VAT). 
 
These results, which are pioneering but obtained from 
data and a method that call for reactions and suggestions for 
improvement, lead us to believe that the world liberalization 
process has not only strengthened the concentration of firms 
downstream (confirmation of an oligopsony of multinationals 
engaged in fierce competition), but has also led to the exertion 
of a buying power upstream, particularly over farmers, since 
their dispersal is now total (dismantling of State regulating 
bodies, which in the past somehow united them, at least on a 
national scale). This market power (ability to impose prices) 
should in theory attract the attention of competition policies, 
since the harm it entails for the collective well-being is 
denounced by economic theory and in competition law. In fact, 
such policies are being reinforced in the USA and the 
European Union since the strengthening of planetary markets 
and trusts, notably in the agrifood sector. But, curiously, there 
is still no international body capable of correcting this market 
failure affecting Ivorian cocoa farmers, and more generally 
developing countries that do not have the resources to set up 
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their own competition policy, and more essentially to ensure 
that it is respected. Indeed, the WTO is limited to promoting 
just one very rudimentary form of competition (free circulation 
of goods), yet it is towards competition that it is supposed to 
work fully, and it is on competition that all its legitimacy is 
founded. 
 
From the decline in African cocoa cultivation, we have 
thus been led to promote the introduction of a true competition 
policy within the WTO: this is a vast undertaking, which is 
primarily political, and which will mean discussing and 
overcoming the substantial limitations of the arrangements 
currently in place in the USA and Europe, be it a matter of 
oligopsony powers, types of coordination, or the thorny 
question of agricultural price stabilization. 
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APPENDIX 1: DISTRIBUTION OF DARK CHOCOLATE TABLET VALUE (1992–2001) 
 
Current euro per ton: 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Production of Beans (the 
Côte d'Ivoire) 
441 451 422 369 370 420 536 477 347 475
Collection and Export of 
beans (to Amsterdam) 
333 277 459 541 520 590 579 551 441 364
- of which Collection (the 
Côte d'Ivoire) 
48 60 91 101 80 100
- of which Wholesalers & 
Exporters 
173 213 215 251 177 36
- of which Levies (the 
Côte d'Ivoire) 
298 317 273 198 184 228
Manufacturing of Liquor 
and Butter (Europe) 
364 454 452 440 409 295 353 358 367 347
Addition of Sugar 
(Europe) 
175 288 265 268 235 241 247 242 229 241
Manufacturing of 
Couverture (Europe) 
721 598 460 489 554 474 381 461 609 532
Moulding & Distribution 
of tablet (France) 
4041 4188 4232 4397 4599 4870 4976 5213 5502 5665
VAT (Europe) 334 344 346 358 368 379 389 402 412 419
Total (tablet price 
inclusive of tax): 
6408 6601 6637 6861 7055 7270 7461 7704 7907 8042
 323 
 
Percentages: 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Production of Beans (the 
Côte d'Ivoire) 
6.9% 6.8% 6.4% 5.4% 5.2% 5.8% 7.2% 6.2% 4.4% 5.9%
Collection and Export of 
beans (to Amsterdam) 
5.2% 4.2% 6.9% 7.9% 7.4% 8.1% 7.8% 7.2% 5.6% 4.5%
- of which Collection (the 
Côte d'Ivoire) 
0.7% 0.8% 1.2% 1.3% 1.0% 1.2%
- of which Wholesalers & 
Exporters 
2.5% 2.9% 2.9% 3.3% 2.2% 0.4%
- of which Levies (the 
Côte d'Ivoire) 
4.2% 4.4% 3.7% 2.6% 2.3% 2.8%
Manufacturing of Liquor 
and Butter (Europe) 
5.7% 6.9% 6.8% 6.4% 5.8% 4.1% 4.7% 4.6% 4.6% 4.3%
Addition of Sugar 
(Europe) 
2.7% 4.4% 4.0% 3.9% 3.3% 3.3% 3.3% 3.1% 2.9% 3.0%
Manufacturing of 
Couverture (Europe) 
11.3% 9.1% 6.9% 7.1% 7.8% 6.5% 5.1% 6.0% 7.7% 6.6%
Moulding & Distribution 
of tablet (France) 
63.1% 63.4% 63.8% 64.1% 65.2% 67.0% 66.7% 67.7% 69.6% 70.4%
VAT (Europe) 5.2% 5.2% 5.2% 5.2% 5.2% 5.2% 5.2% 5.2% 5.2% 5.2%
Total: 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
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PRODUCT STANDARDS, COMPETITIVENESS AND 
DEVELOPMENT 
Kamala Dawar392 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Some of the legal issues raised by international product 
standards on economic development are examined. The legal 
framework governing both mandatory and private standards is laid out, 
before focusing on the impact of private product standards on economic 
competitiveness and consumer welfare in developing countries. The 
developments within the context of the informal market are further 
analysed. It is concluded that there is a lack of coherent regulation for 
certain types of mandatory and voluntary standards at the international 
level. This legal vacuum may not be in the interests of either developing 
country’s export competitiveness or pro-poor development. Finally, 
possible policy options available to developing countries are proposed.  
 
2. Product standards, developing countries and 
competitiveness 
 
In most developing economies, local consumer expectations for 
product quality tend to be lower than international norms. Consequently, 
domestic regulations and standards are generally ‘softer’ than 
international ones and local producers develop production systems to 
meet these lower standards. In addition to this, it has been estimated 
that up 30 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) and 70 per cent of 
workers in the developing world are now informal393. In Sub-Saharan 
Africa, Latin America, Central Asia and Russia it is not unusual for 
informality to exceed 50 per cent of GDP. Within the informal sector 
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 332 
there is no obligation to conform to either domestic or international 
regulations and standards, or offer consumer protection394.  
 
It has been argued that one of the root causes of this type of 
informality is ill-designed and overly stringent product standards, which 
result in more harm than good395. In the case of Egypt, for example, the 
ongoing imposition of obsolete quality standards on food products, 
rather than minimum health regulation has resulted in more than 80 per 
cent of the food being produced informally by low-productivity small-
scale providers. Inappropriate and expensive business legislation 
discouraged small entrepreneurs from becoming formal, limiting the 
number of new entrants to the formal market particularly in high-
productivity export sectors396. These barriers to entry can compromise 
the level of competition in these markets. 
 
Where consumers are forced through lack of choice to use the 
informal market for basic goods, they are denied their rights to safety, 
information, redress and a healthy environment. Many consumer 
organizations urge people not to engage in practices that fuel the 
informal market as this will only expose them to further suffering. 
Furthermore, prices on the informal market have been at least 15 per 
cent more than the actual price on the formal market397. 
 
Clearly, a lack of capacity and resources will make it more 
difficult for small producers to upgrade their production processes to 
meet the stricter international standards. This situation can result in the 
bulk of the lucrative export market going to the few largest local firms 
and multinational companies who have the capacity to adjust their 
production systems to meet international requirements. The smaller and 
medium-sized firms (SMEs) and smallholdings can get caught in a cycle 
of underdevelopment, whereby the lack of valuable market access 
without conforming to international standards serves to prevent their 
future development. This may also exclude them from other pro-
development initiatives such as the US’s African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA) and the EU’s Everything But Arms (EBA). 
                                                 
394 Palmade (2005).  
395
 Ibid. 
396
 Ibid. 
397
 See for example, the Consumer Council of Zimbabwe: The Cost of Living Up 
Again. 6th February 2007. http://www.ccz.org.zw/news/details.php?news_id=10.  
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Despite these difficulties, it is clear that appropriately set 
standards can facilitate trade by reducing transaction costs and risks 
and generally improve intra-firm and industry linkages. Well-defined 
standards and regulations can also enhance social and consumer 
welfare. The difficulty is that while standards may be designed to 
promote trade and meet important social objectives that are not 
automatically addressed by the private sector, the motivations for using 
trade measures to regulate an imported product’s process and 
production methods (PPMs) also include competitiveness. Certain PPM 
requirements mask comparative advantage and are imposed for 
protectionist gain. This can undermine the success of any pro-poor 
trade and development objectives. In the context of widespread poverty, 
serious policy issues emerge if these measures lock small producers 
out of the more dynamic export markets, leaving them to supply the less 
lucrative local and informal markets. 
 
Alongside these government measures, private standards are 
now increasingly influencing the livelihoods of exporters and small and 
medium-sized firms and farmers398. The upsurge of private-sector 
standards and codes of practice being passed down the supply chain to 
suppliers in developing countries is generally promulgated by the major 
retailers in developed countries and not governments399. Although many 
private product standards are not protectionist in intent and may simply 
aim to respond to developed country consumer or producer concerns 
and preferences, they are not necessarily in the interests of developing 
country consumers and small producers. However, these are the very 
sectors of the economy least able to make their interests known at the 
international level. 
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 UNCTAD (2007).   
399
 See for example: EUREPGAP: Harmonized standards and procedures for 
global certification of Good Agricultural Practices (GAP) (i) developed by a 
coalition of retailers; (ii) now 275 members from farm to fork; (iii) business-to-
business (not communicated to consumers); (iv) independent audits and 
certification to measure compliance; (v) 35,000 producers certified in 62 
countries; (vi) Protocol includes Integrated Crop Management (ICM), Integrated 
Pest Control (IPC), Quality Management System (QMS), Hazard Analysis and 
Critical Control Points (HACCP), worker health, safety, welfare and 
environmental pollution and conservation management; (vii) Horticulture: 210 
Control Points (Food Safety, Environmental, Social). 
 334 
World Bank research400 indicates increased difficulties for 
horticultural exporters and associated smallholder outgrowers in East 
Africa to comply with EU regulations and private standards. For 
example, horticultural exports in East Africa grew at an average of 33 
per cent per annum, with over 99 per cent of horticultural export 
products in Uganda and over 70 per cent in Kenya coming from 
smallholder producers. This sector represents a major source of income 
and livelihood to smallholder farmers. Yet the poor infrastructure and 
services available to smallholder farmers reduces their ability to meet 
the private standards especially as regards traceability, and social and 
environmental requirements, which is compounded by lack of effective 
organization and coordination among the various stakeholders. 
 
Auditing systems also present challenges when different 
auditors have varied interpretations of the application of procedures. 
The St. Vincent submission to the World Trade Organization (WTO), for 
example, noted that in the Windward Islands the external auditors 
consider treated sleeves used in the banana industry as a pesticide and 
therefore require that these be stored under specific conditions. 
However, in the Dominican Republic sleeves are not considered to be 
pesticides and therefore there are no specific requirements for 
storage401. 
 
Another commonly cited example402 of the impacts on market 
access due to the rise in private standards is the Kenyan green bean 
sector. Here production for UK markets in the 1970s–80s was 
dominated by small-scale farmers delivering their goods to local markets 
to be purchased by exporters. However, as standards rose and 
supermarkets dominated the market for fresh produce, these big players 
demanded more reliable sources than the wholesale markets were able 
to offer. Consequently, there was an increase in direct purchases 
through integrators/exporters throughout the 1990s. On the regulatory 
side, the 1990 UK Foods Safety Act developed written procedures for 
large retailers to follow when making their specifications, along with on-
site audits. This led to new contractual standards and stability for 
suppliers, which in turn allowed them to make more long-term 
investments in production. However, those suppliers now unable to 
                                                 
400
 See Wilson and Abiola (2003), Czubala et al. (2007). 
401 
 World Trade Organization (2007). 
402 Fulponi (2007).  
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meet new retailer standards could no longer supply the market and were 
marginalized because only those that could remain tightly integrated 
with large exporters through contracts remain linked to the lead retailer 
trade403. 
 
Colombian exporters of cut flowers were also adversely affected 
by the introduction of the Flower Label Program (FLP) which is a 
private, voluntary eco-labelling programme led by German industry 
aimed at restricting the use of toxic chemicals and pesticides for the 
cultivation of such flowers. Between 1992 and 1996 Colombia’s flower 
exports increased and became Columbia’s third most important 
agricultural export, accounting for 10 per cent of the world market. 
Exports to Germany declined significantly after 1996, which was widely 
attributed to the increase in private standards within German markets. 
The Colombian government’s submission to the WTO contended that 
the FLP is based on arbitrary criteria, which are also applied in a 
discriminatory manner. Further, not only does the scheme impose 
significant compliance costs but it is de facto a mandatory measure 
since non-compliance results in ‘negative pressure’. 
 
India has also noted that compliance with the footwear 
industry’s voluntary labelling schemes has raised the costs of 
compliance for Indian footwear exporters by approximately 33 per cent 
of the export price. These costs are not confined to the developing 
world, According to an Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) study404, based on 55 firms in three sectors in the 
United States, Japan and the United Kingdom, the additional costs of 
complying with foreign standards can be as high as 10 per cent. The 
problem is that these private standards are becoming unavoidable for 
SMEs and smallholders, to the extent that some analysts argue that 
they are de facto mandatory for those producers who cannot afford to 
be locked out of these markets. For example, by participating in 
international standards and implementing acceptable international rules, 
Africa has been estimated to gain up to US$1 billion a year from higher 
exports of nuts, dried fruits, and other agricultural commodities. 
Although other studies suggest that the price premiums for goods 
complying with voluntary environmental requirements are not as 
                                                 
403 Ibid. 
404 
 See Andrew et al. (2003).  
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significant as previously thought405. While these may be voluntary 
standards set by retailers in response to developed country consumer 
preferences for particular conditions to be met along the production 
chain, the primary producer has little choice but to meet them. 
 
In the US, private, voluntary standard-setting and product-
certification activities are scrutinized under US antitrust law because it is 
acknowledged that when voluntary standards are set by groups of 
dominant firms, they may easily become industry standards that are 
misused against competing firms for whom such standards become a 
market requirement406. Because standard-setting and certification 
activities by private trade associations may also benefit competitive 
conditions in a marketplace, US courts have typically evaluated the pro-
competitive benefits of a product standard against any anti-competitive 
implications under what is termed the ‘rule of reason’ analysis407. 
However, such a mechanism is absent at the international level despite 
the evidence to suggest that these standards do affect the 
competitiveness and ultimately the growth of developing country 
markets. 
 
This study examines some of the legal issues raised by these 
developments. After setting out the legal framework governing 
mandatory standards, it focuses on the regulation of private product 
standards and their impact on the economic competitiveness and 
consumer welfare in a developing country context. It identifies how 
private standards are created and complied with, along with their impact 
on economic competitiveness and consumer welfare, in the context of 
the burgeoning informal market. It argues that the lack of coherent 
recognition of non-product-related (nPR)-PPMs at the international level 
applies to both mandatory and voluntary standards. This legal vacuum 
may not be in the interests of developing countries.  
 
While some of the challenges involved in setting and monitoring 
private standards can be avoided through transparency alongside 
widespread stakeholder consultation and cooperation from those most 
                                                 
405 
 Ibid. 
406
 Gandhi (2006).  
407
 Ibid. See Consolidated Metal Products, Inc. v American Petroleum Institute, 
846 F2d 284 (5th Cir. 1988) and Allied Tube and Conduit Corp. v Indian Head, 
Inc., 484 US 814. 
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affected, there are other policy responses to maintain competitive 
environments. Finally, identified are appropriate policies for 
governments to respond effectively to the challenges that private 
standards pose at the international level, including the need to advocate 
the formal and transparent regulation of nPR-PPMs. 
 
3. The GATT/WTO legal framework governing product 
standards 
 
As noted above, product standards can be both mandatory 
(government driven) and voluntary (market driven). These standards 
can also be either ‘product related’ or ‘non-product related’ which refers 
to the PPMs used to manufacture or grow the good, that either affect 
(product related), or do not affect (non-product related) the nature, 
properties or qualities of the final product itself. 
 
A ‘product-related’ PPM (PR-PPM) typically describes a process 
or production method that changes the characteristics and quality of the 
final product and that PPM is discernible in the change. These PR-
PPMs are generally dealt with through product specifications and are 
found in industrial process requirements to ensure the quality of a 
product, its safety and its fitness for use. PR-PPMs typically aim to 
protect the end-user or the environment from either harm from the 
product or a substance incorporated into the product. For instance, the 
use of certain pesticides in cultivating a product can be traced in the 
final product. 
 
Non-product-related PPMs (nPR-PPMs) describe a method of 
processing or production that does not affect or change the nature, 
properties or qualities of a product. How a product is created or 
harvested will not affect that final product, although it may affect the 
environment or society by its methods. For example, slave labour will 
not affect the look of an object, but it violates multiple internationally 
recognized and customary human and labour rights. Other examples of 
nPR-PPMs are related to the environment or the welfare of animals. 
 
Mandatory product standards set by government are regulated 
by the following GATT (General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade)/WTO 
agreements. 
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3.1. Annex 1 and Article 2 of the TBT Agreement 
 
In the past, the PPM debate has focused largely on the 
interpretation of the GATT, although both the Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement and the Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT) Agreement are relevant to the PPM debate. For reasons of 
space, only the TBT Agreement is examined where, to date, neither PR-
PPM nor nPR-PPM disputes have been handled within the WTO’s 
Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM). 
 
The principle of the TBT Agreement is to ensure that Members 
can apply product regulations to fulfil legitimate policy objectives – 
provided that these regulations are not “more trade restrictive than is 
necessary” and do not create “unnecessary obstacles to international 
trade”. Thus, the overall objective is to effectively prevent product 
regulations being implemented for protectionist purposes. Therefore, the 
WTO promotes existing ‘international standards’ for Members to use as 
a safe haven while formulating their own domestic legislation. That is, 
any legislation made in accordance with recognized international 
standards is automatically presumed not to constitute an unnecessary 
obstacle to trade. 
 
The TBT Agreement provides specific disciplines for two 
categories of domestic regulatory measures: technical regulations and 
standards. Annex 1 states that technical regulations are mandatory 
rules that regulate “product characteristics or their related processes 
and production methods”. Standards are non-mandatory rules, 
guidelines or characteristics “for products or related processes and 
production methods”. Both definitions seem to imply that only PR-PPM-
based measures are covered; however, due to a lack of WTO 
jurisprudence, these issues have not yet been clarified. 
 
The last sentence of both definitions states that the technical 
regulation or the standard “may also include or deal exclusively with 
terminology, symbols, packaging, marking or labelling requirements as 
they apply to a product, process or production method”. The first 
sentence in the relevant definition refers to “related processes and 
production methods”, suggesting that it is to cover only PR-PPMs, the 
last sentence lacks such a reference and could therefore be seen to 
include nPR-PPMs as well. However, if the last sentence is implicitly 
informed by the context of the first sentence, the reverse is the case. 
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The non-discrimination provisions under the TBT Agreement 
are closer to the non-discrimination clauses of Articles I and III of the 
GATT and therefore an analysis of the consistency of a PPM-based 
measure with the TBT Agreement is likely to hinge upon a ‘like product’ 
test. However, the TBT Agreement offers no exceptions to these 
obligations akin to Article XX. These Article XX considerations are 
consumed in the balancing test provided by TBT Article 2.2. 
 
The implications of this are that if nPR-PPM labelling is covered 
by the provisions of the TBT there would be an obligation under Article 
2.4 to use an international standard if one exists, and, under Article 2.2, 
this label cannot create an unnecessary obstacle to trade. That is, 
developed countries would have to notify the labels to the WTO, 
especially in the case of non-conforming labels. From the position of 
developing countries, this move towards incorporating this type of 
private standard could overall be a positive step for developing 
countries. 
 
The TBT Agreement’s provisions only require Members to notify 
mandatory technical regulations, not product standards (Article 2.9). In 
cases where PPM-based measures are found to fall outside the scope 
of the TBT Agreement, the GATT’s Article I, III or XI408, as well as Article 
XX will likely apply. 
 
3.2. Article I GATT: Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clause  
 
Article I of the GATT provides that with respect to customs 
duties, taxes and internal regulations, any advantage, favour, privilege 
or immunity granted by a party to any product must be accorded 
immediately and unconditionally to the like products of all other parties. 
The only legally recognized exceptions to this fall under either Article XX 
(see below), Article XXIV provisions covering customs unions and free 
trade areas, and the Enabling Clause. 
 
Products have to be ‘like’ for the MFN obligations to be 
applicable; WTO Member governments cannot apply different tariff rates 
on products that are found to be ‘like’. The criteria used to determine 
                                                 
408
 This chapter does not include an analysis of GATT Article XI. 
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‘like products’ include: i) ‘end use’; ii) product characteristics; iii) tariff 
classification; and, iv) consumer tastes and habits. If a government has 
implemented a standard in response to legitimate consumer 
preferences and has adjusted its tariff lines appropriately, a WTO panel 
would assess whether the criterion of consumer tastes and habits in the 
marketplace was a sufficient basis on which to differentiate the products 
according to the PPM. However, because there has not been a WTO 
dispute based on consumer tastes and habits in a like-product case, 
there is no ruling that consumer tastes is a factor that clearly applies in 
Article I cases or on the link between consumer tastes and PPM 
differentiation. 
 
Where tariffs have been negotiated and then bound, exporting 
WTO Members also have some right to reasonable expectations that 
the tariff structures that have been the subject of previous negotiations 
should not be altered to undermine their market access by increasing 
import tariffs. 
 
In GATT/WTO cases, importing countries maintaining a 
differentiated tariff scheme have owed the affected exporters 
compensation for their loss in trade. This applies even if a panel 
assessment determined that the products in the new scheme were ‘not 
like’, since the right to receive compensation by the exporting country 
turns upon its legitimate expectations that the negotiated scheme would 
not be later altered to the export Member’s detriment. 
 
3.3. Article III: National Treatment (NT) and ‘like’ products 
 
Article III obligates WTO Members to grant foreign products 
treatment that is at least as favourable as the treatment granted to 
domestic ‘like’ products. These provisions apply to both taxation and 
other internal regulatory measures. This therefore potentially covers a 
wide variety of measures regulating nPR-PPMs. 
 
The GATT/WTO obligations rule out domestic taxes or other 
regulatory measures that discriminate either between ‘like products’ 
from different WTO trading partners, or between foreign and domestic 
‘like products’. However, unlike the provisions governing Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (SCMs) for example, which assign ‘likeness’ a 
specific meaning, nowhere else in the GATT/WTO framework are there 
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specific provisions for distinguishing between traded products based on 
criteria that are not physically embodied in the products nPR-PPMs. 
This is with the exception of the use of prison labour, which is explicitly 
covered under the provision of Article XX(e). 
 
If ‘likeness’ was interpreted so that nPR-PPMs such as 
environmentally or socially harmful products are seen as different from 
sustainable products, then the WTO’s non-discrimination obligations 
offer considerably flexibility to Members wishing to implement measures 
to regulate nPR-PPMs. However, an examination of process methods 
does not play a role in determining the interpretation of whether or not 
two products or services are like, and hence the WTO’s non-
discrimination provisions constrain the domestic regulatory prerogative 
to enact environmental or social protection measures. 
 
As noted, the exact boundaries of ‘likeness’ and the precise 
impact of the ‘likeness’ determination on domestic environmental and 
health policy making remain unclear. However, relevant GATT/WTO 
nPR-PPM jurisprudence to date includes the 1991 US – Tuna I (Mexico) 
GATT Panel report, which found that differences in nPR-PPMs are not 
relevant in determining ‘likeness’ and the 2001 EC – Asbestos case 
where the Appellate Body found that the determination of ‘likeness’ is 
fundamentally a determination about the “nature and extent of a 
competitive relationship between and among products”. 
 
Article III ‘likeness’ cases almost always reference the three 
Border Tax criteria for determining ‘like products’ from the 1970 pre-
WTO report: Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments: i) the product’s 
end uses in a given market; ii) consumers’ tastes and habits, which 
change from country to country; and, iii) the product’s properties, nature 
and quality. The EC – Asbestos Appellate Body clarified the proper 
application of the Border Tax criteria as follows. Firstly, panels must look 
at all evidence relevant to a ‘likeness’ determination, analysing each 
criterion separately, then weigh all relevant evidence in concluding 
whether products are ‘like products’409. And secondly, even if evidence 
related to one of the Border Tax criteria is extremely persuasive, a panel 
may not end its ‘like products’ analysis after examining only that one 
specific factor but must look at all of the evidence related to the other 
three criteria. 
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 EC – Asbestos Appellate Body Report, Paragraphs 101–103. 
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The EC – Asbestos Appellate Body determination that ‘likeness’ 
under Article III:4 “is fundamentally a determination about the nature 
and extent of a competitive relationship between and among 
products”410 has been criticized by some for being too economically 
oriented. It is argued that it leaves little policy space for Members to 
distinguish between products based on non-market or non-economic 
considerations and is unable to consider environmental or health 
concerns arising from trade in certain products. However, from the 
perspective of developing country governments, the emphasis on 
competitive relationships and markets is in their favour should nPR-
PPMs be included within the remit of the Agreement. The comparative 
advantage of most developing economy markets can be undermined by 
standards governing the production process. 
 
3.3.1. The legal provisions of Article III 
 
Domestic taxation schemes are covered by Paragraph 2 of 
Article III. The first sentence prohibits Members from taxing ‘like’ 
imported products ‘in excess of’ ‘like’ domestic products. The second 
sentence states that Members will be in violation if, under their tax 
regimes, “directly competitive or substitutable” imported and domestic 
products are “not similarly taxed”. 
 
Non-tax measures and regulations are covered by Paragraph 4 
and include: “. . . laws, regulations and requirements affecting [the] 
internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or 
use” of products. Specifically, Article III:4 requires that “internal 
regulatory measures are accorded treatment no less favourable to 
imported products than that accorded to like products of national origin”. 
 
The Article III jurisprudence on ‘likeness’ has been conducted 
on a case-by-case basis, involving an “unavoidable element of 
individual, discretionary judgement” as stated in the Japan – Alcoholic 
Beverages (1996) Appellate Body report411, Article III:2 has two 
categories of comparable products because firstly it requires Members 
                                                 
410
 EC – Asbestos Appellate Body Report, Paragraph 99. 
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 Japan – Alcoholic Beverages Appellate Body Report. Section H.1.a. (1996). 
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to ensure that ‘like’ imported products are not taxed at all ‘in excess’412 
of ‘like’ domestic products and secondly, but equally importantly413, to 
subject ‘directly competitive or substitutable products’ to similar levels of 
taxation. Crucially, if they are not similarly taxed, they must be assessed 
to see whether the different rates of taxation are applied ‘so as to afford 
protection to domestic production’. While the scope of ‘directly 
competitive or substitutable products’ is broad, it is governed by the anti-
protectionist thrust of Article III:1 by examining whether it is ‘so as to 
afford protection’. 
 
Although Article III:4’s ‘like products’ term has been interpreted 
so as to give the overall article consistency, it is remains unclear. If 
products are ‘like’ under Article III:4, then the panels must assess 
whether the treatment afforded to imported products are ‘less 
favourable’ than their domestic counterparts. In EC – Asbestos the 
Appellate Body defined ‘less favourable’ treatment to apply to measures 
implemented “so as to afford protection to domestic production” (EC – 
Asbestos AB report, Paragraphs 97–98). Again, this is because the 
overall objective of Article III is to prohibit regulations that may modify 
the conditions of competition in that relevant market to the disadvantage 
of the imported product. That is, it can be seen that ensuring 
competition is the underlying objective of Article III. 
 
Earlier in GATT/WTO jurisprudence, in the US – Malt 
Beverages the Panel employed the ‘aims and effects’ test as a means to 
ensure the general anti-protectionist objective of Article III and to 
prohibit internal measures that are applied so as to afford protection to 
domestic production when conducting ‘likeness’ analyses. The Panel 
concluded that whether the challenged measure distinguished between 
imported and domestic products for valid public policy purposes, or for 
protectionist reasons, was relevant to the question of whether the 
affected products were ‘like products’. 
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 Any level of taxation imposed on imported products that exceeds the level 
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phrase ‘like products’ in Article III:2 must be interpreted narrowly so as to not 
overshadow Article III:2’s second, broader category of ‘directly competitive or 
substitutable products’ Ibid.  
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The ‘aims and effects’ test was advocated to help balance free 
trade and domestic environmental and social policies. Yet it was finally 
deemed unworkable partly because of problems in assessing ‘intent’ 
and because it deviated too far from an ordinary meaning of the text of 
Article III. The Japan – Alcoholic Beverages (1996) Appellate Body 
explicitly rejected the test, holding that a party need not demonstrate 
any protective aim or application of the challenged tax. 
 
The aims and effects test has not been used to assess 
‘likeness’ under Article III since 1996, although clearly in the area of 
private standard setting it could have a role. A 2003 OECD report414 
noted that private, voluntary standard-setting and product-certification 
activities undertaken by private trade associations in the US have 
historically been the object of antitrust scrutiny under US antitrust law. It 
is thought that even voluntary standards when formulated collectively by 
some dominant firms could quickly develop into industry standards and 
be misused against competing firms for whom such standards become 
a market requirement. However, since standard-setting and certification 
activities by private trade associations may also benefit competitive 
conditions in a marketplace, US courts typically evaluate the pro-
competitive benefits of a product standard against any anti-competitive 
implications under what is termed the ‘rule of reason’ analysis415. This 
approach could be applicable to DSM deliberations. 
 
3.4. Article XX: the exceptions 
 
The exceptions to Article XX include the central GATT provision 
that attempts to balance tensions arising between trade and other listed 
legitimate domestic non-trade policy goals. The most relevant sections 
here are: 
 
• Article XX(b) necessary to protect human, animal, or plant life or 
health; 
• Article XX(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction 
                                                 
414
 Andrew et al. (2003). 
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 See: Consolidated Metal Products, Inc. v American Petroleum Institute, 846 
F2d 284 (5th Cir. 1988) and Allied Tube and Conduit Corp. v Indian Head, Inc., 
484 US 814. 
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with restrictions on domestic production or consumption. 
 
Only measures satisfying one or more of the subparagraphs of 
the exceptions are subsequently scrutinized for consistency with the 
chapeau of Article XX, to ensure these measures are: “[s]ubject to the 
requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised 
restriction on international trade, . . . .”. 
 
3.4.1. Article XX(b) of the GATT 
 
The objective of this provision is to safeguard a country’s ability 
to adopt measures “necessary to protect human, plant, or animal life or 
health”. 
 
In EC – Asbestos, the Appellate Body dismissed a Canadian 
complaint against a health-based French ban on asbestos in 
construction materials. It upheld that health measures under Article 
XX(b) depended largely on the interpretation of ‘necessary’. The terms 
‘necessity’ and ‘least-trade-restrictiveness’ are given considerable 
emphasis when examining the ‘reasonably available alternatives’, in 
light of existing scientific evidence as the basis for its finding on the 
applicability of Paragraph (b) of Article XX. 
 
In Korea – Beef, the Appellate Body found that for a measure to 
be necessary it does not need to be ‘indispensable’ or ‘inevitable’416. A 
‘necessary’ measure is situated between an ‘indispensable’ measure 
and a measure ‘making a contribution to’ a goal, albeit significantly 
closer to the pole of ‘indispensable’. 
 
The Appellate Body created a three-factor balancing test for 
deciding whether or not a measure is necessary when it is not per se 
indispensable: i) the contribution made by the measure to the legitimate 
objective; ii) the importance of the common interests or values 
protected; and, iii) the impact of the measure on trade417. 
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417
 Ibid., Paragraph 164 
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Elements of weighing and balancing are part of the 
determination of whether an alternative GATT-consistent or less 
inconsistent measure was reasonably available (Paragraph 166). It is 
important to note also that in determining whether an alternative 
measure was reasonably available, the Appellate Body in Korea – Beef 
confirmed the Panel’s approach to consider factors such as the 
domestic costs of an alternative measure (Paragraph 173). 
 
Appellate Body EC – Asbestos: whether a French ban on the 
manufacturing, sale, and import of asbestos fibres was ‘necessary’ to 
protect the health of workers and consumers, as required under Article 
XX(b). The Appellate Body accepted that a country may single out a 
product and adopt measures to address its health risks, without first 
exhaustively investigating the risks posed by substitutes. The Appellate 
Body also reaffirmed that a Member was free to choose its level of 
protection and found that the balancing test laid out in Korea – Beef with 
respect to Article XX(d), was also applicable under Article XX(b). Finally, 
the Appellate Body confirmed the importance of the value to be 
protected, noting that the preservation of human life and health was 
“both vital and important in the highest degree”. 
 
3.4.2. Article XX(g) of the GATT 
 
Article XX(g) relates to the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with 
restrictions on domestic production or consumption. 
The US – Reformulated Gasoline Appellate Body viewed 
‘measures’ in Article XX as conservation measures in their entirety, and 
not only as provisions or elements of an overall measure found to 
violate the core GATT provisions (US – Reformulated Gasoline AB 
report, Section III.A). This introduced greater deference to 
environmental considerations, broadening the potential scope of 
application of Paragraph (g) of Article XX. The Appellate Body also 
interpreted the term ‘exhaustible natural resources’ to include living, 
renewable and non-renewable resources. 
 
The treatment of biological resources in pre-WTO jurisprudence 
includes the adopted 1982 Panel Report US – Tuna and Tuna Products 
from Canada. Here both parties considered tuna stocks, including 
albacore tuna, to be an exhaustible natural resource in need of 
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conservation management418. In the adopted Canada – Unprocessed 
Herring and Salmon 1988 the Panel Report also “agreed with the parties 
that salmon and herring stocks are “exhaustible natural resources””419. 
In US – Tuna/Dolphin I and US – Tuna/ Dolphin II: the Panels of both 
cases concluded that dolphins qualified as natural resources420. The 
Panel also determined that, first, clean air is a resource, second, it is 
natural, and third, potentially could be depleted in 1996 US – 
Reformulated Gasoline421. Finally, in US – Shrimp/Turtle I, the Appellate 
Body found that living resources are just as ‘finite’ as petroleum, iron ore 
and other non-living resources422. 
 
3.4.3. Article XX’s chapeau 
 
The chapeau of Article XX prohibits a measures’ application if it 
constitutes either “arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries where the same conditions prevail” or a “disguised restriction 
on international trade”. 
 
In interpreting the chapeau’s requirements during the US – 
Shrimp/ Turtle I dispute, the Appellate Body explicitly referred to the 
notion of sustainable development in trade policy, as reflected in the 
Uruguay Round negotiations and Members’ prior practice423. The report 
noted that the opening paragraph in the WTO Agreement’s preamble 
confirmed that WTO negotiators departed from the original GATT 
language and recognized that an optimal use of the world’s resources 
should be made in accordance with the objective of sustainable 
development. The Appellate Body stated that preambular language 
“must add colour, texture and shading to the rights and obligations of 
Members under the WTO Agreement, generally, and under the GATT 
1994, in particular”, including under the chapeau of Article XX of the 
GATT424. 
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4. Private voluntary standards 
 
A voluntary initiative to promote certain social or environmental 
objectives could take a number of forms, ranging from broad 
aspirational principles to strict benchmark requirements or standards. 
However, it is private standards425 and monitoring systems that have 
been growing rapidly alongside business-to-business standards and are 
evident in markets such as agriculture and food, tourism, fisheries and 
forestry426. 
 
These private standards are often encouraged as a response to 
consumer and producer concerns regarding product quality or suitability, 
in addition to their potential to expand competition and trade 
opportunities in certain sectors in economies that are able to respond 
quickly to new demands and niche requirements. One recent study 
suggested that one of the key motivational factors behind the 
development of private standards schemes was establishing a firm’s 
reputation regarding safety and quality427. Developing and complying 
with private standards can potentially offer producers access to the 
global value chain, improved efficiency in operations, increased 
information and improved worker safety, while offering consumers 
greater choice, information and quality428. 
 
Competitiveness motivations are likely to reflect a perception 
that high domestic requirements put domestic industry at a competitive 
disadvantage in international markets. High levels of environmental or 
social protection in response to government policy or consumer 
preferences can, however, have positive effects on the competitiveness 
of domestic producers and countries. They can spur technological 
                                                 
425
 Private voluntary standards are also sometimes known as Non-
Governmental Standards. 
426
 For example, the monitoring system for the foresty sector is the Forest 
Stewardship Council, for the apparel sector it is hasthe Fair Labour Association, 
for tourism includes it is the Sustainable Tourism Stewardship Council, for 
agriculture and food it is  the Fair Trade Labelling Organization while fisheries 
are monitored by the Marine Stewardship Council.  
427
 Fulponi (2007) op. cit.  
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change, stimulate investment, improve production efficiency, and 
promote new industrial sectors and new market niches429. 
 
Nevertheless, it is also evident that private voluntary standards 
may have the effect of raising the compliance costs of some smaller or 
newer firms relative to other more established or larger firms. Such 
measures particularly disadvantage SME exporting firms from 
developing countries because they must bear the fixed and marginal 
costs of meeting these export standards without gaining any domestic-
scale advantages. In a context of scarcity this has significant 
ramifications for these economic operators. This can restrict competition 
because it changes the competitive environment for these products by 
creating potentially insurmountable barriers to entry. Despite this as yet 
there are no international regulatory mechanisms for assessing the 
impact on competition from these standards.  
 
It has been further argued that rather than being private 
voluntary standards, compliance with these schemes is becoming 
increasingly mandatory for accessing lead-retailer supply chains430. 
Products must meet the importing country’s regulations in addition to the 
requirements of private voluntary standards schemes. However, 
because the necessary infrastructure and services to meet these new 
commercial requirements demands is unavailable, SMEs and 
smallholders are easily locked out of the market for supplying the 
leading retailer chains. 
Thus, although private standards are not mandatory and it is the 
suppliers’ choice to participate in a scheme, it is clear that where private 
standards become the industry norm, choice is limited. The choice of 
whether or not to comply with a voluntary standard becomes a choice 
between compliance or to exit from the market. In this way, the 
distinction between private voluntary standards and mandatory ‘official’ 
or ‘public’ requirements can blur. 
 
The scope of PPMs covered by private standards includes both 
PR-PPM and nPR-PPM issues such as animal welfare, organics, 
traceability, environmental impact and labour standards. These private 
                                                 
429
 Processes and Production Methods (PPMs): Conceptual Framework and 
Considerations on Use of PPP-Based Trade Measures OCDE/GD(97)137.  
430
 Fulponi (2007) op. cit. 
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measures are sometimes referred to as ‘producer characteristics 
standards’. 
 
4.1. Legal frameworks covering private standards 
 
While mandatory government standards are subject to the 
constraints of the MFN and NT non-discrimination provisions, it is not 
clear that these disciplines extend to private voluntary standards, even 
when these standards are capable of discriminating against exporters 
and therefore changing the level of competition in these markets. Some 
private standards schemes may fall within the scope of the TBT 
Agreement. Annex 1 sets out the legal definitions for standards, 
conformity assessment procedures and non-governmental bodies. 
Article 4 requires that Members take reasonable measures to ensure 
that non-governmental bodies accept and comply with Annex 3 of the 
TBT Agreement (the Code of Good Practice for the Preparation, 
Adoption and Application of Standards), which includes notification 
obligations relating to the Code’s acceptance and work programmes. 
Articles 5 and 8 of the TBT Agreement relate to conformity assessment 
obligations. The TBT Agreement also obligates Members to take 
"reasonable measures to ensure compliance" by Non-Governmental 
Organization (NGO) bodies with the Code of Good Practice by non-
governmental bodies. 
 
However, in the Tuna – Dolphin case the Panel found that the 
provisions of a voluntary, federally promulgated, US eco-labelling 
scheme did not violate Article I:1 of the GATT Agreement (MFN Clause) 
because the Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act (DPCIA) eco-
labelling scheme could not be said to constitute a market restriction 
because it does not prevent a manufacturer from selling its product in a 
marketplace without complying with the environmental requirement. This 
implies that only ‘government-conferred’ advantages are subject to the 
MFN requirements, and for a measure to restrict access to a market, it 
must leave an exporter with no choice but to comply with it. 
 
Nevertheless, from the perspective of developing country 
producers even voluntary PPMs can impose additional costs upon 
exporting manufacturers effectively preventing them from selling their 
products in certain markets and consequently altering the competitive 
environment of those markets. Developing countries have a different set 
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of issues related to standards and competitiveness. First, some 
environmental and social standards in their export markets are not 
always well publicized, or well understood or may not allow enough time 
for producers to conform to these new production methods, especially 
where there are many small-scale producers. Second, the standards 
may be set at excessively high levels or require complex testing and 
monitoring to ensure compliance. 
 
Competitiveness issues underlie many of the challenges that 
African commodities exporters face, for example, when appropriate 
policies raise the price of the final good. Here a small price hike can 
cause purchasers to switch exporter. Commodities purchasers will not 
typically pay a premium for environmentally or socially high standards, 
despite the environmental and social issues that surround their PPMs. 
In the Tuna – Dolphin case, it was found that it was necessary for a 
measure not only to restrict market access but also that any advantage 
gained by one exporter over another exporter must be conferred by the 
government implementing the measure and not by consumer 
preference. Disputes between private entities, NGOs and non-state 
organizations are beyond the mandate of the GATT Agreement. So too 
are analyses of instances of market restrictions caused by private 
cartels creating voluntary standards or de facto advantages conferred 
by governments. 
 
Thus, there are certain barriers to establishing that a private 
standard violates the MFN clause, not least because private actors have 
no direct role in the WTO. Not only must a private party be represented 
by a government but there is also an absence of a state entity to launch 
dispute settlement proceedings against. The scope of state attribution in 
the WTO regime is at present interpreted narrowly. In the Japan Films 
case, the WTO Panel acknowledged no ‘bright line rules’ that allowed it 
to rule out an action as being non-governmental, just because it was 
taken by a private party. In the Korea Beef Case, Korean retailers 
responded to a government law introducing a dual retail system by 
voluntarily renouncing the sale of imported beef because of commercial 
considerations. Although the voluntary actions of the retailers could not 
be attributed to the State, the WTO Appellate Body held Korea 
responsible for violation under Article III:4 (NT) because domestic law 
gave a sufficient incentive for its retailers to act in a manner inconsistent 
with the WTO. 
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In order to identify the criteria by which states should be held 
accountable for the use and misuse of private voluntary standards, the 
SPS and the TBT Agreements offer some different approaches. Article 
13 of the SPS Agreement explicitly states that Members “shall not take 
measures which have the effect of directly or indirectly, requiring or 
encouraging…such non-governmental entities…to act in a manner 
inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement”. The TBT Agreement 
affixes gradual levels of state responsibility relating to the extent of 
control that a state can exercise over a non-governmental body. 
 
However, WTO jurisprudence displays the DSM’s reluctance to 
hold a state responsible for the trade-restricting activities of private 
parties within its territories, even if such activities were directly or 
indirectly supported by a governmental measure431. Although the Japan 
Films report found no ‘bright line rules’ to exempt private party actions 
from WTO scrutiny and the Panel acknowledged that a government’s 
measures could assist such cartels by limiting exports, it did not 
incorporate a ‘due diligence’ requirement into Article XI:1 to ensure that 
a state’s laws did not enable private parties to restrict trade. 
 
The success of a contested private standard clearly depends on 
how widely state attribution is interpreted. If the interpretation is broad 
there is a case for challenging private standards under Article III:4. It is 
difficult to show that a private standard violates Article III:4 because the 
measure must be shown to constitute a law, regulation or requirement 
that affects internal sale, discriminates between like products and does 
not afford like treatment to imported products. Nevertheless, it can be 
argued that the scope of a ‘regulation or requirement’ does not prima 
facie exclude private actions under Article III:4. A private action can be 
interpreted as a ‘requirement’ under Article III:4 if “there is a nexus 
between that action and the action of a government such that the 
government must be held responsible for that action”. This nexus can be 
established by private standards supported by government policy, such 
as the Nordic Swan Program, but these are not common. 
 
If the primary objective of Article III is to protect the expectations 
to particular behaviour not actual trade outcomes then the factor at 
stake in judging whether a measure accords less favourable treatment 
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 Argentina — Measures affecting the export of bovine hides and the import of 
finished leather (DS155/R). 19 December 2000.  
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to an imported product should be determined by whether both imported 
and domestic products are afforded an effective equality of competitive 
conditions. In the case of developing country SMEs, it could be argued 
that as long as the NGO standards result in discriminatory competitive 
conditions which deny them effective equality, they could violate Article 
III:4. 
 
4.1.2. TBT Agreement provisions regulating the use of private standards 
 
As noted above, the objective of the TBT Agreement is to 
ensure that mandatory technical regulations and voluntary standards do 
not constitute unnecessary barriers to trade. Voluntary standards have 
to comply with the TBT Agreement’s Code of Good Practice, which 
provides guidelines for the setting and implementing of these standards. 
Technical regulations can be both governmental and non-governmental 
measures. According to Article 3 Members take ‘reasonable measures’ 
available to them to regulate technical regulations that are formulated by 
local government bodies or non-governmental bodies. 
 
The benchmark for a private measure to be considered a 
technical regulation is high. It must require mandatory compliance and is 
generally thought that it cannot be based on an nPR-PPM. This implies 
that the vast majority of private standards are not regulated by the WTO. 
There is considerable opposition among developing countries to the 
inclusion of nPR-PPMs within the WTO on the grounds that it is non-
negotiated mission creep and unfairly discriminates against their 
economic interests. Resistance to technical regulations based on nPR-
PPMs derives from concerns about exporting domestic preferences and 
values that are seen by some as, at best, inconsiderate of differing 
endowments or preferences, and at worst ripe for protectionist abuse432. 
 
However, the exclusion of nPR-PPMs from the WTO due to 
concerns over the protectionist abuse may not be the best policy option 
for smallholders and producers. If nPR-PPM-standards are covered by 
the provisions of the GATT and the TBT Agreement, the result would be 
a more coherent, transparent and procedurally accountable rules-based 
framework for setting these standards, be they mandatory or voluntary. 
At present, the ‘default’ suite of GATT disciplines to which government 
                                                 
432
 See for example, Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1996). 
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measures are subject when the TBT or SPS Agreements do not apply, 
and generally no regulation when the measures are private and 
voluntary, is clearly not in developing countries’ interests. 
 
5. The Informal Market  
 
“The first and second economies in our country are separated 
from each other by a structural fault. … Accordingly, what we now have 
is the reality … of a mainly informal, marginalized, unskilled economy, 
populated by the unemployed and those unemployable in the formal 
sector. The second economy is caught in a ‘poverty trap’. It is therefore 
unable to generate the internal savings that would enable it to achieve 
the high rates of investment it needs.”433. 
 
The informal economy in this description is positioned as 
structurally disconnected from the mainstream of the economy. This 
dualist perspective434 sees the informal economy as operating in a 
distinctly separate and less advantaged position relative to the formal 
economy435. Chen (2007) argues that this conceptualization tacitly 
acknowledges the failure of past trickle-down economic growth policies. 
By splitting the economy, the government can argue that its economic 
policies have been successful for the formal economy and export sector; 
whereas, if there is an interconnected and even interdependent 
relationship between the formal and informal economy, then 
government policy for the latter is either absent or ineffective. Indeed, 
Chen disputes the dualist school, finding few examples of informal 
operators that are not linked in some way into the formal economy; 
informal enterprises rarely, except perhaps some survival activities, 
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 President Mbeki. ANC Today, Volume 4, No. 47, 26 November-2 December 
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 See Sethuraman (1976), Tokman (1978).  
435
 The Structuralist school sees the informal and formal economies as 
intrinsically linked. To increase competitiveness, capitalist firms in the formal 
economy are seen to reduce their input costs, including labour costs, by 
promoting informal production and employment relationships with subordinated 
economic units and workers. See Portes (1989). The legalists’ school focuses 
on the relationship between informal enterprises and the formal regulatory 
environment, not formal firms, while acknowledging that vested capitalist 
interests collude with governments to set favourable rules for trade. See de Soto 
(1989). 
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operate in total isolation from formal firms. Most source raw materials 
from and/or supply finished goods to formal firms either directly or 
through intermediate – also often informal – firms. 
 
If the formal and informal markets are integrally linked, focusing 
pro-poor policy on the interdependencies and causes of the linkages 
should be more effective in promoting development than ignoring 
them436. This is particularly the case when 93 per cent of new jobs in 
Africa are created in the informal economy437. At present, the formal 
regulatory environment comprising government policies, laws, 
regulations, and standards is biased towards formal registered firms to 
the disadvantage of both informal enterprises and informal workers, 
which are the majority in most developing countries. The benefits of the 
formal economy include not only enforceable commercial contracts, 
ownership rights, tax breaks and incentives to conform to standards and 
increase their competitiveness, but also statutory social and consumer 
protection. When informal enterprises obtain licenses, register accounts 
and pay taxes, the costs are high before they start to meet the required 
international standards to begin exporting their goods to the lucrative 
developed country markets. 
 
It is of little surprise that the core debate on the informal 
economy is whether to ‘formalize’ it. If a small enterprise in a developing 
country calculates that the only way to compete with cheaper imported 
‘like products’ is by evading sales tax and hiding its workers from the 
social security authorities, then the likelihood is that the enterprise will 
remain largely in the informal sector. This may deprive the firm of a bank 
loan to expand the business and increase its competitiveness by 
conforming to export standards because it requires an external audit. 
The bureaucracy of both formalization and standard conformity and 
authentication is expensive, and small enterprises will conform only if 
they calculate that it will be worth it to gain access to lucrative foreign 
markets. In such a situation, pro-poor government policy may find it 
                                                 
436
 For example, if an enterprise is required to have six official permits, for 
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more effective to focus on creating incentives for voluntary formalization 
rather than on enforcement activities. 
 
The creation of effective incentives for formalization is clearly 
important for consumer protection. Product informality escapes all 
social, health and safety regulations, in addition to offering any effective 
consumer protection. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The regulation of both mandatory and private standards is not 
yet comprehensive regarding nPR-PPMs. While developing countries 
have traditionally rejected the incorporation of these standards within a 
binding framework, this may not be the most effective way of ensuring 
that these non-tariff barriers are set according to legally rational and 
recognized guidelines. There is a body of research to suggest that 
compliance with private voluntary standards and schemes is becoming 
increasingly mandatory for developing country producers wishing to 
access the main retailer supply chains. While export traders are the key 
link between the purchasers and the producers438, SMEs have an 
increased risk of being excluded from lucrative international markets 
because of the constraints of complying with these private standards. In 
developed countries, government policy is seen to complement 
producer and export industries by ensuring the provision of the 
infrastructure and services necessary to maintain competitiveness at 
both macro- and micro-levels. In the context of economic development, 
governments face more challenges in providing such an ‘enabling’ 
environment. 
 
Developing country domestic policy solutions could start by 
identifying the extent to which subsidies or public support programmes 
are needed to offset the cost disadvantage that stems from international 
technical regulations. This would involve assessing initial set-up and 
variable production costs regarding both standards and technical 
regulations. Appropriate policy solutions could include the targeted 
upgrading of infrastructure along with the requisite training and capacity 
                                                 
438
 These intermediaries are generally responsible for transmitting demand 
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overseeing production and certifications of small-scale producers. 
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building at a grass-roots level. It is the SMEs and smallholders that are 
most detrimentally affected by these regulations; therefore, their input in 
setting standards is vital to ensure that the competitiveness of their 
export markets is not discriminated against. 
 
The domestic policy options to harness the informal market and 
enhance social and environmental protection include simplifying and 
reducing relevant regulations and standards, alongside arbitrary 
economic intervention and governance. To date, progress at addressing 
such issues relating to the informal market has been largely ineffective. 
The poorest countries tend to be those that suffer most from an 
inappropriate and burdensome regulatory environment – although 
clearly they have a very low capacity for both policy making and 
enforcement. In order to create a ‘smarter’ domestic regulatory 
environment, it would be useful to identify critical and neglected 
industry-specific policy issues. This should uncover policy priorities and 
allow for limited enforcement capacity to be targeted more efficiently. 
 
At the multilateral level, there is more scope for identifying and 
assessing the damages to the exporting country’s trade benefits if the 
importing country’s regulations do not conform to WTO obligations. 
Developing country governments have been making more use of the 
WTO dispute settlement mechanism and they could now increase their 
examination of non-tariff barriers, including private product standards, 
particularly those that can severely undermine the competitive trade 
advantages that developing country exporters may have within the 
multilateral trading system. 
 
GATT and WTO Panel and Appellate Body findings tend to be 
tough if they have been able to establish that there has been an 
unnecessary restriction of trade or distortion of the market. Most 
developing countries have not tended to make requests for 
consultations or mount legal challenges to the formulation or application 
of private voluntary standards. Rather, developing countries have 
traditionally been united in their opposition to the inclusion of nPR-PPM 
criteria within the WTO because they perceive that even to acknowledge 
this form of trade-restrictive standards will begin a new era where ‘non-
trade related’ standards, such as labour and human rights are included 
within the remit of the WTO, destabilizing the competitive advantages of 
many developing countries. At present, the limitations of the TBT 
Agreement also make such an nPR-PPM challenge difficult. Not only is 
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the political environment for including these criteria inhospitable, but the 
provisions are ambiguous and risk assessment mechanisms 
inadequate. 
 
Challenging the legal basis of an nPR-PPM standard is not 
necessarily strategically short-sighted. The WTO Shrimp – Turtles 
dispute was based on a contested nPR-PPM scheme and the Appellate 
Body in that case found that ultimately the measure only violated the 
WTO because it was both arbitrary and discriminatory. This did not set a 
legal precedent by authorizing the inclusion of nPR-PPM criteria within 
the remit of the GATT/WTO Agreements; rather the Appellate Body 
subjected the measure to an evaluation of its legality with the GATT 
Agreement. Yet the Appellate Body did show sensitivity in a dispute 
relating to the use of private product standards. It could be argued that it 
is likely to judge the measure on the basis of its restriction rather than 
on the criteria that were used in setting it. 
 
The TBT Agreement is generally also thought to exclude any 
product standard or regulation that is based on the nPR-PPM criteria of 
most developing countries. While this may prevent these criteria being 
used to discriminate between currently ‘like’ products, it also results in a 
situation where private nPR-PPM product requirements are completely 
unregulated within the WTO. The primary objective of the TBT 
Agreement is to discipline the arbitrary use of technical barriers to trade 
and is generally thought to be the most appropriate framework for 
challenging a private standard. If terms including ‘non-governmental 
bodies’, ‘standardizing bodies’, ‘Standards’ and ‘Technical Regulations’ 
are interpreted to exempt private standards from being regulated it 
would undermine the primary objectives of the Agreement. 
 
Given that the WTO DSM has been accused of enlarging the 
remit of the WTO beyond what was originally intended by the 
negotiating parties during its settlement of disputes, it is advisable that 
the clarification of such issues of interpretation should be addressed by 
the WTO membership itself and not left to rule making by judicial 
interpretation during a potentially politically explosive dispute. The most 
appropriate policy option identified here is to further utilize the TBT 
Agreement’s ‘review’ mechanism, which was set up to provide the WTO 
Members an opportunity to “review the operation and implementation of 
this Agreement” at the Triennial Review of the TBT Committee with a 
view to “recommending an adjustment of the rights and obligations of 
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this Agreement…to ensure mutual economic advantage and balance of 
rights and obligations”439. 
 
Developing country WTO Members could see the TBT 
Agreement’s unique review mechanism as a potentially effective 
opportunity to clarify these matters of interpretation, as well as for 
tabling amendments to the text of the TBT Agreement itself. In the 
past440, the review has acknowledged that some standards were being 
formulated by bodies that are not commonly recognized as 
standardizing bodies; however, there were no policy proposals beyond 
calling upon WTO Members to encourage private standard setters to 
utilize the use of the TBT Agreement’s Code of Good Practice. This 
work could be used to draft a proposal sympathetic to developing 
country WTO Members. 
 
Elsewhere in the WTO, the Committee for Trade and 
Environment has also long been aware of the ambiguous role that the 
WTO has at present in facilitating the use of voluntary private 
initiatives441. Developing country WTO Members could also use this as 
an opportunity to actively support proposals such as those demanding a 
notification procedure for voluntary eco-labels and mechanisms for 
insuring that private standards that restrict markets are not used for 
protectionist purposes, in addition to proposing to increase the WTO’s 
international policy coherence surrounding this work. 
 
Private international product standards are playing a greater 
role in determining the competitive environment in markets than 
previously. At a very minimum, governments in both developed and 
developing countries should work to ensure that the membership and 
decision-making processes of these private standard bodies are subject 
to a transparent, participatory and non-discriminatory framework that 
can incorporate some aspect of competition policy.  
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IS THERE POTENTIAL FOR COMPETITION POLICY IN 
THE ECOWAS? 
 
James H.  Mathis442 and Kamala Dawar443 
 
Abstract 
 
The main objective of this study is to discuss competition law 
and policy in regional integration with the aim of identifying whether or 
not effective competition law can be furthered within the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) integration plan. The 
study argues that the ECOWAS region should establish an independent 
competition law capable of addressing public and private anti-
competitive practices that can detrimentally affect the trade between the 
member countries. Further, it argues that the ECOWAS requires a 
regional body to promote the regional law. The study identifies a number 
of different options for a regional competition law, ranging from a highly 
centralized to a highly decentralized system of regional action. The 
study concludes that the policy option with the most potential is the 
‘middle road’, which allows for regional complaints and investigations 
but still relies primarily on the enforcement mechanisms of the Member 
States.  
                                                 
442
 Associate Professor, University of Amsterdam Law School, The Netherlands. 
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Executive summary 
 
• Preferential trade liberalization should facilitate increased 
competition in the regional market but national or regional 
competition policies may also be necessary to provide recourse 
for injurious firm behaviour emerging after the removal of 
governmental barriers.  
 
• There is a stronger argument for an independent regional law 
and a centralized authority in the case of export restraint 
behaviours that affect trade between the members. The 
problem of dumping can be resolved by effective national laws. 
Intergovernmental approaches involving cooperation may be 
satisfactory except in the case where exporting members refuse 
to pass and implement national laws that can address those 
practices.  
 
• Two major elements are at play in the design of competition 
policy in regional integration: 
 
1. Whether or not the region will create an independent 
law, together with the mechanisms by which this law 
would be made effective within the members’ domestic 
legal orders.  
2. Whether the region should establish a separate 
authority that would be able to treat individual cases, 
either alone or in conjunction with the Member State 
authorities and courts.  
 
• Where the objectives of an integration agreement involve a 
customs union or common market formation, it would be 
somewhat logical to favour a more centralized approach. 
 
For the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), a tension exists where the objectives of integration are set 
at high levels (customs union/common market) but the institutional 
powers are set ‘low’ to function by primarily intergovernmental 
cooperation. It is therefore questionable whether the present institutional 
design can give meaningful effect to the integration objectives of the 
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treaty. Institutional changes to the ECOWAS structure are necessary if 
the integration objectives of the treaty are to be met. There is no simple 
resolution to this other than to locate a middle ground of accommodation 
and compromise between the ECOWAS objectives and the institutional 
design in the treaty.  
 
This study therefore recommends: 
 
• Setting firm benchmarks for the establishment of an 
independent regional law and, following that, to raise the 
implementation aspects for an ‘organic’ system of enforcement 
within the Member State legal orders. This is based at the 
outset upon the superiority of the regional law (for which the 
ECOWAS Treaty does provide), and then to institute certain 
guarantees that might render a system of private rights 
effective.  
 
• An independent regional authority should also be established 
that has certain granted powers. Here several alternatives are 
discussed but what is ultimately recommended is to establish a 
regional authority with the power to: 
 
o receive individual complaints 
o independently investigate complaints 
o refer cases to the national authorities and courts for 
action 
o apply for an alternative case-hearing mechanism if 
national authorities are unable to act. 
 
• The study recommends establishing an independent regional 
competition law with general application throughout the region 
and superiority over inconsistent national laws and acts. 
Conflicts of jurisdiction between regional and national law are 
not a major barrier to the creation of a regional law. The 
delimitation for the jurisdiction of a regional law should 
ultimately reside with the highest regional court. A Council 
Regulation can prescribe the minimum thresholds and other 
exemptions that would also describe the jurisdictional 
application of a regional law.  
 
• A core proposal is therefore that either the treaty provisions or 
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an ECOWAS Council Regulation provide for an express 
declaration of direct effect. For competition law, this would 
mean that the treaty practices listed as subject to the 
prohibitions could be raised by a private party in a national court 
in a lawsuit against other private parties or against the state and 
its agencies. This would allow a national authority or court ruling 
that an anti-competitive practice is inconsistent with the treaty 
and that all agreements formed to give effect to such practices 
are void and non-enforceable within that national legal system. 
The Council has this power incumbent in its authority to 
establish Community acts in the form of regulations. 
 
• This recommended system of regional competition law 
enforcement relies, at least in part, on individual claims and 
cases, and includes: 
 
o the use of direct effect before the national courts and 
authorities for ECOWAS competition 
o a procedure for preliminary opinions to promote 
consistent interpretations and uniformity 
o a final private right of appeal from the highest national 
court (or final national court of jurisdiction) to the 
regional court  
o the West African Economic and Monetary Union 
(WAEMU) system should function as a single entity 
within the larger customs union structure. 
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1. Introduction: the elements of a competition law  
 
This study refers to competition law as the set of rules and 
remedies that governments can adopt to prohibit and challenge 
practices by private enterprises and public authorities that restrict or 
distort the contestability of a territorial market444. There is no single 
harmonized expression of a competition law and not all competition law 
is formalized into statutory schemes445. A number of common-law-style 
legal systems recognize and redress a range of unfair and anti-
competitive trading practices. Many of these overlap with competition 
law and policy considerations.  
 
Where competition law is provided by statutory/legislative 
expression, all or nearly all of these provisions recognize that certain 
types of cartels (collusion among firms) that injuriously fix prices, restrict 
output or allocate portions of the market are unlawful (void) or are made 
actionable. This category is also known as ‘hard-core cartels’ and these 
are generally understood to be without any possibility of legality or 
redemption446. Cartels constitute the most common ‘per se’ prohibition 
within a competition law, where the law itself does not recognize any 
pro-competitive effects to these arrangements that might outweigh the 
injury to competition.  
 
Other agreements among firms may also ‘on balance’ be 
injurious to competition in the market but are not injurious ‘per se’. 
These may be subjected to an assessment by a rule of reason, which is 
a balancing determination made by an agency or by a court, or both. 
Most distribution arrangements (vertical restraints) fall within this group. 
Authorities deal with determinations on ‘competition effects’ by adopting 
exemption rules that recognize the pro-competitive nature of certain 
arrangements when they meet certain qualifications. For laws following 
the European Community (EC) approach, this is normally a test of 
                                                 
444 On the theory of contestable markets and the function of competition laws, see, for example, Whish, R. (1993), 
Competition Law, 3rd Edition, Butterworths, pp. 13–16. 
445 There are of course ‘models’ for competition laws. See UNCTAD Model Law on Competition, TD/RBP/CONF.5/7, at 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/tdrbpconf5d7.en.pdf.  
446 See OECD (1998), Recommendation of the Council Concerning Effective Action Against Hard Core Cartels 
C(98)35/Final, adopted 25 March, 1998.  
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stated positive and negative conditions447. Both the West African 
Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU)448 and the draft Nigerian 
competition law include positive and negative conditions for establishing 
exemptions from the application of a prohibition on certain types of 
agreements449.  
 
A second common element of a competition law provides for 
treatment of dominant positions or more commonly, abuses of 
dominance. These are practices engaged in by a single or collective 
enterprise, within or outside of the territory, with sufficient market power 
upon the territory to restrict the contestability of the market by other 
suppliers. These practices are also normally assessed by a balancing 
test where certain pro-competitive effects of a dominant position may 
also be taken into account. Some developing countries apply market 
share criteria to initially capture a dominant position within the purview 
of its law, and then proceed to analyse it in regard to the abuse.  
 
A number (but not all) of regional systems also seek to address 
public practices that distort competition in the market by the application 
of state aid or subsidies. Some require pre-notification regimes with 
thresholds whereby members are obliged to notify a central authority to 
further determine the legality of the proposed subsidy450. It is also 
possible, as in the UEMOA arrangement, to have a stated prohibition on 
subsidies that are conditioned on exports or that require domestic local 
content. The World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Subsidies 
and Countervailing Measures also considers that subsidies directly 
targeting trade are actionable by countervailing duties or by the 
suspension of bound concessions.  
1.1. Unilateral and preferential trade liberalization 
 
From a competition policy perspective, multilateral or unilateral 
trade liberalization may be most desirable when the tariff cuts made to 
all other countries admit the broadest range of competitors to the local 
market from the widest array of sources. This would tend to minimize 
the risk of firms making new collusions to set cartel prices, or in the case 
                                                 
447 As contained in Article 81 of the EC Treaty.  
448 Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA) in French. 
449 As based on the authors’ field survey reports conducted in the spring and summer of 2006.  
450 The EC state aids regime, for example. 
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of a dominant firm, the risk of a single dominant foreign firm abusing the 
market. This is not to say that inefficient domestic firms should survive 
this new competition, but that the resulting firms in the market should 
trade more competitively. Competition law plays a role in guaranteeing 
that new entrants to the market play by the rules of fair competition and 
in respect to the existing domestic firms as purchasers and consumers.  
 
In a regional trade agreement (RTA), the tariff cuts are not 
made on a unilateral or multilateral basis and the possibility of a larger 
number of foreign producers contesting the market may also be 
reduced. This of course depends on the structure of the regional market 
and the profiles of the producing firms. In a case where two highly 
protected countries form a preferential bilateral tariff cut (to each other 
only), whether the resulting market is more or less competitive 
(contestable) would seem to require more information on the positions 
of the firms and the markets in the region. Preferential trade 
liberalization should not be viewed as automatically giving rise to a more 
contestable market overall. An assessment is needed, inter alia, of the 
number of firms operating in the regional market and whether they can 
combine effectively to set prices or restrict output or segment the 
market. This would also include identifying whether there is a single 
dominant firm from one of the territories that may be capable of 
extending that position across the regional market451.  
 
Thus, the basic argument for regional competition provisions in 
a free-trade area or customs union arrangement is, therefore, that while 
most of the traditional economic literature on welfare gains in regional 
trade liberalization presumes that markets commence and end with 
perfect competition, in the real world this is not necessarily the case. For 
a customs union, the core rationale for a regional competition law 
extends to incorporate the detrimental impact of anti-competitive 
practices on the trade liberalization commitments made by the members 
to achieve free trade. This further emphasizes the elimination of trade 
measures (and their future potential to be used) within a formed single 
customs territory. Since a customs union has the capacity to provide for 
                                                 
451 Generally, Nicolaides, P. (1997), “The Role of Competition Policy in Economic Integration and the Role of Regional 
Blocs in Internationalizing Competition Policy”, in O. Hosle and A. Saether, (eds), Free Trade Agreements and Customs 
Unions, European Commission and EIPA, Brussels, pp. 37–39. “But it is also possible that preferential trade 
liberalization may stimulate cartelization even if an industry of at least one partner country does not have an oligopolistic 
structure at the moment of liberalization.”, at p. 39.  
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the free internal movement for goods of origin, as well as duty-admitted 
third-country goods, the focus is more on eliminating the underlying 
trade distortions caused by anti-competitive practices.  
 
1.1.1. Prices too high 
 
If prices on export trade from one market to another are ‘too 
high’ due to export cartel activity or a cross-border abuse of dominant 
position, this affects the trade between the regional members. The tariff 
cut made by the importing country is allocated not to the import country 
consumers, but to the export country producers. The import country can 
take lawful action against these foreign practices – if it has a functioning 
domestic competition law. Usually, however, investigative information 
gathering and enforcement against foreign actors are very difficult for 
domestic agencies when the evidence lies outside the enforcing 
territory. The more centralized the investigative and enforcement 
mechanism, the more likely it is to capture these practices for a remedy. 
The most ‘decentralized’ approach to this problem relies wholly on 
national laws and agencies, and cooperation between them, in order to 
pass information and other investigatory assistance. A more centralized 
arrangement containing a separate regional law for competition, as well 
as an independent agency, would bypass national authorities altogether 
and independently assert any violation of a regional competition law.  
 
1.1.2. Prices too low 
 
‘Too low’ prices upon export trade, as in the case of dumped 
goods, can also be the result of anti-competitive exclusionary practices 
in the export country. If these firms can successfully dump (price below 
normal value), then they may be operating in a ‘closed’ market whereby 
those dumped goods cannot be re-imported to challenge the local 
prices. If there are no trade barriers in place, this ‘closure’ may be 
operated by a private set of exclusionary practices, perhaps in the form 
of vertical restraints in the distribution system from the producer to the 
ultimate consumer. In such a case, the ‘trade solution’ of ‘parallel 
imports’ cannot be made effective, and this is then a competition law 
problem that affects trade between the Member States. This problem 
can be addressed in the producing territory by the affected foreign firms 
 373 
if there is a competition law that can be invoked against anti-competitive 
vertical restraints and which also guarantees a non-discriminatory right 
of action on behalf of all complainants452.  
 
This remedy is also available in a decentralized scheme relying 
only upon national laws that have a provision to address anti-
competitive exclusionary practices. However, there is an obvious 
tension when there is no competition law in the producing market if the 
other regional members do have competition laws. The overall result is 
potentially highly damaging for both the free-trade regimes and 
economic integration. Firms from those countries without laws can 
effectively dump goods on the other regional members without being 
challenged, other than by the use of a trade remedy. Yet firms from 
regional members with functional competition law can always be 
challenged if they are dumping from behind exclusionary vertical 
restraints. The conflicts caused by the lack of reciprocity in competition 
law remedies may result in some members utilizing destabilizing trade 
measures (such as anti-dumping duties or safeguards), irrespective of 
the tariff-cutting schedule and commitments in the RTA.  
 
Most softer integration systems (non-supranational free-trade 
areas) make some reference to the contribution competition policy can 
make in achieving the objectives of the free-trade commitments. 
National competition laws can contribute to reducing trade frictions even 
when most agreements at this lower level do not seek expressly to 
formulate a competition law remedy for dumping, nor do these 
arrangements even seek to eliminate any or all internal trade measures 
in the form of contingent measures, anti-dumping or safeguards. Most 
stronger or ‘higher-level’ arrangements (customs unions) make some 
attempt to address intra-regional dumping and attempt some link to 
competition law regimes, such as the European Economic Community 
(EEC) Treaty.  
 
There is a stronger argument for an independent regional law 
with a separate regional enforcement authority that can operate without 
relying upon national laws at all, where a customs union has members 
                                                 
452 The EEC Rome Treaty, Article 91 treated dumping practices whereby 
protective measures were permitted during the transition period until the EC 
competition policy was in effect. Member States were also not permitted to 
impose trade restrictions on the re-importation of goods.  
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with strong export potential but these exporter members refuse to enact 
competition law. Nevertheless, it is possible that cooperation between 
national authorities can be sufficient to support a customs union plan. If 
the stronger export members are all willing to operate with a functional 
national competition law, the more decentralized and intergovernmental 
approach to ensuring that trade measures do not undermine the proper 
functioning of the customs union is workable, although some institutional 
overview by some overarching authority might also be necessary to 
keep this lower level of cooperation functioning for the benefit of the 
union.  
 
1.2. Regional approaches, centralized, decentralized and 
‘mixed’  
 
It has become almost the universal practice for both free-trade 
areas and custom union plans to declare that certain anti-competitive 
practices are incompatible with the proper functioning of the agreement 
or contrary to its free-trade objectives. These treaty expressions 
obviously range from ‘very soft’ to ‘very hard’ law. It is doubtful whether 
the softer expressions enunciate any regional principle at all that can 
generate actual legal effects. An example of such a ‘soft’ provision 
would recognize that certain anti-competitive practices will undermine 
the objectives of the RTA members to the treaty, and that the members 
should make (best) efforts to address anti-competitive practices. As it 
stands, this is an aspirational expression; while it may or may not have 
political effects on the behaviour of the members and their laws, it does 
not have legal effects. Other customs unions and common market plans 
contain far stronger expressions that establish an independent regional 
law and then institutional regional power to enforce it. For those 
modelled on the original EEC customs union plan, this is nearly a 
‘boilerplate’ approach.  
 
A ‘mixed’ harmonization model can be identified in some of the 
newer free-trade area plans (north–south in particular). Here the trend is 
to substitute the role of an independent regional law, with more 
provisions on the criteria and performance of the domestic laws. In 
some cases this explicitly requires the establishment of national 
competition laws that can treat cross-border anti-competitive practices 
according to certain substantive and institutional performance 
standards.  
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This study now surveys the range of possibilities available with 
reference to these categories. 
 
1.2.1. A regional law and a centralized authority 
 
Where a regional treaty states a legal expression for anti-
competitive practices that affect trade between the members or distort 
competition within the region, this establishes an independent law and a 
distinct regional jurisdictional scope. This law may overlap with domestic 
competition law (both laws may be applicable in a given case), but has 
its own sphere where it is limited only to treating practices that affect the 
trade between members or injure a portion of the territory beyond the 
boundaries of a single Member State.  
 
This regional law should be directly applicable in the laws of the 
Member States and have a position of superiority to the member’s 
inconsistent legal acts or administrative and court judgements. Such a 
law may or may not be ‘directly effective’ in allowing individual firms or 
citizens to invoke the regional law in the domestic courts of the member 
countries. Where an institutional mechanism is also provided at a 
regional level to conduct investigations, enforce actions and assess and 
levy penalties, then these two features together would describe a fully 
centralized regional system.  
 
Among developing country (customs union) regional 
arrangements, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA) and the WAEMU Treaties appear to provide the basis for 
centralized systems. Their approaches are modelled somewhat on the 
EEC Rome Treaty. The Andean Pact also has strong centralizing 
elements for both regional law and authority. The more centralized 
approaches tend to appear in customs union/common market plans, 
although this may be an historical accident caused by modelling on the 
EEC provisions.  
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1.2.2. A regional law and a partially centralized authority 
 
In this model, the independent regional law is established with 
the elements of direct applicability and superiority, and a central 
authority is also created. However, that authority either does not have 
the full range of powers or is not able to exercise those powers with full 
independence. For example, it may have the power to receive 
complaints and initiate independent investigations, but then be required 
in the first instance to rely upon the Member State authorities and their 
national courts for processing case actions leading to enforcement and 
remedies. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) arrangement as it 
has evolved appears to follow a similar approach. This has a clear 
regional law expressed by treaty provisions dealing with cross-border 
anti-competitive practices. It provides for a regional authority, but this 
authority operates together with Member State authorities. In the case 
where a Member State cannot take action or disagrees with the regional 
authority, a resolution is made after referral to a higher body.  
 
1.2.3. A regional law but no central authority – intergovernmental 
cooperation 
 
Here the independent regional law is expressed by treaty or 
protocol, but the application of the law is left entirely to the Member 
States. Cases can be brought by their authorities, as they also receive 
complaints dealing with regional law violations. The national courts may 
also receive private complaints for violations of regional law. The 
regional level may have an expression of common principles laying out 
the minimum requirements for the domestic laws and procedures, and 
may also prescribe some conditions for encouraging cooperation 
between the Member States. There may also be an intergovernmental 
committee formed to assist the cooperation and attempt to allocate 
investigations and cases among the members. The Mercado Común del 
Sur  (MERCOSUR) competition protocol is a possible example of this 
approach where Member State authorities act together on an 
intergovernmental basis. This approach requires the existence of 
Member State authorities operating under domestic competition laws 
that have been passed and implemented.  
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1.2.4. No regional law but criteria for national law and/or a duty to 
cooperate 
 
Several free-trade areas describe the practices that are 
detrimental to the functioning of the RTA and then call upon Member 
States to implement effective national laws to address these practices 
as they affect trade between the members. This approach does not 
establish a separate regional law at the level of treaty commitments. An 
example of such an approach is found in the Canada–Costa Rica Free 
Trade Agreement, whereby the substantive practices to be covered  by 
a satisfactory domestic law are detailed, including procedural matters 
around transparency and due process (the right to be heard, the right to 
appeal) and national treatment requirements. No cooperation 
mechanism is expressly established, although the potential to engage in 
cooperation among authorities is suggested. A sort of political review 
mechanism (by a free-trade council or association) may be provided to 
occasionally examine the overall functioning of the agreement and its 
provisions. There are some examples of explicit timelines to have 
national laws that can operate to treat certain practices. The EC–South 
Africa agreement provides that the national law shall be made 
operational within three years of entry into force of the agreement. It 
further provides a sort of safeguard or recourse mechanism in the event 
that the national law cannot be implemented.  
 
Another African example of this approach is found in the 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU) Treaty, although with far less 
detail then those above. Here the two-sentence Article 40 states that the 
members shall have competition policies (a treaty obligation) and that 
they shall cooperate in the enforcement of competition laws and 
regulations. While this provision does not establish an independent 
regional law, it does allow for some additional development by protocol 
or otherwise to outline the characteristics of Member State cooperation. 
And while it does not allow for the establishment of a regional authority, 
it does not exclude the possibility of Secretariat assistance to facilitate 
cooperation.  
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2. Minimum requirements: establishing a regional law 
 
2.1. Independent regional law and jurisdictional scope 
 
For a customs union, it is noteworthy that the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Treaty does not contain 
any expression whatsoever regarding anti-competitive practices that 
either affect trade between the members or distort competition in the 
regional market453. The treaty is silent on competition. A core 
recommendation here is that a treaty (protocol) expression should be 
established that includes a distinct substantive law for dealing with anti-
competitive practices as they affect trade between the Member States. 
This law should have the capacity to operate within its own jurisdictional 
scope of application.  
 
2.1.1. Affecting trade and/or affecting regional territory standards 
 
This regional law can be expressed either by reference to 
practices “affecting trade between the members” and/or “affecting all or 
a substantial portion of the region”. There is a difference between the 
two. This study recommends that an ‘affecting trade standard’ is 
essential to set a jurisdiction for applicable regional law, and that the 
desirability of the second standard depends upon the longer-term 
objectives of the ECOWAS. If the Community eventually intends to have 
a centralized apparatus to review mergers or take action against foreign 
practices that affect the region overall (or a substantial portion of it), 
then the second standard would be desirable since it expresses a single 
territory treatment. In this scenario both standards should be stated. If 
the ECOWAS commences implementing common economic and 
monetary policies, then this is also a stronger argument for stating a 
‘territory-wide’ jurisdictional standard in addition to one ‘affecting trade’.  
                                                 
453
 The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Treaty was 
signed by the 15 Member States on 24 July 1993 and is available at 
http://www.sec.ecowas.int/index.html. It was circulated to other WTO members 
by communication to the Committee on Trade and Development on 6 July 2005 
as WT/COMTD/54, 26 September 2005. 
 379 
 
This broader scope of jurisdiction is already seen in the 
WAEMU arrangements where the region is treated as a whole (as a 
single territory), just as this would be expressed in a single national law 
where practices affecting competition ‘in the territory’ are commonly 
treated454. The EC Treaty applies the more traditional ‘affecting trade’ 
expression although this has also been explicitly expanded to an 
‘affecting territory’ dimension for the purposes of merger control. The EC 
external agreements uniformly apply the ‘affecting trade’ standard. An 
expression treating practices affecting the ‘territory as a whole’ is not a 
prerequisite for a regional competition policy. A standard based upon 
‘affecting trade between the members’ is a prerequisite for a regional 
legal expression that sets a field of play for a regional law and legal 
action against any anti-competitive practices affecting trade.  
 
In order to have effects in the Community legal order, the 
expression of jurisdictional power has to be made at the level of treaty 
obligation. For the ECOWAS, this would be accomplished by a protocol 
that added treaty articles within a section dealing with and entitled 
‘competition policy’. It is believed here that the independence and 
jurisdictional basis for a regional competition law cannot be promulgated 
by a Community regulation, directive or decision. These legal acts would 
be used to implement substantive standards and institutional features, 
but the legal basis of the law itself should be generated at the treaty-
making level. For the ECOWAS, this suggests a protocol that provides 
amendments to the existing treaty delineating the addition of 
competition law articles to the treaty.  
 
2.1.2. Zones of jurisdiction – Member States and Community 
 
It is clear that the jurisdictional lines between regional and state 
territory have to be clear and well prescribed. However, in a number of 
regional and federal systems this jurisdictional line has also evolved 
                                                 
454
 1994 Agreement for the West African Economic and Monetary Union, signed 
by eight Member States, and as revised in 2003 (UMOA and UEMOA). The 
1994 Agreement was circulated to WTO members via the Committee on Trade 
and Development as WT/COMTD/23, 23 February 2000. The 2003 revised 
treaty is dated 29 January 2003 and is provided on the WAEMU web site 
(French) available at http://www.uemoa.int/index.htm.  
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over time as a result of the cases and interpretations made by the 
authorities and the courts. There are always cases where an ‘affecting 
trade’ and an ‘affecting the national territory’ standard both apply. And 
there are a number of jurisdictions (regional and domestic) where 
remedies taken in one system do not preclude action and remedies 
being taken in the other. The United States is one example where there 
is often a concurrent action taken by an individual state (affecting 
competition in the territory of the state) while the federal power is also 
being applied according to either an ‘affecting trade between the states’ 
standard or with respect to the larger US territory.  
 
The original EEC construction provided for a first enforcement 
regulation, 17/62, and attempted to define several types of cases that 
could not be considered as ‘affecting trade’ between the members, for 
example where the subject firms were all based within a single Member 
State and the practices did not relate directly to imports or exports. Over 
time that expression did not serve so well for court interpretations 
dealing with the rise of the ‘internal market’ concept. In legal practice, 
the court has tended to grant quite a broader scope for ‘affecting trade’. 
While this has assisted the development and application of regional law, 
it has not tended to stimulate the Member States in applying their own 
national laws. Over time this situation has also evolved as the Member 
States have more actively pursued actions also contemplated by the 
Community, but in regard to their own unique legal effects upon the 
Member State territories.  
 
There are inevitable overlaps between the two levels of 
competition law. Rather than attempt to prescribe a precise line between 
them, it is more important to recognize that concurrent jurisdiction is not 
necessarily a problem to be avoided. What is recommended is for both 
a final arbiter of the Community’s regional scope of application in the 
event of clear conflicts of application, and a cooperation mechanism that 
can help allocate cases between regional and national levels. The initial 
management of conflict can be addressed by a Commission or regional 
authority in respect of any particular case (if so empowered), but there 
must also be an ultimate arbiter to rule in the event of conflicts between 
laws. This function is traditionally held by the superior court, in the case 
of the ECOWAS – the Community Court of Justice – either on the basis 
of preliminary opinions, appeals, or cases of original jurisdiction. This 
standard, as with any standard, calls upon the court to interpret the 
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scope of a regional zone of jurisdictional action for regional competition 
law application.  
 
This is not so much a delimitation between state and region, 
since the Community Court does not have the jurisdiction to instruct the 
state law as to its proper scope of application. This is an issue that is for 
the national court to determine. The only matter of issue before the 
Community Court is the proper definition of the zone of authority for the 
regional law. If this results in overlap and concurrent exercise of power, 
then no matter.  
 
Identifying the zone of authority of a regional legal expression 
can also be prescribed by a Council Regulation that sets out the powers 
and activities undertaken according to the regional treaty law (protocol). 
This regulation can set de minimis levels of turnover (below which trade 
between the states is not deemed to be affected) and it can also 
establish the exemptions from regional law for small and medium-sized 
enterprises (by which their agreements are deemed to not appreciably 
affect trade between the Member States).  
 
2.2. Prescribed anti-competitive practices: stated 
prohibitions applying to private and public practices 
 
Practices that are recognized by members as injurious to trade 
between the states must be enunciated at the level of treaty law 
(protocol); however, a regional law is chosen to be made enforceable 
within the Community. As a basic point of departure and 
recommendation, the private practices listed both in Nigeria’s proposed 
law and the existing WAEMU law also reflect current EC Treaty practice 
and the EC external relations (trade agreements) practice. These are 
the obvious candidates for a regional statement of prohibited and 
actionable practices. The argument being made here is to set the listing 
of practices as close as possible to the existing WAEMU and the draft 
Nigerian laws. Since any competition provision likely to emerge in an 
EC–ECOWAS Economic Partnership Agreement will also contain a 
listing for cartels, abuse of dominant position, and possibly a rule of 
reason for pro-competitive vertical restraints, the use of these 
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expressions for the anti-competitive practices to be treated should be a 
‘given’455.  
 
There can be an issue over whether the standard details that 
the practices are ‘prohibited’ or ‘incompatible’ or ‘actionable’. The 
recommendation here is that a prohibition against injurious practices be 
clearly stated, as in the EC Treaty formulation. This establishes a 
stronger basis for the superiority of Community law and the obligation 
for the national courts and authorities to apply it. Agreements that fall 
within the prohibition should be stated as being ‘void’ and without legal 
effect in the Community either in the treaty or the supplementing 
regulation. The ‘agreements’ and ‘practices’ covered within the listing 
should be broad enough to cover any and all agreements or practices 
that detrimentally (or appreciably) affect trade between the states. Any 
further delineation to excuse practices should be undertaken according 
to negotiated exemptions for a Council Regulation. A common 
exemption made for this purpose is a labour agreement. It is not 
common practice for a regulation to exempt industry association 
agreements and it is not a common treaty expression to see any 
particular reference to association agreements being ‘less actionable’ in 
principle than any other restrictive agreement. The better principle is for 
the treaty to cast a clearly stated but ‘wide net’ as to the practices to be 
treated.  
 
The listed practices and prohibitions should be applied without 
distinction, at the treaty level, to both private and public practices. Public 
practices present a myriad of complexities that have to be resolved as 
an ongoing activity of the Community and its Member States. However, 
in principle, they should be fully captured by the primary treaty 
expression when they fall within the legal standard of affecting the trade 
between the members. Otherwise, there is no legal basis to raise and 
assess public practices via a Community apparatus, and even 
cooperative approaches to dealing with public practices will not likely 
move forward. For these areas, there is a risk of distorting the field of 
play where one type of practice or agreement is singled out for some 
better treatment (as in the form of an immunity) at the treaty level. The 
                                                 
455
 Nigeria summary drawn from HB 70, as published in the Nigeria Official 
Gazette, Vol. 92, Vol. 42, 10 June 2005. An English summation of the WAEMU 
competition law can be found at, OECD, Global Forum on Competition, 
Submission by WAEMU, 13 February 2004, CCNM/GF/COMP/WD(2004)31.  
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treaty should not distort the field between private or public practices and 
nor should it distort it between cartels and associations.  
2.3. Community measure of damages 
 
The regulation giving effect to a regional law should enunciate 
the legal effect of agreements that violate the treaty provisions. This 
regulation should make it clear that such agreements are not 
enforceable within the national courts, i.e. that they are ‘void’ in respect 
of the listed practices. In addition to this, the regulation should include 
criteria for assessing injuries and calling for fines and penalties for anti-
competitive practices. These penalties should be set in such a manner 
that they provide guidance to a national court in forming orders. The 
measure of damages established should ensure that wrongdoers are 
penalized for past practices in a manner that would not reward them or 
where they are able to ‘break even’ for the rents they have secured from 
the practices.  
2.4. Rule-of-reason considerations 
 
2.4.1. Vertical restraints 
 
There are detailed theoretical arguments that can be made over 
the advisability of stating any prohibition for vertical restrictions and 
exclusionary practices, and various tests can be raised that apply to 
dominance and the nature of its abuse. The two more comprehensive 
laws in place (WAEMU and the legislation as proposed for Nigeria) 
currently apply the ‘negative and positive’ criteria approach for rule-of-
reason assessments for pro-competitive vertical restraints. And for the 
treaty expression, it is recommended that this is the better approach. 
The practices themselves are covered by the prohibition, but then can 
be validated by consideration of the rule of reason. This follows the 
‘wider net’ for regional law. The ‘formula’ for the negative and positive 
criteria to revalidate contractual restrictions has permitted decision 
makers and the courts to develop a respectable body of law regarding 
vertical restraints, which is available for reference in the ECOWAS 
context. This approach also sets a clear legal basis for a regulation to 
come forward over time to enunciate block and group exemptions 
meeting the criteria of these listed tests.  
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2.4.2. Dominance and abuse 
 
Issues on dominance in the market and abuse are also 
constantly debated among developed and developing authorities. The 
most developed jurisdictions recognize that even highly concentrated 
monopoly firms may not be engaging in abuse if complex markets for 
technology innovations can render a determination of abuse redundant 
even before it is finalized. Developing countries can examine the earlier 
approaches applied to abuse of dominance by those same developed 
country authorities and courts. These allowed for market share 
expressions and particular practices that in combination with high 
concentrations indicated an initial finding of abuse. To attempt any more 
in a developing country arrangement, where the national courts will also 
be playing a role, may overextend the capacity of a regional competition 
law at the outset. A regulation can enunciate the criteria and can be 
amended over time to reflect the status of the evolution within the 
Community and its capacity to assess efficiencies generated by 
dominant firms. The developmental and resource dimension is clearly a 
consideration in this field and it does not seem appropriate here to 
prejudge the evolution of law in this context.  
 
2.5. Governmental practices  
 
Two areas that require further consideration are state aids and 
public practices, including government enterprise schemes and 
governmental grants of special and exclusive rights. Unfortunately, they 
are beyond the scope of this study and there is no shorthand 
prescription to deal with the considerations for any of these subjects. 
The issues that would have to be taken into account in the relationship 
between a regional law and domestic industrial policies include 
enterprise activities (special and exclusive rights) and state aids. 
 
2.5.1. Enterprise activities – special and exclusive rights 
 
Governmental grants of monopolies and the variety of joint 
enterprise schemes between government and private firms should be 
captured by the general treaty expression. That is, injurious public 
practices affecting trade between the Member States are as actionable 
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as purely private practices. Any other treatment at the treaty level will 
distort the types of measures and practices being undertaken in the 
Community where private arrangements can be shifted to governmental 
and quasi-governmental arrangements. By clearly providing application 
of Community law at the treaty level from the outset to all practices and 
agreements, the legal basis is clarified for later regulations to reflect the 
considerations of the members regarding exemptions and exceptions. 
These can be developed in a process of transparent inventory 
(disclosure) and classification of what activities the Member States are 
engaged in that may actually detrimentally affect trade within the region. 
This is essentially a negotiating terrain that also touches directly upon 
economic development activities. However, it should be engaged within 
the context of Community law application at the outset. Public and 
private practices should be equally addressed without distinction in the 
law of the treaty.  
 
2.5.2. State aids 
 
For state aids, a WAEMU legal prohibition provides an initial, 
sensible expression so that a member’s subsidy falls within the 
prohibition when granted upon (made conditional upon) exportation to 
other members, or made conditional upon the purchase of local content. 
Both of these types of subsidies are so trade distorting that they clearly 
also fall within the actionable provisions prohibitions in the original 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The members should 
proscribe these practices as prohibitive in the treaty.  
 
An additional complementary approach is also suggested by 
reference to the WTO Subsidies Agreement. While this only applies to 
trade in goods, there is no reason why it cannot be incorporated at the 
regional level for its standards, and also extended to apply to services 
as well. By a Council Regulation, the ECOWAS can ‘reference’ its 
Community law to the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and can state the 
WTO articles that are being adopted for the purposes of Community 
law. This provides a definitional set of terms for what constitutes 
actionable subsidies and provides the elements for tests dealing with 
specificity and injury. The WTO regime is closely modelled on EC state 
aid practice and has been found to be workable in the panel and 
appellate body cases that have come through since the WTO 
agreement entered into force. Where the members understand that 
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there is a need for greater flexibility for exempting subsidies (in relation 
to regional development, poverty alleviation, environmental concerns, 
etc.), than is currently provided for in the WTO agreement , then the 
Council Regulation can define the terms of agreement between the 
members as to the types of subsidies that should be made non-
actionable or adjust the burden of proof in such cases as they wish.  
 
The EC state aids system provides for value thresholds and an 
obligation of notification of subsidies to a central authority. That authority 
has the power to make a decision, which can be appealed to the 
Community Court i.e. the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Since the 
EC Member States are also members of the WTO, their notifications to 
the EC Commission are also compiled and notified to the WTO. EC 
Member States have had little difficulty in managing the two applicable 
regimes. ECOWAS members are also members of the WTO and have 
the same notification obligations. Developing countries are no longer 
exempt from the Subsidies Agreement, although differential provisions 
still remain for least-developed countries (LDCs).  
 
A Council Regulation for state aids should therefore be 
established that can incorporate the primary elements of the WTO 
system (by reference), apply it to services as well as goods, and 
establish a Community notification and decision-making instrument. 
Provisions should also be made for LDCs and for non-actionable 
subsidies.  
2.6. Merger control 
 
There is a good argument for regional merger control and for a 
system of pre-notification and clearance as the region develops a 
territorial identity and attracts investment from firms doing business ‘in 
the market’. While many criticisms are made of developing countries 
operating pre-notification systems, the value of pre-notification is also 
noted for developing country and regional authorities that receive 
(without having to investigate) ‘free’ information on proposed 
concentrations and the markets upon which they operate. Developed 
country practitioners are critical of the proliferation of notification 
systems. But for developing countries, there is a potential windfall in 
market information generated by notices. Moreover, since developing 
country (or regional) authorities are actually responsible for the quality of 
competition upon their territories, notification systems allow them to 
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respond to new concentrations that affect their legitimate legal domains 
in the same manner as such systems operate to inform developed 
country authorities.  
 
Where a pre-notification and clearance system operates in line 
with accepted international principles (as enunciated by members of the 
International Competition Network (ICN) for example), there can also be 
an extended benefit for regional and international firms that can exercise 
a single notice system for the region when their arrangements affect 
more than one Member State. Similarly, a regional system allows the 
smaller states to have access to a set of remedies for mergers 
substantially restricting competition in their national markets without the 
necessity of establishing a domestic control apparatus. A final positive 
effect for regional merger control is that it allows the region itself to 
defend its territorial interests in the external competition policy arena.  
 
To provide for the possibility of regional merger control over 
time, the jurisdictional standard in the treaty should refer to agreements 
‘affecting the territory’ or a substantial portion of it, as discussed in the 
section above. The administrative load on a pre-clearance system is 
high and a decision to adopt merger control strongly suggests the 
necessity of a centralized authority at the Community level capable of 
working in very short time frames. However, it is also conceivable that 
some elements of regional merger control can be facilitated by an 
intergovernmental group of existing national authorities (or advisory 
group) in cooperation with the Commission. Although there are 
confidentiality issues presented by these approaches, in principle it is 
also possible for a single member that already has a notification and 
clearance system to share the non-confidential components of a 
concentration with the other members, and then either cooperate on the 
review of a concentration to the extent that it affects the other members, 
or possibly to vet the merger in respect of the other territories. This is a 
high form of intergovernmental cooperation and requires structured 
intergovernmental or agency arrangements. An intergovernmental group 
of existing authorities can also be established to consider and 
recommend a more detailed approach to regional merger control for the 
Community that can form the basis for a regulation at a later time456.  
                                                 
456
 For a similar proposal as applied to MERCOSUR, see Mathis, J. (1998), 
Issues in Regional Merger Control, Journal of World Competition, 21/3, pp. 29–
44. 
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Although a regional merger control approach may not be viewed 
as a first priority within a regional competition law, the groundwork 
should be laid by cooperative action of the Member States that is both 
substantive for dealing with current mergers that affect the region, and 
that works prospectively with a view to recommendations for a regional 
system of merger control.  
 
3. Minimum requirements – Application of community law  
 
3.1. Introduction – a system of private rights enforcement 
 
This section examines the application of ECOWAS law within 
the legal regimes of the Member States, with an emphasis on 
application of the law by private rights of action and recourse. While this 
discussion is closely related to that of a regional institutional 
mechanism, such as establishing an ECOWAS authority or advisory 
grouping, the focus of this section is on the application of the regional 
law as it relates to the Member States.  
 
The 1993 ECOWAS Treaty and the revisions undertaken by 
decision and protocol in 2006 together clearly establish the superiority of 
ECOWAS Community law. This indicates that the treaty provisions and 
the regulations drawn up by the Council according to the ECOWAS 
Treaty are already ‘generally applicable’ within each of the Member 
State legal regimes, and are therefore binding upon the agencies and 
the national courts of the members. Thus, where a national court or 
authority is presented with a question of Community law, Community 
law should be applied. Where an authority or court is presented with a 
possible conflict between national and Community law, it should resolve 
that conflict in light of the superiority of Community law457.  
 
These points of general application and superiority of regional 
law appear clear from the ECOWAS Treaty as it stands. However, these 
                                                 
457
 ECOWAS Treaty as cited above. Binding effects on Member States are set 
out in Article 9 for Authority Decisions, Article 12 for Council Regulations, and 
Article 15 for Court judgments.  
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two aspects also raise questions on the application of a regional 
competition law:  
 
1) Who can invoke the law within the national systems? 
2) Before which national authorities can the law be invoked? 
3) How can a uniform application of regional law be 
guaranteed by the Member State courts and authorities?  
4) What ultimate rights should be accorded at regional level to 
redress improper applications or non–applications of 
Community law?  
5) What is the position of UEMOA competition law in the 
ECOWAS legal order for these purposes?  
 
This discussion focuses on the application of law without 
reference to a regional authority except where the absence of a regional 
authority has a bearing on the issue or the recommendation.  
 
3.2. The argument for direct effect of regional competition 
law before national courts and authorities: who can invoke 
the law? 
 
Superiority and general application are not the same as granting 
an individual direct effect in the legal order of the Member States. 
Because the existing treaty indicates the superiority of Community acts, 
it is clear that national courts are obliged to apply the law. However, this 
is not the same thing as granting a party the right to invoke the 
Community law as expressed within the treaty articles before the 
national court or authority. The legal basis to invoke the law directly 
within a national court stems from the nature of the treaty rights and 
obligations and their implications for affecting and conferring individual 
rights, but there is no expression in the ECOWAS Treaty stating that its 
regional laws shall have direct effect.  
 
The EC Treaty does not provide for direct effect of its regional 
competition law either. This development occurred (early on for 
competition law provisions) by the action of the European Court of 
Justice interpreting the treaty provisions as they were raised in actual 
 390 
disputes, and then ruling that the competition provisions conferred direct 
rights for individual action. The ECOWAS Community Court has this 
incumbent (inherent) power to interpret the treaty and reach the same 
result. Arguably, so do the national courts, which also have a duty to 
apply Community law and could rule on an issue of direct effect if and 
when presented in a case.  
 
However, the ECOWAS structure has two differences that may 
delay a court interpretation granting direct effect for regional competition 
law. Since access to the ECOWAS Court is limited to actions brought by 
states, such an interpretive issue may be avoided by the states in their 
decision to press a case. Similarly, since the ECOWAS Commission 
cannot bring an action to the court, this avenue for raising direct effect 
also may not be utilized. Nevertheless, the issue is still likely to arise in 
private contractual enforcement actions in the Member States. The 
example would be where a respondent in a private contract action 
defends against the enforceability of the contract terms by asserting its 
illegality under ECOWAS regional law. At this point a national court will 
refer to the superior ECOWAS regional law, and will have to decide 
whether or not a respondent has an individual right to invoke the treaty 
provisions or the terms of a Council Regulation. While the rights to seek 
a preliminary opinion from the ECOWAS Court are also not settled by 
the treaty or the Council/Court Regulation either, there is the possibility 
of inconsistent rulings on this point from different national courts. The 
possible absence of a regional authority that can receive private 
complaints and can rule on cases pushes the argument more strongly in 
favour of a clear declaration of direct effect in the national systems.  
 
3.3. Before which state authorities can the law be invoked? 
 
As noted above, the issue of direct effect can arise in a private 
contract dispute before a national court. It can also arise in an agency 
enforcement action under national law where the respondent pleaded 
an inconsistency with Community law, or sought to make a counterclaim 
against the moving complainant as based solely on Community law. 
There are states that have no competition laws, and the states 
themselves choose the means by which to implement their national laws 
– either by using an agency model exclusively or by installing a 
regulation that is to be mainly applied by the national courts. 
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The various combinations possible suggest that the level of 
direct effect that is to be granted to individuals within the region should 
be done without regard to the existence of national competition laws, or 
the means by which they are implemented by the national systems. This 
would mean that where a state has not passed a national law 
whatsoever, a private party could still assert (and defend) a claim based 
on an ECOWAS regional law in the courts of that state. Similarly, where 
a state has chosen to have an exclusive agency model (all competition 
complaints must be made solely to the authority), one can still not 
discount the possibility of defences being raised in private national court 
actions that seek to invoke Community law. That is, direct effect should 
be granted in respect of all courts and authorities within the Member 
States and not be limited solely to competition authorities alone or to 
those states that have competition authorities.  
3.4. Can a uniform application of regional law among the 
Member States be guaranteed?  
 
If the Community law is generally applicable – which it is – and 
the national courts have an obligation to apply it (irrespective of who can 
invoke it), then the national courts will also be required to interpret the 
Community law. The uniformity of this application, which is the ability to 
apply it consistently from one court to another and from one Member 
State to another, is an absolute priority for the legitimate grounding of a 
regional legal system. Without uniformity of application of the regional 
law, the system cannot be made functional and it cannot be relied upon 
to distribute rights and obligations according to the treaty provisions.  
 
There are several means by which uniformity can be promoted, 
and all are relevant for any regional system that has established a 
regional court. A first one is to allow a right of appeal to the regional 
court from a national court ruling, normally from the highest national 
court. A second is to provide the right of a national court to request and 
receive a preliminary opinion from the regional court on matters of 
interpretation and application of the regional law. A third is to allow 
certain actions to have original jurisdiction before the regional court. A 
final area is more ‘guidance oriented’ where a regional agency or body 
issues papers and notices expressing its understanding for points of 
interpretation of the regional law.  
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The ECOWAS Treaty does not provide for a right of access to 
the regional court for any party other than a Member State acting 
individually or collectively by the Authority. If this limitation cannot be 
revisited in the context of developing regional competition law, then the 
emphasis has to be placed on a preliminary opinion procedure. The 
ECOWAS Council already has this right secured by the treaty (for the 
purpose of ‘advisory opinion’), and what is proposed here is that this 
should be extended to the national courts for any case where a treaty 
article or a Council legal act is raised in a national proceeding. For the 
purposes of judicial efficiency, this power to request preliminary opinions 
should not be limited to the highest national court but the lower courts 
should also be able to obtain the regional court’s interpretation and then 
insert that opinion into the domestic legal proceeding. A preliminary 
opinion procedure within the ECOWAS is therefore a minimum 
requirement to ensure the uniform application of regional law.  
 
3.5. What ultimate rights should be accorded to redress 
incorrect application or non-application of Community law? 
 
The ECOWAS Treaty confers a right of action before the 
regional court to the Member States or to the Authority458. It also may 
appear that a state can bring an action on behalf of a private party 
before the regional court. There is no other regional institutional entity 
that can bring an action before the ECOWAS Court against a state or a 
private individual459. This final question opens the door to a discussion 
on a regional enforcement mechanism and the balance between 
institutional power and private rights that may be set under a regional 
competition law. It can be argued that where there is no regional 
authority that can form a claim against a Member State to enforce 
compliance with Community law, that the final acts of securing legal 
remedies should be strengthened at the level of appeal from the highest 
national court. Where there is an independent enforcement mechanism 
established at the Community level, then an alternative and final remedy 
to challenge a state would be available.  
 
                                                 
458
 ECOWAS Treaty as cited above, Article 76, Settlement of Disputes. 
459
 The Council is given the right by the ECOWAS Treaty to request advisory 
opinions from the court. Article 10(3)(h).  
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This existing structure strongly suggests that the substantive 
treaty rights being created by the ECOWAS are essentially only being 
granted to the Member States and not to the firms that are seeking to 
trade in the ECOWAS regional market, nor to the ECOWAS institutions 
that have some limited mandate to make effective the treaty rules and 
the Council Regulations460. While this approach preserves the maximum 
amount of sovereignty for the members in the execution of the 
ECOWAS regional plan, it does not bode well for the ability of ECOWAS 
law to obtain a sufficient degree of independence from national law or to 
develop a system of recourse for continuing violations of the regional 
law.  
 
The situation appears to be even less conducive to the interests 
of foreign firms who do business within the ECOWAS, since those firms 
would have to convince a Member State to bring the action on its behalf 
before the regional court. In addition to the possibility that this might be 
discriminatory in any external agreement (the EC and an Economic 
Partnership Agreement (EPA), or even under WTO rules for national 
treatment), it is also a serious defect in the structure of the treaty and 
the institutional powers of its high court. The value of this limitation on 
actions is questionable, if the preservation of Member State sovereignty 
is balanced against the functioning of the market rules for the customs 
union and the political downside of having these disputes forced to be 
generated at such a high political level. The evidence suggests that 
there is little likelihood of resetting the ECOWAS Court authority to hear 
original claims or appeals by any party other than a state in respect of a 
potential ECOWAS competition law. Other possibilities must be 
considered for a competition regime because the limitation of actions 
before the ECOWAS Court will cause problems both internally for the 
Member States and externally for the trading partners as the customs 
union becomes more complete. Thus, a right of final appeal for issues 
dealing solely with ECOWAS law should be granted from the national 
                                                 
460
 The powers of the ECOWAS Commission (formerly entitled the Executive 
Secretary) are provided in Article 19 of the ECOWAS Treaty. Subsection 3(a) 
states that the Commission has the duty of ‘execution of decisions taken by the 
Authority and application of the regulations of the Council’. We do not read this 
provision as granting the Commission the power to make a claim against a 
Member State in the regional court. The Council itself (the higher legislative 
authority) is only granted power to request an advisory opinion from the court. 
We do not offer an opinion on whether a regulation that did convey such a 
power to the Commission would be in violation of the Treaty provisions.  
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court of final jurisdiction to the Community Court. This should be 
provided by a treaty provision or by a decision of the authority of the 
Heads of State.  
 
3.6. The position of WAEMU competition law in the ECOWAS 
legal order 
 
Within the ECOWAS arrangement, the WAEMU is also a 
regional grouping. From a territorial perspective, the WAEMU is a 
distinct customs territory within the larger (forming) customs territory of 
the ECOWAS. For competition law, the WAEMU has all the 
characteristics of a single national territory, with its own high court 
providing for the superior application of its regional law in respect of its 
own members and as applicable across the entire WAEMU regional 
territory. This structure appears to be so identical to the position of a 
single Member State (with full state territorial powers) within a regional 
grouping, that for all practical purposes the WAEMU should be treated 
as a single state (customs territory) entity in respect of a created 
ECOWAS regional law. Just as ECOWAS law would be superior and 
binding on the individual Member States, so would it also be applied to 
the customs territory of the WAEMU. ECOWAS law already has 
superiority over the individual Member State laws within the region and 
must be applied by the courts and agencies of the states. This same 
general applicability and superiority of ECOWAS regional law would 
apply to the WAEMU territory just as it applies to the state territories of 
the WAEMU members. Any other interpretation of the ECOWAS Treaty 
would nullify its provisions stating that ECOWAS law has a binding 
effect on the Member States.  
 
4. Regional bodies and institutional control  
4.1. The argument for regional authority 
 
A diffuse system of treaty law application by individuals before 
national courts and authorities can underpin an operational and 
functional regional legal order, just as private rights of action operate to 
ensure the legal security of law and remedies in many domestic legal 
systems. In competition law, this area of private action is probably most 
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effective in addressing exclusionary practices and abuses of supply 
chain dominance where complainants can more easily identify the 
contractual practice that is affecting their commerce and bring that 
practice before a court or authority for a legal assessment and action. A 
system of private rights can also capture many of the minor actions that 
otherwise fall below the ‘radar screen’ of competition authority attention. 
This is positive for building and reinforcing a set of market rules and 
principles that contribute to economic development where smaller 
players and markets create local economic and commercial growth. 
Many developing (and developed) countries have long provided for such 
types of private actions at the lowest possible court levels where claims 
for the ‘refusal to supply’ or ‘unfair contract terms’ overlap the subject 
areas of competition law.  
 
In different subject areas and within larger regional or 
international markets, private rights of action are also understood to be 
insufficient to provide a reasonable prospect of implementing and 
enforcing competition law. Private actors find it difficult to obtain 
information on anti-competitive practices generally, but on cross-border 
cartel activity in particular. Cartels do not operate in public for obvious 
reasons and the information needed to bring them to the surface for 
remedial action requires investigatory power, expertise and resources. It 
is a rare case where a cartel is disclosed by the investigatory efforts of a 
private individual or firm. The vast majority of these cases are the result 
of agency investigations, and increasingly those with the power to 
operate amnesty and whistle blower programmes.  
 
A similar gap occurs in anti-competitive practices which, while 
affecting the downstream purchasing firms, are also able to be passed 
along to the ultimate consumer who is ultimately the injured party. 
Where cartels or abusive practices can be relayed to the largest national 
and regional consumer markets, the losses to the consumer are high 
and yet the capacity of individual injured consumers to identify the 
practices and develop complaints before national courts is low.  
 
4.2. Competition authorities and core powers 
 
A brief examination of the types of powers granted to 
independent competition authorities provides some insight into the 
implications of considering an independent regional authority. The 
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enumerated powers listed below are drawn from the original 
enforcement regulation of the EEC, Regulation 17/62. According to the 
regulation and operation of Community law, all powers enumerated are 
made subject to review on appeal by the European Court of Justice.  
 
• Investigations: 
 
- to issue written requests for information to be received 
from the Member States, private firms and associations  
- to assess penalties in the event of non-compliance with 
the Commission’s request for information 
- to initiate independent investigations within the Member 
States upon notice to the member. The right to obtain 
the cooperation of the member’s own domestic search 
and warrant system is specified. This includes the 
power to enter business premises according to national 
law and to examine books and records, and to request 
explanations on the spot 
- to assess penalties for providing misleading or false 
information to the investigators  
 
• Decision making and adjudication: 
 
- to conduct hearings and compel testimony according to 
due process rights to submit and to be heard  
- to issue a decision that a practice infringes the treaty 
and to order that the practice be brought to an end 
- to determine that a practice does not fall within the 
treaty prescriptions and the power to issue exemptions 
on a case-by-case basis 
 
• Remedies: 
 
- to determine and assess fines for infringements of the 
treaty according to the governing regulation, 
 
There are important differences between a regional competition 
regime and a regional trade regime where practices being addressed in 
competition have a strong private nature (as addressing private firms 
and private behaviour), and where the interaction between a regional 
enforcement system and private economic actors is brought directly into 
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play. Another difference shown between a competition and a trade 
regime is that the realm of investigatory power is enlarged in the 
competition field. For governmental trade measures that may violate the 
commitments of the treaty, there is not the same need to build evidence 
of the practices involved or for the need to compel documents or 
testimony in order to disclose the practice and prove a case. 
 
4.3. Policy proposals 
 
4.3.1. For a fully functional and independent competition commission 
 
The establishment of an independent institutional power 
considers the balance to be set between a regional authority and the 
Member States as they are represented in the regional legislative 
domain of the Council. This is fundamentally a question of balance 
between executive enforcement power and legislative oversight power. 
As such, while the questions addressed are ‘legal’ to the extent that they 
deal with institutional design, they are also obviously political in 
determining the degree of independence of a regional executive 
enforcement authority and the degree of residual sovereignty to be held 
by the Member States controlling the pace of regional integration. What 
is ‘best’ for integration and what is ‘possible’ for integration present 
mixed questions of law and politics.  
 
The case for a fully functional and independent regional 
competition authority to deal with the functions that are enumerated 
above is based in a large part on the nature of competition law 
enforcement itself. This presents unique issues in cross-border cases 
that cannot be easily resolved by sole reference to national authority 
power and private actions. Recognizing that the existing ECOWAS 
Treaty structure cannot accommodate this degree of independence, the 
functions of a competition commission should be based outside the 
existing commission structure, in a separate commission or authority. 
This is similar to many national competition authorities where the mix of 
functions for investigation, decision making and adjudication renders 
them somewhat different from many other executive branch activities. In 
this sense, a competition commission is more of a complete or ‘closed’ 
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system touching upon elements that also include rule making 
(legislative) as well as judicial (adjudication) aspects.  
 
While the lower ECOWAS institutions do not have any direct 
access to the regional court, the review or appeal of the authority’s 
decisions should be located in the apparatus of the Council. This power 
should be exercised by majority voting or by a reverse consensus 
procedure. The Council does have the power to seek advisory opinions 
from the court in its operations and this power can also be used in 
dealing with the review of an independent commission’s activities on 
particular cases. If the review power is to be held by the Council, then 
the voting aspect of this regional system is critical. If the Member States 
insist on retaining individual veto power over the decisions and 
proposed actions of a regional authority, then a functional regional 
authority cannot emerge with any sufficient independence to perform the 
tasks necessary to give effect to a regional competition law. An authority 
should not be established if a single member veto is retained.  
 
4.3.2. For an advisory panel with power to refer actions 
 
At the other end of the spectrum, the already intergovernmental 
character of the ECOWAS structure allows for the creation of an 
‘advisory panel’ of individual experts or representatives of the national 
authorities to receive complaints by referral from the existing 
Commission. The panel would then refer matters to the Member State 
competition authorities for legal action. The minimum performance 
characteristics of national laws would be set out by the ECOWAS 
(probably by Council Regulation) and there would be minimum 
requirements imposed for convergence regarding the practices to be 
treated by the laws and the definitions for exemptions.  
 
In this approach, the power to receive complaints and to refer to 
national authorities would be (more or less) the extent of the regional 
authority power with respect to the prosecution of individual cases. A 
failure of a member to address an action referred to it by the authority 
could be the subject of an advisory panel’s follow-up report to the 
Council and the Council would have the power to address the Member 
State or to make an additional report that serves as information to the 
Heads of State. The advisory panel could have some power of 
coordination with the national authorities and there could also be some 
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recognized potential to assist in the allocation of particular cases or to 
facilitate cooperation (information sharing) instruments as these may be 
developed.  
 
Additionally, the remaining functions of the advisory panel would 
be more similar to a system of peer review. This would include the 
ability to survey the functioning of the Member State laws in a manner 
that would isolate the points where the law was not being implemented 
or applied, or was not adequately applying or addressing Community 
law violations, or where the law was not being accorded on the basis of 
national treatment (in respect to the rights of foreign complainants or 
granting more favourable treatment of domestic firms).  
 
4.3.3. Small economies and LDCs  
 
The approach suggested above relies upon national law and 
authority to render case action effective. The contentious issue here is 
whether or not LDCs and the smallest economies should be required to 
have any competition law at national level. The resource drain for 
implementing national laws is demanding and some countries’ 
resources are possibly better spent either in dealing with localized unfair 
trading practices or in promoting higher levels of consumer protection. 
Furthermore, the current emphasis is on regulatory policies that have a 
more direct relationship to meeting the demands of poverty alleviation 
and the other millennium goals. Any system that requires a Member 
State to have a national law should be examined in this context, since 
the recommendation to have a law is establishing a national regulatory 
priority, and obviously at the expense of some other priority.  
 
While these smaller LDCs are also clearly affected by domestic 
and external anti-competitive practices, their best opportunity for 
recourse lies in a regional authority that can take care of their interests, 
especially those anti-competitive practices originating in the other 
Member States or internationally. Similarly, where their own firms may 
be engaging in exclusionary practices to the detriment of other regional 
member firms, a regional authority can also deal with those issues 
according to the treaty law without the need for an LDC to create a 
separate national law. Also, as a practical matter, in the smallest of 
markets where consumption and production levels are low, it may well 
be the case that most of the exclusionary practices engaged in within 
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these LDCs would fall below the regional turnover thresholds for 
application of Community law or fall within the exemptions for small and 
medium-sized enterprises.  
 
4.3.4. Large economies and non-implementation  
 
The smallest territories can be significantly hurt in an 
intergovernmental referral apparatus if the largest territory markets do 
not create functional laws that allow the regional law to be applied in 
their jurisdictions. Here the referral apparatus has to have a stronger 
mechanism to ensure either that the establishment of national 
competition laws takes hold in the first place, or, in the event that it does 
not, that cases can proceed anyway. It is not clear at all that a soft law 
‘name-and-shame’ approach is going to be successful in the ECOWAS 
for these purposes. This approach has been used in various forms for 
aspects dealing with the trade liberalization regime of the ECOWAS, 
and the record of implementation with an intergovernmental Council 
apparatus is not very good. For matters involving trade, where the treaty 
also calls for Council or Heads of State actions to ‘address Member 
States’, as in the case of dumped goods for example, one wonders if 
any state has ever been addressed by the intergovernmental bodies in a 
manner that has stimulated compliance or a change of behaviour in 
favour of meeting the treaty objectives.  
 
If intergovernmental recourse has not stimulated compliance 
with the core free-trade and compensation commitments, which have 
been in place since the 1970s, then what countervailing consideration 
would argue that this same approach should work for a competition law 
regime – a regulatory area for which many African, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) foreign ministers are also on active record as opposing for 
inclusion in the EC–EPA Cotonou construction? Even between only the 
larger members, the intergovernmental route also has some significant 
pitfalls. In the absence of a central authority, whatever promise has 
been generated for a ‘customs union’ construction can be undermined 
where differences emerge between the implementation pace of national 
laws, or worse, by decisions taken by national authorities that others 
see to be reflecting industrial and trade policy interests rather than 
competition policy interests.  
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Here the MERCOSUR example is unfortunately but necessarily 
raised. This intergovernmental ministerial approach to regional 
competition law has not been implemented, due to the failure of 
individual members to pass national laws, and the absence of effective 
regional competition remedies has contributed to a degrading of the 
free-trade schedules for this common market. This example is too close 
in point to the ECOWAS situation, and far more so than the other ACP 
arrangements that are operating with higher degrees of institutional 
treaty independence such as the COMESA or possibly the CARICOM.  
 
4.3.5. Proposal for alternative case mechanism 
 
The primary consideration is that while a referral concept has 
solid value and can form the core of a regional approach, there has to 
be an alternative to a national case referral in the event that the referral 
cannot be effectively made or acted upon. This is a minimum 
requirement for achieving an implemented regional strategy for 
competition law, and without it the risk of non-implementation of regional 
law is too high.  
 
The argument here is to grant the advisory panel a clear right to 
petition the Council in the event that a case referral cannot be 
responded to either because of non-implementation, or because of a 
substantive or procedural defect in the national legal provisions. This is 
similar to the criteria applied by the EU–Euro-Med and EU–South Africa 
free-trade area arrangements for instituting recourse on a request for 
action that cannot be fulfilled. In the ECOWAS, the Council, by a 
majority vote, would then decide whether or not the advisory panel, with 
the support of the Commission, can either bring the case directly before 
the ECOWAS regional court, or alternatively, be taken up by the Council 
itself for a majority decision on the merits of the case461. The Council 
would, of course, have at its disposal the power to request an advisory 
opinion from the court on the legal interpretation of ECOWAS law.  
 
This alternative to national referral is a minimum loss of 
prospective sovereignty of the Member States given the objectives of 
                                                 
461
 EU–South Africa Trade, Development and Cooperation Agreement, 
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/archive/1999/l_31119991204en.html. Article 37, 
‘Appropriate Measures’. 
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the ECOWAS Treaty, and in view of the benefits that flow to all 
members if the implementation system was made effective. If this 
recourse procedure is included in the scheme, the likelihood of 
successful implementation of national laws should be increased and it is 
possible that the alternative procedure need not be utilized or only be 
called upon in rare cases.  
 
4.3.6. Other requirements for national referral – investigatory powers 
and preliminary hearing 
 
Even in a system where referral by an advisory panel is being 
made functional, there are two other points of weakness that should be 
addressed. First, the advisory panel is not being given a clear basis to 
engage in investigations of the complaints referred to it by the 
Commission. Second, the advisory panel does not appear to be 
empowered to commence investigations in the absence of a complaint 
being referred. Both are important aspects and discussed briefly in turn.  
 
Whether or not a regional body should exercise all the 
investigatory powers enumerated above for a centralized authority is not 
determined here, but clearly the power to collect or compel information 
from authorities and private firms is a priority. It is clear that without the 
power to investigate, a regional advisory panel cannot make intelligent 
referrals in the first place. The panel needs to be able to determine if a 
referral should or should not be made, and investigatory powers to 
inquire and receive information are needed to facilitate this.  
 
One possibility is that the advisory panel could establish a 
‘preliminary hearing’ procedure prior to referral that would allow parties 
to submit information and be heard. The standard for making such a 
referral would be based upon a ‘probable cause’ standard, i.e. that there 
is a probable cause to believe that an infringement has occurred and 
that the infringement can be addressed by a referral to a particular 
Member State enforcement system. Investigatory power is also 
necessary if the advisory panel seeks to fulfil its function of reporting to 
the Council those cases that are not adequately treated by the national 
authorities. Otherwise, it is not clear how the panel can compare the 
outcomes of cases actually handled by the national authorities with the 
expectations that an infringement could be determined and corrected.  
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The call for regional investigatory power also relates to 
developing the capacity to address international practices that are 
beyond the visible purview of domestic firms in the ECOWAS region. It 
would allow the regional mechanism to survey international cartel 
enforcement actions being taken abroad and consider the possibilities of 
information collection within the ECOWAS. An authority with this power 
can also derive the basis to extend its investigatory powers abroad, 
including the potential to develop international cooperation 
arrangements with other developing regional authorities (within the 
African Union or the ACP group for example) and with other developed 
country authorities. The international dimension also supports the 
argument that the investigatory powers of an advisory panel should not 
be limited to dealing only with actual received complaints. There is no 
reason why an advisory panel should not be able to follow its own leads 
and determine its own basis for referrals. Rather, limiting the panel to 
investigate only received complaints would seem to inhibit the potential 
for the ECOWAS to deal with international anti-competitive practices – 
an area where no single Member State is likely to have sufficient power 
to successfully play.  
 
An advisory panel should therefore be established with the 
power to receive complaints dealing with ECOWAS law and to refer 
action to the Member State authorities. Where a relevant national law is 
not implemented or cannot address the referred practice, that advisory 
panel should have the power to refer the matter to the Council for a 
decision (by majority voting) as to how the case will be heard and 
decided. The panel should be given reasonable investigatory powers 
that can be exercised in its referral determination, and the panel should 
be permitted to exercise its investigatory powers without the receipt of 
an individual complaint. A further recommendation is that the panel 
should be constituted to have the power of conducting a preliminary 
hearing on the question of infringement and referral, and that parties to 
the proceedings are guaranteed a right to be heard and to submit 
information. If the panel does not have the right to compel the provision 
of information and appearances at a preliminary hearing, then it should 
have the right to rule that a probable cause is found as a matter of 
default on the basis of a failure to provide requested information or to 
appear.  
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4.4. Other considerations, notification systems and 
cooperation instruments  
 
4.4.1. Notifications  
 
This study has not raised the question of whether or not a 
regional authority should have the power to declare exemptions in 
respect of individual agreements, or as to classes of agreements. Nor 
has it, in tandem, raised the question of whether private parties should 
be able to notify their private agreements for which, while falling within 
the treaty prohibitions, they would also be seeking to have an exemption 
applied based upon the balancing criteria of pro-competitive effects. The 
value of notification systems, either mandatory or voluntary, is that 
information flows to the regional body and the authority can learn the 
nature of the distribution markets that affect cross-border trade and can 
gradually determine the patterns that can form the basis for handling 
cases and developing regional block exemptions. 
 
4.4.2. Cooperation instruments 
 
This study has started from the position of assessing the 
prospects for decentralized administration of a regional law by the use 
of Member State authorities acting in cooperation. There is a role for 
cooperation between authorities in any regional system whether or not 
there is a centralized authority in position and whether or not a system is 
operating in tandem with private rights of enforcement. There are 
obvious benefits to cooperation where existing authorities can establish 
working relationships and render each other’s enforcement efforts more 
viable. Cooperation can occur both in respect of Community law but 
also in the application of national territorial laws.  
 
The common mechanism for enforcement includes: 
 
• coordination, by agencies on common fact patterns with effects 
upon both jurisdictions 
• investigatory assistance, upon a request by one agency to 
another seeking information on possible practices that may be 
occurring in the requested country that have effects on the 
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requesting country  
• positive comity, a request by one agency for another to assess 
and take action on a possible anti-competitive practice that is 
occurring in the requesting” country’s territory462. 
 
The record of cooperation instruments in existing RTAs that 
have included these provisions is not positive. Surveys by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and 
the Centre for Economic Policy Research suggest that little cooperation 
actually occurs according to the RTA provisions. There are some cases 
where countries are actively requesting and notifying, but not 
consistently, and not in a manner that appears to be generating 
consistent responses from the regional partners. These are tentative 
characterizations because it is difficult to confirm how much informal 
cooperation may be actually going on beneath the cover of these 
cooperation provisions. Many of the agreements utilizing cooperation 
instruments are fairly new, as are the authorities working with them.  
 
ECOWAS competition law cannot be given effect by the sole 
use of a cooperation approach. Nevertheless, there are clear benefits to 
using cooperation as a supportive set of instruments to facilitate 
enforcement of the domestic competition laws of the members. 
Irrespective of the regional body ultimately proposed for the ECOWAS, 
this body should also be given some coordination capacity to promote 
intergovernmental cooperation to facilitate the application of the national 
laws. This could be accomplished by the named regional body itself, or 
as an alternative, a separate intergovernmental body composed of 
representatives of the national competition authorities.  
 
5. Conclusions  
 
This study has aimed to identify a feasible middle path – 
between pure intergovernmentalism and absolute supranationality – that 
can resolve the deficiencies of the ECOWAS Treaty structure with its 
                                                 
462
 These instruments as drawn from OECD (1995), Recommendation and 
Guiding Principles for Anti-competitive Practices Affecting International Trade, 
C(95)130/Final, Revised Recommendation, 27 & 28 July, 1995. These 
techniques are commonly recited in bilateral cooperation agreements and in 
RTAs. 
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rather ambitious integration objectives, and in light of a regional 
competition law. An independent law at the regional level can and 
should be established at the treaty level. Furthermore, this law should 
have a general applicability and be binding upon the authorities and the 
courts of the Member States. These elements are the fundamental 
building blocks of regional integration that can act simultaneously as a 
point of balance between state sovereignty and regional authority. It is 
clear that these elements also underlie a system of diffuse individual 
rights of action that relies upon a regional authority to address 
infringements of regional law.  
 
A system of private rights can be built upon this structure if 
direct effect is made clear and if the national courts have the ability to 
obtain regional court preliminary opinions. In addition to this, an ultimate 
arbiter for appeal should be considered as a reasonable extension of 
standing before the ECOWAS regional court. If these elements are 
accomplished, then the ECOWAS can say legitimately that it has 
installed an effective system of private action for regional law. A pure 
system of private rights enforcement would not be adequate to give 
effect to regional law; some level of regional authority action is 
necessary for the regional law to operate. The differences in 
approaches have been discussed above, but all regional proposals build 
upon the same building blocks of independent law, general application 
and superiority. This is even more so in the case of the referral system.  
 
It is tempting to seek to avoid the pitfalls of a referral system 
that relies upon Member State implementation of national authorities. 
The alternative of a completely independent commission with full 
powers is simple, effective and attractive. However, the lack of 
institutional tolerance for full independent executive powers cannot be 
ignored when this describes what the Member States may be willing to 
actually tolerate. Thus, this study argues for regional action that adopts 
a referral model but is modified to avoid the intergovernmental pitfalls 
that can render such a system inoperative. These include an alternative 
case-handling approach if a referral cannot be effectively made, and a 
clear investigatory power granted to the advisory panel as it attempts to 
determine referrals and monitor the merits of a case. 
 
The competition law issue in ACP regional integration 
arrangements is not a home-grown phenomenon. There are external 
factors raising the competition agenda. This is particularly noticeable in 
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the ECOWAS setting where the treaty does not even accord competition 
policy the status of a regional activity. In contemplating the likely 
requirements that will emerge in the negotiation framework for the EPA 
agreements, it is perhaps helpful to identify the interests of foreign firms 
in the establishment of regional competition law for the ECOWAS. From 
the perspective of the EC, any foreign firm trading or doing business in 
the Community has the individual right to complain and seek redress for 
a violation of regional competition law. From a narrow and more 
mercantilist perspective, the reciprocity that can be expected from an 
ECOWAS arrangement is for a legal structure capable of responding to 
similar complaints when raised by an EC firm. In other words: “How will 
OUR firms address private and public exclusionary practices that 
threaten to undermine the market access commitments that have been 
bargained for in the EPA tariff schedules?”. 
 
A completely intergovernmental system of enforcement cannot 
make this EPA exchange on a reciprocal basis. Consequently, the 
modifications proposed here are for a referral system and the institution 
of private rights of action. Obviously the beneficiaries are not only 
foreign firms. Consumers are the main beneficiaries and welfare gains 
may also be generated by contestable markets. The argument put 
forward in this study may not necessarily lead to the best or most 
efficient institutional outcomes. However, the proposals aim to create an 
outcome that can effectively implement a regional law for competition 
policy in the ECOWAS. While ECOWAS Member States may not 
welcome encroachments on national sovereignty, it is hoped that these 
proposals are considered on the merits of how they meet these wider 
objectives. 
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Abstract 
 
Romania is quite a special case as it has until recently been 
considered to be both a developing country and an economy in 
transition. Romania’s experience in building its competition regime may 
therefore be useful for both developing countries and for economies in 
transition, bearing in mind the important policy implications for economic 
development of establishing an appropriate competition framework that 
relies on a solid legal base and a suitable institutional structure. 
 
Experience suggests that, in the process of transition to a more 
open economy, the existence and application of competition law can 
usefully support other policy initiatives. Trade policy, industrial policy, 
privatization, deregulation, regional policy and social policy all need to 
be conducted in a manner compatible with the market mechanism for an 
economy to function as efficiently as possible. These policies need to be 
conducted in a complementary manner and it is important that a 
mechanism exists for incorporating the "competition dimension" within 
government decisions on such policies.  
 
The purpose of this essay is twofold. First, it provides an 
assessment of the effectiveness of the implementation of competition 
policy in Romania. Second, it shows the important role competition 
policy plays in the liberalization of certain sensitive sectors of the 
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economy. It concludes that law enforcement, competition advocacy and 
institutional effectiveness represent essential components and, 
therefore, key priorities for effective implementation of competition 
policy.  
 
The available evidence suggests the importance of competition 
policy in the context of transition towards a market economy and 
emphasizes the necessity of developing an operational competition 
system in developing countries.  
 
1. Do we really need competition policy? 
 
Widespread privatization and competition policy have been a 
real challenge for Romania in its process of transition to a market 
economy. Further, trade liberalization has been an important driver of 
pro-competitive reforms in Romania, which brought about an 
unprecedented abundance of goods and showed at the same time a 
benchmark of competitiveness, making domestic companies that had 
been working without exposure to competition recognize the limitations 
of their competitiveness.  
 
The introduction of the regulatory framework enabling “freedom 
of ownership, investment and enterprise” created great opportunities for 
domestic and foreign undertakings alike. The increase in the number of 
businesses in general and in new investments together have led to 
substantially improving competitiveness and, in this sense, the legal, 
economic, and economic policy environment supporting the 
implementation of the freedom of ownership, investment and enterprise 
has been a definitely pro-competitive reform and a driving force in 
transforming the Romanian economy. 
 
As with other Central-East European countries associated to the 
EU, Romania took important steps with a view to achieving full 
harmonization of its legislation with the acquis communautaire, to 
enforce its capacity building and to observe the commitments 
undertaken through the Association Agreement concluded with the 
European Union.  
 
The Association Council had to adopt the necessary rules for 
the implementation of competition provisions within three years of the 
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entry into force of the Agreement. Accordingly, the Romanian 
Competition Law was adopted even earlier, in 1996, and entered into 
force in 1997. 
 
The application of the competition acquis prior to the closure of 
the negotiations was not only an EU requirement for Romania and other 
Central-East European accession countries but also a necessity in order 
to help companies to adapt well before the date of accession in order to 
be able to withstand the competitive pressures of the internal market. 
No transition period was granted to Romania since failure to properly 
apply competition acquis could have jeopardized the proper functioning 
of the internal market. 
 
1.1. Building a competition regime in Romania 
 
Against this background, an institution competent to strictly 
enforce the competition rules had to be established. The institution 
started its activity on 6 September 1996 with the elaboration of the 
regulations required to ensure the enforcement of Competition Law. The 
competition authority was defined as an autonomous administrative 
body whose activity had two main objectives: 
 
 a preventive one, aimed at monitoring markets and supervising 
the actors operating therein; and  
 a corrective one, aimed at re-establishing and consolidating the 
development of a normal competition environment. 
 
However, the creation of a competition authority is only the 
starting point for building, on its own activity, its credibility. The 
provisions related to the revision of the Romanian Constitution 
acknowledge that “Romania is a market economy, founded on free 
initiative and competition”, private ownership being guaranteed and 
unchallengeable. It is true that stipulating the role of competition within 
the fundamental law of a State is not a compulsory condition in order to 
apply the rules of the competition authority, but it highlights commitment 
by the political establishment. It confirms that the competition principles 
are at the root of economic policies in Romania. 
 
But the mere creation of a competition authority has not been 
enough to provide substance to national legislation or to make it fully 
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operational. Since its entry into force in 1997, competition legislation has 
required adjustments in order to adapt the national economy to the 
requirements of accession to the European Union.  
 
In December 2003, the Competition Council established by law 
remained the sole Romanian Competition Authority, as an independent 
and autonomous body, provided with institutional structures at local 
level, consisting of representatives in Bucharest and in 41 counties of 
Romania.  
 
The law was revised extensively, eliminating unnecessary 
notifications of exempted agreements, increasing the turnover 
thresholds for merger notification, enforcing the publication of decisions, 
increasing the sanctions for companies refusing to cooperate with the 
Council, allowing for sanctions to be adopted with the same decision 
that identified a violation of the competition rules. The Competition 
Council was also entrusted with the application of the Leniency Policy 
with regard to cartel cases. Furthermore, the discriminating regime for 
the autonomous régies and State-owned undertakings, as compared to 
other undertakings, was eliminated through the amendments brought 
into law in November 2004. Last but not the least, the necessity of a 
Court authorization for dawn raids was abolished.  
 
This not only contributed to the fulfilment of the accession 
criteria on competition, but most of all, it determined the sustainability of 
the Romanian economy. The new responsibilities and powers provided 
by the legislative framework considerably strengthened the Competition 
Council’s role of overseeing and protecting the correct functioning of the 
market economy. As a result, the Romanian Competition Law now 
covers the principles of EC antitrust rules as regards restrictive 
agreements, abuse of dominant position and economic concentrations. 
 
While the adoption of the legislative framework on antitrust and 
State aid was, to a great extent, a technical process that did not face 
major obstacles, the most important and challenging task for Romania 
was the foundation of a well-functioning competition authority. Thus, 
besides providing the competition authority with adequate legislative 
tools, a substantial strengthening of its administrative and operational 
capacity was required.  
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It was crucial to make the competition authority totally 
independent. The main characteristics of such an independence were: 
the competition authority had to have the appropriate legal instruments 
to act against companies and public institutions that breached the 
competition rules; the authority’s decision-making body had to be 
approved so as to ensure that no political pressure was exercised over 
its actions; and the staff of the authority had to be highly qualified and 
sufficiently motivated. 
 
Another challenge for the Romanian Competition Council 
(RCC), as a young institution emanating from the economic reform 
process, was to create adequate and effective relations with other public 
authorities and to establish a real and constructive inter-institutional 
dialogue. It is for this reason that competition advocacy has played a 
crucial role in the enforcement process in Romania. Central and local 
public institutions had to be, at least in broad terms, familiarized with the 
main principles of the competition law so as to avoid implementation of 
measures that could be harmful for competition. The business 
community had to be made aware not only of the risks they face in 
breaking the competition rules, but also of the possibility to address the 
competition authority or, to some extent, the court if another economic 
operator breached competition rules and caused them harm. The courts 
had to be aware of the competition legislation as undertakings, harmed 
by other undertakings, can bring the latter before the court to recover 
the damages under civil law. 
 
Through its continuous advocacy activities, the Competition 
Council has clarified the rules of the game for Romanian society and 
ensured the necessary climate for setting up the mechanisms of a 
functional market economy.  
 
A review of the operations of the Competition Council over the 
last decade shows that, without a fully functional competition authority, 
market rules are significantly distorted. It shows also that, without such 
an institutional mechanism, competition policy-based corrective 
measures cannot be introduced, thus jeopardizing the long-term 
benefits of competition policy both for private business and for the 
general economic growth of Romania. 
 
Since the very beginning of its activity, the RCC has made full 
use of its legal powers, including the power to carry out dawn raids, and 
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has concentrated its resources on the most serious distortions of 
competition. Thus, 3,302 decisions were issued from 1997 to 2007, of 
which 42.2 per cent represented merger decisions (Table 1, Graph 1).  
 
 
Table 1: The increasing trend in the number of decisions issued by the 
Competition Council in 1997–2007 
  
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total 
Total number 
of decisions 
reached  
44 138 520 559 510 423 482 248 161 154 63 3,302 
Economic 
concentrations 
6 45 140 200 169 157 247 165 115 106 45 1,395 
Complaints 10 15 11 32 23 48 26 18 11 8 4 206 
Negative 
clearance  
5 6 9 9 5 6 16 5 4 0 4 69 
Individual 
exemptions 
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 1 1 6 
Block 
exemptions 
4 19 312 256 163 119 22 2 0 0 0 897 
Sanctioning 
decisions463  
4 9 13 16 64 42 114 50 25 25 3 365 
Other types of 
decisions 
15 48 40 60 147 81 126 52 26 37 9 641 
 
 
Graph 1: Structure of decisions issued by the Competition Council from 
1997 to 2007 
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 These refer to sanctions for both substantive and procedural infringements. 
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In the work of the Romanian competition authority, the gradual 
transformation and re-concentration of the partially privatized market 
structure became apparent in 1998. This was partly attributable to global 
effects, as some of the mergers reflected the results of concentrations 
abroad on the Romanian market, while others were essentially 
Romanian phenomena, irrespective of the owner being Romanian or 
foreign. This was reflected in the notable merger wave in Romania 
between 2000 and 2006. This wave covered a major part of the 
economy, for instance, the energy sector, public services, metallurgy, 
the chemical industry, food and beverages, telecommunications, the 
banking sector and trade. All types of concentration were present at this 
stage, with horizontal concentration dominating, but there were also 
some vertical and conglomerate-type concentrations. 
 
Fines imposed by the Competition Council for infringements of 
Competition Law in the 1997–2007 period amounted to 271.5 million 
RON, i.e. around 78 million Euro (see Table 2). This figure confirms that 
a systematic and conscious fining policy was drawn up and put into 
practice by the Competition Council over its ten years of existence. The 
increased total of fines recorded in 2005 can be partially attributed to the 
fact that more hard-core cartels were discovered in that year. From 
2006, the decrease in the number of anti-competitive practices 
confirmed a better understanding by the business community that 
competition was the engine of its affairs. 
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Table 2: Evolution in the amount of fines imposed by the Competition 
Council in 1997–2007* 
 
 Amount of fines 
(RON) 
Amount of fines (Euro) 
1997 76,900 95,045 
1998–2001 1,354,400 678,702 
2002 42,394,180 13,563,859 
2003 3,684,680 981,120 
2004 8,590,420 2,119,411 
2005 159,753,750 44,088,998 
2006 55,235,000 15,671,726 
2007 457,061 1369,55 
Total 271,546,391 77,335,816 
*The estimation of the value of fines in Euro is based on the average 
annual exchange rate RON/Euro supplied by the National Bank of 
Romania.  
 
To sum up, the stages followed by Romania in order to improve 
its competition regime were: 
 
- a legislative framework on antitrust and State aid was adopted 
and subsequently modified to adopt the EU rules; 
- an independent competition authority was established and 
equipped with highly qualified staff and appropriate technical 
equipment; 
- a credible enforcement record of the EU rules on competition 
has been ensured with the support of other stakeholders, such 
as public authorities, judiciary and the business environment. 
 
1.2. Case law 
 
Competition Law applies to anti-competitive practices by private 
commercial operators and State-owned enterprises, including 
commercial companies where the State is a major shareholder. The 
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main substantive elements of the law are provided by Art. 5464 – anti-
competitive agreements – and Art. 6465 – abuse of dominant position. 
 
Romanian Competition Law provides in a distinct chapter the 
control of economic concentrations, following the model of the European 
Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4056/1983, having as its objective the 
prohibition of any economic concentration that creates or strengthens a 
dominant position that would significantly impede effective competition.  
 
The merger control rules contained in the Competition Law are 
detailed and expanded through its secondary legislation, in regulations 
and guidelines. 
 
The economic concentrations466 – transfer of the ownership or 
the use of assets, rights and obligations of an undertaking through 
                                                 
464
 Art. 5 of the Romanian competition law no. 21/1996, which is similar to Art. 
81 of the EC Treaty, prohibits any express or tacit agreements between 
undertakings or associations of undertakings, any concerted practices or 
decisions by the associations, which have as an object or as an effect the 
restriction, prevention or distortion of competition in the Romanian market or in a 
part of it. The most serious infringements are the cartels, allocation of market 
power and other practices that prevent the proper functioning of the market. The 
Competition Council may grant, by decision, exemption for individual cases of 
agreements, association decisions or concerted practices, and establish (by 
regulations/guidelines) exemptions for certain categories of agreements, 
association decisions or concerted practices.  
465
 Art.6 of the Romanian Competition Law, which is similar to Art.82 of the EC 
Treaty, prohibits certain unilateral conduct that jeopardizes competition. 
According to this article, any abuse of a dominant position held by one or more 
undertakings in the Romanian market or in a substantial part of it, by resorting to 
anti-competitive deeds, which have as an object or may have as an effect the 
distortion of commerce or the prejudice of consumers, is prohibited. 
 
466
 A concentration is subject to the Competition Council's control and it must be 
notified if the aggregated worldwide turnover of the parties to the concentration 
exceeds EUR 10 million and the turnover in Romania of at least two of the 
participating undertakings exceeds EUR 4 million. The economic concentrations 
may be authorized if, when analysing them pursuant to the criteria provided for 
in the Competition Law, they are compatible with a normal competition 
environment, and if the involved undertakings prove that they fulfil cumulatively 
certain conditions such as increase of the economic efficiency and of the 
competitiveness of exports, and benefits for consumer through reduced real 
prices. 
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merger or through a direct or indirect acquisition of control over one or 
more undertakings – are prohibited to the extent that they create or 
consolidate a dominant position and lead to or are likely to lead to a 
significant restriction, prevention or distortion of competition in the 
Romanian market or in a part of it. 
 
1.2.1. Ministry of Internal Affairs/RASP/Tuingdor/Mitsubishi, Decision 
no. 127 [1998] 
 
Keywords: Driving license photos, horizontal agreement, 
vertical agreement, abuse of dominance, Article 9(1)467 
 
Facts: This case came to the attention of the Romanian 
Competition Council following a large number of complaints alleging 
infringements of the competition law in the market for driving license 
photos. 
 
The investigation undertaken showed that a contract for driving 
license photos had been signed between the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 
and the Regie for the Administration of the State Protocol (RASP), on 
the one hand, and Tuingdor SRL (Tuingdor) and Mitsubishi Electric 
Europe GmbH (Mitsubishi), on the other. According to this contract, 
Tuingdor, the exclusive distributor of Mitsubishi in Romania, had been 
granted exclusive rights to establish a network of photographers in the 
entire national territory, using exclusively Mitsubishi equipment. The 
Ministry of Internal Affairs refused photos where Mitsubishi supplies 
were not used. Moreover, the contract set a maximum price for the 
photos. It has to be mentioned that the computerized system issuing the 
driving licenses had been introduced by a contract signed between 
RASP and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and, in the contract between 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Canadian Banknotes Overseas Ltd, 
                                                 
467
 Art. 9(1) Any actions by the central or local public administrative body that 
have as an object or may have as an effect the restriction, prevention or 
distortion of competition are prohibited, especially when: 
a) making decisions that limit the freedom of trade or the undertakings’ 
autonomy which are being exercised under the law; 
b) setting discriminatory business conditions for undertakings. 
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none of those contracts referred to the photos required for the newly 
introduced driving licenses. 
 
Tuingdor established a network of photographers, initially in 
Bucharest and in the county capitals, which extended to around 150 
photographers. The contracts between Tuingdor and each of the 
photographers provided for exclusive usage of Mitsubishi equipment, 
supplies and seals distributed by Tuingdor. The photographers also took 
it upon themselves to sign a service and maintenance contract with 
Tuingdor, for both the warranty and post-warranty periods. In cases 
where photographers used Mitsubishi equipment not acquired from 
Tuingdor, only post-warranty services were provided, on condition that 
the photographer acquired an initial technical evaluation and a minimum 
quantity of supplies. 
 
In order to ensure the origin of the photos, Tuingdor introduced 
a “Mitsubishi seal” applied on the photos. Such a seal was unnecessary 
in terms of photos issued for drivers' licences. Its only use was to certify 
that it had been issued by an authorized photographer. It is worth 
mentioning that the price of the seal had to be paid by the final 
consumer. 
 
Definition of relevant market: 
The relevant product market was defined as the market for 
driving license photos, as there was no substitute between this type of 
photo and any other type of photo. The geographic dimension of the 
market was defined at the national level. Moreover, the anti-competitive 
behaviour of the parties involved affected the market for video printing 
equipment and supplies. 
 
Harm on competition: 
The Competition Council found that Tuingdor, Mitsubishi and 
RASP infringed the provisions of Article 5(1) of the Competition Law by 
concluding and implementing an anti-competitive agreement, having as 
its purpose to eliminate competition from other photographers; oblige 
photographers to acquire only a certain type of equipment and supplies; 
limit the access of other distributors to the market, as well as to limit 
parallel imports.  
 
The Competition Council also found that Tuingdor infringed 
Article 6 of the Competition Law by abusing its dominant position in the 
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relevant market, by indirectly setting retail prices, especially through the 
price of the “Mitsubishi seal”; tying sales, forcing photographers to 
acquire service and maintenance, beside equipment and supplies; 
exploiting the dependency of its clients, as it had the right to unilaterally 
extend or denounce the contract when photographers did not hold 
similar contractual rights.  
 
The Competition Council decided that the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs had infringed Art. 9 of the Competition Law, as it unnecessarily 
limited trade freedom and introduced discriminatory rules related to the 
activity of undertakings by awarding exclusivities with regard to the 
photo equipment and supplies used for driving license photos.  
 
Enforcement measures: 
Tuingdor, Mitsubishi and RASP were sanctioned with fines. The 
Competition Council decided also that Tuingdor had to give the State 
budget the profits it obtained as a result of anti-competitive behaviour. 
The decision of the Competition Council annulled both the contract 
regarding the photos for the driving licenses and the contracts between 
Tuingdor and the photographers. 
 
Appeal proceedings: 
The involved parties appealed the decision. The Bucharest 
Court of Appeal, as the first instance court, ruled by entirely rejecting the 
Competition Council’s decision. In its judgment, the Bucharest Court of 
Appeal stressed that the decision was issued before the infringement of 
the provisions of competition law had been adopted and signed by the 
entire Plenum of the competition authority, as the law stipulated. Also, 
the ruling stated that Tuingdor and Mitsubishi did not infringe Article 5 
since there was no anti-competitive agreement because, at the time 
when the contract was concluded, the competition law was not in force.  
 
The Competition Council appealed the Bucharest Court of 
Appeal’s ruling before the High Court of Cassation and Justice. The 
Supreme Court ruled that the ruling given by the first instance court was 
illegal and unsubstantiated and that the Competition Council’s decision 
was legal. Thus, the court stated that the decision was legally adopted 
by the Plenum, one of the members being replaced during his absence 
by the Vice-President of the competition authority who was legally 
appointed. Moreover, the court concluded that the parties implemented 
an anti-competitive agreement, having as its purpose to eliminate 
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competition from other photographers and to oblige photographers to 
acquire only a certain type of equipment and supplies. 
 
Harm on consumers: 
This is a case where the award of exclusive rights by a State 
authority to a single company affected not only the companies operating 
on the downstream level but also the consumers through tying sales 
and higher prices than those that would have been established in 
conditions of competition. Also, despite the presence of the corruption 
issue in this case and the non-responsibility of the Romanian 
Competition Council to produce such evidence, it strove, however, for 
the opening of the respective markets to competition for the benefit of 
consumers. 
 
1.2.2. Romanian Shareholders Registry (RSR), Decision no. 247 [1999] 
 
Keywords: abuse of dominant position, refusal to deal, unequal 
terms for equivalent services to trade partners  
 
Facts: This case reflects the attempt of a dominant company to 
hinder the entry of other companies to the market. Several well-
conceived behavioural measures that were imposed on the incumbent, 
apart from the sanctions, played an important role in the re-
establishment of a normal competitive environment in the relevant 
market. 
 
The case came under the competition authority’s scrutiny as a 
result of the complaint filed by seven independent stock registers 
against the RSR. The complaint related to the RSR’s refusal to transfer 
the registers of shareholders from the client companies. 
 
The RSR was set up in 1996 as a stock company, with the 
financial and logistical support of USAID, and took over, unconditionally 
and without charge, shareholder lists held by the National Agency for 
Privatization in a computerized register. This register included about 
5,700 companies. During 1997–1998, the Romanian National Securities 
Commission authorized another ten private independent register 
companies to operate in this market. 
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At that time, according to the specific legal framework468, the 
RSR was bound to transfer to other independent private register 
companies the shareholder lists, within a five-day period from the day of 
registering the company’s request. The transfer should have been 
executed unconditionally, except in the case when the issuer company 
is bound to pay to the register company the charge for the services 
provided by it. If contractual relations were binding the issuer company 
and the register company, the transfer had to be executed 
unconditionally and without the imposition of a charge for that service.  
 
Definition of the relevant market: 
In this case, the competition authority defined the relevant 
market as the market of registering services on RASDAQ469. This 
service did not have substitutes at that time. Beneficiaries of this service 
were companies listed on RASDAQ which had the legal obligation to 
keep a shareholder's register, as well as the proof of shares issued and 
traded in this market.  
 
Harm on competition: 
From the analysis carried out on this market, the Council found 
that in 1997, the RSR held a dominant position, determined by its 
market share, i.e. 100 per cent, and in the following year, the RSR held 
a market share of 96.4 per cent. The RSR owed its high market share to 
the circumstances of its establishment mentioned above.  
 
The investigation established that, once the other private 
independent register companies entered the market, client companies 
could either continue to use the services provided by the RSR, or 
transfer their shareholder list to another private Register Company. 
However, only 236 of 585 companies that had requested the transfer 
effectively accomplished it. The explanation for this lies in the RSR’s 
discriminatory behaviour. Thus, while for several companies that had 
not concluded a contract with the RSR, the transfer was executed 
unconditionally, in other cases client companies were compelled to 
                                                 
468
 The regulation of this market is accomplished by the Romanian National 
Securities Commission (RNSC). 
469
 RASDAQ (The National Securities Market was officially launched in October 
1996, in order to address the need for a transparent, institutional and technical 
trading environment dedicated to companies that had become public following 
the Mass Privatization Programme).  
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conclude a contract in order to have their shareholder lists transferred. 
Moreover, the RSR ceased charging for the services performed for the 
companies that consented to enter into a contract. If client companies 
did not follow through with their intention to transfer, the RSR wrote off 
their debts.  
 
Thus, the Competition Council found that the RSR abused its 
dominant position by imposing unfair contractual terms in contracts 
concluded with beneficiaries. The abuse consisted also in the refusal to 
deal, namely by refusing to transfer shareholder lists to the independent 
private register. The RSR’s action of imposing conditions on the 
transfer’s execution with the payment for services allegedly performed 
prior to the conclusion of the contract resulted in either the foregoing of 
the transfer and entering into an agreement with the RSR, or the 
transfer’s execution, but at a higher cost and in a longer period of time. 
The Competition Council also found that the RSR applied a 
discriminatory treatment to the issuer companies.  
 
In that sense, the following anti-competitive practices were 
identified: charging different tariffs for similar services; coercing the 
issuer company to conclude a contract, while other companies, under 
the same circumstances, had their transfer unconditionally executed; 
requiring payments for services performed outside any contractual 
relations.  
 
Enforcement measures and remedies: 
In its decision, the Competition Council’s Plenum sanctioned the 
RSR for the infringement of Art. 6 lit. a) and c) of the Competition Law. 
 
In order to re-establish a normal competitive environment in the 
affected market, the Competition Council’s Plenum compelled the RSR 
to allow transfers in strict observance of the RNSC regulations, without 
imposing additional conditions. The Competition Council also forbade 
the RSR to grant additional facilities, other than those laid down in the 
contract, when the issuer companies expressed the intention to transfer 
their lists to another register company, so as to prevent or to limit the 
client’s transfer to other register companies. 
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1.2.3. National Agency of Mineral Resources/National Company of 
Mineral Waters/APEMIN, Decision no. 575 [2000] 
 
Keywords: horizontal agreement, vertical agreement, Article 
9(1), mineral water. 
 
Facts: The case came to the attention of the RCC upon 
receiving, almost simultaneously, a request from the Ministry of Industry 
and Commerce (MIC) and a complaint from the National Company of 
Mineral Waters (NCMW). Both the MIC and the NCMW requested the 
intervention of the Romanian competition authorities470 in solving a 
contractual litigation between the NCMW and 19 companies bottling 
mineral water regarding a price increase proposal made by the NCMW 
for the extracted mineral water.  
On the one hand, the 19 companies, members of APEMIN, i.e. 
an employers’ association composed only of companies operating in the 
mineral water bottling field, that refused to accept the price increase 
proposal, decided to empower the chairman of the association to 
negotiate a different price level. On the other hand, the NCMW, which 
holds a quasi-monopoly for the activity of extracting mineral water, 
claimed that in the last 3 years, i.e. in 1997–1999, the price had not 
suffered any modification and that its proposal for a price increase was 
based on its increased expenses. 
 
The analysis of the product market evolution after 1990 
emphasizes certain characteristics: 
• Until 1990, companies that traded mineral water were 
subordinated to a central administrative body, according to the 
existing system at that time. These companies were responsible 
for the extraction, bottling and trading process for mineral water. 
• In 1990, the extraction activity was separated from the bottling 
and trading activities. The extraction activity was entrusted to an 
autonomous regie (RAMIN) and the bottling State-owned 
enterprises were reorganized into trade companies under the 
                                                 
470 The competition legislation in force at the time of the infringement provided 
for two competition authorities, namely the Competition Council as the 
autonomous investigation and decision-making authority and the Competition 
Office, the governmental body entrusted only with investigative powers. 
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privatization process but maintained their object of activity. 
• Through this separation, a new market was created, having as 
its objective the trade of the extracted mineral water between 
RAMIN and the bottling companies. 
• The reform evolution, mirrored also in the legislation, triggered 
the privatization of RAMIN and its subsequent conversion into a 
trade company (the NCMW) in December 1997. 
•  State interests in the mineral resources field are represented by 
the National Agency of Mineral Resources (NAMR). 
• Mineral water resources are considered State public property 
and the extraction activity can only be licensed or given into 
administration by the NAMR to companies extracting mineral 
water. 
 
Definition of relevant market: 
 
• The market regulation and organization at the time of 
investigation show that the NCMW held a quasi-monopoly for 
the activity of extracting mineral water. 
• As a raw material, mineral water cannot be substituted by the 
bottling companies with any other product. 
 
As a result, the Competition Council found that the relevant 
product market is the extracted mineral water market, traded as raw 
material between the NCMW and the bottling companies. 
With regard to the geographic market, both the supply and the 
demand are located near each mineral water source, with only one 
existing supplier and one buyer. The mineral water extracted from a 
specific source can only be used by a single bottling company. It can 
therefore be argued that each mineral water source can be defined as a 
separate geographic market. However, the Competition Council found 
that all those alleged local markets have common features, such as the 
same selling company, similar exploitation technology, and similar 
products. Based on those facts the Competition Council defined the 
geographic market at the national level. 
 
The analysis of the NCMW’s monopolist behaviour showed that:  
• The NCMW reached an administrative monopolistic position, 
not a real one based on its own forces. Furthermore, it did not 
benefit from economic and financial strength so as to exercise 
market power. 
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• The customers rely on the NCMW, but in turn, the NCMW relies 
on the mineral water buyers, since the contracts concluded with 
the bottling companies have a long validity term (20–25 years, 
according to the duration of the concession obtained by the 
NCMW from the National Agency for Mineral Resources), and 
the mineral water cannot be stocked. If the contractual relations 
were broken, the NCMW would not have an immediate 
alternative for selling the water to a different customer, the 
investments located close to the mineral water source being 
mandatory and quite substantial.  
 
As can be observed, the elements of this analysis did not 
highlight a potential abuse of the dominant position of the NCMW. 
 
Harm on competition: 
 
a) A written agreement represented by a “Negotiation Note” 
concluded between RAMIN and APEMIN was found during the 
investigation and considered illegal; first, this agreement, dated August 
1997, was signed on behalf of APEMIN, only by some of its members 
who held the largest market shares. Second, all contractual transactions 
concluded between RAMIN and the bottling companies, members and 
non-members of the association, provided for the same price fixing of 
the mineral water.  
 
b) The agreement lasted until the spring of 1999, when the 
NCMW, RAMIN’s successor came up with a proposal for a price 
increase and decided to start price negotiations with each bottling 
company. Accordingly, some of the APEMIN members decided, within a 
series of general extraordinary assemblies, not to accept the increase in 
price proposed by the NCMW. Moreover, they empowered the APEMIN 
chairman to negotiate a different price for mineral water on behalf of 
APEMIN members and if the NCMW did not accept, to proceed in 
boycotting the NCMW by ceasing payments. 
Even if the minutes of the general assemblies had been signed 
with no objection by the representatives of APEMIN’s members, 
subsequently, some of them consented to sign additional documents 
modifying the price to the level suggested by the NCMW, and others 
paid the increased price. 
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c) The NAMR permitted the concession of the mineral water 
sources exclusively to a single company, the NCMW, without organizing 
a public tender. This was contrary to the letter and spirit of the law that 
stipulated that the concession should be granted to the winner of a 
public tender. This led to the perpetuation of the existing monopoly in 
the market of mineral water as a raw material, for a period of time 
difficult to assess, given that the NCMW’s water sources represented 
approximately 96 per cent of the exploited sources.  
 
d) Since 1998, the NAMR granted the concession of other 
sources by tender, the winners being both the NCMW and other trading 
companies. The concession price, i.e. the royalty cashed by the State 
through the NAMR, was calculated as a percentage of the value of 
tradable mineral water.  
 
Therefore, the NCMW had been advantaged as it had to pay a 
royalty calculated on the basis of the price of the mineral water sold as a 
raw material while the few bottling companies that were licensed 
eventually to extract the mineral water had to pay a royalty calculated on 
the basis of the sale price of the bottled mineral water bearing in mind 
that any new company entering the field leased the spring for bottling 
the mineral water and selling it for consumption.  
 
Enforcement measures: 
The Competition Council decided that both the vertical and 
horizontal agreements infringed the provisions of Article 5(1) of the 
Competition Law, ordered the cessation of the anti-competitive practices 
and sanctioned with fines the NCMW and the 19 bottling undertakings 
that were members of APEMIN. 
The Competition Council also decided that the NAMR infringed 
the provisions of Article 9(1) of the Competition Law by directly allowing 
the concession of mineral water sources to the NCMW (with no tender 
being held) and establishing discriminatory conditions for the 
undertakings involved in the concession of sources on aspects 
concerning the payment of royalties.  
 
The impact on consumers: 
The concerted action of the members of APEMIN led to the 
creation of a monopsony. If we look at this case from the economic 
theory perspective, we can see that the monopsony power cancelled to 
a large extent the monopoly power and this in fact prevented the 
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increase in the price of extracted mineral water, which would have 
eventually triggered higher prices for consumers. Moreover, the 
enforcement measures taken against the decision of the state 
authorities at that time to award the mineral water concession to a single 
company, the NCMW and not, for example, to each bottling company, 
and to establish discriminatory conditions for the undertakings involved 
in the concession of sources on aspects related to the payment of 
royalties, had also a positive indirect impact on consumers. The 
concessionaire companies, other than the NCMW, were acting in the 
market of trading the mineral water for direct consumption, in 
competition with NCMW clients and they were required to pay a royalty 
approximately 30 times higher than the NCMW. Accordingly, this higher 
royalty converted itself into a price increase of bottled mineral water that 
put the burden on consumers.  
 
1.2.4. LAFARGE /HOLCIM /CARPATCEMENT, Decision no. 94 [2005] 
 
Keywords: oligopoly, collusive agreement, cement market  
 
Facts: In March 2001, the Competition Council opened an ex officio 
investigation into the cement market. One of the main triggering events 
behind this action was a significant and simultaneous increase in 
cement prices in the specific market operated by the local cement 
producers. The investigated parties were: Lafarge (member of the 
French Group LAFARGE), Holcim (member of the Swiss Group 
HOLCIM) and Carpatcement (member of the German Group 
HEIDELBERGCEMENT).  
 
The three cement companies operated in the Romanian cement market, 
each of them controlling three homogeneously spread cement plants. 
This indicated an oligopolistic market structure, favourable to anti-
competitive practices. The only competition the three cement producers 
faced was represented by imports, which accounted for 2 per cent of the 
market. 
 
Harm on competition:  
All three undertakings were accused of infringing Art. 5(1)(a) of the 
Competition Law. The evidence showed that the activities of the three 
undertakings (in the period analysed, 2000 – 1st quarter 2004), had as 
scope (respectively as “object”) and had as a result (“effect”) the 
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restriction, prevention and/or distortion of competition in the Romanian 
cement market. 
 
In addition to the written evidence on the illegal agreement471, evidence 
on the market irrefutably showed the real effects of these activities: 
 
• All Romanian cement producers behaved in the same way by 
setting prices during the analysed period. This refers to the price lists 
whereby they offered reference prices to be discounted by the 
companies in order to obtain and maintain equal market shares. 
• The market shares were kept constant and symmetrical, despite 
differences between production costs. 
• During the analysed period, cement prices constantly increased, 
even if the real production costs were decreasing, due to investments to 
modernize the plants. 
• When the investigation was opened, there was another player 
on the relevant market, Romcif Fieni, which was controlled by a 
Romanian company. After the investigation began, Romcif Fieni 
reduced its prices and maintained this downward trend until October 
2001 when it stabilized the prices, which remained constantly lower than 
those of its competitors. This “asymmetry” was changed at the end of 
2002 when Romcif Fieni was acquired by Carpatcement. Carpatcement 
then raised prices for the cement produced at Fieni by 30 per cent, 
adjusting them to the price margin of its competitors. 
• During that period, the three companies were members of the 
Professional Cement Association – CIROM. Although the professional 
associations are generally legal and play a positive role, this is not the 
case when they are used for anti-competitive purposes. CIROM 
published a quarterly bulletin comprising sensitive and detailed 
information, including individual statistical data regarding each cement 
plant. The “CEMENT Committee” in the Cement Professional 
Association had as members only the three cement producers. 
 
                                                 
471 A holographic copy of a note from Holcim’s country manager in that period. 
This note proves the existence of a common strategy, a collusive agreement 
between all cement producers, with a view to coordinate the market shares by 
price-fixing practices.  
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Enforcement measures: 
In May 2005, the Competition Council decided to impose fines of over 
27 million euro on the three cement producers, considering that all three 
undertakings were members of a price-fixing cartel in the Romanian 
market. 
 
The Competition Council also decided to annul the CEMENT Committee 
in order to stop the possibility of concluding collusive agreements. The 
decision required each producer to provide a monthly submission of 
cement prices for the prior month, for a period of 2 years. 
 
The investigation also found that HOLCIM infringed the provisions of the 
Law for the non-fulfilment of the obligations and the conditions imposed 
through the conditional authorization Decision no. 221/08.05.2000 
issued by the Competition Council. Holcim was sanctioned with a fine of 
1 per cent of the total turnover achieved in the previous financial year. 
 
Harm on consumers: 
It is worth noting that companies that are members of the groups that 
operate in the Romanian cement market behaved in an anti-competitive 
manner in other countries. For instance, in 1994, the European 
Commission levied fines of 248 million euro on six companies and the 
cement manufacturers’ association. The parties involved used the 
European Association of Cement (Cembureau) as a vehicle for market 
allocation and exchange of information on prices. In judicial appeals 
finally decided in January 2004, the fine was reduced by 140 million 
euro, and the fine on the trade association was quashed. These six 
included Lafarge and Holcim. Lafarge was fined 187 million euro by the 
EC in 2003 for participating in another cartel, the third largest fine ever 
levied for being a regular offender. In Germany, the competition 
authority sanctioned a cartel in the cement market, in which companies 
of the Lafarge and Heidelbergcement Groups were involved. The Italian 
Competition Authority applied fines to the same companies for anti-
competitive behaviour in the concrete market, including price fixing and 
illegal exchange of information. The list is endless and only goes to 
prove that the reiteration of this kind of behaviour is possible and even 
occurred in the Romanian market. Cement enterprises are the most 
favoured of competition authorities around the world because they 
almost always collude as a cartel and fix prices, thus adversely affecting 
consumers and other businesses. 
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Apart from the sanctions applied, the impact of the RCC’s intervention in 
such an important market for the development of the Romanian 
economy had immediate and positive effects: the price fell by 6 per cent, 
even if the construction materials sector had an upward trend. 
 
1.2.5. National Company for Freight Railway Transport “CFR Marfa” 
Decision no. 119 [2006] 
 
Keywords: abuse of dominant position, refusal to deal, unequal terms 
for equivalent services to trade partners, railway freight transportation 
Facts: This is a case where private companies as competitors of a spin-
off owned by the State were disadvantaged in the market by having to 
pay much higher charges than the companies that had split from the 
former National Company of Romanian Railroads. The settlement of the 
competition issues that arose in this case was made through sustained 
advocacy measures of the Romanian competition authority that 
triggered the amendment of the anti-competitive provisions of the legal 
framework in force. 
 
Through a complaint lodged by the Association of Romanian Private 
Freight Railway Transport (ARPFRT) Companies  against the National 
Company for Freight Railway Transport ("CFR Marfa"-SA472), ARPFRT 
accused CFR Marfa of anti-competitive practices. In fact, ARPFRT 
claimed that CFR Marfa took advantage of its dominant position in the 
market of ancillary services to freight railway transport. It adopted 
several decisions whereby it imposed on the private-owned freight 
railway operators, organized in ARPFRT, different tariffs from those 
charged to the State-owned operators. CFR Marfa refused to deal any 
further with private operators on the grounds that they were its 
competitors.  
 
Definition of relevant market: 
In this case, the analysed product market included services of 
exploitation, maintenance, and repairs of locomotives, specific services 
for locomotive personnel (access of locomotive personnel to bedrooms 
                                                 
472 CFR Marfa is a spin-off owned by the State, set up after the reorganization of 
the former National Company of Romanian Railroads, operating freight railway 
transport. 
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in the locomotive depots), and all the other activities required for the 
proper functioning of railway freight transportation.  
 
The relevant geographic market was defined as regional given the 
location of regional units owned by CFR Marfa where it performed these 
services.  
 
Entry barriers: 
Access to the relevant market was regulated, in the sense that it 
required a license to be obtained from the Romanian Railway Authority. 
In addition, the locomotive shedding required a depot; the same 
requirement was applied for the provision of the locomotive personnel’s 
access to bedrooms, as for the personnel accommodation in other types 
of space that would have contravened the specific legal framework. 
 
The Competition Council’s investigation revealed that, initially, the 
current depots were in the possession of the two State-owned railway 
operators, namely CFR Marfa and CFR Calatori (passengers transport). 
For that reason, the market had the structure of a duopoly and the 
clients had the possibility to opt for the services provided by one of two 
operators. It should be mentioned that CFR Calatori was charging much 
lower tariffs than CFR Marfa. Subsequently, the Ministry of Transport 
issued an order whereby the depots were passed either under CFR 
Marfa’s ownership, or under CFR Calatori possession, and the market 
was shaped as a monopoly, since there was only one depot in the end-
of-line stations, except for Bucharest and Ploiesti, where each of the two 
companies held a depot.  
 
Harm on competition: 
Examining the behaviour of the two undertakings acting in the same 
product market, CFR Marfa and CFR Calatori, the Competition Council 
found that the tariffs charged by CFR Calatori were the same for all its 
beneficiaries, while CFR Marfa was charging differentiated tariffs laid 
down in an internal regulation, based on the beneficiary’s ownership 
(State-owned or private railway operators). Following CFR Marfa’s 
refusal to conclude contracts with private operators, the concerned 
services continued to be provided by CFR Calatori in areas where it 
possessed depots and sheds.  
 
The non-discriminatory tariffs charged by CFR Calatori were considered 
by the Competition Council to be a benchmark in the relevant market. In 
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comparison with this benchmark, the tariffs charged by CFR Marfa for 
private operators were, until the contracts expired, from 5 to 20 times 
higher.  
 
Enforcement measures and remedies: 
Based on all the evidence, the Competition Council’s Plenum decided 
that CFR Marfa infringed the provisions of Art. 6 lit. a) and c) of the 
Competition Law, abusing its dominant position in the relevant market 
and resorting to anti-competitive behaviour consisting of: 
 
• application of unequal conditions for similar services to private 
operators, namely the application of distinctive charges as 
compared to the same services provided to former SNCFR 
companies; 
 
• refusal to deal with certain business partners, namely privately 
owned railway freight operators. 
 
The Competition Council’s Plenum decided to recommend that the 
Ministry of Transport modify the order whereby the existing depots were 
divided between State-owned railway operators and private operators, 
demanding the Ministry to guarantee equal conditions for all 
undertakings, irrespective of their nature. 
 
1.2.6. OMV/Petrom SA, Decision no. 299 [2004] 
 
Keywords: corrective measures, commitments, acquisition, petrol 
market. 
 
Facts: On 23 July 2004, the Ministry of Commerce, as seller, and the 
Austrian undertaking OMV Aktiengesellschaft (OMV), the owner of OMV 
Group, as buyer, concluded a privatization contract regarding the 
acquisition by OMV of a majority participation in SNP PETROM SA and 
of sole control of this undertaking. This operation was notified to the 
Competition Council.  
 
OMV is the parent company of an international group of undertakings 
acting mainly in the area of exploring, producing, processing and 
distributing petrol products. In addition, at the international level, OMV 
has joint control with Rompetrol Holding SA Switzerland over Rompetrol 
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Group N.V. Holland, the parent company of the Rompetrol group of 
companies, operating in the Romanian petrol market. Petrom is a 
diversified undertaking that operates in Romania and also in 
international markets in exploring, developing, producing and selling oil 
and natural gas; processing and distributing refined petrol products; 
developing, producing and selling various chemical products and 
chemical composts. 
 
Since the acquirer OMV has joint control over Rompetrol Group N.V. 
Holland, a real overlap existed between the activities of Petrom that 
were presented above, and the activities of OMV and Rompetrol in 
Romania, only regarding the following activities: oil refining and 
processing, distributing and selling petrol products, selling lubricants, 
producing and selling petrochemical products. 
 
Harm on competition: 
Analysing these four activities and the associated markets, the Council 
found that the concentration OMV/Petrom restricted competition only in 
two of these markets, as a result of the important market shares held by 
the parties involved: the oil refining and processing market (Petrom and 
Rompetrol) and the market for the distribution and sale of petrol 
products (OMV, Petrom and Rompetrol). 
 
Commitments: 
In order to avoid restricted competition in these two affected markets, 
OMV submitted to the Romanian Competition Council proposals of 
commitments. Thus, OMV committed itself to relinquish joint control in 
Rompetrol Group N.V. Holland, by selling its minority participation. Also, 
until the sale of its shares, OMV was not to participate in decisions 
regarding the daily activities of Rompetrol Group N.V. Holland, which 
might have an impact on the competitive behaviour of this undertaking.  
 
The RCC’s review of the commitments envisaged the prevention of a 
possible consolidation of a dominant position in the affected markets. 
The divestiture of minority shareholdings was therefore considered an 
adequate and sufficient commitment in order to clear the transaction 
and make it compatible with a normal competitive environment in the 
Romanian market for the distribution and sale of petrol products. 
Consequently, the Romanian Competition Council issued a non-
objection Decision with corrective measures. 
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1.2.7. Azomures/Chimpex, Decision 113 [2005] 
 
Keywords: acquisition, corrective measures, chemical fertilizers 
 
Facts: The parties involved in the economic concentration were:  
– the acquirer, Azomures, holding a dominant position in the Romanian 
chemical fertilizers market, according to its volume of production and 
sales;  
– the target company, SC Chimpex SA, the Romanian traditional port 
operator for chemical fertilizers, which also held a dominant position in 
the market of port operating services for chemical fertilizers and, 
furthermore, for a certain type of solid chemical fertilizers (bulk urea).  
 
Due to its storage spaces, Chimpex had a quasi-monopoly position, 
being the only port operator specialized in that type of operation. 
 
Definition of relevant market: 
The relevant market has been defined as the market of Romanian port 
operating services. According to the activities performed by the parties 
involved, the economic concentration would lead to a vertical integration 
in the Romanian market. Since both parties involved held dominant 
positions in their markets, the affected market was defined as the 
Romanian market of port operating services for solid chemical fertilizers. 
 
Harm on competition: 
The only competitor of Chimpex was SC Socep SA, which rented an 
installation from SC Transocep Terminal SA. Azomures had joint control 
at Transocep, together with other shareholders. These facts gave 
Azomures the possibility to get involved in the activity of Socep, in the 
segment of port operations for chemical fertilizers. After acquiring a 
majority of the stock in Chimpex, Azomures would have been able, to a 
considerable degree, to behave independently towards its customers 
and competitors, a fact that might have led to a significant restriction, 
prevention or distortion of competition in the relevant market.  
 
Analysis of the compatibility of this acquisition with a normal 
competitive environment: 
The compatibility of the proposed merger with a normal competitive 
environment was regarded and assessed in two directions: 
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• the transaction’s implications for the Romanian fertilizers market 
due to the vertical integration stemming from the merger; 
• the transaction’s effects on the relevant market affected by the 
proposed merger, i.e. the stevedoring operations of the solid 
fertilizers Romanian market. 
 
On the basis of a survey, it was found that the other stevedoring 
operators either did not display any interest in performing in the future 
fertilizer stevedoring services, or they were interested in re-orienting 
their activity to this market, in case of an increased demand and a 
developed infrastructure. Due attention was paid to the assessment of 
entry barriers to the relevant market.  
 
 
It was found that the entry to the relevant market depended both on the 
obtaining of a license of an administrative nature and the observance of 
certain compulsory norms. So, the total entry costs were considered as 
medium in terms of financial investment. 
 
Following the cumulative assessment of the compatibility of the 
proposed transaction with a normal competitive environment, it was 
concluded that even if the merger had contributed to the enhancement 
of the target company’s economic efficiency, the positive effects of the 
merger could not outweigh the negative effects of a restrained 
competition that could allow the authorization of the merger. 
 
Commitments: 
In order to avoid the prohibition of the proposed acquisition, Azomures 
submitted commitment proposals to the Romanian Competition Council, 
in order to make the operation compatible with a normal competitive 
environment. Thus, Azomures took upon itself to relinquish the joint 
control in SC Transocep Terminal SA, by selling the 20 per cent 
participation held in this undertaking.  
 
The acquirer’s commitment in the form of a structural remedy made the 
operation compatible with a normal competitive environment, giving 
sufficient grounds for the approval of the economic concentration.  
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2. Role of competition policy and law in the regulatory reform 
 
A large and growing number of economies are undertaking 
major reforms in the area of economic regulation aimed at achieving 
better regulatory outcomes in the public interest. Although there are 
significant differences across countries and industries, major regulatory 
reforms have generally envisaged the privatization of former State-
owned companies; rethinking universal service obligations; liberalizing 
restrictions on entry, prices and business practices; and taking 
measures to ensure that consumers are properly informed and 
protected. 
 
Restoring the governance of competition and free prices in 
highly regulated sectors and protecting consumers against abusive 
prices represents a difficult task, requiring a very broad range of 
expertise and experience. In this context, competition authorities all over 
the world have an important role to play. They have a vital role in 
ensuring that the regulatory structures put in place are not anti-
competitive or do not create competitive distortions. 
 
The Romanian competition law applies to all sectors of the 
economy, even when these are subject to specific regulation. This 
means that the Competition Council is empowered to open 
investigations and to make pronouncements with regard to anti-
competitive practices and economic concentrations in all sectors of the 
economy, even in the regulated ones. 
 
The legal regulations applying to all these activities of general 
interest call for the Competition Council’s specific intervention in these 
markets. This intervention has a sanctioning character (ex-post) and 
takes place when the regulatory authorities do not have the power to 
ensure that the competition rules are observed, or fail in their preventive 
intervention (ex-ante) or act in contradiction to the competition rules.  
 
Over the last ten years, the Romanian Competition Authority 
has been at the forefront in advocating extensive liberalization of the 
domestic economy and has provided substantive input and support to 
the design and sound implementation of competition-oriented 
privatization and regulatory reforms in a large number of sensitive 
economic sectors and public policy areas such as telecommunications, 
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electricity, gas, transport, construction, the steel industry, postal 
services, public procurements and commercial distribution.  
 
In Sections 2.1 and 2.2, focus will be on an analysis of two 
essential sectors, i.e. electricity and telecommunications, respectively, 
where preserving fair competition is considered of the utmost 
importance for the development of Romania’s economy. For each of 
these sectors, an analysis will be made of the structure of the markets 
and of the general competition issues Romania faced in liberalizing 
these two sectors. Where possible, this analysis will be upheld by 
sectoral case studies handled by the Romanian Competition Council in 
order to explore the actual or potential benefits of competition for 
consumers, in particular, and for the development of a competitive 
market environment, in general.  
 
2.1. Competition issues in the electricity sector 
 
The strategic role the electricity sector plays in any economy 
(developed or otherwise) as well as in ensuring the welfare of 
consumers/citizens is unanimously accepted. The complex reform of the 
energy sector undertaken at the European Union level has also been 
pursued by Romania, particularly during its EU accession process. The 
heart of the liberalization process in the electricity sector in Romania 
consisted of privatizing State-owned energy companies, thus creating 
conditions for efficient competition and related reduction in the energy 
price for consumers and in ensuring that consumers can freely select 
their suppliers, the price and the quality of the product or service. 
  
The electricity sector, as in other network industries, combines 
natural monopoly activities (the transmission and distribution systems) 
with potentially pro-competitive activities (the generation and supply 
systems). In 1998, in order to attain the objective of creating and 
ensuring the functioning of competitive electricity markets, Romania 
began the process of restructuring its electricity sector. An independent 
regulatory body, the National Authority for the Regulation of Energy 
(ANRE), was established and the regulatory reform has advanced 
significantly.  
 
Following the example of some other European countries and 
the EU Electricity Market Directives of 1996 and 2003 and the more 
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recent Green Paper473, the Romanian process of restructuring its 
electricity sector moved through successive stages that envisaged the 
vertical unbundling of generation, transmission and distribution systems 
and the horizontal unbundling of some generation companies holding a 
dominant position in the market. Even if it did not generate competition, 
the vertical unbundling of production from transmission and distribution 
was an important step in reforming the Romanian electricity sector that 
provided for administrative transparency and non-discriminating access 
to the network.  
 
Thus, from 1998 to 2000, the vertically integrated State-owned 
company CONEL was split into five separate State-owned enterprises: 
Nuclearelectrica, for nuclear generation; Hidroelectrica, for hydroelectric 
generation; Termoelectrica, for thermal power generation; Transeletrica, 
for transmission; and Electrica, for distribution. Since then, the 
distribution function carried out by Electrica has been further divided into 
eight regional divisions: Muntenia Sud, Muntenia Nord, Transilvania 
Sud, Transilvania Nord, Oltenia, Moldova, Banat and Dobrogea.  
 
The Italian company ENEL further signed selling–buying 
contracts with Electrica SA, subsequently acquiring control over three 
distribution companies, namely Electrica Muntenia Sud, Electrica Banat 
and Electrica Dobrogea. A similar sell-off strategy was approved for 
Electrica Oltenia and Electrica Moldova. Thus, five of eight electricity 
distribution companies have been privatized in Romania so far. The 
other three continue to be in State ownership, but there are plans to 
privatize them as well. 
 
In accordance with current legal provisions, the privatization 
process falls under the legislation of competition protection. Most of the 
individual privatization acts are economic concentrations, as defined by 
law, and they should be notified to and approved by the Competition 
Council. The rationale is that privatization could create anti-competitive 
effects through the restructuring of the markets while also potentially 
enhancing efficiency. In order to establish their compatibility with the 
Romanian competitive environment, all the above-mentioned operations 
were notified and subsequently approved by the Competition Council.  
 
                                                 
473
 European Commission Green Paper. A European Strategy for Sustainable, 
Competitive and Secure Energy, EC (2006). 
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The privatization that took place in the distribution system has 
also played an important role in the restructuring of the Romanian 
electricity sector. It upheld the financial development of the distribution 
system, covering investment needs and promoted profit-oriented normal 
market behaviour and the improvement of a competitive environment. 
 
Furthermore, the process of creating independent generation 
companies has just started to deliver significant efficiency gains, which 
in the longer run can be passed on to the consumers. These gains refer 
mainly to the decentralization of the less productive thermo generators 
with a view to adapting the production capacities to local consumption 
requirements. Thus grouping the most viable generators (the hydro 
plants, the energy complexes and possibly, the nuclear producer, 
Nuclearelectrica) together with other less efficient thermo generators 
would create companies with similar average costs and market shares 
that could successfully compete against each other. A relevant example 
of horizontal unbundling is Termoelectrica. Together, the most important 
entities that were spun off Termoelectrica account for about 25 per cent 
of electricity production in Romania. 
 
 
The restructuring process of the electricity sector has been 
accompanied by the opening up of the market to competition through 
the gradual increase of the competitive market. From the year 2000 to 
June 2005, the opening rate increased from 10 per cent to 40 per cent. 
Since July 2005, all industrial consumers have been able to switch their 
supplier, even if it was anticipated that this would only happen by 1 
January 2007. Romania’s market opening is 100 per cent for industrial 
consumers as of 1 January 2007 and 100 per cent for residential 
consumers as of July 2007. 
 
The structure of the Romanian electricity market is promising 
although the effects of competition have been limited, especially in the 
generating sector. In 2007, in this market there were 22 producers out of 
67 licensed operators, 7 system services suppliers, 48 electricity 
suppliers in the gross market, 95 electricity suppliers in the retail market, 
1 transport operator, 1 system operator, 8 distribution operators, 8 
million residential consumers and 600,000 industrial consumers, able to 
choose their suppliers.  
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Regarding generation, the market structure offers a starting 
point from which to judge the possible competitiveness level of the 
electricity market. According to the economic theory, the following 
market concentration indicator may be defined: 
 
HHI, Herfindahl-Hirschman Index = sum of square market shares of 
participants (%): 
 
The indicator values signify: 
1) HHI < 1,000 = competitive market; 
2) 1,000 < HHI < 1,800 = moderately concentrated market; 
3) HHI > 1,800 = highly concentrated market. 
 
Since 2003, the annual values of the HHI based on both 
installed capacity and production have been moderate, with values of 
less than 1,800. More recently, i.e. in the first 11 months of 2007, the 
HHI recorded a value of 1,405 in the electricity wholesale market, thus 
reflecting a moderate concentration level of the market power held by 
the main economic operators (Chart 2). 
 
 
Chart 2: Market structure from generation perspective in the first 11 
months of 2007 
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 Source: ANRE. 
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On the other hand, privatization of the generation sector has not 
advanced and remains almost entirely State owned. The most attractive 
generators, such as the hydro-generation power plants and the energy 
complexes that could have been of interest for private investors are still 
withheld from privatization, as they are considered of strategic 
importance. On the contrary, the thermoelectric power plants that were 
listed for sale several times did not attract investor interest due to their 
age, outdated technology and a significant need for investment. 
Nonetheless, it is planned that privatization will start in the short or 
medium term with the first major power plant most likely to be the 
Turceni and Rovinari lignite-fired thermal power complex, following the 
reorganization of the State-owned generation player Termoelectrica. 
 
Competition in the electric energy market faces many 
constraints especially in the transition to its full liberalization. This is 
attributable mainly to the particularities of the sector as well as to other 
factors impacting on its functioning. For instance, it is more difficult to 
define the relevant market to assess the competition in the electric 
energy market than in other recently liberalized markets. Why? Because 
in the case of the electric energy market, we are dealing with a 
combination of different markets and different types of contracts.  
According to the current legal framework, the Romanian 
electricity market includes a regulated market and a competitive market 
and the energy transactions can be performed through wholesale and 
retail sales. 
 
The regulated market of electricity and ancillary services works 
on the basis of commercial contracts concluded between the market 
players based on regulated prices. The quantities contracted through 
wholesale transactions concluded between electricity producers and 
suppliers are established by ANRE. 
 
The regulated electricity acquisition contracts can be reviewed, 
at the request of the supplier, as a result of the migration of the eligible 
consumers and the decrease in the prognoses errors as the date to 
deliver the electricity to consumers approaches. When the total quantity 
of electricity decreases, the suppliers should ask the producers to 
reduce the contracted quantities in the decreasing order of the prices 
regulated by the contracts.  
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However, when eligible consumers are migrating, it is less likely 
for suppliers to relinquish high price quantities or to contract additional 
low price quantities. In such circumstances, the additional costs or 
incomes incurred by the suppliers caused by the adjustment of the 
electricity quantities in the acquisition contracts are considered ex-post, 
the next calculation of the regulated tariffs for captive consumers.  
 
It appears that the mechanism to review the regulated 
contracts as a result of eligible consumer migration may harm 
household consumers and may lead to a distortion of competition in 
the market.   
 
The electricity competitive market is functioning on the basis of  
bilateral contracts negotiated between suppliers and producers, bilateral 
contracts negotiated by electricity suppliers with eligible consumers,  
import and export electricity contracts, auction transactions on the spot 
market and transactions of specific services.  
 
The liberalization of the electricity market and the consumer's 
option to choose between the centralized and the competitive system of 
electricity delivery led to a 3.9 per cent increase in the beneficiary’s 
consumption absorbed by the competitive market whereas the 
consumption absorbed by the regulated system dropped by 0.7 per 
cent, in November 2007, compared to that in the same month of the 
previous year. The number of consumers supplied by the competitive 
system increased by around 35 per cent in the same period (Table 3). 
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Table 3: Evolution in electricity consumption and in the number of 
consumers supplied by the competitive system from November 2006 to 
November 2007 
 
Indicator November 
2006 
November 
2007 
% 
Consumption within the 
regulated system 
(TWh) 
1,854 1,841 99.3 
Consumption within the 
competitive system 
(TWh) 
1.901 1,976 103.9 
Number of consumers 
supplied by the 
competitive system 
(no.) 
1,969 2,662 35.2 
        Source: ANRE. 
 
In the EU-25 Member States, a comparative analysis of 
electricity prices charged to industrial and household consumers reveals 
that those charged to industrial consumers are lower than those 
charged to household consumers. In Romania, the situation is the 
opposite. 
 
Since May 2007, the Romanian authority responsible for energy 
regulation is ANRE, following the restructuring process that merged the 
former National Regulatory Authority in the Electricity Field (ANRE) and 
the former National Regulatory Authority in the Natural Gas Field 
(ANRGN). The third-party access is regulated by provisions issued by 
ANRE. 
 
As an overall picture, the current structure of the electricity 
sector in Romania reveals that all major producers are State owned 
(100 per cent), five of eight distribution companies have a combined 
ownership (51 per cent private, 49 per cent State owned), the transport 
operator is State owned and the largest supplying companies are 
private. 
 
As shown previously, concentration in the sector is moderate 
and the chances to create a competitive power sector in Romania are 
genuine. The property regime, the inheritance of past regulation which 
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sought to use electricity prices as a tool for social protection, together 
with the political interference in the management of State-owned 
companies, have been the main obstacles to competition. 
 
It is well known that the success of privatization is mainly 
dependent upon prior restructuring, which is needed to provide a legal 
background, transparency, and appropriate market conditions for 
investors to enter the market. In Romania, the energy sector has seen 
substantial change in recent years, as many of the old State-owned 
monopolies have been restructured and privatized. The most common 
method of privatization in the energy sector has been for a strategic 
investor to be found. However, in the future, capital markets are 
expected to play a greater role through the sale of shares on European 
stock exchanges. 
 
Privatization of the energy system in Romania was designed not 
only to encourage foreign direct investment but also to allow market 
liberalization and increasing competition. An important step forward was 
made on 1 July 2007, when the entire EU market was liberalized, with 
household consumers now being able to choose their suppliers of 
electricity and natural gas. In principle, this should lead to cheaper 
energy but in practice reductions in energy prices may not take place 
immediately as major investments are needed in the sector, and will 
subsequently be passed on to consumers. In practice, the regulation of 
electricity and natural gas prices will continue and adequate measures 
of protection for household consumers are permanently sought in 
Romania. Low-income households, such as pensioners, will continue to 
benefit from subsidies to ensure that energy consumption costs do not 
exceed 15–20 per cent of their total income, according to ANRE. 
 
A real challenge now for Romania consists in ensuring that 
energy providers are accountable to their customers, with clearly 
defined delivery targets and penalties for failure to meet them. Another 
challenge is that its energy sector needs significant investment to bring 
its technology up to date, since many installations are 35−40 years old. 
According to an estimate by the Ministry of Economy and Finance, the 
costs will be approximately EUR 30 billion between now and 2020, 
Some EU funding is available for the Romanian energy sector for 
2008−2013, but this is relatively low (around EUR 600 million) and for 
selected sectors only, with a strong emphasis on improvement of 
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environmental standards. Still, the government is expecting that the 
financial gap will be filled by the private sector. 
 
Nevertheless, these investment needs also present an 
opportunity for the Romanian energy sector as the latest technology will 
be brought in, which will make it more competitive. The electricity 
industry requires considerable modernization to bring the sector up to 
European standards.  
 
It is true that, as a result of reform measures in Romania, the 
structure of available electricity output has improved in terms of primary 
energy sources (the share of the thermal electric capacities decreased 
whereas the share of the hydro-electric capacities increased), as has 
the beneficiary’s ownership (the share of the State-owned capacities 
decreased in favour of the private-owned ones). In addition, the number 
of operators authorized to operate in the competitive segments of the 
markets increased significantly. 
 
However, in comparison with other countries, which use a 
diversification of supply sources, with a mixture of hydro, renewable, 
thermo and nuclear power, most electrical energy in Romania is still 
supplied from coal-fired power stations. However, the following chart 
shows that solid fuels (35 per cent) are followed by hydro resources (20 
per cent) while liquid fuel lags behind with a share of only 1 per cent 
(Chart 3). 
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Chart 3: Structure of the energy provided in terms of types of resources, 
November 2007 
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     Source: ANRE. 
 
As an emerging market and a new EU Member State, Romania 
offers many opportunities to investors in this field. While much still 
needs to be done, the country has made significant progress in 
environmental standards in recent years in order to comply with EU 
requirements. Improvements have also been made to the quality of the 
energy infrastructure and to the level of service provided to consumers. 
In addition, Romania has seen substantial economic growth and very 
high levels of foreign direct investment in most sectors. Potential 
investors are likely to view the country as an attractive place to do 
business. 
2.2. Competition issues in the telecommunication sector 
 
The liberalization process in the essential sectors of a transition 
economy forces domestic monopolies to face international competition. 
A perfect illustration of competition benefits for consumers, in particular, 
and for the economy, in general, lies in the liberalization of the 
telecommunication sector. 
Following its liberalization in January 2003, the face of the 
Romanian telecom market completely changed. At the beginning of that 
year, Romtelecom lost its monopoly over fixed telephony. Initially, other 
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fixed telephony operators were reluctant to enter the market, which 
required important infrastructure investment. However, towards the end 
of 2005, the market share of the former monopolistic provider started to 
decrease considerably, while other operators were gaining significant 
slices of the telecom “pie”. 
The new entrants made considerable investments in innovative 
technologies so as to reduce the cost of infrastructure development. 
This reduced the dominant operator’s market share and forced it to 
reinvent itself. The former monopolistic operator thus needed to react to 
the powerful wave of competition by investing significantly in its own 
infrastructure. The end result was a reduction in the costs for the 
maintenance and operation of infrastructure and higher quality 
connections to its clients. In the increased competition from the new 
entrants, the incumbent had to significantly reduce its prices. It even 
started to provide free calls within its network, which was inconceivable 
when there was no competition.  
From 2002, the sector was given a totally new legislative and 
regulatory framework in line with the latest EU standards. During recent 
years the Romanian National Agency of Telecommunication 
Regulations (ANRC) delivered a competition-oriented set of secondary 
legislation, which offered investors easy access to the market, fair rules, 
based strictly on economic grounds, and protection from potential 
abuses of those attempting to take unfair advantage of their position. 
Nowadays clients are expecting much more from their 
telephone line: broadband Internet, interactive and multimedia content 
and new services. From 2003 to 2006, there was a constant rate of 
increase in the number of fixed telephony providers. Thus, in only 4 
years the number of alternative providers increased by over 1.6 times 
whereas the providers of telephony services using Internet connections 
recorded an average annual rate of increase of over 6.7 per cent for the 
period 2003−2006 (Chart 4). 
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Chart 4: Evolution of the number of alternative providers and of providers 
of telephony services supplied through the Internet 
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       Source: ANRCTI, 2007. 
 
Therefore, Romtelecom was forced once again to move into 
new “territories” and transform itself into a multi-services and multi-
technologies provider. It is a process that has already started to produce 
results, with 30,000 people opting for the new digital television Dolce 
every month and a tenfold increase in the number of broadband Internet 
users. 
 
There are currently 65 alternative fixed telecommunication 
suppliers other than Romtelecom that collectively account for 15 per 
cent of the market. The most intense competition by far is for 
international telecommunication services where, in 2006, 63 companies 
were active.  
Romania is entering a second phase of the deregulation 
process, whereby all the benefits of liberalization are gradually 
becoming visible. The market has reached the stage where the core of 
telecom services − basic fixed telephone services – is being targeted by 
a multitude of market players. 
 
As a result, tariffs are in some cases significantly lower than 
those of Romtelecom, the former monopolist incumbent. This is a clear 
indicator that the market players are willing to invest in the possibilities 
the sector is offering in the medium and long term. 
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The highest expectation in the next few years is the emergence 
of full competition on all fixed telephony segments. Beside the national 
operator, there are currently few operators who could provide fixed 
telephony based on their cable network.  
 
Chart 5: The fixed telephony market in Romania – evolution of market 
shares 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chart 5 illustrates that competition leads to managing business 
in an efficient manner, with good results for both the consumers and the 
economy. The quality of connections of the former monopolist 
Romtelecom improved due to infrastructure developments generated by 
competitive pressures. Further, its related services were improved due 
to competition and good quality services provided by other companies.  
 
2.2.1. Mobile telephony 
 
Together with fixed telephony, mobile telephony has an 
important and more expanding role. Nowadays, alongside the GSM 
mobile communications, the latest advanced technologies – CDMA 
(used by Telemobil), EDGE (used by Orange) and UMTS – are being 
utilized in Romania. In April 2005 3G services were launched in 
Romania by Vodafone and in June 2006 by Orange. In January 2007, 
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two more 3G licenses were granted for the providers S.C. Telemobil 
S.A. and S.C. RCS&RDS S.A. 
Because consumers have had the chance to choose between 
fixed and mobile telephony, the total number of users increased 
significantly, from 7 million (2003) to 19.5 million (2007). The penetration 
rate practically tripled, as shown in Table 4. 
 
 
Table 4: Evolution of the total number of users of mobile telephony 
and of its penetration rate during 2003–2007 
 
Indicator 31.12.03 30.06.04 31.12.04 30.06.05 31.12.05 30.06.06 31.12.06 30.06.07 
Total 
number of 
users 
(million) 
7.0 8.4 10.2 11.4 13.4 14.9 17.4 19.5 
Penetration 
rate per 
100 
inhabitants 
(%) 
32.5 38.6 47.1 52.5 61.8 68.8 80.7 90.5 
   Source: ANRCTI. 
 
 
Compared to the other EU-15 Member States, the average 
penetration rate of the mobile telephony services in Romania was 90.5 
per cent in 2007. It is shown in Chart 6 that Romania’s position as 
regards the penetration rate of mobile telephony services is under the 
Community average by 22.5 percentage points. 
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Chart 6: Romania’s position compared to EU-15 Member States as 
regards the penetration rate of mobile telephony services 
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       Source: ANRCTI. 
 
The consumer's option for different means of payment for the 
mobile telephony services is regarded as another positive effect of the 
mobile telephony. Almost 70 per cent of about 2 million new “users” 
recorded on 30 June 2007 compared to 31 December 2006 preferred 
the supply of mobile services by means of prepaid cards instead of 
monthly subscriptions. Compared to 2006, the number of users of 
monthly subscriptions decreased by 2.4 percentage points, whereas the 
number of users of prepaid cards increased by the same percentage 
(Chart 7).  
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Chart 7: The evolution of users of prepaid cards 
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The rising trend in users of prepaid cards may also be regarded 
as an increased freedom of consumers who use mobile telephony 
services, as well as a reaction to the various costs involved in 
subscriptions.  
 
With regard to the application of competition rules in the fixed 
telephony markets, two cases where Romtelecom was involved are 
relevant.  
 
2.2.2. ROMTELECOM/ GOCR, Decision no. 168 [2002] 
 
Keywords: association of two companies, non-compete clause, 
agreement, telecommunication 
 
Facts: This is a case that illustrates the behaviour of 
Romtelecom at the time when it had exclusive rights over the national 
fixed telephony market. Moreover, it shows that whenever the behaviour 
of the companies acting on a regulated market has the characteristics of 
an anti-competitive practice prohibited by the competition law, the 
Romanian Competition Council can intervene and impose the sanctions 
provided for by the Competition law. 
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In 1999, SNT Romtelecom SA (Romtelecom) filed a complaint 
to the Competition Council about the non-compete clause provided by 
the statute of SC Global One Communications Romania SA (hereinafter 
GOCR), of which Romtelecom was a shareholder. Romtelecom alleged 
that it was prevented from carrying out activities or capital investments 
in the package data transmission market (where GOCR was active), 
and invoked the provisions of Art. 54474 of the Competition Law. 
 
Gocr was established as a stock company in 1993. 
Subsequently, following a series of transactions, from January 1996 to 
April 2001, GOCR equity was held by SC Global One Communications 
Holding BV (50.5 per cent) and Romtelecom (48.98 per cent). 
 
Romtelecom was the national telecommunication incumbent, 
which benefited at that time from exclusivity for national fixed telephony. 
It held sole ownership of all Romanian telecommunication 
infrastructures that it leased to the companies acting on the data 
transmission market. Global One Communications Holding BV (GOCH) 
was a joint venture of France Telecom, Deutsche Telekom and Sprint. It 
was established as a vehicle company that allowed those companies to 
enter the European data transmission market, services with added value 
and Internet. Subsequently, Deutsche Telekom and Sprint left the 
business, and France Telecom became the sole shareholder.  
 
Harm on competition: 
Analysing the GOCR statute, the Competition Council found 
that the contracting parties (Romtelecom and GOCH) were not allowed 
to compete with GOCR if they held shares and for a period of five years 
from the termination of their activity as shareholders.  
 
Furthermore, the investigation revealed that Romtelecom did 
not exert any determinant influence on GOCR, which was controlled 
only by GOCH. Consequently, the establishment of GOCR did not 
constitute an economic concentration and the non-competing clause 
could not follow the legal regime of an ancillary restraint. Against this 
background, the non-compete clause had to be treated as an 
agreement that affected competition on the data transmission market, 
                                                 
474
 According to Art. 54, any contractual clauses referring to an anti-
competitive practice banned by Art. 5 are null and void. 
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preventing the two parent companies of GOCR from entering the market 
independently. 
 
The Competition Council also examined the compatibility of the 
association between GOCH and Romtelecom with the national 
competition legal framework. For that purpose, the relevant market was 
determined as being the data transmission (using commuting packages) 
market475. 
 
The competition authority examined the degree to which the two 
parent companies competed with each other. More precisely, the 
investigation analysed the ability of the parties to individually provide 
services already performed by GOCR.  
 
The investigation revealed that GOCR parent companies 
undertook substantial activities in the related markets (namely on mobile 
and fixed telephony). In the communications sector, these markets 
account for a significant place in comparison with the market of GOCR. 
In addition, Romtelecom and GOCH, by means of their parent 
companies, were already performing substantial activities in similar 
fields, and had the financial and technical capacity to enter the relevant 
market on their behalf. In conclusion, GOCH (and consequently France 
Telecom) and Romtelecom were potential competitors, having the 
financial and technical capacity to enter the relevant market on their 
own.  
 
The decision made by Romtelecom and GOCH to cooperate 
harmed competition, falling thus under the scope of the Art. 5 para. (1). 
According to the legal principle accesorium sequitur principale, the 
agreement on non-competing concluded between GOCH and 
Romtelecom falls under the scope of Art. 5 para. (1).   
 
The analysis of the relevant market’s structure made clear that, 
in 1999, only two firms were active on this market: GOCR and LOGIC 
TELECOM, GOCR being the market leader with a market share of 78 
per cent. In 2000, GOCR managed to conserve its leading position in 
                                                 
475
 Commuting packages represents a way to improve the network capacity and 
consist in splitting data sequences in «packages», commuting the packages 
towards the intended destination and then reassembling them in order to get the 
original data sequences. 
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the data transmission market. Under the circumstances of an oligopoly 
market, with substantial investments and being strictly specialized, the 
association of two companies, together with the analysed non-compete 
clause, clearly constituted an artificial entry barrier; this barrier 
prevented the two potential competitors from entering the market, 
seriously limiting competition. 
 
Likewise, while reviewing this partnership during the 
investigation in April 2001, the General Extraordinary Assembly of 
GOCR Shareholders decided Romtelecom’s withdrawal from this 
company, along with the annulment of the non-compete clause in the 
GOCR statute. 
 
Enforcement measures: 
In its Decision, the Competition Council’s Plenum sanctioned 
Romtelecom and Global One Communications Romania for having 
breached the provisions of Art. 5(1) of Competition Law, by concluding 
an association agreement in setting up a new company, Global One 
Communications Romania SA, and for the stipulation of a non-compete 
clause in the company’s statute.  
 
Appeal proceedings: 
The decision was appealed before the Bucharest Court of 
Appeal (“Court”), which dismissed the complaint and maintained the 
decision as legal and well founded. The Bucharest Court of Appeal 
decision was further appealed before the High Court of Cassation and 
Justice. In their appeal the parties (Romtelecom and Global One 
Communications Romania) requested the annulment of the decision 
claiming that the competition authority’s decision did not respect their 
rights of defence. The parties also claimed that the decision infringed 
upon the principle of non-retroactivity of the competition law because 
the agreement and the establishment of the new company took place 
long before the competition law was enforced, and thus the alleged 
infringement of Article 5(1) of Competition Law no. 21/1996 exceeded 
the limitation period. The Supreme Court upheld that the limitation 
period of the infringement was not exceeded because it was a 
continuous infringement, which ended only with the competition 
authority’s investigation. The High Court of Cassation and Justice 
upheld the Bucharest Court of Appeal decision. 
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Another interesting case where Romtelecom was again involved 
was brought to the attention of the RCC in 2004, after the liberalization 
of the fixed-telephony market. This case shows that ex-ante regulations 
must be applied together with legislation in the field of competition in a 
complementary manner, in order to promote effective competition in the 
market. 
 
2.2.3. AIETES TELECOM vs. ROMTELECOM, 2004 
 
The involved parties in this case were Aietes Telecom, as 
complainant, and Romtelecom, as defendant. The alleged infringement 
of Competition Law consisted in a possible abuse of a dominant position 
committed by the incumbent fixed-line operator (former monopolist), i.e. 
Romtelecom, against an alternative operator, i.e. Aietes Telecom, by 
refusing to grant interconnection in certain pertinent and feasible terms 
(both technical and economic). It was interesting that the complaint was 
also sent to the ANRC, thus creating a positive conflict of competences 
regarding the interconnection conditions provided by the incumbent in 
the market of access to the fixed public telephone network for call 
origination, termination and transit. 
 
Since the facts of the case revealed technical problems and 
infringements of both telecommunication legislation and the ANRC’s 
decision, the RCC requested the ANRC’s viewpoint in this respect. After 
consultation between these two authorities, the RCC suspended its 
procedure until the ANRC issued a decision.  
 
In its decision, the ANRC obliged Romtelecom to negotiate and 
conclude an interconnection agreement (using the R2 signalling system 
requested by Aietes Telecom) at the ANRC’s tariffs settled through its 
previous decision. Under these circumstances, the reasons for the 
complaint disappeared and the RCC closed the case after the 
withdrawal of the complaint by Aietes Telecom. 
 
It appears evident in this case that a clear procedure of 
cooperation between a national competition authority and a sector 
regulator needs to be in place when companies commit certain deeds or 
acts that may constitute, simultaneously, both a breach of competition 
legislation and a breach of the electronic communications legislation. In 
the above case, it was considered more appropriate that the sectoral 
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regulator intervene. However, this does not mean that we can overlook 
the fact that there are particular circumstances that trigger the 
application of competition law even if access and interconnection come 
under the ambit of sector-specific regulation. 
 
Another conclusion we can draw from this case is that the 
paramount role of cooperation between a national competition authority 
and a sector regulator is to avoid the adoption of contradictory 
measures and the imposition of disproportionate sanctions or 
obligations.  
 
Cooperation between a national competition authority and a 
sector regulator should be based on a procedure that stipulates clear 
rules for handling different circumstances, such as:  
 
• where one of the parties finds that it does not have the 
competence provided by law to investigate or settle a certain 
dispute, but it considers that the dispute may fall under the other 
party’s competence – it shall send the other party the relevant 
information, notifying the interested persons; 
 
• where one of the parties finds it has the competence, but it 
considers that the respective case could also involve the 
competence of the other party – it shall inform the other party, in 
order to identify a potential positive conflict of competence; 
 
•  the party receiving the information shall make its stand on the 
case; 
 
• if, during the parties’ correspondence or meetings, it is revealed 
that one of the parties is not competent to investigate or to solve 
the case, that the measures or sanctions it may impose would 
not be effective or that the other party’s actions would be 
sufficient, this party shall decline its competence, or suspend 
the exercise of its attributions; 
 
• if both parties decide to continue the investigations, they shall 
consult each other in order to ensure consistency of the 
decisions and proportionality of the sanctions and obligations 
imposed; 
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• one party may investigate acts or deeds that have been 
authorized or imposed by the other party, requiring the other 
party to take a stand regarding that matter, and it shall consider 
the respective answer in the process of making a decision; 
 
• the parties shall provide each other with the information they 
have, in order to exercise their legal attributions; 
 
• the request for information shall be made in writing or, under 
exceptional circumstances, orally, establishing deadlines for 
providing the information; 
 
• the information provided shall be used only for the purposes 
indicated in the request (one party shall require the written 
consent of the other party if it intends to use the information for 
other purposes); 
 
• in order to establish effective communication, contact persons 
shall be designated to ensure operative collaboration between 
the parties. 
 
3. Conclusions 
 
The role of competition policy in the efficiency and productivity 
of the economy has not always been as relatively undisputed as it is 
today. There was a time when many commentators doubted which of 
the two competing economic orders in the world, a market economy or a 
centrally planned economy, would eventually lead to better results. 
Competition policy has slowly but surely became a growing element of 
the economic governance in Europe and worldwide.  
 
Today, competition policy is part of an investment climate aimed 
at improving economic growth. As Joseph Stiglitz has observed: “Strong 
competition policy is not just a luxury to be enjoyed by rich countries but 
a real necessity for those striving to create democratic market 
economies”. 
 
The last ten years have seen a continuous evolution in 
competition law in Romania and an enforcement policy that is now 
widely accepted as a key policy to promote the competitiveness of the 
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Romanian economy. This could also serve as a model for countries with 
an economy in transition or still at the developmental stage. 
 
The adoption of the relevant legislation is relatively easy as 
there are enough international pieces of legislation already validated by 
practice that can be adapted to the individual state needs.  
 
Enforcement of competition law is however much more difficult. 
Public officers in transition economies or developing economies are 
usually not familiar with or are even hostile to privatization and free 
market mechanisms. If State employees, privatization authorities and 
competition authorities are not genuinely favourable to market 
mechanisms, any subsequent effort to train staff or encourage them to 
enforce the law is pointless. As a result, enforcement may be 
aggressive or passive and discretionary, with inconsistent outcomes and 
effects on the market.  
 
Decision makers have an important role in building a fully 
functional and credible institution. Therefore, there is a need for 
coherent internal policies to interpret the law and the regulations, so that 
there is consistency in their application. Otherwise, the competition 
authorities could be influenced by different lobby groups (political, 
business, consumers, etc.) and practically “disappear”, thus 
endangering the long-term viability of the institution.  
 
Competition policy should be a constant part of the policy mix. 
The existence of such a policy would considerably ease the competition 
review of the privatization process and confer credibility on the 
competition authorities. The control of the privatization process should 
be fair and transparent enough to attract the interest of real investors. In 
an economy in transition, most of the anti-competitive practices involve 
the State represented at different levels (ministries, local 
administrations, and other institutions). It sometimes plays a double role, 
that of regulator establishing the rules of the game and another one as 
market player. This anomalous situation can be rectified only by 
strengthening the role of the competition authority as an independent 
autonomous body capable of implementing an effective competition 
policy, on the one hand, and by scaling down the role of the State as a 
market player in the economy, on the other hand. 
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International experience has shown that anti-competitive 
practices tend to be less prevalent in economies where the effective use 
of national competition law and policy acts as a deterrent. If correctly 
implemented, competition policy can protect producers and consumers 
from anti-competitive practices that increase costs and prices and 
reduce production. At the same time it can promote transparency and 
enhance the attractiveness of an economy to foreign investment, and 
also reinforce and maximize the benefits of such investment. 
 
An important part of competition policy is its advocacy function, 
which helps to impart a culture of competition in the manner in which 
firms interact in the economy and can in itself foster increased 
adherence to competition principles and encourage self-discipline 
amongst firms, thus reducing production and enforcement costs. Finally, 
political will is extremely important for the success of competition and 
regulation regimes in developing countries.  
 
High-quality capacity building programmes, such as those 
developed by UNCTAD in the area of competition law and policy, are 
most useful. They should continue to assist developing countries in 
particular in their efforts to construct and develop an efficient and 
competitive economy. 
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COMPETITION LAW AND ENFORCEMENT: THE 
AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE 
Deborah Healey* 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Competition law in Australia is well developed and has provided 
significant benefits to the economy and consumers. The Australian 
competition law, the Trade Practices Act 1974 (TPA), has changed 
significantly over time. This discussion below is divided into two parts 
and will focus on two particularly important factors in the effectiveness of 
Australian competition law: the breadth of competition policy and the 
law, and the robust enforcement of the TPA by the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), the agency that has 
responsibility for enforcement. 
 
There was a general recognition in the early 1990s that the 
country needed a competition policy that took a broad approach to the 
issues of competition law. This led to the implementation of a National 
Competition Policy in the mid-1990s which resulted in major benefits to 
the economy, which are shared by all. Section 2 below outlines the 
scope of the TPA and its significant limitations prior to the 1995 
amendments. The amendment process and the current application of 
the TPA are described, using case studies to illustrate the application to 
areas previously immune from prosecution, including government 
bodies. It also describes the broader reforms of National Competition 
Policy and their quantifiable benefits for the economy and consumers. 
 
The profile of the TPA and the development of a significant 
culture of compliance in Australia have been aided by the robust 
approach to enforcement taken by the ACCC. Section 3 of the 
discussion outlines the ACCC’s broad powers to investigate 
contraventions of the TPA, which have been particularly important to 
enforcement. Case studies show the way in which the enforcement can 
achieve outcomes that benefit a large number of consumers. These two 
areas provide some interesting lessons for other jurisdictions. 
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2. The breadth of Australian competition law and policy 
 
Australia has had some form of competition law since 1906, 
although the area did not become particularly important until the 
enactment of the TPA in 1974.476 Prior to 1974 the law was more 
limited, the enforcement mechanisms underdeveloped and sanctions 
provided little incentive to comply with the law. In summary, the laws 
were not particularly effective.477 
 
The 1974 TPA was the first really serious competition law in 
Australia and was modelled on provisions contained in both the US and 
EU statutes operative at that time. There were, however, a number of 
important areas of business to which it did not apply. 
 
A range of government and non-incorporated bodies were not 
subject to the TPA because of Constitutional limitations. Australia is a 
Federation made up of States and Territories. The Australian Parliament 
has specific powers to make laws under the Australian Constitution, and 
the States exercise residual power. The Australian Parliament’s powers 
under the Constitution to make laws with respect to corporations478 and 
trade or commerce provide the Constitutional basis for the TPA.479 
                                                 
* LLM (Hons) (Syd.), Senior Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of New South 
Wales and Solicitor. 
References to legislative provisions are to the Trade Practices Act 1974 unless 
otherwise stated. 
476The Australian Industries Preservation Act 1906 was declared to be 
unconstitutional under a now-discredited view of Constitutional interpretation. 
The 1965 Trade Practices Act was also declared to be unconstitutional and was 
replaced by the 1971 Trade Practices Act, which had a more limited application 
and was constitutionally uncontentious. It was superseded by the 1974 TPA, 
which is the current law.  
477
 Under the 1971 TPA, in order to avoid prosecution, a company could simply 
register an agreement and in 1974 there were some 14,000 registered 
agreements. See Productivity Commission, Review of National Competition 
Policy Reforms, Productivity Commission Inquiry Report, No 33, 28 February 
2005 (the “Productivity Commission Report”). 
478
 Specifically trading, financial and foreign corporations: Constitution of 
Australia, section 51(xx); TPA, Section 4(1). 
479
 Trade or commerce power: Constitution, Section 51(i); TPA, Section 6(2). 
There are some other Constitutional provisions of more limited relevance but 
those mentioned provide the major platform for the law. 
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Bodies that are not trading, financial or foreign corporations, or are not 
engaged in Constitutional trade or commerce, are not within 
Constitutional power. This means that the Australian Parliament itself 
lacks power to legislate with respect to other bodies, and they cannot be 
prosecuted under the TPA. 
 
Another gap in coverage arose because State and Territory 
governments could enact laws within their own jurisdictions expressly 
exempting particular conduct and certain bodies from the operation of 
the TPA, possibly for anti-competitive or protectionist purposes, without 
the need to justify the action.480 Prior to the reforms the Australian 
States and Territories often made laws and regulations favouring their 
own industries and undertakings and the Commonwealth could not 
control this. 
 
Finally, there was a common law doctrine called the “shield of 
the Crown” which gave government bodies forming part of the executive 
arm of government immunity from the TPA, and substantially limited the 
way in which laws were applied to bodies that formed part of the Crown 
(or government). To clarify this issue, the Crown is the “government”. 
This means in Australia that the Crown exists at Commonwealth, State 
and Territory levels because each has its own government. In each of 
these jurisdictions the government acts through its departments and 
officers, and the reference to the “Crown in right of the State” or the 
“Crown in right of the Commonwealth” refers to the Ministries that 
discharge executive functions in those jurisdictions. They are not 
generally separate legal entities. 
 
Under Australian laws of statutory interpretation, if there was no 
mention of the Crown, there was a presumption that it was not caught 
by the law. The TPA itself originally did not mention the Crown in right of 
the Commonwealth, State or Territory. In 1977 the Commonwealth 
Parliament recognized that it was inappropriate for Government bodies 
carrying on business to have immunity from the TPA, and a section was 
added which made the TPA applicable to Commonwealth Crown bodies 
where they were carrying on business.481 
                                                 
480Under the TPA itself the Australian Parliament could also enact laws 
exempting particular conduct and certain bodies from the operation of the TPA 
without giving reasons. 
481
 Section 2A. 
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Under the Constitution, however, there is no power for the 
Australian Parliament to make laws that bind the States, so State bodies 
were not caught by the TPA even where they were carrying on 
business. 
 
2.1. Major review of competition policy 
 
A major review of Australian competition policy took place in 
1992 with the agreement of the Commonwealth, and all States and 
Territories.482  
The reasons for the review are well summarized in the words of 
the Productivity Commission: 
 
“During the 1970s and 1980s, output growth slowed, inflation 
and unemployment rose, and productivity growth was consistently low 
by international standards…high trade barriers and various regulatory 
and institutional restrictions on competition in the domestic market led to 
significant inefficiencies across the economy. They also created a 
business culture that focussed on securing government preferment 
rather than on achieving a competitive edge through cost control, 
innovation and responsiveness to customer needs…from the early 
1980s, Australian governments embarked on a programme of extensive 
economic reform. As the reform programme gathered pace, it became 
apparent that aspects of Australia’s wider competition policy framework 
were impeding performance across the economy and constraining the 
scope to create national markets for infrastructure and other 
services.”483. 
 
The outcome of the review, the Hilmer Report, emphasized that 
competition policy embraces a range of laws, not just the TPA itself. It 
concluded that an effective competition policy for Australia should 
address six concerns: 
 
1. Anti-competitive conduct of firms; 
                                                 
482
 Report by the Independent Committee of Inquiry into National Competition 
Policy, 1993, AGPS, Canberra (the “Hilmer Report”). 
483
 Productivity Commission Report at p. xiv. 
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2. Unjustified regulatory restrictions on competition; 
3. Inappropriate structures of public monopolies; 
4. Denial of access to certain facilities that are essential for 
effective competition; 
5. Monopoly pricing; and 
6. Competitive neutrality when Government businesses compete 
with private firms484. 
 
It recommended a large number of significant reforms, which 
were ultimately agreed to and adopted by the Australian Government 
and the Governments of each of the States.485 These reforms, which 
became known as “National Competition Policy”, included amendments 
to the TPA. They also included review by governments of all laws 
restricting competition, structural reform of public monopolies to facilitate 
competition, third-party access to significant infrastructure facilities, 
some price oversight and introduction of competitive neutrality. 
 
2.2. Application outside Constitutional coverage: all persons 
in business 
 
The Hilmer Report stated that the competition law should apply 
to all entities carrying on business and that any exemptions or immunity 
should be of limited nature and implemented only after a transparent 
process. It found a number of categories of conduct that were exempt 
from the application of the TPA, including conduct by bodies outside 
Constitutional limitations, and those that were entitled to the “shield of 
the Crown” (or Crown immunity).486 In particular the Hilmer Report 
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recommended that Government Business Enterprises (GBEs) should 
not enjoy any advantages when competing against their private-sector 
counterparts and that the TPA should apply to State and Territory GBEs 
in the same way that it already applied to Commonwealth GBEs. 
 
Ultimately, the competition laws were changed so that the TPA 
prohibitions now cover both of these groups.  
 
Because of the limitations of the Constitution, agreement was 
reached that various laws would be enacted or amended. The States 
enacted laws to mirror Part IV of the TPA, Restrictive Trade Practices, 
which mean that bodies that are not Constitutional corporations or are 
not carrying on Constitutional trade or commerce are caught under the 
Competition Codes of the States.487 A new Part XIA was inserted into 
the TPA creating this Competition Code. Application legislation in each 
State and Territory makes the Competition Code part of the law of that 
jurisdiction. While the Competition Code repeats the substantive 
provisions of Part IV, it applies to “persons” rather than to corporations 
to address the issue of the limitations on the Commonwealth 
Parliament’s power to legislate in this area. 
 
This means that unincorporated persons or bodies such as 
partnerships, individuals not covered by Constitutional trade or 
commerce, professionals such as doctors and lawyers, and 
cooperatives are now caught by the TPA or a Competition Code of a 
State if they are carrying on business. 
2.3. Ability to exempt by law or regulations curtailed 
 
                                                                                                            
States and Territories in a non- transparent way. Other conduct could be given 
administrative approval after a more transparent process. So, for example, 
those engaged in professional activities such as doctors or lawyers were not 
generally caught by the TPA prior to these amendments due to constitutional 
limitations  they were not incorporated and did not engage in interstate or 
overseas trade or commerce, i.e. Constitutional trade or commerce. 
 
487
 They also agreed to maintain the mirror legislation in a uniform way going 
forward in the interests of creating one main competition statute for the whole of 
the country. 
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The ability of the Commonwealth, the State and Territory 
Parliaments to exempt particular bodies or specific conduct was 
significantly curtailed by the introduction of transparency and a more 
rigorous process of evaluation.488 
 
The possibility of States and Territories exempting particular 
organizations by legislation is now limited by a process set out in the 
Competition Principles Agreement. There are also requirements for 
review of any new legislation to prevent the enactment of laws that 
hinder competition without examination under a transparent process 
setting out the anti-competitive effect of conduct and justifying it on 
public benefit grounds.489 
2.4. Application to government bodies 
 
Sections 2B and 2C were inserted into the TPA making the 
Crown in each the State and Territory liable for breaches of Part IV of 
the TPA. Section 2B provides that the TPA applies to bind the Crown in 
right of the States and Territories “so far as the Crown carries on a 
business, either directly or indirectly or by an authority of the State or 
Territory”. The Crown is not, however, liable to penalty, but an authority 
of a State or Territory may be liable to penalty.490 
2.5. How do you determine the status of a government body? 
 
The issue of the extent to which government bodies are or 
should be subject to competition laws is an issue of complexity in many 
jurisdictions. 
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In Australia, for the purpose of determining whether a 
government body is subject to the TPA it is necessary first to determine 
whether it represents the Crown or not, and then secondly to see 
whether or not it is carrying on business. 
 
There is a whole range of government bodies of different 
characters in Australia. Some continue to exist as Government 
departments carrying out government functions. Some carry out 
regulatory functions. Some have been corporatized and others have not. 
Some are corporatized but wholly owned by government. Some are 
partially government owned. There are various categories of legislation 
governing their status and operation depending upon the nature of their 
functions, the way they are managed and the degree of autonomy that 
they have over day-to-day matters. 
 
2.6. Does it represent the Crown? 
 
In order to determine whether or not a body is part of the Crown 
(executive) (and hence whether or not it is entitled to Crown immunity), 
the courts have traditionally relied upon two tests: the incorporation test 
and the control test. 
 
The incorporation test asks whether or not the body has been 
incorporated and the way in which this has been done. The fact that the 
Government has decided to create a separate body to perform a 
particular activity is an indication that it is not meant to be the Crown. To 
determine whether an incorporated body is the Crown it is necessary to 
look to the legislation establishing it to ascertain the intention of the 
legislators. If the legislation setting up the body is silent on the issue of 
whether or not it is part of the Crown, it is likely that it is not. The courts 
generally require clear wording indicating that a body forms part of the 
Crown for this to be the case. If a body is set up under the general 
Corporations Act, for example, it is unlikely that the body represents the 
Crown.491 
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 See, for example, NT Power Generation Pty Ltd v Power and Water Authority 
& Anor  [2004] HCA 48 (“NT Power case”) where the subsidiary of PAWA was 
incorporated under the Corporations Act, not the statute setting it up. 
 471 
A test called the control test applies and a government body is 
entitled to the Crown immunity if a Minister of the Crown exercises 
control over it, in the sense of control and direction of activities. Control 
for the purposes of the test refers to the right to control, not necessarily 
the actual exercise of control. The test was summarized in the NT 
Power case, discussed further below, where the High Court stated: 
 
“...in every case where the question arises it is necessary to 
examine the nature and degree of control that the Crown exercises over 
the corporation. If the corporation is subject to the same control as a 
governmental department it is likely to be the alter ego of the Crown. If 
the corporation is largely free of ministerial control then it is unlikely to 
be the Crown’s alter ego.”492 
 
In that case the High Court found that the mere giving of 
guarantees by the government was not sufficient to suggest that Gasgo 
should have immunity from the TPA on the basis of its connection with 
the Crown or PAWA, which had Crown immunity. 
 
Where the boards of Government-owned corporations or GBEs 
are subject to Ministerial directions it is likely that they are entitled to 
Crown immunity. This may not be a total immunity. It may be that they 
are entitled to Crown immunity in respect of some activities and not in 
respect of others. This will be the case should their relevant legislation 
allow for the grant of Ministerial directions in respect of only some 
conduct. This is an issue that has sometimes proved difficult to 
determine without significant consideration and it thus an area of risk for 
these bodies. 
 
If a Government body is not part of the Crown, then the TPA 
applies to it in the same way that it would to any other body. The 
relevant questions are then whether or not it is a corporation and if it is, 
is it a trading, financial or foreign corporation, or the holding company of 
one of them, such that the TPA applies? If it is not within one of those 
categories of corporation, then is it a “person” acting in trade or 
commerce in which case the TPA applies, or if not, is it a person to 
which one of the State Competition Codes would apply?  
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 NT Power case at para. 126. 
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2.7. Is the Government body carrying on business? 
 
Once a government body is characterized as the “Crown” the 
next question is to consider whether or not it was carrying on business 
when it engaged in the conduct, to see whether or not the TPA is 
capable of applying to the conduct. 
 
“Carrying on business” for the purposes of the TPA does not 
require a profit motive.493 The nature of the activities undertaken, and 
whether or not they are in the nature of government activities, or are 
activities that usually would be undertaken by business, are important 
considerations in analysing whether or not a body is carrying on a 
business. The High Court emphasized in the NT Power case that the 
TPA should be given a broad application rather than a narrow one, 
based on it purposes and the intention of the Competition Policy 
amendments. The nature of the statute setting up the government body 
concerned is an important consideration in this issue. If activities are 
carried on in a regular manner with repetition and system they are more 
likely to involve carrying on a business.494 Carrying on procurement for 
the use of the government body is unlikely to be carrying on a 
business.495 
 
Section 2C of the TPA lists a number of activities that do not 
constitute carrying on business and some of these are: 
 
• Collecting taxes and levies; 
• Licence fees; 
• Granting or revoking licences; 
• Transactions involving only Crown organizations; 
• The compulsory acquisition of primary products by a 
government body under laws in certain circumstances. 
 
This idea of carrying on business has been the subject of many 
decisions in Australia. The following activities have been held not to be 
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carrying on business for the purposes of Section 2C and the similar 
State provisions: 
 
• Inviting tenders to sell off part of an existing business;496 
• Running immigration detention centres for profit;497 
• Managing a national park;498 
• Running the Trade Practices Commission (the predecessor of 
the ACCC);499 
• Operating a public hospital providing services to public patients 
through a contractor;500 
2.8. Other issues related to the Crown: derivative Crown 
immunity 
 
“Derivative Crown immunity” is the name given to a further 
exemption that might be given to parties who are engaged in conduct 
involving the Crown. Where conduct in breach of the TPA occurs 
between two or more parties, and one of the parties is entitled to Crown 
immunity (or the shield of the Crown), the other party may also be 
entitled to immunity on the basis that to make orders against that party 
would have the effect of indirectly applying the TPA to the Crown.501 
This approach was applied in a number of cases and in effect allowed a 
party dealing with Government to escape liability for breaches of the 
TPA in certain circumstances. 
 
2.8.1. Case examples 
 
Three fairly recent interesting cases have considered different 
aspects of the way in which the TPA applies to government bodies in 
Australia. 
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The first case considers what happens when a government 
body not previously exposed to competition and traditionally performing 
a public service is faced with a competitive threat; when a government 
body entitled to Crown immunity is “carrying on business”; the extent to 
which the TPA applies to the refusal of such a body to enter a new 
business area or to assist others to do so and whether a subsidiary is 
entitled to Crown immunity. 
 
In NT Power Generation Pty Ltd v Power and Water 
Authority,502 PAWA was a government body set up under a special law 
and subject to directions of the Minister. It generated electricity and 
purchased electricity from others; it transported electricity from 
generation sites to distribution points and then distributed the electricity 
to customers. 
 
NT Power Generation Pty Ltd (NT Power) had a licence to 
generate electricity issued by PAWA. It wished to sell the power it 
generated to customers but could not do so without access to the 
existing electricity transmission and distribution infrastructure, which 
was owned by PAWA. It sought access to this infrastructure and PAWA 
refused it access. 
 
It was accepted by the parties that PAWA was entitled to the 
Crown immunity because it was set up under special legislation and was 
subject to Ministerial direction, but the issue before the High Court was 
whether it was carrying on business in refusing the use. The fact was 
that it had never allowed anyone to have access before – because of 
industry restructuring this now became possible. PAWA was in the 
process of setting up an access regime for its infrastructure under the 
Access provisions contained in Part IIIA of the TPA, but this had not yet 
been finalized when the request was made by NT Power. PAWA 
refused to give the access because it wished access seekers to be dealt 
with under that Part IIIA regime once finalized. It argued that it was not 
carrying on business in making its refusal, which meant that the TPA did 
not apply. 
 
The High Court found that PAWA was carrying on business and 
using the infrastructure as a significant part of its business. This was 
despite the fact that PAWA had never before allowed anyone to use the 
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infrastructure. PAWA had an express duty under its legislation to act in 
a commercial manner, and itself described its transmission and 
distribution facilities as “business products” in its own documentation. 
The High Court said that the actual refusal was conduct that advanced 
PAWA’s business and that it had taken the decision not to supply NT 
Power because of the negative impact that this would have in the short 
term on its business of selling electricity. The fact that PAWA had not 
supplied the access before was not relevant to the point. Ultimately the 
High Court found that PAWA had breached Section 46, Misuse of 
Market Power, in refusing to allow NT Power to use the infrastructure.503 
 
There was a second government body involved in the dealings 
with NT Power. PAWA had a subsidiary, Gasgo, and the High Court 
also looked at whether Gasgo was entitled to derivative Crown 
immunity. NT Power required gas from suppliers for its generator and 
sought an undertaking from Gasgo that it would not insist on its existing 
contractual pre-emptive rights, which might have left NT Power without 
supply. Gasgo refused to give this assurance to NT Power. NT Power 
said that this refusal was in breach of Section 46, Misuse of Market 
Power, of the TPA and Gasgo said in its defence that it was entitled to 
Crown immunity or derivative Crown immunity. It argued that the 
Northern Territory Government would suffer financial prejudice if 
derivative Crown immunity was not extended to Gasgo. This was 
because Gasgo and PAWA would need to seek additional supplies of 
gas in a competitive market where those supplies might be constrained 
by the available reserves if the guarantee requested by NT Power was 
given. 
 
The High Court found that Gasgo was not entitled to Crown 
immunity nor was it entitled to derivative Crown immunity. The finding 
on derivative Crown immunity was on the basis that financial prejudice 
was not enough to justify the immunity. The High Court said that in order 
to benefit from derivative Crown immunity it is necessary for a body 
seeking the immunity to demonstrate that the application of the TPA to 
the party would adversely affect a more tangible right such as a legal 
prerogative, or a statutory, proprietary, contractual or other legal or 
equitable right or interest belonging to the Government.504 
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The issue of derivative Crown immunity was also considered in 
ACCC v Australian Medical Association (WA) Inc. 505 where the court 
reviewed the issue of Crown immunity in a complex situation that arose 
after the Hilmer amendments. There were two aspects to the case but 
only one will be referred to here. The State Government entered into 
contractual arrangements with Mayne Nickless Limited (MNL) under 
which MNL would provide medical services free of charge to public 
patients on behalf of the State and thereby the Minister would discharge 
his statutory obligations to the community. The ACCC alleged that the 
Australian Medical Association (WA) (AMA(WA)) and MNL made an 
understanding containing a price-fixing provision, namely that MNL 
would contract doctors to provide services to public patients at rates 
prescribed by the State fee for service rates controlled under a relevant 
state agreement. 
  
The Federal Court found that there had been no price fixing.506 
However, even if there had been, the Court stated that MNL would have 
been entitled to derivative Crown immunity. The State of WA was not 
carrying on a business in operating a public hospital. The TPA thus did 
not apply to the State. MNL was entitled to derivative Crown immunity 
on the basis that the Crown had been heavily involved in the negotiation 
of all of the arrangements and that the interests of the Crown would 
have been prejudiced if the TPA had been applied to the contractual 
arrangements. 
 
A different view on derivative Crown immunity that did impose 
some limits on the scope of the immunity was reached in another case 
involving the health system in 2007. There the High Court considered 
derivative Crown immunity in the context of the supply of 
pharmaceutical products to the State-run hospital system. This is an 
interesting case because in this context there is no consideration of the 
market power of the State-purchasing authorities – ordinarily one would 
assume that they had significant power but this was not an issue in the 
case. ACCC v Baxter Healthcare Pty Ltd507 involved a situation where 
Baxter Healthcare Pty Ltd (Baxter) had bundled one sterile fluid product 
that it supplied almost exclusively in Australia with other sterile fluid 
products that it competed with others to supply. The contract price for 
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the bundled products was much cheaper than the prices for the 
individual products under the contract tenders submitted by Baxter. The 
products were supplied to the State-purchasing authorities for public 
hospitals in a number of States. 
 
The lower courts found that this bundling conduct in some 
respects breached Section 46, Misuse of Market Power, and Section 47, 
Exclusive Dealing of the TPA. However, they found that Crown immunity 
applied to the State-purchasing authorities because they were not 
carrying on business in providing public health services to public 
patients. The lower courts found that derivative Crown immunity also 
applied to protect Baxter from the application of the TPA.508 
 
The High Court disagreed with the application of the derivative 
Crown immunity in these circumstances. The relevant contracts were 
entered into after a period of negotiations following a formal request for 
tender by the State purchasing authorities and each of these requests 
allowed bundled offers. 
 
In finding that Baxter was not protected by derivative Crown 
immunity, the High Court reiterated that the purpose of the TPA set out 
in Section 2 was to enhance the welfare of Australians through the 
promotion of competition and fair trading.509 The High Court noted that 
the case relied upon in the lower courts to support derivative Crown 
immunity, Bradken Consolidated Ltd v Broken Hill Proprietary Company 
Ltd (“Bradken”)510 had been decided prior to the Hilmer amendments. 
This meant that at the time of the Bradken decision, the State Crown 
was not bound by the TPA at all. Amendments in 1995 meant that the 
Crown in right of the State was now caught by the TPA in so far as it 
carried on business.511 Later decisions of the High Court in relation to 
Crown immunity had formulated a more flexible approach than that 
applied in Bradken.512 Importantly, the High Court noted that Baxter was 
a trading corporation and stated: 
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“A conclusion that, in carrying on dealings with a government in 
the course of its own business, it enjoyed a general immunity not 
available to the government when the government was carrying on 
business itself would be remarkable. Such a conclusion would be 
impossible to reconcile with the object of the Act as now declared in s2. 
Further such a conclusion would go far beyond what is necessary to 
protect the legal rights of governments, or to prevent a divesting of 
proprietary, contractual and other legal rights and interests.” 
2.9. Other National Competition Policy reforms 
 
Processes were put in place as part of National Competition 
Policy to review all Commonwealth, State and Territory laws to isolate 
examples of provisions having an anti-competitive outcome and delete 
those that could not clearly be justified on public benefit grounds. This 
process of review of legislation was supervised by the National 
Competition Council (NCC) and was completed under a timetable 
approved by the NCC. States and Territories received payments for 
compliance with this timetable. 
 
In 2005 the Productivity Commission reviewed the impact of 
National Competition Policy and related reforms on the Australian 
economy and the Australian community.513 As part of the reform 
process A$834m were paid to the States and Territories between 1998 
and 2003 for compliance with agreed processes. The Productivity 
Commission Report concluded that National Competition Policy had 
delivered substantial benefits greatly outweighing its costs, contributing 
to the productivity surge that has underpinned 13 years of continuous 
economic growth and associated strong growth in household incomes. 
The annual benefits to the Australian economy were estimated at 2.5 
per cent of GDP, or A$20bn annually. Reforms had directly reduced the 
prices of goods and services such as electricity, gas, milk, freight rail 
rates, port charges and telecommunications.514 Many households would 
have benefited from lower prices for other goods and services made 
possible by cheaper infrastructure inputs for businesses, as well as from 
the longer-term stimulus to employment and wages provided.515 They 
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had stimulated business innovation, customer responsiveness and 
choice.516 In summary, the Productivity Commission stated: 
“In contrast with the 1970s and 1980s, Australia’s recent 
productivity growth has also been strong by international standards. 
That rapid overall growth has been sustained despite a decade of 
economic stagnation in Australia’s largest export market (Japan) and 
the financial crisis which struck that country and other key Asian trading 
partners in 1997. 
While many factors can influence productive growth, a number 
of analytical studies indicate that microeconomic reforms – including 
NCP – have been a major contributor to Australia’s productivity surge in 
the 1990s and to the economy’s increased resilience in the face of 
economic disturbances. The reforms have achieved this by increasing 
the pressures on both private and government businesses to be more 
productive, through increased competition, while simultaneously 
enhancing their capacity to respond through more flexible work 
arrangements, the removal of unnecessary red tape and the like. Other 
suggested causes of the productivity surge, such as recovery from 
recession or unsustainable increases in work intensity, have not 
withstood analytical scrutiny.”517 
 
The mix of National Competition Policy reforms has had a very 
significant impact on the community and particularly consumers in 
Australia. The dismantling of many traditional regulatory barriers to trade 
and commerce, the restructuring of government bodies and monopoly 
suppliers, the broader application of the TPA and significant industry 
reform have all contributed to these benefits. 
 
To quote the ACCC on National Competition Policy: 
 “… whether you are a doctor or a lawyer, whether you own 
shares in a power company, own a bottle shop, work on a wheat farm, 
ever catch taxis, have gas heating in your home, purchase CDs, have 
sugar in your tea, have milk on your cereal , take public transport, own a 
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mobile phone, post letters , you are benefiting from competition policy 
reforms.”518 
3. Enforcement of the TPA by the ACCC 
 
Part IV of the TPA, Restrictive Trade Practices, contains 
prohibitions similar in many respects to those of other jurisdictions.519 It 
contains provisions dealing with the usual forms of anti-competitive 
conduct, plus more onerous provisions in relation to aspects of the 
telecommunications market, and an access regime in relation to 
essential facilities.520 It also deals in depth with various areas of 
consumer protection and product liability, which will not be discussed 
here.521 
 
The ACCC has extensive powers to investigate and enforce the 
TPA and has done so in areas related to both restrictive trade practices 
and consumer protection.522 The successful high profile prosecutions 
that it has taken over the years undoubtedly have raised the 
consciousness of both business and consumers, and have acted as a 
significant deterrent to businesses contemplating conduct that might 
breach the TPA.  
In enforcing the TPA the ACCC has stated that its priorities are 
promoting vigorous, lawful competition and informed markets. When 
deciding whether or not to pursue court action the ACCC looks at 
whether the matter involves: 
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• conduct that is in blatant disregard of the law; 
• conduct that is by a person, business or industry with a history 
of previous contraventions of competition law, including 
overseas contraventions; 
• conduct that causes significant detriment to consumers and/or 
business, and/or a significant number of complaints or has 
disproportionate effect on disadvantaged groups; 
• conduct that is of major public interest or concern; or  
• a situation that has the potential for action to have a worthwhile 
educative or deterrent effect and achieve a likely outcome that 
would justify the use of the resources.523 
 
A wide range of remedies is available to the ACCC in enforcing 
the competition provisions of the TPA.524 
 
The ACCC may take a matter to the Federal Court and seek 
civil pecuniary penalties. These penalties are currently set at the greater 
of A$10 million, three times the value of the benefit from anti-competitive 
conduct, or 10 per cent of the turnover of the body corporate and all its 
related bodies corporate during the period of 12 months ending at the 
end of the month during which the act or omission occurred.525 
Individuals involved in conduct are liable for pecuniary penalties for up 
to A$500,000. Penalties are levied in respect of “each act or 
omission”,526 so that the cumulative total of penalties may theoretically 
be much higher than the levels set for an individual breach.527 There is 
currently a well-advanced proposal to introduce criminal penalties for 
serious cartel conduct.528 
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The ACCC may seek injunctions restraining future similar 
conduct,529 and other orders.530 It has the ability to reach binding 
agreements called enforceable undertakings, which settle court 
proceedings.531 In this context, or where respondents admit liability, 
penalties may be negotiated and an agreed figure on penalty is 
sometime presented to the court. 
 
The ACCC may seek orders that individuals be disqualified from 
managing corporations for a specified period.532 
 
3.1. Powers of the ACCC to investigate and question 
 
The ACCC may investigate complaints lodged by consumers or 
traders or initiate its own inquiries. In its investigations it has wide 
administrative powers to gather information, which are contained in 
Section 155 of the TPA, which it routinely uses.533 
 
Where the ACCC has reason to believe that a person is capable 
of furnishing information, producing documents or giving evidence in 
relation to a contravention, it may issue a notice requiring a person to 
furnish information, produce evidence or appear before the ACCC to 
give evidence.534 This can be done before or after proceedings are 
commenced.535 There are two preconditions to the issue of such a 
notice: a matter that may constitute a contravention, and a reasonable 
belief that the person named in the notice is capable of assisting the 
inquiries. The addressee must know what the possible contravention is. 
The privilege against self-incrimination is abrogated in relation to these 
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notices.536 It is, however, permissible to refuse to provide information 
and documents that are subject to legal professional privilege.537 
 
Where the ACCC conducts an oral examination it is unclear 
whether or not the rules of natural justice apply as the TPA is silent on 
the issue. 
The ACCC may also formally interview persons suspected of 
contravening the TPA before commencing proceedings to gain 
admissions that it might use in the proceedings. In this situation a 
person may decline to answer questions. 
 
There has been controversy about whether a person is entitled 
to be represented by a lawyer while being examined by the ACCC. The 
TPA is silent on the issue. As a matter of practice the ACCC usually 
allows representation to a limited extent but requires both the lawyer 
and client to keep the content of the discussions confidential. 
 
A more extensive power to enter facilities and seize documents 
was introduced in 2006. Documents may be seized voluntarily where 
there are reasonable grounds for believing that there is evidential 
material on the premises. If consent is not forthcoming, the inspector 
must obtain a search warrant from a magistrate after providing sufficient 
information about the grounds for the warrant.538 Once a search warrant 
has been obtained an inspector may enter, search, make copies of 
material specified in the warrant, operate electronic equipment and take 
equipment into the premises to carry out its search. Seizure of 
documents is most likely to occur where the ACCC fears destruction of 
potentially valuable evidence. 
If a person fails to comply with an ACCC notice under the TPA 
they are guilty of an offence.539 
 
In 2005–2006 the ACCC issued 347 notices under Section 155 
to compulsorily acquire information, 124 notices to provide information 
in writing (Section 155(1)(a)), 135 notices to provide documents 
(Section 155(1)(b)), 88 notices to appear in person (Section 155(1)(c)) 
and no authorities to enter premises and inspect documents (Section 
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155(2)).540 These statistics underscore the utility of the provisions for 
information gathering, which add significantly to the enforcement law 
arsenal of the ACCC. 
 
Documents obtained under these provisions are not admissible 
in criminal proceedings other than for non-compliance under the TPA.541  
3.2. Enforcement in relation to conduct affecting consumers 
 
The ACCC has been successful in prosecuting conduct of 
various types under Part IV of the TPA. Case studies set out below 
illustrate a number of enforcement actions that have resulted in 
substantial fines and concrete benefits for consumers. 
3.2.1. Cartel conduct 
 
Cartel conduct is routinely listed as the ACCC’s top priority in 
enforcement. Cartel conduct is prohibited under Section 45 of the TPA, 
which prohibits the making or giving effect to a contract, arrangement or 
understanding that has the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially 
lessening competition. Additional provisions prohibit price fixing outright, 
i.e. without consideration of its effect or likely effect on competition542 
and “exclusionary provisions”, which catch arrangements to share 
markets and in the nature of primary boycotts.543 
 
The ACCC has prosecuted a number of high-profile companies 
for cartel conduct such as price fixing, market sharing and collusive 
tendering. 
 
                                                 
540
 ACCC, Annual Report 2005–2006 at p. 43. 
541
 See, for example, ACCC v Neville [2007] FCA 1583, where a real estate 
agent was fined A$2160 and given 200 hours of community service for giving 
false evidence in breach of Section 155(5). See also Samuel, G, Chairman 
ACCC, The enforcement priorities of the ACCC, Competition Law Conference, 
Canberra, 12 November 2005. 
542
 Section 45A. 
543
 Section 4D. 
 485 
Industries as diverse as major construction,544 the express 
freight industry,545 the pre-mixed concrete industry,546  the vitamin 
industry547 and the power distribution transformer industry548 have been 
the subject of major litigation, sometimes on more than one occasion. 
Most of the behaviour in these cases had been going on for significant 
periods of time. Importantly, each of the areas mentioned above has the 
capacity to significantly impact on consumers. The express freight 
industry case, for example, added costs to many deliveries of goods 
paid for by retailers. Consumers bore the brunt of increased costs when 
the costs were passed on in the retail purchase price. In the power 
distribution transformer case, the costs were ultimately passed on to 
consumers when they paid for their electricity. 
 
3.2.1.1. Case studies 
 
A recent high profile cartel case pursued by the ACCC was the 
Visy case.549 
It involved two Australian companies, Visy and Amcor, which 
together during the relevant period held 90 per cent of the corrugated 
fibreboard packaging market in Australia. The two companies engaged 
in price fixing between 2000 and 2004 in breach of Section 45 of the 
TPA. Amcor received conditional immunity from the ACCC. The price fix 
was revealed to lawyers acting for Amcor during unrelated legal 
proceedings and Amcor approached the ACCC and received conditional 
immunity under the ACCC Immunity Policy. 
 
                                                 
544
 ACCC v CC (NSW) Pty Ltd (1999) 92 FCR 375 (collusive tendering and 
market sharing by industry participants); A$200,000 penalty for CC (under lower 
maximum penalties). 
545
 TPC v TNT Australia Pty Ltd (1995) ATPR 41-375 (price fixing in freight 
forwarding); A$4.1m against TNT (under old limits); A$6m against Mayne 
Nickless.  
546
 ACCC v Pioneer Concrete Pty Ltd (1996) ATPR 41-740 (price fixing); agreed 
penalties of A$6.6m for each corporate respondent and A$50,000 for each 
individual respondent.  
547
 ACCC v Roche Vitamins Australia Pty Ltd (2001) ATPR 41-809 (price fixing 
re vitamins) fines of almost A$23m in total. 
548
 ACCC v ABB Transmission and Distribution Ltd (2001) ATPR 41-815. 
549
 ACCC v Visy Industries Holdings Pty Limited (No.3) [2007] FCA 161 2 
November 2007 (Heerey J.).  
 486 
The behaviour included an overarching agreement to fix prices 
and maintain market shares (including compensation where customers 
were lost to the other), understandings to increase prices from time to 
time and annually, and related understandings on price with customers. 
The arrangements were agreed at almost 50 meetings, and the 
overarching agreement was reinforced by the CEOs of the two 
companies, one of whom was Mr Pratt, at a lunch meeting. 
 
Ultimately Visy and three of its senior officers admitted the 
contraventions. The Federal Court found that there were 69 
contraventions of the TPA. It imposed a penalty of A$36 million on Visy 
for 37 contraventions of the TPA but did not impose an individual 
penalty on Mr Pratt, who was knowingly concerned in the conduct, 
because he owned the company. Mr Debney was involved in 14 
contraventions and was given a penalty of A$1.5 million;550 Mr Carroll 
was knowingly concerned in 49 contraventions and was given a penalty 
of A$500,000. 
 
Of particular interest in relation to consumers was the following 
statement of the Federal Court (Heerey J.): 
“Every day every man, woman and child in Australia would use 
or consume something that at some stage has been transported in a 
cardboard box. The cartel in this case therefore had the potential for the 
widest possible effect… 
The cartel went on for almost five years. Had it not been 
accidentally exposed, it would probably still be flourishing. It was run 
from the highest level in Visy, a very substantial company. It was 
carefully and deliberately concealed. It was operated by men who were 
fully aware of its seriously unlawful nature.”551 
 
In the context of levying the highest cartel penalty ever in 
Australia, His Honour made a number of statements that reflected his 
views on the conduct of the participants. His Honour described the 
corporate compliance culture of Visy as “non-existent” and stated: 
 
“…The Visy Trade Practices Compliance Manual might have 
been written in Sanscrit for all the notice anybody took of it”. 
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He also described a statement made by Mr Pratt on behalf of 
the company in relation to the decision to admit liability in the matter as 
being “…hardly consistent with a frank admission of wrongdoing”552, and 
noted that the cartel in effect operated for Mr Pratt’s “personal benefit 
via his ownership” of Visy”.553 
 
The size of the penalties in this case, and the publicity given to 
it in the media given the high profile of the company and its owner, 
illustrate the importance of such cases for protection of consumers and 
also as a deterrent to others contemplating similar arrangements. A 
class action has also been launched on behalf of persons suffering loss 
because of the conduct, who are reportedly claiming A$700 million from 
Visy and Amcor on the basis of additional packaging costs paid.554 
Other parties affected by the conduct have reportedly launched 
additional, individual actions. Visy and Amcor supplied many of 
Australia’s leading food companies such as Nestlé, Coca Cola Amatil 
and Goodman Fielder. 
 
3.2.2. Exclusionary conduct 
 
Arrangements that constitute “exclusionary provisions” are 
prohibited by the TPA per se or absolutely – without consideration of 
their effect on competition in a market. This conduct involves a situation 
where competitors agree not to supply or acquire from particular 
persons or classes of persons555. Market sharing or similar conduct 
often falls within this provision. 
 
3.2.2.1. Case study 
 
In 2006 penalties totalling A$4,750,000 were imposed on 
Liquorland (Australia) Pty Ltd when it admitted breach of the TPA. 
Penalties were subsequently imposed on Woolworths for similar 
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conduct. The two were Australia’s retailers and substantial retailers of 
liquor.556  The conduct arose out of similar arrangements made by 
Liquorland and Woolworths individually with applicants for liquor 
licences in local areas. Under the state legislation, existing retailers of 
alcohol in an area could object to the grant of additional licences by the 
NSW Liquor Administration Board on various grounds. Liquorland and 
Woolworths had existing retail outlets in the areas under consideration. 
In each case Liquorland and Woolworths had lodged objections to the 
granting of the licences to small applicants. Small applicants up against 
the resources of very large retailers did not really have the resources to 
deal with the objections. In each case there would have been a 
contested hearing for the licences but Liquorland and Woolworths 
agreed to withdraw objections to the applications on condition that the 
applicants accept restrictions on their liquor licences. The agreements 
were evidenced in various Deeds signed between Liquorland and 
Woolworths and the various parties. The types of restrictions contained 
in the agreements were: 
 
• Liquor license applicants were prevented from selling packaged 
takeaway liquor from their premises; 
• Liquor licence applicants were restricted and prevented from 
opening a dedicated bottle shop or establishing a separate 
drive-through bottle shop; 
• Liquor license applicants were restricted and prevented from 
advertising or conducting promotions for the sale of packaged 
takeaway liquor over the counter to consumers; 
• Liquor license applicants were prevented from expanding the 
size of their licensed premises; and  
• The amount of liquor that liquor license applicants could keep 
on their premises to meet consumer demand was limited.557 
 
Woolworths did not admit the conduct and was ultimately found 
to have contravened the TPA. The Federal Court found that the 
agreements between Woolworths and the small retailers contained 
unlawful exclusionary provisions, and they also had the purpose of 
substantially lessening competition. The Federal Court imposed 
penalties totalling A$7 million.558 
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In levying this penalty, the Federal Court (Allsopp J.) made the 
following comments: 
“Lying at the heart of the Act is the competitive process. A subjective 
purpose of a substantial commercial entity of substantially affecting 
competition is of the utmost seriousness. This is especially so when 
experienced senior officers undertook such conduct deliberately to 
ensure that licences did not become any form of competitive platform or 
threat. Whilst no particular effect was proved, I should approach the 
matter on the basis that the conduct was seen as relevantly important to 
protect Woolworths' interest by ensuring the absence of a competitive 
platform. It was of relevant commercial significance to Woolworths and 
should be viewed in that light". 
 
The conduct of the two retailers was clearly relevant to the 
potential for competition between liquor suppliers for the consumer 
dollar at a local level. For this reason, the case was a significant 
outcome for consumers, in that it eliminated conduct that limited the 
ability of smaller liquor outlets to sell to consumers. 
 
3.2.3. Misuse of market power 
 
Section 46 of the TPA prohibits a corporation with a substantial 
degree of market power from taking advantage of that power for anti-
competitive purposes such as deterring competitive conduct or 
preventing market entry. 
 
The enforcement of this provision has been problematical and it 
was amended in 2006 to assist small business. Further amendments 
are currently planned. Unresolved issues exist about the level of 
protection that the provision should provide for small businesses, the 
role of the concept of recoupment in cases involving allegations of 
predatory pricing, and the approach to be taken to the measurement of 
the threshold level of market power. 
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3.2.3.1. Case studies 
 
The Safeway case559 involved a consideration of issues 
including misuse of market power in the context of that company’s 
acquisition of bread for sale in its stores. Safeway adopted a “deletion 
policy” under which it imposed a term of trade on three bakers who 
supplied bread to it. Under this term, if they sold bread to competitors of 
Safeway at a price less than their price to Safeway they must offer 
Safeway the same price.560 If they refused to do so, Safeway would not 
display any of their bread products in its store and would stop 
purchasing further supplies. This was found to fall within the misuse of 
market power provision by the Federal Court. Safeway had a substantial 
degree of market power in the market, and both the trial judge and a 
majority of the Full Federal Court found that it had taken advantage of 
that power in four instances where it removed all or most of the baker’s 
products from one of its supermarkets. The conduct was directed at the 
supply of discount bread to a competitor, and a firm without market 
power would have been commercially compelled to stock the full range 
of products in order to satisfy consumer demand. Safeway had also 
introduced “fighting brands” of different bakers to achieve its outcome. 
The majority (Heerey and Sackville J.J.) characterized the conduct as: 
 
“…the use of the leverage it had in the market to inflict pain on the plant 
baker concerned and thereby dissuade it from continuing to supply 
discounted bread to Safeway’s’ local competitor”561 
Penalties totalling A$8 million were imposed on Safeway in respect of 
this conduct.562 
 
3.2.4. Exclusive dealing  
 
Section 47 of the TPA prohibits various vertical arrangements 
that have the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening 
competition. Both the making of the arrangements with specified 
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conditions, and the refusal to deal without acceptance of those 
conditions, are prohibited. Third line forcing conduct is prohibited per se 
or absolutely. 
The conditions concern such things as customer and territorial 
arrangements, tying contracts and requirements contracts.  
 
3.2.4.1. Case study 
 
The Universal Music case involved the issue of anti-competitive 
conduct in the supply of CDs to retailers. On 30 July 1998, amendments 
to the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) removed the previous prohibition on the 
importation of sound recordings without the consent of Australian 
copyright owners or licensees. The effect of the amendments was that 
Australian wholesalers and retailers of CDs and other sound recordings 
could acquire stock from other countries; provided the manufacture of 
that stock did not infringe copyright law in the source country and had 
been carried out with the consent of the copyright owner. This meant 
that Australian retailers were no longer obligated to acquire their stock 
from Australian sources. Australian distributors Universal Music 
Australia Pty Ltd (‘Universal’)563 and Warner Music Australia Pty Ltd 
(‘Warner’), ceased to supply certain retailers who imported CDs from 
overseas. They also made it known they might not supply other retailers 
who imported. The ACCC brought proceedings claiming breaches of 
Sections 45, 46 and 47 of the TPA. Hill J., at first instance, found that 
both distributors had contravened Sections 46 and 47, and that certain 
executives had been knowingly involved in the conduct.564 He also 
found certain of their executives had been knowingly involved in those 
contraventions. Between the decision at first instance and the appeal 
the Boral case was handed down. This overruled the original decision 
on Section 46. The recording companies appealed on the Section 47 
issue. 
 
The relevant market was confirmed as the Australian wholesale 
market for recorded music, and 70 per cent of this music originated 
overseas. Specifically, Universal wrote to retailers stating that it 
reserved the right to review the terms and conditions of trade with 
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retailers who parallel imported its recordings. Threats were made to 
discontinue certain discounts. Other threats were made to cease supply 
where parallel importing took place. Warner engaged in similar conduct. 
The conduct was said to constitute an offer to supply goods and 
services to retailers on condition that they agreed not to acquire goods 
of a particular kind or description, namely imports consisting of non-
infringing copies, directly or indirectly, from a competitor. 
 
The conduct was found to infringe Section 47 and the Full 
Federal Court confirmed this. The conduct did not have the effect of 
substantially lessening competition because many retailers purchased 
non-infringing copies by direct importation or purchasing stock imported 
by others. This may have been because the conduct was “nipped in the 
bud” by the intervention of the ACCC, or because many retailers were 
not intimidated by the threats. It was not possible on the evidence for 
the Full Court to find that the conduct had the likely effect of 
substantially lessening competition. The conduct did, however, have the 
purpose of substantially lessening competition. The record companies 
said that their purpose was to prevent freeriding, but the trial judge 
found that it was motivated by an intention to bring about the result that 
persons would not import recordings into Australia. The Full Court 
agreed that this brought the conduct within Section 47. 
 
3.2.5. Resale price maintenance 
 
Resale price maintenance, or fixing the price at which goods are 
to be resupplied, is prohibited in wide-ranging provisions of the TPA.565 
The ACCC has been particularly successful in prosecuting cases under 
this provision. Of recent note are two cases involving consumer 
products. The highest ever penalties for resale price maintenance were 
imposed in 2007 against companies involved with the sale of Jurlique 
cosmetics for conduct occurring between 1991 and 2003. There was a 
long-standing policy against discounting, and the conduct in question 
included attempting to induce retailers not to sell at prices less than 
those specified by Jurlique, supplying on condition that there would not 
be discounting, and withholding supply on account of discounting. 
Ultimately the parties admitted the conduct. The Federal Court ordered 
penalties totalling A$3.4 million against four companies and their 
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founder, Dr Jurgen Klein. Dr Klein was ordered to pay a penalty of 
A$200,000 personally as well as A$20,000 in costs. The penalties were 
large because the conduct went on for a long time and involved the 
most senior executives of the company.566 In another recent decision 
penalties totalling A$1.36 million were imposed on Navman Australia 
Pty Ltd, a company supplying car, marine and personal navigational 
equipment, and its employees.567 The company sought to ensure that 
there was no discounting in its products and in some cases cut off 
supply where discounting took place. In levying the penalty the judge 
commented that the conduct was not merely deliberate but was 
systematic and pursued in an aggressive and high-handed manner by 
senior managers of the company. In commenting on the outcome, the 
Chairman of the ACCC noted that consumers like to shop around to get 
the best deal on GPS and other electronic equipment, encouraging 
competition and enabling consumers to buy at lower prices.568  
 
3.2.6. Mergers 
 
Mergers and acquisitions in Australia are prohibited if they have 
the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition 
in a market.569 Enforcement action by the ACCC in this area is 
extremely rare. It engages on a regular basis in reviewing acquisition 
activity in an administrative context. There is no requirement for 
mandatory filing of pre-merger notifications in Australia. Where parties 
are of the view that conduct risks breaching the TPA there are a number 
of options available to them. 
 
A party may approach the ACCC informally to seek its views 
and seek reassurance that it would not be likely to take the matter to 
court.570 This informal process is used extensively but there is no review 
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and the outcome does not protect the parties to the merger from action 
by third parties. 
 
A new formal merger review process, administered by the 
ACCC and reviewable by the Tribunal was introduced in 2007. Its aim is 
to provide additional certainty to applicants while maintaining a relatively 
short time approach to the issue.571 This process is not reviewable. 
 
Alternatively parties may apply to the Australian Competition 
Tribunal for an authorization, which is an administrative sanction 
available for a variety of conducts under the TPA based in this context 
on a test which provides that the authorization must not be granted 
unless the Tribunal is satisfied in all the circumstances that it would 
result in such a benefit to the public that it should be allowed to occur.572 
The authorization route was previously used only rarely.573 
 
The ACCC has not taken court proceedings in relation to a 
proposed acquisition for a number of years, although this is open to it 
and it has the power to seek divestiture of assets for conduct in breach 
of the TPA.  
It is, however, extremely active in the area of informal 
clearance. In 2005–2006, for example, the ACCC examined 272 
mergers, acquisitions and asset sales for compliance with the TPA. Two 
hundred and sixty-one were not opposed (including 26 withdrawn before 
final decision). Two were initially opposed and subsequently resolved 
with acceptance of court-enforceable undertakings. Six were resolved 
during the review process with court-enforceable undertakings. One 
hundred and forty-one matters were considered on a confidential basis 
and, of these, three were opposed or had concerns confidentially 
expressed.574 
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3.2.7. Conclusions 
 
It can be seen from the Case Studies that the ACCC takes 
particular note of the potential impact of conduct on consumers when 
making decisions on enforcement priorities. All of the cases mentioned 
have a significant consumer impact. The tangible effect of the 
curtailment of offending conduct in all cases was increased competition 
and ultimately reduced costs for consumers. The broad powers given to 
the ACCC to investigate and enforce the provisions of the TPA 
significantly assist and are essential to the effective prosecution of 
competition law cases under the TPA.  
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AN OVERVIEW OF THE ANTI-MONOPOLY PRACTICE IN 
THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
Mao Xiaofei* 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This study seeks to explore the anti-monopoly practice in China 
from 1993 to 2007. In 1993 the first competition law, the Law Against 
Unfair Competition (“LUC”),575 was enacted which embodies a few 
provisions concerning anti-monopoly issues and laid down the initial 
foundation for the antitrust practice in China. Thereafter, the Chinese 
government issued several other anti-monopoly provisions in different 
laws, regulations or even directives to supplement the LUC. Such an 
incremental approach led to a fragmented legal framework against 
restrictive behaviour in the Chinese market. The status quo is expected 
to be altered when the new Anti-monopoly Law (AML) takes effect on 1 
August this year. The law was passed by the People’s Congress on 30 
August 2007, after a long legislative history of about twenty years. 
  
The basic pillars such as prohibition of restrictive agreements, 
abuse of market dominance and merger review, which are common in 
all antitrust regimes, have been gradually established from 1993 to 2007 
in China. It began with the condemnation of abusive conduct of public 
enterprises and undertakings with monopoly positions, provided for in 
the LUC. The law empowers the State Administration for Industry and 
Commerce (SAIC), along with its local offices, to safeguard competition 
in the Chinese market. The supervision over restrictive agreements, in 
particular price cartels, was stipulated in the Price Law576 passed by the 
People’s Congress five years later. Not the SAIC but the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) was authorized in this 
respect since the NDRC and the local price bureaus have been 
responsible for pricing activities in the long administrative tradition. 
However, in practice, the SAIC seemed to be actively involved as well. 
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The competition review on mergers and acquisitions (M&A) was 
attached with no great importance until the issue of takeovers of 
domestic enterprises by foreign investors, in particular its impact on 
Chinese industries, raised notable concerns of policy makers. In 2003, 
the first merger review was provided for in the Interim Provisions on 
Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors 
(Interim Provisions),577 which put only M&A involving foreign enterprises 
under control. A third authority – the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) 
– was entrusted, together with the SAIC, to carry out competition 
assessment. 
 
Therefore, not only was the legal framework for antitrust issues 
fragmented but also the competence for implementation was granted to 
different administrative bodies. In the following, the enforcement 
practices by respective bodies will be addressed. Part 2 explores the 
crackdown of price cartels as the most pernicious form of anti-
competitive behaviour. After reviewing the cases dealt with by the SAIC 
in sanctioning abusive conduct of public enterprises and undertakings 
with legal monopoly status (Part 3), the focus will be turned to merger 
control by the MOFCOM and the SAIC (Part 4). In Part V, abuse of 
administrative power impeding competition, a special feature of the 
Chinese anti-monopoly practice, will be addressed. A brief comment on 
the transition from the past anti-monopoly practice to the implementation 
of the AML will be given at the end of the analysis. 
 
2. Restrictive agreements 
 
The prohibition of restrictive agreements by the Chinese 
authorities has been limited to the hard-core cartels, in particular price 
cartels and rig bids. Cases concerning production restriction and market 
allocation were little condemned. Due to the lack of legal basis, other 
restrictive agreements such as collaboration in production, joint 
marketing schemes and resale price maintenance, which may also raise 
competition concern, were not even investigated.  
For the crackdown of price cartels, two major administrative 
agencies are involved: one is the NDRC together with local price 
bureaus, and the other is the SAIC with its local offices. The NDRC and 
local price bureaus became sluggish ever since they failed in the first 
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cartel case in 2001. It lasted until July 2007 when the draft of the AML 
was discussed in the People’s Congress. The SAIC and its local offices 
seem to be more active, according to the cases and the statistics 
disclosed to the public.578 However, their competence is controversial, 
which thus leads to an inconsistency in the practice of different local 
SAIC offices. As far as rig bids are concerned, there was a structural 
change conceived in 2000 as the Chinese Tender Law was 
promulgated. This greatly reduced the power of the SAIC. 
 
2.1. A growing awareness of the NDRC and local price 
bureaus 
 
By virtue of the Price Law, the NDRC and local price bureaus 
are the government authorities that are authorized to investigate abuse 
in pricing activities including cartels. Most of the cases are handled by 
local price bureaus and only important ones with a significant effect on 
the whole Chinese market are to be dealt with by the NDRC. Compared 
to other kinds of unlawful pricing practices condemned by the 
authorities, cartel prohibition is rare in practice.  
The first notable case is the price collusion among sellers of 
gold jewellery in Shanghai in 2001. After the abolition of the price control 
over pure gold jewellery by the state, gold jewellery sellers in Shanghai 
started to reduce their sales prices. Facing such a “price war”, the 
Shanghai Industrial Association for Diamond and Jade and the 
Shanghai Gold & Jewellery Trade Association, upon the request of 
several members, called for a meeting with the participation of 13 
undertakings, amounting to 80 per cent of the total market share in 
Shanghai. As a result of the conference, the participants agreed on a 
minimum price for pure gold jewellery. This action was made public in a 
joint statement released by the participants claiming that an 
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unreasonable price war among them would only destroy their own 
existence. The Price Bureau of Shanghai initiated an investigation over 
the issue and concluded that the concerned practice constituted a price 
collusion infringing Article 14 of the Price Law. 579  
The participants contested the decision by arguing that the price 
coordination was aimed at curbing the destructive price war among 
them since a ruinous pricing under cost would only destroy the market 
order, consequently to the detriment of consumers. Moreover, there 
were no formal agreements concluded. No coercive measures had been 
taken by associations to enforce the minimum price agreed. It was 
absolutely up to the participants whether or not to implement the pricing 
scheme. Therefore, there was no intention of collusion and price 
manipulation for violation of Article 14 of the Price Law. Besides that, it 
was argued that the minimum price was supposed to protect 95 per cent 
of the small and middle-sized enterprises in the industry that had to pay 
a higher purchase price for gold as a raw material for production, which 
was still under the control of the central government. Only a few 
companies with special rights could acquire gold directly from the 
People’s Bank of China. They were capable of saving production costs 
and could sell at a lower price. A price competition on such a basis was 
unfair to those small and middle-sized competitors. A minimum price for 
pure gold jewellery would, to a certain extent, offset the negative effects 
of the unequal distribution of raw materials and improve the competitive 
strength of the small and middle-sized firms. The most disputed issue in 
the case was whether or not the associations who were involved in the 
price conference should be responsible for the conduct since the 
administrative decision was merely addressed to the undertakings. Most 
controversial was whether or not the self-regulation of prices by 
industrial associations fell under the legal activities of associations who 
are supposed to establish codes of conduct for member enterprises.580 
The appeal was brought to the administrative review office of Shanghai 
Municipality. Finally, the Price Bureau revoked its decision on the 
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grounds of procedural defects. Thus, the first effort by the Price Bureau 
could more or less be regarded as having failed. 581 
 
The justification of the prevention of “destructive” pricing is 
popular with cartelists but hardly accepted in any antitrust jurisdiction 
because it has been always proven to be the excuse adopted by 
cartelists to charge a price that is higher than the competitive level. It is 
well acknowledged that competition is a process by which a reasonable 
market price is to be established according to the demand and supply of 
the market. No producers themselves are in a position to decide 
whether a price is reasonable or not. A so-called destructive price may 
occur when a dominant producer intends to drive his/her competitors out 
of the market by selling the relevant product below cost. Furthermore, 
there must exist the possibility that the loss incurred by the destructive 
price can be recouped at a later point, otherwise no rational producer 
would operate under such circumstances. However, in China this 
populist explanation has been put forward repeatedly by undertakings, 
even in recent cases.582 The attitude of the responsible authority is 
unclear since there is no official comment available, but neither is there 
an absolute rejection of this justification. 
 
The argument that the price cartel was established in order to 
protect the disadvantaged producers of gold jewellery, above all small 
and middle-sized enterprises who had to pay a higher purchase price for 
raw materials, was unique in the Chinese context. In the reform process 
of the Chinese economy, the deregulation of markets has been put 
forward gradually. The side effect of this incremental approach is that 
some markets are liberalized, whereas their neighbouring markets may 
still be under the control of the government. As shown in this case, the 
sale price for pure gold jewellery was market oriented, but the price for 
gold and its distribution was regulated by the Chinese People’s Bank. 
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Enterprises that have special access to the raw material are indeed 
privileged in competition. Nevertheless, the price cartel cannot be 
justified on this ground because it doesn’t function as an adequate 
instrument for solving the real problem. The disadvantaged producers 
may set forth a higher price by establishing a cartel, but since this price 
is higher than that of the privileged producers, the cartelists are still less 
competitive in the market. Or, both the disadvantaged producers and 
the privileged agree on a cartel price so that the disadvantaged may 
also survive in the market by acquiring monopoly profits. However, such 
a cartel leads to a lessening of price competition, which functions as a 
key instrument in selecting those competitors who survive based on 
better business merits. In other words, inefficient producers may 
continue their production resulting in a waste of economic resources 
and a significant loss of consumer welfare. The price cartel is unable to 
drive out the privileged producers who are inefficient as well. Unfair 
competition as such can only be effectively resolved by a structural 
approach that eliminates unequal treatment in the distribution of 
resources. In the case in question, this justification was upheld by the 
sellers of pure gold jewellery rather than the producers, which 
demonstrates an obvious misuse by the cartelists since they were not all 
affected by the unfair distribution of resources. 
 
The issue of the involvement of the associations and their 
liability was controversial in this case. The Price Bureau in Shanghai 
didn’t condemn the concerned associations for coordinating the price 
conference. The undertakings contended that they were requested by 
the associations to take part in the meeting. The associations 
recognized their engagement but considered it to be lawful since it fell 
under the scope of their self-regulating activities within the industry.583 
Thereafter, a discussion on the function of industrial associations was 
raised in public. 
  
The role of industrial associations is ambiguous in China. In 
theory, they are designed as organizations established on the free will of 
the undertakings to stand for the interests of members. However, in the 
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Chinese context, industrial associations could include representatives of 
undertakings. In many cases they were viewed as an external 
administrative body of the government facilitating the implementation of 
certain administrative measures by means of imposing compulsory 
obligations upon their members. Hence, they have been variously 
entitled “second government”, “half government”, and “new ‘mother-in-
law’ for enterprises”. 584 Consequently, it is hard to make a clear 
distinction as to whether they are acting for member companies or are 
taking action on behalf of the government. In the latter case, 
undertakings are left with little latitude to make their own decisions. This 
is why the undertakings were arguing that they were in fact organized by 
associations, and therefore “innocent” in the case. 
 
The complicated identity of industrial associations has come 
into being during the transitional process of Chinese society, particularly 
in the reform of the Chinese administrative structure. As a huge number 
of administrative organs were cut back during the administrative reform, 
some of the former governmental bodies were transformed into 
industrial associations.585 It has been the conventional practice that the 
roles of chairman or directors of industrial associations are held by 
current or former governmental officials.586 There is a hazy 
interrelationship among administrative bodies, industrial associations 
and enterprises, though efforts have been made to confine the boundary 
of associations’ power. For instance, the Shanghai Municipality enacted 
the first specific regulation in this regard on the local level, which defines 
industrial associations as non-profit institutions created voluntarily by 
undertakings and prohibits governmental officials from holding leading 
positions in these associations. 587 However, things cannot be changed 
overnight.  
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With regard to the case in question, though the influence of 
industrial associations was noticeable, it was still not enough to argue 
that the participating firms were obliged by the associations to enter into 
the cartel. In contrast, there are sufficient facts proving that the price 
conference was initiated by the associations upon the request of some 
of the jewellery sellers. Furthermore, the agreement maintaining a 
minimum price was concluded by the participants themselves.588 The 
liability of the participants is well grounded by the Price Bureau, 
regardless of the liability of the involved associations. As to the legality 
of the associations, the Price Bureau in Shanghai found it difficult to 
assess the nature and the scope of the self-regulation in pricing 
activities by industrial associations provided for in Article 17 of the Price 
Law. However, the majority of the commentators from academic circles 
condemned it as anti-competitive.589 Indeed, Article 17 of the Price Law 
obliges industrial associations to comply with the Price Law and the 
relevant rules and to reinforce the self-regulation in pricing. Obviously, 
the self-regulation by associations is to be construed in the context of 
disciplining the pricing activities of member enterprises so as to conform 
to the Price Law. By virtue of a supervisory obligation, industrial 
associations shall in fact not only themselves refrain from any 
engagement in price cartels but also prevent their members from cartel 
practices, which is nevertheless the contrary in this case. It was a flaw 
that the negative finding was solely addressed to the undertakings 
without carrying out any investigation regarding the associations’ 
responsibility for the infringement. Even more questionable was that the 
initial decision of the Price Bureau was subsequently revoked by it 
because of some procedural defects during the administrative review.  
The defeat of the Price Bureau of Shanghai in the first cartel 
case shadowed the later administrative actions against price cartels in 
China. In 2004, the Shanghai Gold & Jewellery Trade Association, the 
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same association involved in the above-mentioned case – again issued 
a statement on the self-regulated prices for gold jewellery in which a 
standard price, adjustable weekly to the estimation of the Association, 
was proposed. The sellers of gold jewellery could set forth their prices 
without exceeding the 3 per cent limit of the standard price. For the sake 
of supervision, a hotline was established for complaints. The concerned 
distributors could be sanctioned in case of non-compliance. The Price 
Bureau of Shanghai didn’t take any action on this occasion, though the 
responsible official held personally that such a price restriction by the 
association, in particular the minimum price, might curb the free 
reduction of prices by enterprises which could be a matter of price 
collusion. Whether or not the self-regulation by associations may violate 
the freedom of undertakings in their pricing activities is another issue, 
which is irrelevant for the discussion here. It won’t be explored in further 
detail at this point.590 
 
The ambivalence that resulted from the defeat of the authority in 
the first case led to confusion in the practice. A few of the cartels were 
cracked down upon by local price bureaus,591 whereas quite a number 
of alleged collusions exposed to the public were not dealt with until the 
summer of 2007.592 
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The turning point occurred while the draft AML was being 
discussed at the People’s Congress. In July, several key producers in 
the instant noodles industry, together with the China Branch of the 
International Ramen Manufacturers Association, hereinafter referred to 
as “IRMA (China)”, announced a joint increase in prices for their 
noodles, which aroused great public concern. Upon complaints from 
consumers, the NDRC carried out an investigation and found that the 
IRMA (China) had organized three meetings with the participation of 
major producers to increase prices for instant noodles in different quality 
categories from 2006 to 2007. The conference memos were printed in 
the periodical so that information on prices was made available for all 
undertakings. The producers involved subsequently raised their prices. 
The NDRC requested the IRMA (China) to correct its excessive 
practices, make an open statement to eliminate the negative effects and 
annul the decision regarding the collective price increase agreed in the 
conference memos.593 
 
It is notable that for the first time an administrative action on the 
level of the central government was taken, while the previous ones were 
typically undertaken by local officials. It shows that the NDRC, and even 
the State Council, were becoming aware of the issue of price cartels in 
the Chinese market. Thereafter, a series of punishments for cartel 
activities was carried out by the local officials in China.594 It is 
noteworthy that the growing concern regarding the harmful effects of 
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price collusions to the detriment of consumers imposed great social 
pressure on the government to take action.595 The occurrence of cartel 
cases was coincident with a rapid increase in the price of food products 
where the standard of living for the average person was significantly 
affected. As the NDCR noted, the price increase even incurred a rush to 
purchase among consumers in some areas.596 Unlike the case of gold 
jewellery, the decision by the NDRC was addressed directly to the 
concerned association but not to the enterprises, which implies a 
tougher attitude toward associations playing an unfavourable role in the 
most pernicious anti-competitive practices. Ultimately, an explicit 
provision was incorporated into the AML (Article 16) to obstruct the 
involvement of the associations in cases of cartels as well as other 
monopoly agreements.  
 
2.2. A controversial competence of the SAIC and its local 
offices 
 
In 2002, the SAIC office of City X initiated an investigation into 
an alleged cartel involving seven gas suppliers and the Association of 
Gas in the local market. It was found that a unanimous wholesale price 
for gas was negotiated, facilitated by an allocation of market shares 
among participants. A working group was set up to supervise this. 
Subsequently, the wholesale price for gas was raised from 38 RMB per 
can to 40 RMB in the city. The local SAIC office held that the joint action 
of the seven gas companies constituted an infringement of Article 18 of 
the Regulation against Unfair Competition of Zhejiang Province, 
hereinafter referred to as “UCR<Zhejiang>”597 enacted by the local 
People’s Congress to implement the LUC. Article 18 bans any 
distribution of markets, restriction of trading partners and production, or 
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other practices impairing fair competition by means of contracts, 
agreements, proposals, etc. Fines were imposed on the participating 
companies. 
 
The parties disagreed with the decision and appealed to the 
District Court of City X. They argued that Article 18, as the legal basis 
for the administrative sanction, doesn’t conform to the Administrative 
Punishment Law598 (APL) in China. By virtue of Article 11(2) of the APL, 
where an administrative punishment for the misconduct is provided for 
in laws and regulations on the central level, the specification thereof by 
local laws and regulations must be in line with the form, the type and the 
degree set forth in the upper laws and regulations. Since there is no 
provision contained in the LUC corresponding to Article 18 
UCR<Zhejiang>, local legislators are not entitled to extend the scope of 
the LUC by establishing new types of anti-competitive practices and 
relevant sanctions. It was further contended that even if the joint action 
had constituted a price cartel, it had to be sanctioned pursuant to the 
Price Law for which the local Price Bureau, but not the SAIC, is 
responsible.599 
 
The local SAIC office insisted on the legality of its decision on 
the grounds that the stipulation of Article 18 is based on the Legislative 
Law600 in China which permits local governments to enact local laws 
and regulations on issues that are not ruled by the central government 
according to the particular circumstances and factual necessities in the 
region.601 This opinion was upheld by the courts both on the first and 
second appeal.  
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The overlap of the authorities’ competence in some respects is 
well displayed in this case. The legality of the SAIC in treating hard-core 
cartel cases, in particular those with relevance to price collusion, is 
questionable, though the courts in the city confirmed the competence of 
the local SAIC office. The problem is to be understood against the 
background of the complicated legislative structure in China. As we can 
see, both the central and local governments have the power to make 
laws and regulations. Local rules are subordinate to those issued on the 
central level. However, in the absence of upper laws and regulations, 
local governments may enact special provisions to adapt to the regional 
circumstances. In this case, there was no comprehensive Anti-monopoly 
Law available on the central level, and the regulation on anti-monopoly 
issues contained in the LUC is not exhaustive. Indeed, local 
governments have the right to stipulate specific rules according to 
“specific circumstances of the region and the factual necessities”. It is 
debatable whether this condition of Article 64(2) of the Legislative Law 
was fulfilled in the given case. Another restriction on the legislative 
power of local governments in this regard is that local governments are 
not authorized to regulate issues reserved for the legislation of the 
central government, provided for in Article 8 of the Legislative Law. 
According to No. 8 of Article 8, issues concerning the fundamental 
economic system are to be regulated by laws of the People’s Congress. 
Differing legal opinions could be held on the point of whether the content 
of Article 18 UCR<Zhejiang> is concerned with the fundamental 
economic system or not. 
 
Furthermore, Article 18 UCR<Zhejiang> is worded broadly so 
that an overlap with the application of Article 14 of the Price Law may 
occur, particularly in the case of price collusion. In general, Article 14 
shall prevail due to the doctrine of lex specialis. The Price Law doesn’t 
empower the SAIC, but in fact empowers the NDRC and local price 
bureaus to deal with price cartels. It is reasonable that the gas 
companies questioned the competence of the SAIC. But in this case, 
besides the price fixing, the market share of each participant was 
allocated. The latter conduct could be viewed as a component of a price 
cartel but not necessarily so, which means that it may in itself constitute 
anti-competitive behaviour to which Article 18 UCR<Zhejiang> is 
applicable. It is common in practice, as shown in this case, that a 
scheme of price fixing among competitors may consist of several anti-
competitive measures. For example, parallel to the coordination in 
pricing, a distribution of product volumes may be agreed by cartelists as 
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well. Therefore, it would have been adequate to have a general 
provision proscribing hard-core cartels. A fragmented legal framework is 
always prone to generate potential conflicts. 
 
This case raised, on the one hand, the dispute over the 
competence of the SAIC in this regard; on the other hand, it created in 
fact an alternative for combating cartels in practice.602 However, due to 
the legal ambiguity stated above, the practice of the local offices of the 
SAIC is inconsistent. The local office in City X, after its first decision was 
confirmed by the local courts, continued its efforts in punishing cartel 
behaviour, while other local offices remained inactive. 
 
2.3. A structural change in the prohibition of rig bids 
 
Before the year 2000, rig bids were completely banned by the 
LUC.603 The SAIC and its local offices were therefore the authorities 
having the exclusive right to deal with such cases. However, the Tender 
Law was promulgated in 2000, which also embodies a prohibition of rig 
bids in Article 32. Different administrative agencies are responsible for 
its enforcement, depending upon in which sector the concerned 
collusion in bidding occurred. In most cases, the power rests with the 
respective ministries for various industries such as construction, railway, 
telecommunication and post, etc. Hence, institutional tension between 
the SAIC and other ministries surged as the Tender Law took effect. As 
a response to the problem, the Commission Office of the Central 
Communist Party for Institutional Arrangement released a decision, 
whereby it is made clear that the undue practices in tendering, including 
rig bids, shall be handled by the administrative agencies in the related 
industries that are affected by the alleged practices.604 Where there is 
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no sector regulator, the SAIC and its local offices are responsible. Along 
with this structural change, the power of the latter is reduced on a large 
scale. It is illustrated in a sudden decline in the number the cases of rig 
bids – falling from 229 to 131 for all of China in 2001 and 2002. But it 
didn’t cause the complete withdrawal of the SAIC and its local offices 
from this area. In some cases, they currently seek to cooperate with the 
relevant sector authorities to carry out investigations.605 
 
3. Abusive practices 
 
In the Chinese anti-monopoly practice, actions against 
enterprises abusing market dominance have been primarily focused on 
public enterprises and undertakings with legal monopoly status granted 
by laws and regulations. Privately owned companies were rarely 
challenged. The reason is that a general prohibition on the restrictive 
behaviour of public enterprises and undertakings with legal monopoly 
status is expressed in the LUC. Article 6 stipulates that such enterprises 
are banned from restricting others to purchase products from appointed 
business operators, thereby excluding other undertakings from fair 
competition. Private undertakings are only prohibited from selling 
products under cost and from bundling products or imposing other 
unreasonable conditions under Article 11 and Article 12 of the LUC. 
Since “market dominance”, a key notion in the antitrust law, was not well 
established in China, the condemnation of private undertakings for 
predatory pricing and tie-ins was restricted to a considerable extent. 
  
Though “market dominance,” or any other comparable concepts 
such as “market power” or “superior market position,” is not inscribed in 
the LUC, it doesn’t necessarily mean that the basic conception relating 
to abuses in the sense of antitrust law was unknown to the Chinese 
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lawmakers. In contrast, it was well acknowledged that strong market 
power may be misused by undertakings to distort competition. The 
Legislative Affairs Commission (LAC), an influential working group in the 
legislative process which is affiliated to the People’s Congress, pointed 
out that “the meaning of this provision [Article 6] is that public 
enterprises or other undertakings with legal monopoly status shall 
refrain from abusing their superiority to impair fair competition of other 
undertakings. An abuse of such a superior position refers to the 
situation where such undertakings may engage in unfair competition 
due to their positions, but others (customers) are not capable of leaving 
or challenging them. For instance, if one wants to get telephone access, 
one is obliged to buy devices provided by the telecommunication 
supplier. Or, if one wants to get hot water, one must purchase the 
particular appliance required by the gas supplier.606 Thus, it was 
presumed under Article 6 that public enterprises and undertakings with 
legal monopoly status have superior market power compared to their 
competitors and trading partners. As shown in the following analysis, in 
most cases, no serious efforts were made to investigate the market 
power of the concerned enterprise when ascertaining abuses, with a few 
exceptions. In other words, the presumption has been treated almost as 
irrebuttable. As a result, instead of the concept of “market dominance” in 
modern antitrust law, “public enterprises” and “undertakings with legal 
monopoly status” constitute the central elements relating to the sanction 
of abusive practices in China.  
 
3.1. “Public enterprise” and “undertaking with legal 
monopoly status” 
 
The term public enterprise is not defined in the LUC. Instead, it 
is specified in a directive issued by the SAIC called Several Provisions 
on Prohibition of Anti-competitive Conduct by Public Enterprises 
(hereinafter referred to as “Several Provisions”).607 Pursuant to Article 2, 
public enterprises are undertakings engaged in supplying public utilities 
including water, electricity, heating, gas, post, telecommunication, 
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 513 
transportation, etc. This definition is in line with the perception of the 
LAC.608 Public enterprises are characterized by the nature of their 
business activities and their involvement in supplying public utilities. The 
public utilities sectors are illustrated by examples that are not 
exhaustive. In practice, the SAIC adheres to the listed examples without 
extending the scope. In cases where an alleged undertaking may not fall 
under the catalogue, the SAIC seeks to construe them as “undertakings 
with legal monopoly status”, which will be explored at a later point.  
 
Public enterprises are not necessarily stated-owned enterprises 
(SOEs), albeit in many cases they are concerned with the same entity in 
the background of the strong state economy in China. But it was 
reinforced by the SAIC in one case that the qualification of a public 
enterprise rested upon the business activity of the concerned party 
rather than upon its ownership. In that case, a natural gas company was 
punished for compelling its customers to buy its gas appliances when 
supplying natural gas. The concerned company contended in the 
investigation that it shouldn’t be qualified as a public enterprise because 
it was privately owned. The local SAIC rejected the defence by arguing 
that “the major criterion for judging a public enterprise is whether the 
concerned enterprise is engaged in a business activity of public utilities 
and whether it is exclusive and non-competitive. It has nothing to do 
with its state ownership, the proportion of state capital or the form of its 
legal liability”.609 
 
“Undertakings with legal monopoly status” is not defined in any 
legal documents after the promulgation of the LUC. The LAC explained 
the notion by providing merely two examples: the undertakings involved 
in transportation and those involved in the sale of cigarettes and 
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tobacco,610 which are nevertheless not very illuminating for the 
application. The SAIC has adopted essentially a case-by-case approach 
in practice. 
 
In 1997, the SAIC was confronted with the first case on this 
issue, upon the request of the local SAIC office of Sichun Province. The 
local SAIC office initiated an investigation against a credit cooperative in 
the town of Lidian in Muchuan County. It was alleged that the Lidian 
credit cooperative granted loans, designed for agricultural use, to 
applicants under the condition that the latter had to purchase fertilizer 
from an appointed supplying company. Instead of receiving cash, the 
applicants were given loan certificates issued by the credit cooperative, 
with which they had to buy all their fertilizer from the appointed supplier. 
The key question at issue was whether the concerned credit cooperative 
could be construed as an undertaking with legal monopoly status under 
Article 6 of the LUC.611 The SAIC confirmed the monopoly status of the 
concerned party by arguing that credit cooperatives were special 
financial institutions established and regulated by financial laws. They 
had an exclusive position in managing loans for agricultural use. The 
constraint imposed on applicants to purchase fertilizer violated Article 6 
of the LUC.612 Pertaining to the reply of the SAIC, the local office 
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imposed a fine of 50,000 RMB. The Lidian credit cooperative appealed 
to the local court, but the court upheld the SAIC’s decision.613 
 
Thereafter, the SAIC identified the undertakings operating cable 
television stations614 and providing insurance services615 as having legal 
monopoly status. Until 2000, in the reply for the case concerning the 
status of a Xinhua bookstore, the SAIC sought to define “undertakings 
with legal monopoly status”. 
 
The Xinhua bookstore at the Jianlin County of Jinzhou City in 
Hubei Province was found to require all the primary and middle schools 
in its distribution area to purchase books and learning materials, 
supplementary to the compulsory textbooks for students, at the 
beginning of the new semester in 1999. To sanction the non-
compliance, the Xinhua bookstore refused to provide textbooks for the 
schools. The question was whether the concerned Xinhua bookstore 
could be qualified as an undertaking having legal monopoly status so 
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that Article 6 would be applicable. The local SAIC office in Hubei 
Province submitted the question to the SIAC. 
  
In its administrative reply, the SAIC put forward an interpretation 
by which “‘undertakings of legal monopoly status’ are not public 
enterprises but are those granted with monopoly rights to business 
operations for certain products including services by means of laws, 
regulations, directives or other legal regulatory documents. The 
monopoly status refers to the circumstances where the concerned 
undertaking is the monopolist, or operates without sufficient competition 
restraints, or upon whose products customers or consumers are 
strongly dependent.”616 It was clear in the statement that, first, 
undertakings with legal monopoly status are those who do not fall under 
the scope of public enterprises.617 Second, there must be a legal basis 
granting the monopoly status. The description of monopoly status is 
noteworthy because it encompasses not only the pure monopoly with a 
single undertaking but also the circumstances where no effective 
competition is perceivable or a strong dependence between customers 
including consumers and providers exists. The monopoly status was 
broadly interpreted, almost equal to the concept of “market 
dominance.”618 Regarding the concerned bookstore, the SAIC 
ascertained its legal monopoly status on the grounds that the exclusive 
right of the Xinhua bookstore to distribute textbooks for primary and 
secondary schools was provided for in several rules. Pursuant to Article 
2 of the Regulatory Rules on Distributing Textbooks for Ordinary 
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Primary and Middle Schools issued by the Chinese State Education 
Commission (now the Ministry of Education) and the Administration of 
Press and Publication, Xinhua bookstores were responsible for the 
subscription and distribution of textbooks for primary and middle 
schools. The rules enacted by the local government reinforced the 
monopoly rights of the local Xinhua bookstores and banned any other 
undertakings from carrying out this activity.619  
 
The perception of the SAIC relating to undertakings with legal 
monopoly status in the Xinhua Bookstore case reflects the development 
of the idea of market dominance and the awareness of an economic 
approach in practice, at a minimum, on the central level of the SAIC.620 
However, since the market dominance is not an indispensable 
constituting element required, it was then up to the local SAIC office to 
decide how to address this issue in individual cases. Hence, there is an 
inconsistency among local SAIC offices. A few local offices made 
investigations over the market power of the concerned undertaking, 
whereas the majority attached less importance to the issue.621  
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3.2. Abusive practices 
 
In principle, a business practice always entails certain 
limitations on trading partners in terms of the conditions for supply, 
payment, maintenance, etc. It is the freedom of enterprises in economic 
activities. However, for public enterprises and undertakings with legal 
monopoly status, this basic principle is reconciled. As noted above, they 
are prohibited from imposing restrictions impeding competition on the 
presumption that they possess superior market positions.622 
 
Instead of continuing the abuse of market dominance, conducts 
of public enterprises and undertakings with legal monopoly status were 
condemned because of the coercive nature in the Chinese antitrust 
practice. Pursuant to Article 6 of the LUC, public enterprises and 
undertakings with legal monopoly status shall not constrain others to 
purchase products from the appointed undertakings. The key point is 
whether the concerned enterprise imposes any restrictions on its 
customers. But to determine what measures are restrictive is a difficult 
issue because it must be kept in mind that public enterprises and 
undertakings with legal monopoly status must not be deprived of their 
reasonable business autonomy. In one administrative reply, the SAIC 
defined “restrictions” as “direct or indirect coercive measures, such as 
compulsory requirements, hurdles on services, constraints, suggestions 
and unequal treatment, etc., adopted by public enterprises and 
enterprises with legal monopoly status to compel others to acquire 
products from the appointed undertakings”.623 In the concerned case, a 
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public enterprise providing mobile network access in Shangdong 
province was found to be involved in a discriminatory practice. For 
authorization of access to the mobile network, it charged its customers a 
fee of 1,000 RMB for cell phones provided by its company, but 2,500 
RMB for cell phones that customers bought from other suppliers. 
Thereby, unequal treatment was qualified as a form of restriction. In 
practice, several typical restrictive measures have been established 
which will be explored below.  
 
(i) Abusive pricing 
The Electric Company of Qihe County charged local farmers 
additional prices for material costs, installation fees, transportation 
expenses and subsidies for its own employees, as it upgraded the 
electricity network in the rural area from 1999 to 2000. After having 
carried out investigations on the facts of the alleged excessive pricing, 
the local SAIC office of Dezhou City in Shandong province submitted 
the question to the SAIC as to whether the pricing activity was abusive 
as defined by Article 6 of the LUC. The SAIC held it as abusive for the 
reason that the electric company was the sole enterprise that was 
authorized to upgrade the electricity network for the farmers of Qihe 
County in the concerned region. This monopoly position was misused 
by the alleged company to charge prices exceeding the level set forth by 
the government. In this regard, the State Council and the relevant 
regulatory agencies had issued several decrees and directives making it 
clear that the upgrading project was subsidized by the government. 
Except for cables connecting the electric energy meter to home 
appliances, no other prices in the form of material fees, installation fees, 
maintenance fees, etc., should have been paid by the farmers.624 
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Therefore, the additional prices imposed by the concerned company 
were abusive. 
 
It was shown in this case that, unlike abusive pricing 
condemned in common antitrust regimes, the excessive pricing was not 
reasoned on the calculation of any costs, neither marginal costs nor 
average costs. It was still established on the fact that the pricing activity 
infringes the relevant pricing rules issued by the state. Therefore, the 
condemnation of monopoly pricing in the Chinese practice was in fact 
different from that excepted in the modern antitrust law. 
 
Furthermore, such an approach resulted in overlaps with the 
application of the LUC and other administrative laws, in particular the 
Pricing Law, for which the NDRC and the local price bureaus are 
responsible. Conflicts as such did occur between the two authorities. It 
was resolved in a practical way, that is, the authority who is first 
informed of the claim is to be in charge.  
  
(ii) Tying  
A typical case of tying is that the local SAIC office in City X of 
Liaoning province sanctioned a local company as a wholesaler for 
cigarettes and tobacco in 2001. The concerned company was 
condemned for obliging the retailers for cigarettes and tobacco in the 
region to purchase cigarettes of certain brands which were not required 
by the latter. Since the concerned company was the only authorized 
supplier for cigarettes in the local market, this means that it had a 
monopoly status, and the customer was in fact forced to buy the tied 
products. Such a practice not only impeded competition in the local 
cigarette market but also caused harm to consumer welfare. 
 
The second type of tying case in China is notable for its 
“altruistic” character, which means that the tying arrangements were 
carried out by the concerned party not to benefit the production or sales 
of its own products but for those of other companies. For example, in 
1999, Ningxia Property Insurance Company, a subsidiary of the Chinese 
Property Insurance Co. Ltd., required all its affiliates in the regional 
market to follow a unanimous policy when paying insurance benefits in 
the case of broken car windows. By virtue of this policy, all new windows 
were to be supplied and installed by the Fuyao Glass Engineering 
Group Ltd., hereinafter referred to as “Fuyao.” As to the indemnity for 
broken windows of insured cars, the calculation of prices was subject to 
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the Price List of Car Windows jointly issued by the Chinese Property Co. 
Ltd. and Fuyao. There were no disputes over the point that Ningxia 
Property Insurance Company was an undertaking with legal monopoly 
status under Article 6 of the LUC in the local market of Ningxia, since its 
parent company monopolized the whole Chinese insurance market for 
property pursuant to the relevant laws and regulations. The measure 
adopted by the local subsidiary was aimed at bundling the insurance 
service with the sale of car window glass provided by Fuyao. It was anti-
competitive because customers had no other alternative but to choose 
glass from Fuyao, as otherwise the damages would not be 
compensated by the insurance company. Other producers of car 
window glass were virtually restricted in competition as a result of the 
restrictive measure. As noted above, the concerned practice was not 
benefiting the car insurance service provided by the company but 
facilitating the sale of car window glass by Fuyao. The bizarre 
phenomenon as such can only occur in a monopolized market where 
the monopolist has no fear of losing customers when carrying out 
restrictive measures.  
 
(iii) Unequal treatment 
In 2005, the SAIC office of Wulanbucha made a finding of a 
discriminatory practice by the local subsidiary of an oil company X in 
Wulanbucha. From 2003 to 2005, the concerned company provided 
petroleum and diesel to its associated gas stations at a wholesale price, 
whereas other gas stations had to pay a much higher price – the full 
retail price. The company was an enterprise with legal monopoly status 
since it was the sole supplier for petroleum and diesel in the local oil 
market. The price discrimination distorted competition among gas 
stations in the region because the non-associated gas stations were 
placed in a disadvantaged position in competition due to the higher 
costs resulting from the unequal treatment. Based on these facts, the 
local SAIC decided that the discriminatory pricing adopted by the 
concerned company infringed Article 6 of the LUC. The concerned 
company was sanctioned by the confiscation of its illegal gains 
amounting to 836,927 RMB and a fine of 100,000 RMB.  
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3.3. Problem with the current transition to the concept of 
market dominance  
 
As a whole, the doctrine of market dominance hasn’t been fully 
established in competition enforcement, albeit this perception was 
reflected by legislators and administrative enforcers on several 
occasions. Under the absolute state economy prior to the economic 
reforms, public enterprises were state-owned companies and 
simultaneously monopolists in the relevant market. No doubts were cast 
on this presumption at the earlier stage of the administrative 
enforcement as the public utilities sectors were not open to any effective 
competition, or even monopolized by one SOE. This structure has 
undergone a change as barriers to market entry are gradually reduced 
and more and more private undertakings are introduced into the market 
to compete with public enterprises. It makes the rigid application of 
Article 6 of the LUC, without taking the market power of the concerned 
enterprise into account, questionable. 
 
This issue was discussed in the case where the decision of the 
local SAIC office in Shanghai was challenged in the local court. The 
local SAIC office made a finding that the concerned gas company was a 
public undertaking since it engaged in supplying gas, which falls under 
public utilities. From 1997 to 2000, the gas company sold insurance for 
gas cans to its customers as it provided liquefied gas to the local 
residents, which was held as restrictive by the SAIC office in Shanghai. 
The gas company contended that it shouldn’t be construed as a public 
enterprise in the meaning of Article 6, which requires that an enterprise 
shall have a monopoly position in the relevant market. On the contrary, 
there were still six other liquefied gas companies in the same area 
competing with this company. It had no market strength to force its 
customers to buy any insurance service. The court favoured the general 
approach applied by the SAIC through the years. However, it was 
indeed worth considering whether the non-economic assessment would 
even impose restrictions on new entrants entering into the markets for 
public utilities. Regardless of this, the local SAIC office lost the case on 
the other point. 
 
As we can see in this case, there is a need for a conceptual 
change in the Chinese anti-monopoly practice as the Chinese economy 
is becoming more liberalized.  
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4. Merger control 
 
The control over mergers and acquisitions in China has been 
greatly influenced by the conception of the socialist market economy. 
On the one hand, the Chinese government is still deeply involved in the 
management of SOEs. In respect to M&A, most of the transactions of 
SOEs have been carried out by the state as part of the reform program. 
In 1994, the central government restructured large and middle-sized 
SOEs in 100 cities. In 1997, 120 giant groups of enterprises were 
created in industries of strategic importance to constitute the “national 
fleet” under the direct supervision and guidance of the State Council. 
Measures were taken on the local level as well. For example, 75 per 
cent of the enterprises owned by Shanghai Municipality were 
reorganized.625 The M&A of SOEs has constituted the basic form of 
merger in China since the 1990s. On the other hand, the idea of a 
socialist market economy implies the liberalization of the market with the 
involvement of private enterprises. At the end of the 1990s, China 
adjusted its policy toward foreign investment to encourage more foreign 
investors to acquire domestic companies so as to accelerate the pace of 
reforming Chinese enterprises.626 The policy permitted not only the 
direct establishment of enterprises in China but also the acquisition of 
shares of the existing domestic firms on the stock market. Thus, the 
merger activities by foreign investors contribute to a significant part of 
M&A in China. The third major form of M&A includes those among 
private domestic companies which, compared to the aforementioned 
two forms, plays a subordinated role because of its limited scale of 
transactions. 
 
M&A of SOEs have been considered as measures to reform the 
uncompetitive structure of the former state economy and increase 
economies of scale by reallocating resources to efficient enterprises. 
From the perspective of the government, it in itself is an effort to 
improve the competition situation in the market. Therefore, no additional 
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 LIN Ping [林国], Zhong Guo Qi Ye Jian Bin De Fan Long Duan Kong Zhi [The 
Anti-monopoly Control on M&A of Enterprises in China 
《 中中中 中中于反 反中中业 垄 》 ], in WANG Xiaoye [王晓晓], Jing Ji Quan Qiu Hua Xia 
Jing Zheng Fa De Xin Fa Zhan [New Development of Competition Laws under 
Globalization 《 全全全全 中中于全 全经经 竞 经 》 ], 2005, p. 27. 
626OECD，Zhong Guo Kua Guo Bing Gou Zheng Ce Bao Gao [Investment 
Policy Reviews CHINA 《 中中中中中 国中 中关 购 》 ], 2006, p. 25.  
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assessment in this regard is necessary. Little attention has been paid to 
M&A among private domestic enterprises, since the transaction volumes 
in most cases appear to be relatively low. On the contrary, merger 
activities of foreign enterprises are noteworthy due to the high volumes 
of transactions, which may give rise to serious concerns of competition 
threats particularly to domestic competitors. 
 
Early in 1999, the Chinese authorities issued a decree on the 
merger and separation activities of enterprises with foreign 
investments.627 A review on the matter of competition related to a 
merger was stipulated for the first time. It is generally provided for in 
Article 24(2) that if the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation (MOFTEC) holds that the proposed merger “tends to 
monopolize an industry or may constitute a predominant position in the 
market”, the review time can be extended to 180 days. However, since 
no substantial competition assessment was seriously carried out in the 
practice, this provision was only a perfunctory one.628  
 
A more detailed merger review system, established as The 
Interim Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises 
by Foreign Investors (hereinafter referred to as “Interim Provisions”),629 
was jointly issued by four Chinese authorities.630 Since the rule only 
targets the M&A by foreign investors and is not applicable to Chinese 
enterprises, it has been regarded as discriminatory.631 The Interim 
Provisions system was amended in 2006; the provisions regarding 
                                                 
627The Provisions on the Merger and Division of Enterprises with Foreign 
Investment, enacted by the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation and the State Administration for Industry and Commerce on 
23.9.1999.  
628
 YE Jun [叶军], Wai Zi Bing Gou Zhong Guo Qi Ye De Fa Lü Fen Xi [An 
Analysis of Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign 
Investors – From a Legal Perspective 《 外 中 中中中 于中外外外资 关 业 》 ], 2004, p. 318. 
629
 It was enacted on 2.1.2003 and took effect on 12.4.2003.  
630
 The four authorities are the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation (later the Ministry of Commerce), the State Administration of 
Taxation, the State Administration for Industry and Commerce and the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange.  
631
 HUANG Yong [黄黄]，  Wo Guo De Qi Ye Bing Gou Fan Long Duan Gui Zhi 
Wen Ti Yan Jiu [A Study of the Anti-monopoly Regulations on M&A of 
Enterprises in China “我中于中 中 反 反 中 中中业 关 垄 业 关关 ”]，  in SHI Jiansan [史史史] 
(ed.), Zhong Guo Bing Gou Fa Bao Gao [A Report on Chinese M&A Laws 
《 中中中 中关 购中》 ], Vol. 2007, 2007, p. 33. 
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merger control were kept intact.632 Indeed, there is unequal treatment 
with regard to the effects of M&A on competition since anti-competitive 
harm may be incurred by merger activities, regardless of the national 
identity of the enterprises. The Interim Provisions illustrate the Chinese 
government’s concern about the foreign enterprises’ deep involvement 
in the Chinese market. The different treatment has been abolished in 
the newly enacted Chinese Anti-monopoly Law, which is, indeed, a 
great improvement and one to be welcomed. As the phenomenon of 
oligopoly markets is becoming noteworthy with the proceeding of the 
restructure of SOEs, considerable importance shall be attached to the 
acquisitions by giant SOEs, which may increase the anti-competitive 
danger subject to this kind of market structure. Furthermore, with the 
growth of private undertakings, their business operations also turn out to 
be influential on the market. 
 
In the following, the controversial Interim Provisions and the 
implementation practice by the Chinese authorities will be explored.  
 
4.1. Interim provisions  
 
The Interim Provisions system is designed to stipulate various 
issues concerning the takeover of domestic companies by foreign 
investors, such as the requirement on foreign investors and the issue of 
foreign exchange and taxation in M&A, where the competition review is 
only one component thereof. Unlike the vague rule of 1999, the Interim 
Provisions system is more detailed and practical. Specific thresholds for 
notification and a substantial test for competition appraisal are provided 
for, albeit there are obvious loopholes when compared to merger control 
in other well-developed antitrust regimes. For example, though a pre-
notification system for merger control is provided, there is no sanction 
on its infringement to safeguard the effective enforcement. Therefore, 
                                                 
632
 The amended Interim Provisions system was issued jointly by the Ministry of 
Commerce, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission of the State Council, the State Administration of Industry and 
Commerce, the China Securities Regulatory Commission and the State 
Administration of Foreign Exchange on 8.8.2006 and took effect on 8.9.2006. 
Merger control is provided for in Articles 51 to 54 of the new Interim Provisions, 
while it was dealt with in Articles 19 to 22 in the old version.  
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there is an inconsistency in the notification practice among foreign 
enterprises. 
 
It is provided in the Interim Provisions that the concerned 
undertakings shall notify their merger proposals to the MOFCOM and 
the SAIC. It is reported that there were over 300 cases of M&A notified 
to the MOFCOM,633 whereas the SAIC announced only over 200 
applications.634 This discrepancy strengthens the impression that the 
SAIC is less involved in the merger review than the MOFCOM. The 
latter played a key role in almost all the important merger cases 
disclosed to the public.635 It was also the MOFCOM who organized the 
first hearing for merger control in the case of SEB/Supor. 636  
 
4.1.1. Definition of M&A 
 
The term “M&A” is defined in Article 2 of the Interim Provisions 
(2006) as follows: 
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 Shang Wu Bu Guan Yuan Jie Du Fan Long Duan Fa [MOFCOM Official 
reading the Anti-monopoly Law “商务部官员解读反垄断法” ], available at 
http://finance.jrj.com.cn/news/2007-10-08/000002754887.html, last visited on 
2.3.2008.  
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 Chuang Xin Zhi Fa Li Nian, Yan Ge Yi Fa Xing Zheng, Fan Long Duan Fa 
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the Rule of Law in Administration, Significant Achievements in the Anti-
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 Carlyle cuts its stake to 50 per cent in Xugong takeover bid, 19.10.2006, 
China Daily, available at  
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/newsrelease/commonnews/200610/20061
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1205286998.html, last visited on 2.3.2008. 
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 HUANG Yong [黄，]  Wo Guo De Qi Ye Bing Gou Fan Long Duan Gui Zhi Wen 
Ti Yan Jiu [A Study of the Anti-monopoly Regulations on M&A of Enterprises in 
China “我国我国反反我我业业垄业业 ”]， in SHI Jiansan [史史] (ed.), Zhong Guo Bing Gou Fa Bao 
Gao [A Report on Chinese M&A Laws《国国新中业购》], Vol. 2007, 2007, p. 33.  
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 “For the purpose of the Provisions, mergers and acquisitions of 
a domestic enterprise by foreign investors shall mean that foreign 
investors, by agreement, purchase equity interest from shareholders of 
domestic enterprise with no foreign investment (hereinafter referred to 
as the "Domestic Company") or subscribe to the increase in the 
registered capital of the Domestic Company with the result that such 
Domestic Company changes into a foreign investment enterprise 
(hereinafter referred to as "Merger and Acquisition by Shares"); or the 
foreign investors establish a foreign investment enterprise and then, 
through such enterprise, purchase the assets of a domestic enterprise 
by agreement and operate such assets, or the foreign investors 
purchase the assets of a domestic enterprise by agreement and use 
such assets as investment to establish a foreign investment enterprise 
to operate such assets (hereinafter referred to as "Merger and 
Acquisition by Assets").” 
 
As we can see, there are two forms of merger – “M&A by 
Shares” and “M&A by Assets”– provided for in the above definition, both 
of which are nevertheless inadequate from the perspective of merger 
control. “M&A by Shares” requires that a takeover shall enable a 
domestic company to be changed into a “Foreign Investment 
Enterprise.” That is the case when the acquisition results in the foreign 
investment of no less than 25 per cent of the company’s total equity 
interest, pursuant to the relevant laws and regulations in China.637 With 
such restriction, a great number of merger cases that may cause 
competition problems are ignored. For instance, a foreign investor 
increases its stake in a company, which is already registered as a 
Foreign Investment Enterprise in China, from 25 to 60 per cent, which 
enables the foreign investor to have control over the latter replacing the 
Chinese shareholders. In fact, the change of control in the same 
company may also have an impact on competition in the relevant 
market. However, this transaction doesn’t fulfil the constituent element 
of the definition, and thus does not need to be approved by the 
responsible authority. The narrow form of acquisition by shares has 
virtually restricted the scope of merger review to a great extent. 
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 Art. 18 of the Rule on Implementing the Law on Chinese-foreign Equity Joint 
Ventures, approved by the State Council on 7.8.1995, promulgated by Order 
No. 6 of the Ministry for Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation on 4.9.1995; 
Art. 4 of the Law on Foreign-Capital Enterprises, enacted on 1.7.1979, last 
amended on 3.15.2001. 
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The second form, “M&A by Assets”, sets no substantial 
condition for the notification. It means that even a minor purchase of 
assets of a domestic undertaking by foreign investors, for example 
buying merely some products from the domestic enterprise, could be 
qualified for a notification, albeit no negative effects on competition in 
the relevant market can be expected. This may lead to an excessive 
merger review, which not only produces unnecessary administrative 
costs for enterprises but also an overload for the authorities.  
Furthermore, it is criticized that other forms of acquiring control 
of one enterprise over the other, such as by appointing key members in 
the board of the latter as well as other contractual means, are not 
encompassed in the definition.638 The reason for the inadequacy lies 
mainly in that the definition in the Interim Provisions is not designed for 
merger control, but for a general scrutiny of foreign investment in China. 
 
4.1.2. Thresholds for notification 
 
With regard to thresholds for notification, a differentiation is 
made between onshore (Article 51)639and offshore transactions (Article 
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 HUANG Yong [黄勇], Wo Guo De Qi Ye Bing Gou Fan Long Duan Gui Zhi 
Wen Ti Yan Jiu [A Study of the Anti-monopoly Regulations on M&A of 
Enterprises in China “我国的企业并购反垄断规制问题研究”]， in SHI Jiansan 
[史建三] (ed.), Zhong Guo Bing Gou Fa Bao Gao [A Report on Chinese M&A 
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 Article 51 provides that in case of any of the following occurrences in 
connection with the merger or acquisition of a domestic enterprise by foreign 
investors, the investors shall submit notification to the MOFTEC and the 
SAIC: (1) the revenue of a party to the merger or acquisition in the domestic 
market for the current year exceeds RMB1.5 billion; (2) the foreign investors 
have merged with or acquired more than ten domestic enterprises in aggregate 
engaging in the related businesses within one year; (3) the market share of a 
party to the merger or acquisition in the domestic market has reached 20 per 
cent; or (4) the market share of a party to the merger or acquisition in the 
domestic market will reach 25 per cent as a result of the merger or acquisition.  
Even without the above occurrences, the MOFCOM or the SAIC may still 
require the foreign investors to submit notification upon the request by any 
competing domestic enterprise, relevant functional department or industrial 
association, if the MOFCOM or the SAIC finds that the merger or acquisition will 
involve a huge market share, or if there is any other material aspect of the 
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53).640 The reason for the different treatment is that the Chinese 
government seeks to review those merger activities taking place outside 
the territory of China that could impede competition in the domestic 
market. It has been the international practice that merger control by the 
national competition authority can be extended to overseas transactions 
that may affect the national market. This is known as the effect doctrine. 
Since the Interim Provisions system as a whole is not extraterritorially 
applicable, a special provision permitting the review of offshore M&A 
was introduced. However, Article 53 doesn’t stipulate any requirement 
for a noticeable effect of the concerned merger in the domestic market 
but merely requires the notification where at least one of the conditions 
listed is satisfied by the parties involved. Consequently, a great number 
of M&A, which may not even affect the Chinese market, would have 
been notified to the Chinese authorities. For example, Coca-Cola, 
whose turnover in the Chinese market exceeds ca. US$208.3 million641 
in the current year, could purchase a local vodka producer in Russia 
                                                                                                            
merger or acquisition that might severely affect market competition, the national 
economy or people's livelihood and national economic security. The above-
mentioned "party to a merger or acquisition" shall include any affiliated 
enterprise of foreign investors. 
640
 Article 53 provides that in case of any of the following occurrences in 
connection with an offshore merger or acquisition, any party to the merger and 
acquisition shall, prior to its public announcement of the plan for the merger or 
acquisition or together with its application to the regulatory authorities of the 
country where it is located, submit to the MOFCOM and the SAIC the plan for 
the merger or acquisition. The MOFCOM and the SAIC shall examine whether 
the merger or acquisition might cause over-concentration of the domestic 
market, impair fair competition in the domestic market or damage the domestic 
consumers' interests, and decide whether to approve the plan: 
 (1) the assets owned by a party to the offshore merger and acquisition within 
China exceeds RMB 3 billion; 
 (2) the sales of a party to the offshore merger or acquisition in the domestic 
market for the current year have exceeded RMB 1.5 billion; 
 (3) the aggregate market share in the domestic market by a party to the 
offshore merger or acquisition and its affiliated enterprises has reached 20 per 
cent; 
 (4) the aggregate market share in the domestic market by a party to the 
offshore merger or acquisition and all of its affiliated enterprises in the domestic 
market will reach 25 per cent as a result of the offshore merger or acquisition; or 
 (5) as a result of the offshore merger or acquisition, a party to the offshore 
merger or acquisition will hold, directly or indirectly, equity of more than 15 
foreign investment enterprises engaging in the related businesses within China. 
641
 The exchange rate applied for the calculation is 1US$ to 7.2 RMB. 
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that has no sales in China. Under the Interim Provisions, such an 
acquisition scheme would be submitted for approval. Nevertheless, a 
review on notification wouldn’t make any sense since the impact of the 
transaction can be almost ruled out at the outset. 
 
The basic concepts of thresholds reflected in Articles 51 and 53 
will be examined in the following, without addressing each provision 
separately, since most of the thresholds are identical, at least 
conceptually. The criteria are applied alternatively, which means the 
notification is necessary when one of these requirements is fulfilled. 
 
(i) Turnover 
Both Article 51 and Article 53 embody the same turnover 
standard. This means that when the turnover of one of the merging 
undertakings reaches 1.5 billion RMB (ca. US$208.3 million), the 
proposed merger shall be submitted to the responsible agencies for 
approval. The turnover is generally applied as a filter for merger 
notification in many antitrust regimes, albeit the instrument itself is not 
perfect. The critique, in particular by overseas commentators, focuses 
on its application to offshore transactions.642 As stated above, without 
the requirement for noticeable effects of the concerned merger in the 
Chinese market, the turnover requirement alone brings excessive 
control on overseas M&A, which may have no relevance to the 
competition situation in China.  
 
(ii) Asset 
The asset standard is only provided for in No. 1 of Article 53 for 
offshore transactions. Should the assets owned by a party for the 
offshore merger with China exceed 3 billion RMB (ca. US$416.6 
million), the proposed merger is to be notified to the MOFCOM and the 
SAIC. This threshold results in the same problem as the turnover 
standard since there is no noticeable effect in the Chinese market 
required as well.  
 
(iii) The number of required domestic enterprises 
Both No. 2 of Article 51 and No. 5 of Article 53 make the 
notification dependent upon the number of the domestic enterprises 
taken over by the acquirer in the corresponding sectors – for onshore 
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 Moritz Lorenz, Chinesische Fusionskontrolle [Chinese Merger Control], WuW 
12/2006, p. 1248. 
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mergers 10 domestic companies and offshore mergers 15. In cases of 
onshore acquisitions, it is further required that the subsequent takeovers 
shall succeed in one year, whereas there is no time limit for offshore 
activities. It was pointed out by commentators that this threshold cannot 
reflect the competitive circumstances in the market, and appears to be 
“ill-grounded and unnecessary”.643  
 
(iv) Market share 
As for the market share standards in No. 3 and No. 4 of Article 
51 regarding onshore transactions (No. 3 and No. 4 for offshore), they 
are difficult to apply in practice because, before ascertaining the market 
share of the merging party, the relevant market must be first identified. 
However, the scope of the relevant market at issue is seldom clear from 
the outset. On the contrary, in most cases it can only be outlined during 
the investigation, which first requires a formal notification. Moreover, the 
issue of relevant market is always extremely controversial. It can’t be 
expected that the concerned enterprises would voluntarily make a 
notification on the grounds of the high market share.644 
 
(v) Notification upon request 
Beyond the aforementioned thresholds, Article 51(1) also 
enables the MOFCOM or the SAIC, upon the request of domestic 
competitors, regulatory bodies or industrial associations, to ask the 
concerned foreign investors to notify a merger or an acquisition, which 
would affect a large scale of market share. Article 51 also expects 
investors to reveal other important concerns in the perspective of the 
officials. Obviously, it gives more discretion to administrative bodies to 
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extend the scope of merger control. The restriction of the qualification of 
a complainant upon domestic competitors displays the attitude of the 
lawmakers to give more attention to Chinese companies, since foreign 
competitors who could also be affected by the merger as participants in 
the Chinese market wouldn’t be granted the opportunity.645 As to the 
involvement of the relevant regulatory bodies in this regard, it is held 
critically that this power could be misused by local governments to 
protect the fiscal interests of local enterprises.646 In practice, however, 
there has been no single merger case that has been notified upon 
request.647 
 
4.1.3. Substantial competition test  
 
If a merger may “result in over-concentration”, “impair fair 
competition” or “damage consumers' interests” according to the 
assessment of the MOFTEC and the SAIC, the proposed merger shall 
be prohibited. 
 
It is not specified further how the over-concentration is to be 
assessed; therefore, it is unclear whether the examination of 
concentration shall be limited only to factors such as the addition of 
market shares and the increase of concentration ratio. Otherwise, a 
comprehensive evaluation of the effects on competition is to be carried 
out so that other important parameters such as market barrier entry may 
also be taken into account. In practice, it can be seen that the MOFCOM 
pursued an overall assessment because it was required in its guideline 
for notification that the applicant should make a detailed description of 
the competition situation in the relevant market.648 
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As to the impediment of fair competition, doubts were raised by 
commentators as to whether it is an adequate standard for the 
competition appraisal since the concept of “fair competition” is a term 
conventionally applied in the LUC.649 It must be acknowledged that no 
rigid distinction can be drawn between laws against unfair competition 
and antitrust laws since in many competition regimes they are integrated 
into one comprehensive competition law. However, there is a significant 
difference between the two legal areas. That is, a practice is deemed as 
unfair pursuant to the LUC if it acts “unduly” or “improperly” against 
certain business customs without any reference to the market position of 
the undertakings and the structure of the relevant market. By contrast, 
anti-competitive conduct in the sense of antitrust laws must be generally 
judged under the circumstances of the relevant market. In particular, 
merger activities cannot be labelled as “fair” or “unfair” since most of the 
mergers are pro-competitive. Some mergers are regarded as “bad.” But 
“bad” mergers are not in themselves unreasonable; rather they are 
“harmful” to competition in the context of the market circumstances 
where they are embedded. Therefore, “unfair competition” in the 
definition of the Interim Provisions is no other than the market status 
where (effective) competition is restricted by M&A. 
 
The notion of “damaging consumers’ interests” is also 
ambiguous because it can be either narrowly understood as concrete 
rights of consumers which are protected in various laws, for example, 
the Law on Protecting Consumers’ Rights and Interests650 or the Law on 
Quality of Products.651 Consumers’ interests can also mean “consumer 
welfare” – a term which is more commonly used in antitrust terminology. 
In such cases, consumers’ interests are not treated as individual rights 
but mostly protected as a whole. This results from the competitive 
process. Therefore, it could sometimes be misleading if the same 
terminologies are applied in different contexts.652 
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(ed.), Zhong Guo Bing Gou Fa Bao Gao [A Report on Chinese M&A Laws 
《 中中中 中 中关 购 》 ], Vol. 2007, 2007, p. 30; see also Moritz Lorenz, Chinesische 
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 See also HUANG Yong [黄黄]，  Wo Guo De Qi Ye Bing Gou Fan Long Duan 
Gui Zhi Wen Ti Yan Jiu [A Study of the Anti-monopoly Regulations on M&A of 
 534 
 
4.1.4. Justifications for exemption 
 
The prohibition of the proposed merger or acquisition may be 
exempted if one of the four justifications contained in Article 54 is 
fulfilled: (1) the merger or acquisition can improve the conditions for fair 
competition in the domestic market; (2) the merger or acquisition can 
restructure the enterprise running at a loss and ensure employment; (3) 
the merger or acquisition can absorb advanced technologies and 
management professionals and enhance the international 
competitiveness of the domestic enterprise; or (4) the merger or 
acquisition can improve the environment. 
 
The first justification – the improvement of conditions for fair 
competition – entails a trade-off between pro-competitive and anti-
competitive effects related to the merger or acquisition. The argument of 
efficiency can be taken into consideration on this point. 
 
Exemptions on the grounds of No. 2 to No. 4 are granted in 
consideration of other economic or social interests. No. 2 provides for 
an exemption if the takeover may solve problems resulting from the 
bankruptcy of a domestic undertaking, such as the loss of assets and 
the issue of unemployment. In such cases, the authorities have to 
balance not only economic benefits but also social interests in terms of 
increased unemployment caused by competition. The national industrial 
policy is reflected in the justification of the international competitiveness 
of domestic enterprises (No. 3), and the environment policy is pursued 
in No. 4. Concerns are raised about the question of whether or not the 
responsible authorities are capable of striking a balance between 
competition concerns and other social or economic interests, which 
would make the complicated competition appraisal even more 
unpredictable.653 
4.1.5. Procedural rules 
 
                                                                                                            
Enterprises in China “我中于中 中 反 反 中 中中业 关 垄 业 关关 ”]，  in SHI Jiansan [史史史] 
(ed.), Zhong Guo Bing Gou Fa Bao Gao [A Report on Chinese M&A Laws 
《 中中中 中 中关 购 》 ], Vol. 2007, 2007, p. 32. 
653
 Ibid. p. 33. 
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A general rule for merger control is provided for in Article 52. It 
simply sets a time limit of 90 days for a review by the MOFCOM and the 
SAIC. A quick review, commonly 30 days or one month for cases that 
are unlikely to raise competition concerns, is not stipulated in the Interim 
Provisions. A hearing can be held by authorities with the involvement of 
the relevant departments, organizations, enterprises and other related 
parties. 
 
The procedural rule is obviously simple because important 
issues concerning the qualification of applicants and the documents 
required are not even mentioned. Moreover, the authorities are 
empowered with great discretion to decide how long the review shall 
actually take within the 90 days. It entails a legal uncertainty for 
undertaking a merger. Furthermore, an unreasonably long review 
period, particularly in less problematical merger cases, may hamper the 
economic activities of enterprises. 
 
In 2007, the MOFCOM issued The Guideline on the Notification 
of Foreign Investors’ M&A of Domestic Enterprises to specify the 
procedural requirements654 (hereinafter referred to as “Guideline”), 
which will be examined in the following. 
 
According to the Guideline, the acquirer is in general obliged to 
notify the transaction, while the acquired may also be the applicant 
under certain circumstances. Where more applicants are involved, the 
notification can be made either jointly or respectively. The applicant may 
apply in its own name or through an authorized Chinese law firm.  
As to onshore mergers and acquisitions, the notification shall be 
done before transactions are made known to the public. Concerning 
offshore transactions, it is to be undertaken at the same time as it is 
notified to the responsible authorities in the countries where the involved 
enterprises are registered. 
 
The Guideline specifies the general rule on the review period by 
the MOFCOM in that a two-stage procedure is provided for. The first 
stage of merger review is to be finished in 30 working days after the 
completed documents are submitted. If the applicant doesn’t receive a 
notice for further review, the transaction is deemed to be approved. 
                                                 
654
 The Guideline was issued on 8.3.2007 by the MOFCOM. There is no similar 
document available by the SAIC.  
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Where the applicant isn’t informed of further scrutiny, the review will be 
prolonged to 90 working days.  
 
For a successful notification by the MOFCOM, the following 
information is required:  
 
i. the application(s),  
ii. the Identify Card(s) of the applicant(s) or the certificate of 
registration, 
iii. the authorization letter(s) for the law firm(s) and the introduction 
letter(s) for the representing lawyer(s) issued by the law firm(s), 
iv. the basic information on the parties to the merger,  
v. the names and a brief introduction on the related enterprises of 
the parties to the merger, 
vi. certificates and business licences of the enterprises established 
by the parties to the merger, the standing representative offices, 
affiliated undertakings and other entities registered in the 
territory of China, 
vii. a description of the transaction(s), 
viii. the definition of the relevant market(s), 
ix. the turnovers and market shares of the concerned parties to the 
merger in the last two accounting years, 
x. the names of the five largest competitors in the relevant market, 
xi. the supply and demand structure of the relevant market, 
xii. the statement on the competition situation in the relevant 
market, 
xiii. the M& A agreement(s),  
xiv. the audited financial reports of the parties to the merger in the 
previous accounting year, 
xv. documents for the request of exemption if necessary, 
xvi. information on the industrial associations in the relevant market, 
xvii. the notification of the concerned merger in other jurisdictions, 
xviii. other information that needs to be disclosed to the responsible 
authority, 
xix. the statement on the truthfulness of the information and the 
accuracy of its sources.  
 
Before the formal notification, an informal consultation between 
the applicants and the MOFCOM can be undertaken to improve the 
efficiency, transparency and predictability of the merger review, which is 
influenced by the practice of the European Union.  
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Obviously, the MOFCOM Guideline provides more detailed 
rules on notification, which improves the legal certainty for parties 
involved in M&A to a great extent. Presumably, it will shed light on the 
future enforcement of merger control in the AML.  
4.2. “SEB/Supor” 
 
Since the Interim Provisions took effect, the MOFCOM has 
carried out detailed investigations on several M&A cases, which also 
attracted public attention. Among them, the takeover of Supor by SEB is 
historical since it triggered the first hearing in the history of Chinese 
merger review.655 
 
On 14 August 2006, Shanghai SEB International Co. Ltd. 
(hereinafter referred to as “SEB”), wholly owned by the French home 
appliance giant SEB S.A., agreed with Zhejiang Supor Co. Ltd. 
(hereinafter referred to as “Supor”) on a framework of strategic 
investment. Supor is a listed company on the Shenzhen Stock Market 
and wholly owned by the Supor Group. Supor is regarded as a leading 
manufacturer of pressure cookers, woks and other kitchenware in 
China. 
 
Pertaining to the acquisition agreements, SEB subscribed 40 
million normal (A) shares at a price of 18 RMB per share by means of 
the targeted issuing by Supor. Furthermore, it purchased 9.17, 4.24 and 
0.43 per cent of the equities from Supor Group, SU Zengfu, Su Xianze, 
respectively, which amounts to 25,320,116 shares. Finally, SEB 
acquired between 48,605,495 and 66,452,084 shares from other 
shareholders of Supor through a partial tender offer on the stock market. 
With all the above transactions, SEB held 52.4 to 61 per cent of Supor’s 
equities and become the controlling shareholder. The A shares held by 
SEB were not to be transferred for 3 years. The deal was worth around 
US$296 million.656 
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 Shang Wu Bu Qi Dong Supor Bing Gou An Fan Long Duan Shen Cha Cheng 
Xu [The MOFCOM initiated the Anti-monopoly Review Procedure on the 
Acquisition of Supor “商务部启动苏泊尔并购案反垄断审查程序”], available at 
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 CHEN, Yingming [陈瑛明], Wai Guo Zhan Lue Tou Zi Bing Gou Zhong Guo 
Shang Shi Gong Si De Fa Lü Wen Ti [Legal Problems on the Acquisition of the 
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After the takeover was made known to the public, concerns on 
competition rose among competitors and several related industrial 
associations. It was feared that “the acquisition may create a monopoly 
in the market and bankrupt most of the country’s cookware 
manufacture”.657 The MOFCOM initiated the review procedure and held 
a hearing with the participation of the concerned undertakings, related 
industrial associations as well as representatives of local governments 
on different levels. 
 
On 4 November 2007, the MOFCOM issued the approval of the 
acquisition of Supor by SEB China. The consent decision was almost 
identical to the proposed transactions.658  
 
                                                                                                            
Listed Companies in China by Foreign Investors by Means of Strategic 
Investment 《外国投资者战略投资并购中国上市公司的法律问题》], in SHI 
Jiansan [史建三] (ed.), Zhong Guo Bing Gou Fa Bao Gao [A Report on Chinese 
M&A Laws 《中国并购法报告》], Vol. 2007, 2007, p. 69.  
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 Government urged to block Supor Sale, available at 
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visited on 2.3.2008.  
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(2007) MOFCOM, 11.4.2007, available in CHEN, Yingming [陈瑛明], Wai Guo 
Zhan Lue Tou Zi Bing Gou Zhong Guo Shang Shi Gong Si De Fa Lü Wen Ti 
[Legal Problems on the Acquisition of the Listed Companies in China by Foreign 
Investors by Means of Strategic Investment 
《外国投资者战略投资并购中国上市公司的法律问题》], in SHI Jiansan [史建三] 
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In this case, two issues were intensively discussed. The first 
one is the definition of the relevant market. However, neither definition 
for relevant market nor a formula for the calculation of market shares is 
stipulated in the Interim Provisions.659  
 
For the competitors of SEB/Supor, the relevant product market 
involved shall be the market for pressure cookers. The relevant 
geographic market is defined as the different regional markets in cites. 
In accordance with this definition, SEB/Supor held a market share of 
41.94 per cent based on the statistic released by the Chinese Center for 
Publication of Information on Enterprises in Industries.660 SEB/Supor 
insisted on a broader relevant product market that covers the whole 
range of products in the cookware market, where pressure cookers 
make up only a segment of the market. It was argued that there is high 
substitutability of different cooking devices and the market entry is easy 
due to the low barriers for new entrants. By virtue of the need of 
demand, the availability of outlet channels as well as the supply model 
of products, no single cooking appliance may constitute a relevant 
product market. In respect to the relevant geographic market, 
SEB/Supor considered it to be the national market since there are no 
differences in relevant laws and regulations ruling the business 
conditions and technical specifications in different regions. Moreover, 
the sales circumstances are almost identical so that producers and 
distributors can set up production bases and sales networks 
everywhere. Consumers have the opportunity to choose the competing 
products. 
 
Merely from the arguments presented above, both the definition 
of the competitors and that of the SEB/Supor seem to be problematic. 
The market for pressure cookers brought about by the competitors is too 
narrow since pressure cookers can be replaced by other cookers, for 
instance, the traditional pots without pressure techniques or electric 
cookers. However, the broad definition of SEB/Supor appears to neglect 
the simple fact that pressure cookers are not interchangeable with water 
cookers, though both of them fall under the category of cookware. Yet, 
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 OECD, Zhong Guo Kua Guo Bing Gou Zheng Ce Bao Gao [Investment 
Policy Reviews CHINA 《国中国格中中业购》], 2006, pp. 33–34. 
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 The data are based on the result of a survey on the sales of pressure 
cookers in 70 per cent of all department stores in 15 large and middle-sized 
cities throughout China.  
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there is no official statement by the MOFCOM available on this critical 
point. Therefore, it is unclear how the authority had made the 
evaluation. The finial decision shows us that the argument by 
SEB/Supor could have been accepted since the merger was approved 
just as notified. But as stated above, the broad definition by SEB/Supor 
is questionable. 
 
Secondly, the acquisition gave rise to an intense debate over 
issues that have social dimensions, in particular the maintenance of 
national brand names and the matter of national economy security 
among the public.  
The opponents held that there have been sufficient cases in 
sectors such as cosmetics and toothpaste, where national brand names 
disappeared after the completion of takeovers. Foreign investors had 
utilized the distribution network of the purchased firm just to sell 
products of their own brands to replace the Chinese brands. Thereby, 
the acquired Chinese enterprises were merely transformed into the 
production units for foreign products.661 However, Supor assured that 
the Chinese brand name (Supor) wouldn’t disappear from the market. 
On the contrary, the financial and technical support from SEB would 
assist the further development of Supor in the domestic market and 
open overseas markets.662 
 
Regarding the economic securities, it was a concern that 
acquisitions as such would curb the growth of national companies. The 
price war incurred thereafter in the sector would drive domestic 
producers out of the market. It is also reported that the local government 
of Zhejiang Province has launched surveys on the tide of foreign 
enterprises’ takeover of privately owned Chinese companies in 
Zhejiang. The aim of the project was to carry out an analysis on the 
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scope of such acquisitions and their potential negative effects on the 
competitive process in the related sectors as well as the influence on 
brand names of the privately owned companies. This “danger” was 
viewed by supporters of the merger as “a narrow-minded nationalism in 
the economic sense”. “Even the issue of ‘a cooker’ would have affected 
national securities; there will be then no way for China to proceed with 
the reform and opening policy”.663 
 
5. Abuse of administrative power 
 
A special characteristic of the Chinese anti-monopoly practice is 
that it also condemns administrative measures having anti-competitive 
effects. This is not covered by many antitrust jurisdictions such as the 
US antitrust law. Article 7 of the LUC prohibits governmental bodies 
from restricting others to purchase products from appointed 
undertakings impeding the business activities of other undertakings. The 
application of this provision by the SAIC has proven to be difficult, as 
shown by statistics. There have been only 335 cases dealt with by the 
SAIC, while the number of cases concerning public enterprises and 
undertakings with legal monopoly status reaches 5,188.664 The reason 
for this notable discrepancy is not necessarily that there was less 
misconduct taking place in this regard, rather it was because of the 
difficulty faced by the SAIC and its local offices to challenge 
governmental agencies in the Chinese political and social background. 
 
The sanction on such abuses is also relatively moderate, as is 
shown in the following case. In 1998, the Housing Fund Management 
Center of City X (hereinafter referred to as “Center”) in Jiangsu 
Province, adopted an interim measure that required the applicants for 
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public housing loans to buy insurance from the local subsidiary of the 
People’s Insurance Corporation when submitting applications. The 
insurance fee consists of property insurance, liability insurance and 
guarantee insurance. The local SAIC office in the city ascertained that 
the Center involved was a governmental body of the city that was 
authorized to manage public housing funds – an administrative 
responsibility of the government. The restriction it imposed on applicants 
had anti-competitive effects because it curbed other insurance 
companies from providing the same services. As a result, competition in 
the insurance market was distorted by this administrative measure. The 
local SAIC office informed the Municipality of City X about the issue. 
The latter asked the Center to annul the anti-competitive policy.  
 
6. Conclusion 
 
As we can see, the Chinese authorities have gathered some 
experience in previous anti-monopoly issues, which means that the 
enforcement of the AML doesn’t have to start at zero. But on the other 
hand, the authorities have to struggle with the “old habits” of the past, 
where laws and regulations with somewhat different objectives and 
conceptions to those of the AML were applied. As shown in many cases 
handled by the SAIC, the definition of relevant market and the 
assessment of market power were hardly addressed in investigations. 
This old approach, which rested upon the LUC, shall be abandoned 
since “market power” constitutes the key element of abusing dominant 
market positions. As to merger review, the new substantial legal test is 
to replace the one applied in the current competition assessment. 
Presumably, there will be a transitional period for the Chinese 
authorities to adopt a new approach that is consistent with international 
standards. 
 
The issue concerning the shared enforcement power by 
different administrative bodies, and thus the conflicts and inconsistency 
between them, is not clarified in the AML. As a compromise, a new 
authority, the Anti-monopoly Commission, has been created by 
lawmakers to coordinate individual enforcers in problematic cases. 
Whether or not this institutional arrangement will function as an effective 
instrument to solve those past problems is left to be evaluated in future 
anti-monopoly practice. 
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ESTIMATION OF ANTITRUST DAMAGES AND ITS 
EFFECTS ON ANTITRUST POLICY IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES: A CASE STUDY OF A TURKISH YEAST 
CARTEL665 
 
Alper Karakurt and Ussal Şahbaz666 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This study quantifies damages from an anti-competitive practice 
in the Turkish yeast market667. The overcharges and the deadweight 
loss for the whole market are computed using before-after methodology. 
The magnitude of fines is compared with the damages within an optimal 
deterrence perspective. Damages for households are also estimated in 
order to assess the effect of the infringement on household budgets. 
After reviewing the reasons why households are not responsive to 
damages resulting from competition infringement in the Turkish yeast 
market, the role of market assessment in solving this problem is 
emphasized. 
 
To our knowledge, this study is the first attempt to quantify 
damages from an anti-competitive practice in Turkey. Section 2 deals 
with the optimal deterrence theorem. Section 3 outlines the competition 
legal framework in Turkey. Section 4 describes the yeast market and the 
anti-competitive conduct. Section 5 shows damage calculations for the 
whole market and for households. Sections 6 and 7 discuss the market 
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assessment tool. Finally, Section 8 provides policy recommendations 
and the concluding remarks.  
 
2. Optimal deterrence theory and importance of damages 
 
The major goal of competition law enforcement is to increase 
social welfare by maximizing total surplus in a given industry, which is 
defined as the sum of producer and consumer surpluses668,669. 
Competition policy makers should take this major goal into account in 
assessing the magnitude of fines imposed by public bodies and courts 
in assessing the scale of damages. Hence, anti-competitive conduct 
should be deterred to the extent that deterrence maximizes social 
welfare. The optimal deterrence model (OD-model) provides a 
framework for assessment of the magnitude of fines and damages such 
that anti-competitive conduct, which results in social loss, is deterred. 
 
Figure 1: Overcharge and deadweight loss 
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 It is difficult to asses whether a consumer welfare standard is preferred over 
a total welfare standard in application, or whether it should be preferred; 
however, this does not result in a major change in the consequences of the 
economic analysis that are discussed below. 
 547 
 
The OD-model follows the seminal paper of Gary Becker670, 
which proposes that a conduct should be deterred if and only if the 
social cost of conduct is higher than the gains from the conduct plus the 
enforcement cost. In parallel, the OD-model suggests that penalties for 
anti-competitive conduct should equal “the net harm to persons other 
than the violator”671. Any increase in prices due to a cartel or to 
monopoly pricing brings two types of cost to consumers: the overcharge 
and the deadweight loss. Assume that, in Figure 1, as a result of a cartel 
agreement, the price increases from P1 to P2. In this case, the area 
P1TRP2 represents the overcharge, which is transferred from the buyer 
to the cartel members or monopoly. On the other hand, the area RTS 
represents the deadweight loss. This cost occurs because some buyers 
discontinue buying the product at the cartel (monopoly) price. The 
deadweight loss is lost by consumers, and does not represent a gain to 
producers. It is a net social loss. 
  
Although how much of the overcharge constitutes a social loss 
is controversial from a deterrence perspective, the penalty should be set 
equal to the sum of the overcharge and deadweight loss, which 
corresponds to the area P1SRP2 in Figure 1. A simple numerical 
example demonstrates this. Assume that the overcharge is US$10 and 
deadweight loss is US$5. The gain of the infringer from the anti-
competitive conduct is US$10. If the penalty is set at the deadweight 
loss (US$5), the net gain of the infringer will be 10-5 = US$5; therefore 
the conduct will not be deterred. Obviously the magnitude of the penalty 
should be higher than US$10. The question is how much it should be. 
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Figure 2: Overcharge, deadweight loss and efficiency 
 
 
 
The answer to this question should take into account any 
efficiency that an anti-competitive conduct may create. Assume that the 
cartel lowers the marginal cost from P1 to C1 in Figure 2. Considering 
that under perfect competition marginal cost equals price at equilibrium, 
this change in price causes an efficiency represented by the area 
C1BTP1. Assume that the monetary value of this efficiency is US$4. Now 
the gain of the infringer is US$14 while the net social cost of the conduct 
is 5 (deadweight loss) – 4 = US$1. A penalty equal to the sum of the 
overcharge and deadweight loss will still deter this anti-competitive 
conduct. If the C1BTP1 area equals US$5.1, now the gain of the infringer 
(10 + 5.1 = US$15.1) will exceed the penalty and the conduct will not be 
deterred. Obviously, any conduct that creates net social cost will be 
deterred by a penalty comprising the overcharge and deadweight loss, 
and any conduct that does not create a net social cost will not be 
deterred by it. Therefore, this penalty formulation results in optimal 
deterrence. 
 
The above discussion presumes that the detection and 
conviction probability for any anti-competitive conduct is one. Of course, 
this is not the fact for some anti-competitive practices, especially for 
cartels. Although it is hard to estimate this probability, various studies 
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estimate it as being lower than 20 per cent672. In this case, optimal 
penalty can be assessed using the following formula673,674, which results 
in a higher magnitude than the sum of overcharge and deadweight loss: 
 
 violator theother than persons  the toharmnet 
conviction ofy probabilit
1
 penalty  optimal ×=
 (1) 
 
The optimal penalty mentioned above is, in practice, the total of 
any fines that the infringer will face through public law enforcement and 
any damages it will be forced to pay through private litigation. Private 
damage actions constitute the major enforcement tool in the United 
States675, but it is not well developed in Europe676 and other 
jurisdictions.  
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University (2005). 
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 In recent decades, private damage actions constitute more than 90% of 
antitrust suits filed in the United States [Herbest Hovenkamp  Federal Antitrust 
Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice. Second Edition. West Group. 
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3. Legal framework in Turkey 
 
This section introduces the legal framework in Turkey that 
regulates anti-competitive agreements and concerted practices as well 
as fines and private damage actions for those practices. The Act on the 
Protection of Competition677 (the Act) includes provisions on 
agreements, decisions and concerted practices, which prevent, restrict 
or distort competition; abuse of dominant position and anti-competitive 
mergers/acquisitions. The Act was enacted in 1994 and became 
operational in 1997 with the establishment of the Turkish Competition 
Authority (TCA). 
  
The undertakings that engage in anti-competitive practices, 
upon investigation by the TCA, are fined up to 10 per cent of their 
annual turnover. When assessing the amount of the fine, factors such 
as existence of intent, the severity of fault, the market power of the 
undertaking or undertakings upon which a penalty is imposed, and the 
severity of potential damage should be taken into consideration678. 
However, no standard procedure exists to reflect those considerations 
into the magnitude of the fine. 
 
Private damage actions are also possible against the 
undertakings that engage in anti-competitive practices679. In certain 
cases where fault is severe680 treble damages can also be awarded. 
However, no damages in private actions have been awarded in the ten-
year application of the Act. 
4. Yeast case 
 
In 2005, the TCA received a complaint claiming that the yeast 
producers operating in Turkey were engaged in concerted practices. 
The yeast market has an oligopolistic structure with four players. The 
                                                 
677
 The Act on the Protection of Competition (Date: 7 December 1994, No: 
4054). http://www.rekabet.gov.tr/word/ekanun.doc 
678
 Article 16 of the Act. 
679
 Article 57 of the Act. 
680
 Article 58 of the Act. Although the wording of the Article is not clear, many 
scholars support the view that treble damages can be awarded only in cases 
where the fault of the infringer is severe. 
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customers are 15,000681  bakeries in Turkey. Upon the complaint, an 
inquiry was initiated, and as a result of a dawn raid and other 
examinations, the TCA decided682 that, between February 2003 and 
November 2003, the yeast producers raised their prices as a result of an 
anti-competitive concerted practice. The four yeast producers were fined 
by 1 per cent of their annual turnover. The fines for these undertakings 
are as follows (thousand YTLs): 
 
Pakmaya 1,217 
Özmaya 906 
Maurimaya 134 
Akmaya 455 
TOTAL 2,712 
 
Fresh baker’s yeast is one of the main ingredients used in bread 
production (the others being flour, salt, and warm water). It has a 
relatively short life of two to three weeks. A vast majority of the fresh 
yeast is used by bakeries in producing bread. During the investigation, 
the relevant market has been determined as the “fresh baker’s yeast 
market,” which is from now on referred to as the “yeast market.” 
 
Since yeast is a highly homogenous product, bakers do not take 
brands into consideration when they select their yeast providers. Thus, 
many of the bakeries source their yeast requirements from different 
suppliers at the same time, shifting to another supplier without a 
problem. In such a market structure where brand dependence is at a 
negligible level, price is the only means for competition. 
 
The reason to elaborate on this case is that yeast prices are 
directly related to the price of bread, which is a staple food for low-
income people. The bread market does not have a competitive structure 
– bakeries usually form cartels683 and fix bread price at the 
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 Source: Bakeries Federation of Turkey 
682
 Decision Date: 23.9.2005, No: 05-60/896-241 
683
 There had been four investigations that penalized bakery cartels [İstanbul 
Ekmek (Date: 04.08.1999, No: /99-37/376-241), Kütahya Ekmek (Date: 
17.08.2004, Number:  04-54/750-187), Ankara Ekmek (Date 18.01.2005, No: 
05-06/52-21), Gaziantep Ekmek (Date: 07.01.2005, Number: 05-02/18-9)]  
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recommended level, which is announced by the local chambers684 and 
is usually calculated on a cost basis. Therefore it is fair to assume that 
any increase in yeast prices will in turn be reflected in bread prices. With 
this assumption, in addition to computing the amount overcharged in the 
next section, the financial burden on bread consumers resulting from the 
anti-competitive practice in the yeast market will be demonstrated. 
Another reason for the selection of the yeast case is that it is 
one of the rare cases that data necessary for damage calculation have 
been collected during the investigation. It should be emphasized that 
these data have been collected not for damage calculation, but for the 
analysis of oligopolistic interdependence. As damage calculation is not a 
standard part of fining procedure in Turkey, after the investigation is 
over, it is hard to find related data for many anti-competitive practices. 
 
5. Damage estimation 
 
This section is the empirical part of the study where damages in 
the yeast case are estimated. Although estimation of damages is a hot 
topic in EU competition policy circles, damage estimation techniques 
have mostly developed within the US private litigation system. In this 
section, first, the US legal standards in damage estimation, which are 
widely shared by different jurisdictions, are reviewed. Then the damages 
in the yeast case are estimated. 
 
In the US private litigation system, the plaintiff proves the 
existence and amount of antitrust damages. Once the existence of 
damages is proved, the determination of the amount of damages 
requires a less rigid standard of proof. The Supreme Court reasoned 
that for a calculation of damages, it is sufficient to show “the extent of 
the damages as a matter of just and reasonable inference, although the 
results be only approximate”685. This relaxed standard of proof, 
however, does not allow for damage estimates that are based on 
“speculation or guesswork”. In damage calculations, “there must be a 
reasonable basis for assumptions employed in the […] model”686. 
                                                 
684
 Article 62 of the Act Numbered 5362 and Article 12 of the Act Numbered 
5174. 
685
 Story Parchement Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 
(1931). 
686
 Hobart Brothers Co. v. Malcolm t. Gilliland, Inc., 471 F.2d 894, 903 (1973). 
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The Supreme Court’s relaxation of standard of proof stems from 
its position that “the vagaries of marketplace usually deny us sure 
knowledge of what the […] situation would have been in the absence of 
[…] antitrust violation”687. Moreover, it is recognized that “if there is 
uncertainty, the defendant should bear the burden of uncertainty 
because his unlawful actions created it”688. 
 
The overcharge is the difference between the cartel price and 
the price that would occur but for the violation. Therefore, measurement 
of overcharge requires estimation of the price had the violation not 
occurred. There are two major established methodologies for this 
estimation: The before-after method compares the period before 
violation with the period during violation. The yardstick method 
compares a similar business in a similar market (often a nearby 
geographical market) in which a violation did not take place with the 
business and market affected by the violation689. As the infringement in 
the yeast case affected the whole national market, there exists no 
similar market that can be a benchmark. Therefore, the before-after 
method is used. 
 
Yeast producers, during the investigation, reported their monthly 
average price and quantity data, along with the average monthly cost 
data for four major variable costs (molasses, chemicals, electricity and 
packaging) for the period of June 2002–November 2003 (18 
observations per each of four firms). The price figures are plotted in 
Figure 3. First a regression model is estimated with the price as the 
dependent variable for the period before the violation (June 2002–Feb 
2003). Then, using this model, but-for prices are predicted for the period 
after violation has started (Mar 2003 – Nov. 2003). 
                                                 
687
 J. Truett Payne Co., Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 566 (5th 
Cir. 1981). 
688
 Malcolm v. Marathon Oil Co., 642 F.2d 845, 864 (5th Cir. 1981). 
689
 For a detailed explanation about these methodologies and their applications 
in the US, see William Page. Proving Antitrust Damages: Legal and Economic 
Issues. American Bar Association (1996). 
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Figure 3: Yeast prices (YTL/kg, Pakmaya June 2002 = 100) 
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Ideally cost items and demand for yeast might be used as 
independent variables to predict the prices. However quantity 
demanded is simultaneously determined with the price and using 
quantity in our regression will result in biased estimates. On the other 
hand, the reaction speed for fermentation is proportional to the 
temperature, hence in hot weather demand for yeast falls. Consequently 
quantity demanded and temperature are highly correlated (-0.77), while 
correlation between temperature and price is low. As a result, 
temperature is used as an instrument for quantity demanded. The 
monthly average temperature data are retrieved from the Turkish State 
Meteorological Service. All variables are in logarithms (Cm: Cost of 
molasses, Cc: Cost of chemicals, Ce: Cost of electricity, Cp: Cost of 
packaging, TEMP: temperature in degrees Celsius). The following 
model is estimated: 
 
titititititi TEMPCpCeCcCmP 543210 ββββββ +++++=
 (2) 
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The methodologies developed to estimate damages are only 
useful for estimating the overcharge. However, there exists no standard 
methodology for estimation of the deadweight loss as it is not 
recoverable690. Its estimation requires knowledge about actual and but-
for prices and quantities along with the shape of the demand curve 
between R and S (in Figure 1). Various methodologies have been 
developed for an accurate estimation of deadweight loss691, but they 
have extensive data requirements. Leslie proposes that692 for damage 
calculation purposes, in line with the “just and reasonable inference” 
standard, it may be reasonable to presume that the demand curve is 
linear from R to S in Figure 2. If demand and supply curves are perfectly 
linear, the monopoly overcharge is equal to twice the deadweight 
loss693. If the demand curve is concave, which is the case in many 
markets, then damages will be greater. While estimating deadweight 
loss, it is assumed that the demand curve is linear. Hence the estimates 
in this study constitute a lower threshold. 
 
 
Table 1: Regression results to predict but-for prices 
 
 
Coefficient St. error p-value 95% confidence 
interval 
Cost of molasses 
(Cm) 0.209 0.287 0.467 -0.354 0.771 
Cost of 
chemicals (Cc) 0.160 0.157 0.308 -0.148 0.468 
Cost of electricity 
(Ce) 0.228 0.248 0.358 -0.258 0.713 
Cost of 
packaging (Cp) 0.367 0.610 0.547 -0.828 1.563 
Temperatures 
(TEMP) 0.186 0.056 0.001 0.076 0.295 
N = 32. 
R2 = 0.58. 
 
                                                 
690
 Id. at 195. 
691
 Jerry A. Hausman, Exact Consumer’s Surplus and Deadweight Loss, 71 
American Economic Review 662 (1981); Vincent Requilart and Michel Simioni, 
Welfare Losses Due to Market Power: Hicksian Versus Marhallian 
Measurement, 83 American Journal of Agricultural Economics 157 (2001). 
692
 Christopher R. Leslie. Antitrust Damages and Deadweight Loss. 51 The 
Antitrust Bulletin. 521-568 (2006). 
693
 Hovenkamp, supra note 11, at 653. 
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The results of the panel data regression to predict but-for prices 
are shown in Table 1. But-for prices in the violation period are predicted 
using these estimates. The price predictions are shown in Appendix 1. 
95 per cent confidence intervals for price predictions are also calculated. 
 
 
Table 2: Overcharge estimates (thousand YTLs) 
 
 Unadjusted to inflation Adjusted to inflation 
 (1) High (2) Average (3) Low (1) High (2) Average (3) Low 
Pakmaya 20,769 17,190 12,670 24,152 19,987 14,724 
Özmaya 19,407 15,899 11,393 22,574 18,498 13,262 
Maurimaya 8,883 6,757 4,009 10,330 7,858 4,666 
Akmaya 9,749 7,885 5,264 11,326 9,164 6,126 
TOTAL 58,809 47,732 33,337 68,382 55,506 38,778 
Deadweight 29,405 23,866 16,669 34,191 27,753 19,389 
Optimal 
penalty 
88,214 71,598 50,006 102,573 83,259 58,167 
 
These predictions yield three scenarios for but-for prices: (1) 
high but-for price, (2) average but-for price, and (3) low but-for price. 
Overcharges are calculated by subtracting but-for prices from actual 
prices and multiplying them by the quantity purchased. Summing over 9 
months of the violation period, three total overcharges are calculated for 
each scenario: (1) low overcharge, (2) average overcharge, (3) high 
overcharge. Deadweight losses are also calculated as half of the 
overcharge. These estimates are demonstrated in Table 2. 
 
The following calculation shows the overcharge per kilogram of 
bread using the overcharge magnitudes in the average scenario: As 
mentioned above, yeast is one of the ingredients of bread. When 
producing bread, 100 kg of flour are mixed with an average 3.5 kg of 
yeast; 100 kg of flour are mixed with 58 kg of water to produce 122 kg of 
bread694. Hence it is necessary to use 3.5/122 = 0.0286 kg of yeast to 
produce one kilogram of bread. The total quantity of yeast sold during 
the conduct is 86,342 kilograms; and using the total overcharge in 
scenario 2 in Table 2, an average overcharge of 0.552 YTL/kg is 
calculated (47,732/86,342 = 0.552). Keeping our presumption that the 
                                                 
694
 Source: Bakeries Federation of Turkey. 
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overcharge is fully passed on to bread prices, average overcharge of 
bread is 0.0158 YTLs (0.0286 x 0.552 = 0.0158). The average price of 
bread during the conduct was 1.2 YTL. Therefore the price of bread 
increased by around 1.3 per cent due to the conduct (0.0158 / 1.2 = 
≈0.013). 
 
It is also possible to calculate the share of this overcharge in the 
household budget. Estimates for allocation of a poor household budget 
relying on minimum wage695 suggest that 30 per cent of household 
consumption is allocated for bread consumption. Although this estimate 
seems to be high, even in this case, the effect of the anti-competitive 
conduct on a poor family’s consumption will be  0.30 x 0.013= ≈0.4 per 
cent. 
 
The damages and fines issued to undertakings are compared in 
Table 3. Even in the low-damage scenario, which is shown in Table 3, 
the fines that undertakings face are far less from the overcharges. The 
estimate for total overcharge is 12 times higher than the fines imposed. 
The optimal penalty estimate, which also includes the deadweight loss, 
is more than 18 times higher than the fines. It should be noted that, if we 
also take the fact that the probability of conviction is less than one, the 
optimal penalty would be much higher (Equation 1 in Section 2). 
Apparently, the fines are not high enough to be a deterrent of anti-
competitive behaviour.  
 
Table 3: Comparison of unadjusted damages in low scenario with fines 
(thousand YTLs) 
 
 Damages Fine 
Pakmaya 12,670 1,217 
Özmaya 11,393 906 
Maurimaya 4,009 134 
Akmaya 5,264 455 
TOTAL 33,337 
Optimal penalty 50,006 2,712 
 
                                                 
695
 Minimum wage was around US$160 per month at the time of the 
infringement.   
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For fines to be a deterrent, the magnitude of fines should be 
linked to damages. Although the Act mentions the severity of potential 
damage as a factor in assessing the magnitude of fines, this is not 
standard procedure in practice in Turkey. Nevertheless, even if the legal 
maximum fine of 10 per cent of turnover is imposed, the total fine would 
be 27,120 YTL, still lower than the damages. Therefore, to attain optimal 
deterrence, the administrative fines should be accompanied by other 
measures against infringers. 
  
Private damage actions can be another factor in increasing the 
liability that infringers would face. The legal framework includes such 
actions in Turkey, as stated above, but no damages have been awarded 
up to now. Various factors in the European legal framework hinder 
private damage actions696, but another factor is lack of capacity in 
damage calculation697. It should be noted that the low magnitude of 
damages relative to the price of the product (1.3 per cent per kilogram of 
bread) or relative to the household consumption budget (0.4 per cent in 
the worst case for the poorest family) is another factor that constitutes a 
disincentive for private damage actions. Allowing for class action suits698 
will be a good way for initiation of more private damage actions against 
anti-competitive practices that harm consumers. Private damage 
actions, in this way, will also bring competition law/policy closer to the 
consumers. 
 
As seen from the above calculations, in contrast to the high 
amount of the overall damage caused, the infringement results in a 
relatively low value of damage per consumer.  More interestingly, the 
anti-competitive behaviour took place in the yeast market, where the 
                                                 
696
 See Green Paper, supra note 12. 
697
 Damage calculation capacity, development of which is among the purposes 
of this study, is not adequately present in the competition enforcement agencies 
as well. 
698
 A class action is a procedural device used in litigation to determine the rights 
of and remedies for large numbers of people whose cases involve common 
questions of fact by aggregating a large number of individualized claims into one 
representational lawsuit. In antitrust damage class actions, injured parties from 
an infringement seek for damages as a class. Class actions avoid "the problem 
that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a 
solo action prosecuting his or her rights", Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 
U.S. 591, 617 (1997). 
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buyers are bakeries, whereas the damages were borne by bread 
consumers. Hence, the market where the violation occurred is different 
to the market where the damages appeared. Because of these two 
facts, households did not respond to the competition infringement in the 
yeast market. It is obvious that competition authorities operating in 
developing countries need an instrument to make the micro-damages 
resulting from infringements visible to a large number of consumers. 
“Market assessment,” which is a component of competition advocacy, is 
one of the instruments that can be employed in generating awareness 
and responsiveness among consumers to competition restrictions 
caused by undertakings.  
 
6. Market assessment 
 
Competition advocacy is different from competition law 
enforcement. Competition advocacy deals with policy measures to 
create a competitive business environment and promote a competition 
culture in society. Competition advocacy may be achieved through 
active participation of stakeholders in the preparation of regulatory 
proposals, public consultations, and reports on the state of competition 
in the economy. The review of the literature on competition advocacy 
indicates that there is an emphasis on encouraging active participation 
in the preparation of regulations and public consultations. However, 
market assessment has been ignored or, at least, has not been given 
due attention. 
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Market assessment699, seeking to analyse the market structure 
from a competition perspective, serves in determining the current 
competition level in the market, uncovers the results of limited 
competition, and demonstrates the ways that possibly enhance 
competition. Furthermore, market assessment drives the attention 
towards competition and strengthens it by giving local market examples. 
It is very important for an antitrust authority to raise awareness among 
stakeholders on gains resulting from competition. As such assessment 
seeks to define the causes and consequences of competition 
restrictions, the natural outcome would be that the affected parties 
become more sensitive to competition restrictions and tend to take 
action against them. In this way, it may be possible to establish a local 
mass that reacts to competition infringements and supports antitrust 
authority. 
 
                                                 
699 
 Market assessment is different from competition assessment. The aim of 
competition assessment is to focus on public policies that distort or prevent 
competition in the market.  
It appears that, so far, a very limited number of general and comprehensive 
templates have been publicized to guide competition assessments. The 2007 
report of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
entitled Institutional Options for Competition Assessment sheds light on 
competition assessment, based on government regulations, rules and/or laws 
that hinder competition in the market. Recently, the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) 
(2007) published an outstanding template, entitled Completing Competition 
Assessments in Impact Assessments, for policy makers to help them assess 
whether or not the proposed policy is likely to have a significant impact on 
competition. In contrast to the OECD’s report, the OFT focuses on the scope 
and structure of the relevant market to some extent. But mainly, the OFT 
struggles to identify the impact of existing legislation on competition as well. In 
the light of these studies, it can be claimed that competition assessment is 
directly related to rules and regulations that have the potential to restrict 
competition in the market.  
It is also apparent that both documents mentioned above have a narrow 
approach, which considers competition assessment as a tool that enables 
antitrust authorities only to evaluate other public policy instruments that deter or 
impede competition. On the contrary, market assessment examines the full 
range of restrictive factors regardless of their sources. Both public-policy-
originated and market-oriented restrictions fall under the scope of market 
assessment. Therefore, market assessment has a broader scope than 
competition assessment.  
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In this context, two points are noteworthy. First of all, it should 
be recognized that the creation of public opinion about the importance of 
competition is not an easy task. Therefore, any action or instrument 
contributing to this process merits attention.  It should be kept in mind 
that if a competition authority fails to create strong public opinion that 
supports its work, undertakings subject to competition cases or firms 
whose interests are adversely affected by competition advocacy will 
divert public opinion on competition. 
 
Furthermore, market assessment generates a spillover effect on 
future enforcement activities by providing essential information for case 
work, as competition assessment extracts the sector-specific 
information embedded in the market.  This practical information is 
essential for case-law applications. Thus, market assessment allows an 
agency not only to evaluate competition restrictions in effect but also to 
estimate potential anti-competitive behaviour. In this way, market 
assessment sends signals to an agency keeping it informed about 
possible strategies of firms in the future. 
 
Market assessment provides another benefit for developing 
countries by revealing the full range of effects of competition as well as 
factors that determine the competition level in the market. These are 
helpful indicators for policy makers, which can be exploited in a 
decision-making process. The study by McMillan et al.700 indicates the 
importance of market assessment implicit in the policy-making process. 
The said authors worked on the distributional and efficiency 
consequences of the reform in Mozambique’s cashew sector. This 
sector was liberalized in the early 1990s through the removal of quotas 
and a decrease in export tax. The aim of liberalization was to create a 
double benefit: an efficiency gain arising from the reversal of adverse 
resource allocation and a distributional gain arising from the rise in farm-
gate prices for the poorest households in Mozambique. The study 
concludes that the multilayered marketing chain and the monopsony 
position of India resulted in low benefits to cashew farmers. In other 
words, the market structure in this specific case together with 
liberalization efforts caused frustration among the farmers. 
 
                                                 
700
 Margaret S. McMillan, Dani Rodrik and Karen Horn Welch. When Economic 
Reform Goes Wrong: Cashews in Mozambique. NBER Working Paper No. 
W9117 (2002). 
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This example demonstrates that market assessment may 
produce meaningful indicators that should be taken into consideration 
by the decision makers in designing an appropriate policy for a given 
sector. In many cases, it is observed that the outcomes of public policies 
have been influenced by the competition landscape of the given market. 
Public policies established without taking the market structure into 
consideration may bring about undesired outcomes701. 
 
Another important issue to look at is the necessity of market 
assessment to demonstrate the damage borne by consumers even if 
this damage (or the efficiency loss) is very small. 
 
Market assessment helps to determine the competition level in 
the market and to demonstrate the ways that possibly enhance 
competition.  It can be said that the final aim of assessment is to 
increase efficiency gains by providing useful information that can be 
used to support competition. At that point one can say that any market 
assessment contributes little to overall efficiency gains. The calculation 
below gives insight into the importance of boosting competition with the 
help of market assessment for economic growth in the long run. The 
study done by Sala-i-Martin and Barro is an example to illustrate the 
consequences of small differentials in growth rates when accumulated 
over long periods of time702. In this study, the authors calculated what 
the GDP of the United States would be in 2000 if it had grown at 0.8 per 
cent per year since 1870, which is one percentage point per year below 
its actual rate703. If the United States had begun at a real per capita 
GDP of US$3,340 in 1870 and had then grown at 0.8 per cent per year 
over the next 130 years, its per capita GDP in 2000 would have been 
$9,450, only 2.8 times the value in 1870 and 28 per cent of the actual 
                                                 
701
 Market assessment may generate another benefit. As long as any antitrust 
authority has a strong position in terms of institutional capacity, advocacy 
conditions evolve in favour of an antitrust authority. Market assessment displays 
talents and in-depth knowledge of the authority about markets. Comprehensive 
assessment carried out by an antitrust authority is an indicator of mastery of the 
market and so gives credibility to the antitrust authority from an institutional 
perspective.  
702
 R.J. Barro and Xavier Sala-i Martin. Economic Growth. Cambridge: MIT 
Press (2004). 
703
 The real per capita gross domestic product in the United States grew by a 
factor of 10 from US$3,340 in 1870 to US$33,330 in 2000. This increase 
corresponds to a growth rate of 1.8 per cent per year. 
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value of US$33,330 in 2000. Then, instead of ranking second in the 
world in 2000, the United States would have ranked 45th out of 150 
countries. To put it another way, if the growth rate had been lower by 
just 1 percentage point per year, the US per capita GDP in 2000 would 
have been close to that in Mexico and Poland. 
 
The authors demonstrate the impact of small differentials in 
growth rate on the overall economic growth over a long period of time. 
The study does not elaborate on the effect of efficiency gains due to 
competition on economic growth. Nevertheless, this example helps us to 
understand how a complete set of competition assessments may play a 
vital role in increasing efficiency and thereby supporting economic 
growth in the long run. 
 
7. Elements of market assessment 
 
This section examines the components of “market assessment” 
in order to clarify the concept itself. Market assessment requires three 
filters: market structure and conditions, public policies, and firm 
behaviour/strategies. Market outcome is defined by the interaction of 
these three elements. In this part of the study, these components, 
except public policies, will be analysed in order to illustrate how they 
determine the competition landscape in any market. 
   
In the first part of market assessment, the market structure is 
examined. The concept of relevant market is a crucial step in analysing 
the market structure. Actually, a well-defined relevant market helps in 
understanding market structure questions in general and the following 
issues related to the market power in particular. The relevant market 
establishes the scope of competition assessment. Other connected 
markets such as upstream and downstream markets or aftermarkets 
may also be taken into account, as the competitive process in the 
relevant market is shaped by conditions pertaining to other markets. 
Alternatively, the conditions under which the relevant market operates 
can be deeply manipulated by another market. In some instances, 
defining the relevant market and analysing connected markets - 
upstream and downstream markets or aftermarkets - may still not be 
sufficient to fully evaluate competitive conditions. Technology and 
 564 
innovation markets704 also have special positions in marking out the 
competitive environment. 
 
Some sectors, even if not directly related to the relevant market, 
have a potential to considerably affect competition in the relevant 
market. As for the financial infrastructure, Stiglitz705  claims that the 
United States has clearly been worried about the possible deleterious 
effects of banking practices that limit competition among firms. Banks 
can serve, and have served, the function of limiting competition in 
product markets, as they are in an ideal position for coordinating 
decision making. The rationale behind this fear is that the more likely 
fierce competition is, the higher the number of inefficient firms within the 
market that will go bankrupt, increasing the possibility that some loans 
may not be reimbursed. This obviously illustrates the possible side 
effects of financial markets for all markets. 
  
The aforementioned explanations reveal the fact that it is 
essential to adopt a holistic approach while making a market 
assessment. It is not sufficient to focus only on the relevant market 
without examining other markets, including aftermarkets, upstream and 
downstream markets, technology and innovation markets, which in 
some way affect the functioning of the relevant market. 
 
After defining the markets that should be covered by market 
assessment, the next step is to analyse market factors to understand 
the competitive structure. There exist many factors that influence the 
competitive environment in a given market. If these factors can be 
categorized, a user-friendly analysis with in-depth information can be 
made. These factors are separated into three categories: market-based, 
product-based and firm-based factors.      
                                                 
704
 The relevant technology market includes technologies that are regarded by 
licensees as interchangeable with or substitutable for the licensed technology, 
by reason of technologies, characteristics, their royalties and their intended use 
(Commission Regulation (EC) No 772/2004 of 24 April 2004 on the application 
of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to the categories of technology transfer 
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substitutes for that research and development (Department of Justice and 
Federal Trade Commission, 1995 Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of 
Intellectual Property). 
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 J.E. Stiglitz. Whither Socialism. Cambridge: MIT Press (1996:222). 
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There are a number of firm-based factors that should be borne 
in mind in making market assessment. One of them, relying on the 
structure of firms and connections between undertakings, has an 
importance in the process that aims to uncover the competitive structure 
of the market. For instance, if the number of competitors becomes 
relatively small and their market position (size, costs, R&D potential, 
etc.) is rather similar, this market structure may increase the risk of 
collusion. On the other hand, if firms have any connection such as a 
joint venture in any part of the market, the likelihood of getting a 
competitive market structure becomes less. The study done by 
UNCTAD, in this context, is a great example unveiling the importance of 
connections among market players706. UNCTAD believes that the global 
water market has been controlled by three big groups and these actors 
can be dominant alone or collectively in a bidding process after a reform 
process. Joint ventures established by these three global actors lead to 
a lower number of potential bidders. According to UNCTAD, failures of 
water privatizations have been resulting from this specific trait of the 
water provision market. 
Another firm-based factor is the concentration level. It is one of 
the most informative indicators that should be utilized when examining 
the market structure. While highly concentrated markets do not 
necessarily imply a shortage of competition in the market, it is generally 
agreed that market concentration is one of the most important 
determinants of competitiveness. For example in the banking sector, the 
relationship between market concentration and competitiveness has 
been examined in detail for many countries, and the results indicated 
that high concentration tends to reduce competitiveness in this sector707. 
Although most of the empirical works in the literature are built on data 
from developed economies, some other studies related to the banking 
sector arrive at the same conclusion for developing economies. 
 
In many cases, concentration ratio is not a sufficient explanatory 
component of market outcomes. Khawaja and Musleh-ud Din708 studied 
the determinants of interest spread in Pakistan. Given the specific 
                                                 
706 UNCTAD. FDI and Development: The Case of Privatization-Related Services 
FDI: Trends, Impact and Policy Issues. United Nations Trade and Development 
Board. TD/B/COM.2/EM.14/2 (2003). 
707 Richard J. Gilbert. “Patents, Sleeping Patents and Entry Deterrence”, in 
Strategy, Predation and Antitrust Analysis (1984:223-255). 
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 I. Khawaja and Musleh-ud Din, Determinants of Interest Spread in Pakistan, 
PIDE Working Papers 22 (2007). 
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characteristics of the banking sector in Pakistan, such as the lack of 
financial intermediaries, it was concluded that the inelasticity of deposit 
supply to banks works as a determinant of interest spread. Another 
important finding is that concentration does not have a positive and 
significant impact on interest spread. 
 
Another firm-based factor consists of barriers to entry. Today, 
some business strategies have become critical in market entry 
decisions. For instance, in “patent fences” strategy, an initial innovator 
may seek to build a “fence” around its position by securing additional 
patents on near substitutes, thereby blocking follow-on innovators from 
designing around the initial patent or raising their R&D costs. Under a 
pure “fence” strategy, the patentee would have no intention either to 
license the substitute patent technologies or to develop them on its own. 
The only goal would be to keep rivals out. A related strategy, which 
might be designated as “patent extensions”, involves efforts to extend 
patent protection beyond the life of an initial patent by accumulating 
patents on improvements709. Another strategy - “patent flooding” - that 
covers efforts to build a sufficient patent portfolio to induce others to 
share their technology through cross-licences may shade into more 
aggressive strategies. When rivals obtain patents on trivial variants of 
an initial innovation, “patent flooding” becomes possible. Under this 
strategy, “[t]he flooder ‘surrounds’ a competitor’s patent or technology . . 
. so that over time, the competitor finds itself ‘unable to maneuver.’”710. 
 
An example for market-based factors is transparency that may 
allow undertakings to restrict competition in the market to some extent. 
In the Turkish yeast case, there is a close relationship between yeast 
producers and bakeries. The fact that fresh yeast loses its effectiveness 
shortly after production requires yeast firms to deliver the product on a 
frequent but short-term delivery basis. During very large number of 
deliveries, yeast producers have contacts with bakeries and discover 
rivals’ sales conditions, which results in a very transparent market 
structure. Besides, due to the homogeneity of fresh yeast, product 
differentiation is not an effective strategy to compete in this market. 
Hence, yeast producers have difficulty in maintaining long-term 
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relationships with bakeries. Under these market conditions, each yeast 
producer has the potential to easily control the price offered by its rivals. 
 
Another market-specific condition appears in the water sector. A 
widespread metering network in the water sector is an essential element 
for competition711. Helm and Jenkinson712 found that the failure to meter 
the consumption level of water by consumers who have low demand 
blocks the competitive process in the lower segment of the market in 
England. 
 
As to product-based factors, it should be pointed out that the 
nature of the product plays a critical role in assessing the competition 
level in the market. It is important whether products on the market are 
more homogeneous or heterogeneous, whether the product is cheap, 
taking up a small part of the consumer’s budget, or is expensive and 
whether the purchasing process of the product is repeatedly ongoing or 
not. Examining the cement industry in general, we see that although a 
huge fraction of cement consumption is attributable to the building 
industry, costs for cement amount to about 1 per cent of the overall 
building cost. Since any movement in cement price will slightly affect 
demand, demand for cement can be seen as highly inelastic. 
 
The strength of barriers to entry depends on the nature of the 
product. In some cases, the homogeneity of the product leads to the 
elimination of certain entry barriers.  This is the case for the yeast 
market. As mentioned above, bakers, being industrial users, do not take 
brands into consideration in selecting their yeast provider. In such a 
market form, where brand dependence is at a negligible level, entry 
barriers such as product differentiation and advertisements would not 
bring about the expected impact on yeast sales. Therefore, price is the 
only tool to be competitive in the yeast market. 
  
In fact, all of these (market, product and firm-based factors) 
contribute to the process of shaping the competition landscape. 
Therefore, without taking these factors into account, it is not possible to 
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make a comprehensive market assessment that provides the decision 
makers with useful and critical information about the market structure.  
 
8. Concluding remarks  
 
The estimations on the magnitude of the damage caused by the 
anti-competitive conduct in the Turkish yeast case show that the fines 
issued to the undertakings are much lower than the amount necessary 
to deter the anti-competitive conduct. Even though the magnitude of the 
fine issued was the maximum provided by the Act, it would still not 
suffice. In order to increase deterrence and ensure that consumers 
benefit from competition law enforcement it is essential to encourage 
private damages actions. However, the relatively low amount of 
individual damages does not provide sufficient incentives for consumers 
to file suits. 
 
Market assessment is another useful instrument for raising 
awareness among consumers. Market assessment, seeking to analyse 
the market structure from a competition perspective, serves in 
determining the current competition level in the market, uncovers results 
of limited competition, and demonstrates the ways that possibly 
enhance competition. One of the reasons for insufficient support is the 
ignorance of consumers with regard to the damage of competition 
infringements imposed upon them. This ignorance stems from the 
relatively low value of harm per consumer and the fact that consumers 
are generally not proximate to the markets where infringements occur. 
Undertaking market assessments by competition enforcement agencies 
may help them overcome this problem. As a matter of fact, by seeking 
to define the causes and consequences of competition restrictions, 
market assessment allows competition agencies to encourage the 
affected parties to be more responsive to anti-competitive practices and 
to raise awareness about the damages caused by competition 
infringement.  
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Appendix 1. Price prediction for infringement period 
 
Figure A1. Predicted prices for Pakmaya (price Feb 2007 = 100) 
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Figure A2. Predicted prices for Özmaya (price Feb 2007 = 100) 
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Figure A3. Predicted prices for Maurimaya (price Feb 2007 = 100) 
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Figure A4. Predicted prices for Akmaya (price Feb 2007 = 100) 
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ABUSE OF DOMINANCE AND ITS EFFECTS ON 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
 
Michael Adam and Simon Alder 
 
Abstract 
 
Rules on abuse of dominance are used to find a balance 
between three objectives: 1) ensuring enough competition between 
firms in order to force them to be efficient and to compete on merit, 2) 
allowing a certain degree of profitability so that companies have 
incentives to become more efficient, and 3) achieving an equal 
distribution of wealth and business opportunities among different sectors 
of society. While the discussion in developed countries focuses on the 
first two aspects in order to maximize innovation and growth, developing 
countries may also want to consider the third dimension and include the 
reduction of inequality and poverty as objectives of abuse of dominance 
laws. But even the relationship between the first two aspects tends to 
vary among regions, because investment depends on factors that differ 
between developing and developed countries. These factors sometimes 
contradict each other and it is crucial to find a sound balance between 
them. Firstly, since developing economies often have smaller markets 
and, therefore, a lower equilibrium number of firms that can exploit 
economies of scale and operate efficiently, markets in developing 
countries are more likely to be concentrated. Furthermore, entry barriers 
tend to be higher and capital markets are often less developed, which 
causes obstacles for firms trying to compete with a dominant company. 
Secondly, large firms play a different role regarding their investment 
activity in developing countries than they do in more developed 
economies. Established firms can be important for less developed 
economies to have a sufficiently high level of investment in production. 
In such countries, the benefits of increased investments may outweigh 
efficiency losses that can arise from a more lax treatment of dominant 
firm conduct. Thirdly, distributional aspects may be especially important 
for developing countries. Smaller firms, which often represent poorer 
sectors of society, may have to be given better chances to compete 
against large dominant companies. Competition law can be used for 
 572 
such public interest issues, but it is crucial that the law gives clear 
guidance on how these objectives should be balanced against other 
objectives such as efficiency. The comparison of the EU and the US 
regarding abuse of dominance shows that significant differences exist 
even among developed countries. One reason for the disparity is 
differing assumptions about what types of conduct are harmful and how 
difficult it is to differentiate them from other conduct. The 'access to 
market principle' of the EU arises from the assumption that restrictions 
of market access are harmful to the economy and that a harmful 
conduct can be distinguished from other, not harmful, conduct. On the 
other hand, the 'non-intervention principle' of the US is based on the 
assumption that the distinction of such conduct is difficult, that there is 
great danger of prohibiting behaviour that is efficient and that the 
unnecessary prohibition of efficient conduct is severe. One conclusion 
from the comparison is that these assumptions should be analysed and 
be grounded on the economic reality. How likely and severe errors of 
competition authorities are can, for example, be assessed in an analysis 
of past decisions and their effects on the economy. Support of 
developing countries' competition authorities in analysing their own 
cases and the impact of their decisions on the economy would therefore 
be valuable. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The fundamental goal of competition policy is to increase 
welfare. Competition policy aims to accomplish this goal by defining 
appropriate rules for business conduct, but the impact of competition on 
welfare is complex and may differ between countries. On the one hand, 
competition can improve the efficiency of firms and consequently 
increase the welfare of consumers. On the other hand, unfettered 
competition may augment an unequal distribution of assets, power and 
business opportunities which exist in many countries and reduce 
growth. This aspect is particularly important for developing countries, 
which face poverty and inequality as their most pressing issues. 
 
Laws on abuse of dominance are central to both aspects of 
competition, i.e. the efficiency of the firms and the equal distribution of 
opportunities. Outperforming competitors and achieving a position of 
dominance that allows making profits is the key incentive for firms to do 
their best in serving their clients and thus to become more efficient: “It is 
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precisely the prospect of enjoying some market power (i.e. of making 
profit) that pushes firms to use more efficient technologies, improve their 
product quality, or introduce new product varieties.”713. But welfare is 
reduced if a firm abuses its dominant position to keep more efficient 
competitors away or exploit its costumers. Maximizing the efficiency 
therefore requires a careful trade-off between providing incentives and 
limiting abuses. Given that market structures are different in developed 
and developing countries, the outcome from this trade-off is likely to be 
different across countries and regions. For example, higher barriers to 
entry, less developed capital markets and asymmetries of information 
reduce the opportunities of firms and thus the dynamic of competition 
particularly in developing countries714. Authorities in these countries may 
choose to adopt a stricter approach towards dominant firms. On the 
other hand, investments in production made by established firms are 
important for less developed economies, this being an argument for 
developing countries to be more in favour of dominant firms than 
developed countries. Laws on abuse of dominance are also crucial for 
the distributional aspects of competition. Many developing countries 
may find it important to include rules that focus on reducing the 
foreclosure of markets. The objective of such an approach can be to 
give better opportunities to small firms often representing poorer parts of 
society to engage in the economy and to increase the income of their 
owners and employers. 
 
The purpose of this study is to link the discussion about the 
appropriate competition policy for developing and emerging economies 
to the specific issue of abuse of dominance. To establish this link, we 
first briefly provide an economic and legal background of abuse of 
dominance. We then look at the situation of different developed, 
developing and emerging economies and make recommendations for 
future cooperation between institutions and organizations to improve the 
legal framework. 
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714
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2. The scope of the prohibition of abuse of a dominant 
position 
2.1. The United Nations Set of Principles and Rules on 
Competition 
 
The abuse of a dominant position is addressed in the United 
Nations Set of Principles and Rules on Competition and naturally also in 
individual jurisdictions worldwide.  
The United Nations Set of Principles and Rules on Competition 
– like the majority of national competition authorities – defines 
dominance in a behavioural way, although many structural criteria are 
still used in practice: "Dominant position of market power refers to a 
situation where an enterprise, either by itself or acting together with a 
few other enterprises, is in a position to control a relevant market for a 
particular good or service, or groups of goods or services"715. The set 
then lists a number of acts from which dominant firms must refrain. 
 
Box 1: Section D.4 of The United Nations Set of Principles and Rules on 
Competition 
 
Enterprises should refrain from the following acts or behaviour in a relevant market 
when, through an abuse or acquisition and abuse of a dominant position of market 
power, they limit access to markets or otherwise unduly restrain competition, having or 
being likely to have adverse effects on international trade, particularly that of developing 
countries, and on the economic development of these countries: 
 
(a) Predatory behaviour towards competitors, such as using below-cost pricing to 
eliminate competitors; 
(b) Discriminatory (i.e. unjustifiably differentiated) pricing or terms or conditions in the 
supply or purchase of goods and services, including by means of the use of pricing 
policies in transactions between affiliated enterprises which overcharge or undercharge 
for goods or services purchased or supplied as compared with prices for similar or 
comparable transactions outside the affiliated enterprises; 
(c) Mergers, takeovers, joint ventures or other acquisitions of control, whether of a 
horizontal, vertical or a conglomerate nature; 
(d) Fixing the prices at which goods exported can be resold in importing countries; 
(e) Restrictions on the importation of goods which have been legitimately marked abroad 
with a trademark identical with or similar to the trademark protected as to identical or 
similar goods in the importing country where the trademarks in question are of the same 
origin, i.e. belong to the same owner or are used by enterprises between which there is 
economic, organizational, managerial or legal interdependence and where the purpose 
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of such restrictions is to maintain artificially high prices; 
(f) When not for ensuring the achievement of legitimate business purposes, such as 
quality, safety, adequate distribution or service: 
(i) Partial or complete refusals to deal on the enterprise's customary commercial terms; 
(ii) Making the supply of particular goods or services dependent upon the acceptance of 
restrictions on the distribution or manufacture of competing or other goods; 
(iii) Imposing restrictions concerning where, or to whom, or in what form or quantities, 
goods supplied or other goods may be resold or exported; 
(iv) Making the supply of particular goods or services dependent upon the purchase of 
other goods or services from the supplier or his designee. 
 
UNCTAD: The United Nations Set of Principles and Rules on Competition. United 
Nations. Geneva. 2000. 
 
2.2. Different competition laws in developed and developing 
countries 
 
Most developing countries have adopted laws on abuse of 
dominance that have been inspired by the rules of the European Union 
(EU), i.e. Art. 82 of the EC Treaty. According to EU case law, dominant 
firms have the "special duty" not to exploit consumers and not to 
exclude competitors by anti-competitive means716. The idea of a special 
responsibility of dominant companies is founded in the view that 
competition is already weakened when one company dominates the 
market. The decreased level of competition is balanced by stricter rules 
on the conduct of the dominant firm, which should not be able to take 
advantage of this situation. The European concept of special 
responsibility of dominant firms is in conflict with the rules on dominance 
in the US, where dominant companies are granted greater freedom.717 
Developing countries often have highly concentrated markets with 
sometimes only one or two companies offering a certain product or 
service718. Therefore, there is a danger of dominant companies taking 
advantage of their position by charging higher prices, offering inferior 
products to consumers and foreclosing potential competitors thus 
consolidating their dominant position. This explains why it makes sense 
for many developing countries to opt for strict rules on the behaviour of 
                                                 
716
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 Lipimile (2004: 199, 201). 
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dominant companies and to invoke a special responsibility of dominant 
firms.  
 
2.3. Theoretical concepts of abuse of dominance  
 
There are two tests in the European framework for assessing 
whether the prohibition of the abuse of dominance applies: 
1) the undertaking has to be dominant, and 
2) it must be abusing that dominant position. 
The first test raises two questions: the definition of the market in 
which the undertaking is alleged to be dominant, and whether it is 
actually dominant in this market. 
 
2.3.1. Market definition 
 
Before assessing whether an undertaking is dominant, the 
relevant market must be determined. This relevant market has two 
dimensions: 
1. the product market, and 
2. the geographic market. 
 
As to the product market, it is examined if the product offered by 
the dominant company is interchangeable with other, similar products. If 
it is found that buyers would be ready to switch to an alternative product 
if the price of the first product increases slightly, these two products 
belong to the same product market. If buyers prefer paying a higher 
price for the first product rather than switching to another product, the 
two products are offered on different markets. 
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Box 2: Market definition in the EU 
 
The basic principles for the market definition are for example laid down in the EU 
Commission Notice on the Definition of Relevant Market for the Purpose of 
Community Competition Law (Official Journal C 371, 09/12/1997 p. 5-13). According 
to Paragraph 2, market definition is a tool to identify and define the boundaries of 
competition between firms. Market definition is not an end in itself but is an analytical 
tool. 
Paragraph 13 states that firms are subject to three main competitive constraints: 
1. demand substitutability 
2. supply substitutability 
3. potential competition. 
For the purpose of market definition, it is demand substitutability that is significant. 
One way of making this determination can be viewed as a speculative experiment, 
postulating a hypothetical small, lasting change in relative prices and evaluating the 
likely reactions of customers to that increase (the so-called SSNIP Test – Small but 
Significant Non-transitory Increase in Price). 
Paragraph 25 relates to the evidence to be used in order to define the relevant 
market. There is a range of evidence permitting an assessment of the extent to which 
substitution would take place. In individual cases, certain types of evidence will be 
determinant, depending very much on the characteristics and specificity of the 
industry and products or services that are being examined. The same type of 
evidence may be of no importance in other cases. In most cases, a decision will have 
to be based on the consideration of a number of criteria and different items of 
evidence. The Commission follows an open approach to empirical evidence, aimed at 
making an effective use of all available information which may be relevant in 
individual cases. The Commission does not follow a rigid hierarchy of different 
sources of information or types of evidence. Evidence of substitution in the recent 
past, the views of customers and competitors, studies and consumer surveys, barriers 
and costs associated with switching demand to potential substitutes and the different 
categories of customers and price discrimination are factors that can be taken into 
account.  
 
 
When defining the geographic market, a similar test is carried 
out: will buyers switch to a product from another geographic region if the 
price of the first product increases slightly? If transportation costs and 
other barriers are low, this is likely and the two products could belong to 
the same geographical market. If goods are perishable and cannot be 
transported or if transport is very costly, buyers are not able to switch to 
products from other regions, which therefore are offered on a distinct 
geographic market. 
 
The outcome of the market definition is crucial in determining 
dominance. The same firm may be regarded as dominant if the market 
in which it is active is defined narrowly or it may be considered as not 
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dominant if the market is defined broadly. The key concept for the 
market definition is substitutability. A market should not simply be 
defined as a collection of similar goods, but of goods that can be used 
for the same purpose and thus exercise a competitive constraint on 
each other719. Other factors that have to be considered here are, for 
example, functional characteristics of the product or transportation 
costs720. All these factors are reflected in the willingness of the 
customers to switch to other products. It is therefore a straightforward 
way to define a market by investigating whether customers change to 
other products when the price of the product they normally purchase 
increases. This test is used in areas of antitrust such as merger 
control721. However, in the case of abuse of dominance, the test can be 
misleading, because the consumers' willingness to change supplier can 
be considerably influenced by the abusive conduct under consideration. 
If a firm has in the past undertaken abusive conduct such as excluding 
direct competitors, it is likely to have a dominant position and to be able 
to set higher prices. The consumers who are faced with this high price 
may switch to imperfect substitutes if they would have to pay an even 
higher price (which is hypothetically assumed in the test). This substitute 
would consequently be included in the market and, on this broadly 
defined market, the firm under consideration may appear to not even 
have market power722. Consequently, this test will be biased towards 
defining markets too broadly in abuse of dominance cases723. The 
assessment of dominance in cases of abuses is difficult and authorities 
will have to rely more than in other cases on the products’ 
characteristics and their interchangeability in the individual case and 
they will have to take the distortions in observed prices into account. 
This reflects a more behavioural approach to dominance, which looks at 
the firm’s ability to act to some extent independently from other market 
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Economic Research Associates (NERA) (2001: 24). 
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forces, as opposed to the structural approach, which looks at the market 
conditions724. 
 
2.3.2. Existence of a dominant position 
 
Having defined the relevant product, geographical and temporal 
markets, the next issue is to decide what constitutes dominance. In 
United Brands, the EU Court of Justice defined dominance as “a 
position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables 
it to hinder the maintenance of effective competition on the relevant 
market by allowing it to behave to an appreciable extent independently 
of its competitors and customers and ultimately of its consumers”. 
 
The question remains, however, how to measure such market 
power. Market shares may be a useful indicator but there are several 
other factors that have to be taken into consideration such as market 
position, buyer power and entry conditions725. There are differences 
between markets regarding at what market share level a firm is 
dominant, but a lower bound (safe harbour presumption) and an upper 
bound (dominance presumption) can give guidance and predictability. 
However, an investigation that takes the characteristics of the case into 
consideration may be needed in an individual case. The size and market 
shares of competing firms also have to be considered. Secondly, entry 
barriers must be analysed, whereby special attention needs to be paid 
to those barriers that may be an outcome of the firm’s abusive conduct 
itself 726. Thirdly, buyer power needs to be considered in order to know 
whether the buyers can put a constraint on the dominant firms. 
 
The more direct assessment of market power uses econometric 
techniques to estimate the elasticity of demand in response to price 
changes. Market power then is defined as the ability of a firm to raise 
prices above its marginal cost727. This ability depends on the elasticity of 
demand and estimating the elasticity therefore allows one to directly 
assess market power. The econometric analysis can become 
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complicated and demands a certain quality and quantity of data. The 
traditional indirect approach, which focuses more on the market 
structure (such as concentration), is therefore still widely used in 
practice728. 
 
Dominance not only exists if one company holds a paramount 
market position, but it can also be found with regard to several firms if 
certain conditions are fulfilled. Cases involving collective dominance 
have emerged in developed and in developing countries and posed 
significant problems in both. 
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Box 3: Case 1 – Collective dominance in the Zimbabwean cement 
industry 
In December 1998, the Competition Commission commenced a preliminary probe into 
various allegations of restrictive and unfair trade practices in the cement industry, 
which were leading to shortages and excessive prices of cement on the local 
Zimbabwean market. The allegations came from complaints made to the Commission 
by the cement trade and the general public, as well as from newspaper reports. 
Four companies were involved in the production and distribution of cement in 
Zimbabwe: (i) Portland Holdings Limited (Unicem) of Bulawayo, (ii) Circle Cement 
Limited of Harare, (iii) Zimbabwe Cement Company (Pvt) Limited (ZimCement) of 
Norton’ and (iv) Techniks (Pvt) Limited of Gweru. Only Unicem and Circle Cement 
were involved at all stages of cement production, from the quarrying of limestone to 
the final product. The other two companies were more involved in blending 
operations. A new cement manufacturing plant, under a joint venture between China 
and the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC), was nearing completion in 
Lalapanzi. The cement industry was found to be highly concentrated, with a 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of 4,602. The two largest players in the industry 
(Unichem and Circle Cement) controlled a combined market share of over 90%. 
The evidence gathered confirmed some of the allegations levelled against Unicem 
and Circle Cement, and others which came up during the course of the investigation, 
such as: (i) restricting the distribution of cement; (ii) enhancing or maintaining the 
price of cement; and (iii) supporting or promoting the distribution of cement by 
inefficient and uneconomical means. No evidence was found to support the 
allegations of: (i) prevention or restriction of entry into the cement industry; (ii) undue 
refusal to distribute cement; and (iii) collusive arrangements between the cement 
producers. With regards to allegations of collusion between Unicem and Circle 
Cement, it was found that the fact that Unicem was a more efficient producer than 
Circle Cement was clearly reflected in that company’s lower retail prices on the 
market. It was also found that even though the two companies had natural markets in 
the northern and southern parts of the country, because of high transports costs of 
distributing their products, the companies’ products were sold in either of their 
‘natural’ markets.  
The Commission therefore ordered Unicem and Circle Cement, in terms of Section 31 
of the Competition Act, to discontinue and terminate the identified restrictive practices.  
The Commission’s investigation also identified other public interest concerns in the 
distribution of cement on the local Zimbabwean market, such as lack of transparency 
in the distribution of the product, lack of distribution outlets in remote rural areas, high 
import duties on cement raw materials and discriminatory sales tax regime in favour 
of large buyers. The Commission made appropriate recommendations to the relevant 
authorities and parties on the alleviation of the concerns. 
Quoted from: UNCTAD: Review of Recent Experiences in the Formulation and Implementation of Competition Law 
and Policy in Selected Developing Countries: Thailand, Lao, Kenya, Zambia, Zimbabwe. United Nations. New 
York and Geneva. 2005. 
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Defining when a collective dominant position exists is a difficult 
task. The case law in the EU has developed a rather specific definition 
that may be helpful for the treatment of collective dominance cases in 
developing countries as well. According to this definition, collective 
dominance exists if two independent firms act as a collective entity on 
the market and are as this entity not subject to substantial competition 
from other companies. Collective dominance exists mostly in 
oligopolistic markets and is therefore of special interest for developing 
countries, where markets are often highly concentrated. However, the 
existence of an oligopoly in itself is not enough to assume that collective 
dominance exists729. 
 
Box 4: EU case law regarding collective dominance 
 
According to the case law of the EU Court of Justice, three conditions have 
to be met: 1 
1) The market has to be transparent enough for every member of the 
oligopoly to be able to quickly inform itself of the conduct of the other 
members. 
2) There must be an incentive for tacit and permanent coordination between 
the members of the oligopoly. This means that all members must know that 
unilateral moves of one member with the objective of trying to increase its 
market shares - e.g. by cutting prices - would immediately provoke the same 
measure or sanctions by the other members, so that it would make no 
sense for the individual member to make moves of this kind. 
3) The oligopoly is not faced with substantial competition from outside the 
group so that members can be sure that customers will not switch to other 
providers easily. 
 
1
 ECJ, Judgment of 16 March 2000, Compagnie maritime belge, Joined cases C-395/96 P and C-
396/96 P, ECR 2000 Page I-01365. 
 
 
Substantial market power of few companies can make it 
especially difficult for small firms to remain in the market and even more 
to enter new markets. Markets in developing countries are often highly 
concentrated and dominated by – often foreign – firms that hold strong 
positions in these markets and are sometimes the only provider of a 
                                                 
729
 Another crucial issue is the role of the state, which may allow, facilitate or 
even create dominant companies. This issue will be discussed in more detail in 
Section 4.5. 
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certain good or service730. On the other hand, the local economy is often 
characterized by a large number of small business units that create 
employment for most of the population but lack economic power. 
Survival in the markets by these small, often newly created, companies 
is made difficult if dominant players abuse their dominant position in 
order to prevent market entry and competition by other players. In order 
to create a more level playing field and to protect smaller local 
companies from such abusive practices, rules on abuse of dominance 
are essential for developing countries. 
 
2.3.3. Abusive conduct 
 
There are two types of abusive unilateral conduct by dominant 
firms: exploitative abuses and exclusionary abuses731. The former refer 
to cases where firms charge excessively high prices from their 
customers, pay low prices to suppliers, or discriminate among 
consumers. The latter refer to cases where firms suppress competition 
by refusing to deal, engaging in predatory pricing or tying products in 
order to raise costs of entry and exclude competitors from the market to 
create or strengthen a dominant position. The difficulty with abusive 
conducts is that the same conduct can be pro- or anti-competitive, 
depending on the individual case. For example, refusals to deal may be 
necessary to ensure quality standards, and lower prices are, in principle, 
a fundamental goal of competition policy. 
                                                 
730
 Lipimile (2004: 199, 201). 
731
 Anderson et al. (1999: 72). 
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Box 5: Case 2 – Preliminary investigations into allegations of 
predatory pricing in the clear beer brewing and distribution industry in 
Zimbabwe 
In December 1999, Nesbitt Brewery (Pvt) Limited of Chiredzi complained to 
the Competition Commission that National Breweries Limited was engaged 
in predatory pricing, having drastically reduced the price of its clear beer in 
Chiredzi to levels that were unprofitable, with the intention of driving Nesbitt 
Brewery out of the market. The investigations conducted by the Commission 
revealed that the clear beer industry in Zimbabwe is highly concentrated 
with an HHI (Hirschman-Herfindahl Index) concentration index in excess of 
8,000. Nesbitt Brewery was a new entrant into the clear beer market 
challenging the long-standing monopoly position of National Breweries, 
which held a market share of 90%. National Breweries has a national 
distribution network while Nesbitt Brewery only operates in Chiredzi. The 
investigations further revealed that the National Breweries had run a beer 
promotion in Chiredzi from May 1999 to April 2000 when the Competition 
Commission started gathering information on the case. The promotion 
included free snacks and T-shirts, lucky-draw tickets, free beers and 
substantial price reductions. The promotion was only held in Chiredzi where 
Nesbitt Brewery is based and sells the bulk of its beer. The National 
Breweries retail prices for its beer in Chiredzi during the promotion period 
were below its normal landed prices in that town. The Commission found the 
alleged practices to be predatory within the terms of Section 2 of the 
Competition Act. Although National Breweries stopped the practices as soon 
as it became aware that the Competition Commission was investigating it, 
the Commission compelled it to formally undertake that it would desist from 
future practices aimed at driving Nesbitt Brewery out of the market. 
Quoted from: UNCTAD: Review of Recent Experiences in the Formulation 
and Implementation of Competition Law and Policy in Selected Developing 
Countries: Thailand, Lao, Kenya, Zambia, Zimbabwe. United Nations. New 
York and Geneva. 2005. 
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Box 6: Case 3 – The Coca-Cola Company (TCCC)/Zambia Bottlers (ZB) 
exclusive dealing arrangements 
ZB notified its exclusive dealing arrangements to the Zambia Competition 
Commission (ZCC). The Board observed that ZB had in place both 
distributorship and cooler hire contracts into the trade. It was also found that 
ZB owned the distribution containers, the Strategic Sales Depots (SSDs), 
and appointed operators for public service after purchase of merchandise. 
ZB also had cooler hire contracts with retailers along with conditions not to 
sell competing products. The Board approved the exclusive dealing 
arrangements in so far as the SSDs are owned by ZB, on condition that they 
are devoid of price fixing, abuse of dominant position and that the cost of 
cooler repairs be met by ZB since maintenance fees are being paid. These 
conditions have also been made an essential part of the compliance 
programme regarding the takeover of Cadbury Schweppes (CS) brands by 
TCCC. The compliance programme will be monitored by ZCC. 
Quoted from: Zambia Competition Commission: Annual Report 1999. 
Lusaka. March 2000. 
 
 
 
Box 7: Case 4 – Microsoft's abuse of market dominance in the 
Republic of Korea 
The Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) reported to UNCTAD that, in 
2000, Microsoft had tied its Windows Media Service (WMS) to the Personal 
Computers (PC) Server Operating System (OS). The Window Media Player 
(WMP) was first tied to the PC Operating System Windows 98 Second 
Edition in 1999, and since then, WMP has been tied to the succeeding PC 
Operating Systems. Additionally, the company combined MSN Messenger 
with Windows ME in 2000 and Windows Messenger with Widows XP in 
2001. Under the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA) of the 
Republic of Korea, Microsoft has a dominant position in the market. Its 
market share of the PC Operating System was 99% in terms of domestic 
sales, as compared with a 50% threshold stipulated in the Act. 
The investigation and analysis of the case revealed three factors. Firstly, the 
tie-in sales constituted obstruction of competitors' business, which is part of 
abuse of market dominance. The tie-in sales deprived companies of the 
opportunity to purchase PC OS without WMS, WMP, and Windows 
Messenger attached, even when they did not wish to purchase them. 
Moreover, the tie-in sales had the effect of driving competitors out of 
business by restricting competition in the market. The market shares of 
other players in the market, for example RealNetworks, Daum Messenger, 
Nate-On Messenger and others, continued to decline as Microsoft’s market 
share continued to rise in all aspects of its business. 
 586 
Secondly, it was feared that the tie-in sales would significantly undermine 
consumer interest. Using dominance, Microsoft virtually forced consumers 
to purchase WMS, WMP, and Windows Messenger, even when they did not 
wish to do so. This is an infringement of the consumer’s right to choice. 
Lastly, in the tied product markets, Microsoft's tie-sales constituted unfair 
business practices, as they restricted competition from competitors and 
consequently forced consumers to purchase the PC OS bundled with WMS, 
WMP or Windows Messenger. 
The KFTC concluded that the company's tie-in sales were in violation of 
Articles 3-2 and 23 of the MRFTA ban on abuse of market dominance and 
unfair business practices that work against consumer interests and restrict 
or hinder competition in related markets. 
On 7 December 2005, the KFTC imposed a series of corrective measures: 
(i) a surcharge of 33 billion Won (US$ 31 million); (ii) with regard to the tie-in 
of WMS, the KFTC ordered the company to strip WMS from the PC Server 
OS within 180 days from the date when the corrective order was imposed; 
(iii) for the bundling of WMP and Windows Messenger, the company was 
ordered to provide two different versions of the PC OS, whereby one version 
would have WMS and the Messenger programme removed from the PC OS 
while the other would keep WMP and Windows Messenger and allow 
customers to download competitors' products; and (iv) to ensure compliance 
with the decision of this case, the KFTC was to appoint a Supervisory Board 
composed of members nominated by the KFTC, the Minister of Information 
and Communication and Microsoft. The board was to be tasked with the 
responsibility of determining the specifics of the remedies and overseeing 
their implementation, while Microsoft was to bear all costs associated with 
the running of the Supervisory Board. 
 
Quoted from: UNCTAD: Recent important competition cases involving more 
than one country. Report by the UNCTAD Secretariat. Geneva. 2007. 
 
 
 
2.3.4. The possibility of objective justification  
 
In some cases, an objective justification of an abusive conduct 
may be invoked. A company has the right to legitimate commercial 
behaviour and the defence of its legitimate interests. Under which 
circumstances a justification of otherwise abusive behaviour exists is 
determined on a case-to-case basis. Examples for such a justification 
can be efficiency increases or quality improvements that arise from the 
conduct. 
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3. Why should developing countries and countries in 
transition consider abuse of dominance? 
 
3.1. The political economy dimension in developing 
countries 
 
One of the reasons why rules on abuse of dominance are 
important for developing countries lies in the challenges many of them 
face as a result of their political institutions. Most developing countries 
have had economic systems with a relatively strong degree of command 
economy until recently. A command economy brings about the inherent 
existence of concentrated markets and of monopolies, because in many 
fields of the economy the state is the only actor and will not expose itself 
to competition. Nowadays, these systems have mostly been subject to 
the liberalization and privatization efforts of developing countries' 
economic systems732. In this process, the former public monopolies had 
to be abolished and the markets were supposed to be open to free 
competition of various private actors. However, what has happened in 
many cases is that large companies, often from developed countries, 
have been able to take over the position of the former state monopoly. 
Privatization has in many cases not led to more competition but simply 
to a substitution of public monopolies by private ones. This is one of the 
reasons for high market concentrations in developing countries733. 
Examples for this tendency exist in various sectors, for example in the 
field of sugar, beer, cement or packaging. These private companies 
have acquired a key position in many developing countries' markets. If 
they decide to engage in exploitative conduct – e.g. by charging overly 
high prices to customers or by offering only inferior products – or 
exclusionary conduct by excluding their competitors and thus 
consolidate their dominant position, developing countries' authorities 
need an instrument to tackle such business behaviour. This instrument 
is the existence of laws on abuse of dominance. Developing countries 
can only regulate efficiently the conduct of dominant firms if they create 
                                                 
732
 Lipimile (2004: 177).  
733
 As to the high market concentrations, e.g. in the beer brewing and 
distribution and the cement distribution sectors, see the cases cited in Lipimile 
(2004: 199, 201). 
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and apply laws on abuse of dominance that allow them to tackle the 
anti-competitive behaviour of such firms to protect competition in their 
markets and, as a result of this, consumers. It is in this context that 
especially the EU approach, which attributes a "special responsibility" to 
a dominant company, suits rather well the interest of developing 
countries to gain control over dominant firms and keep their markets 
open to competition. 
 
Another aspect that is linked to the political economy of 
developing countries concerns the role of the state. In newly liberalized 
economies, the role of government in the national economy typically 
remains strong. Many dominant companies are either state owned or 
controlled by the government; others are afforded a special protection 
by government policies. Such phenomena can especially, but not only, 
be witnessed in many network industries (railways, ports, electricity, 
telecommunications, etc.). The question of the role of the state in 
competition policy is delicate and difficult to handle, especially by public 
authorities that are themselves subject to government control. On the 
other hand, also, companies protected by governments should not be 
allowed to exploit consumers or to unduly restrain competition, which 
may lead to the exclusion of other players that offer better products or 
lower prices. Competition policy and, more specifically, rules on abuse 
of dominance are a useful instrument to treat this issue. By laying down 
general rules that apply to all companies with a paramount market 
position, a more level playing field can be created and it can be argued 
that governments also have to respect the basic rules of fair play in the 
markets which in the end will benefit the overall welfare and consumers. 
 
3.2. Inequality, competition, and growth in developing and 
emerging economies 
 
Laws against abuse of dominance can influence the distribution 
of assets, power and business opportunities. This distributional aspect 
of competition is particularly important for developing countries, where 
economic power and wealth are not fairly distributed. Competition policy 
may have to play the dual role of raising the power of underprivileged 
individuals and enterprises to participate in the process of competition 
and of creating a sound legal framework for free competition. If these 
objectives are not met, unfettered competition will simply help the big 
firms to monopolize domestic markets that are usually protected from 
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foreign competition734. The resulting inequality will lead to public 
dissatisfaction and the excessive market power has the potential to 
raise prices735. Dominance not only leads to an unequal distribution of 
market power, wealth and business opportunities, but has also a 
potential negative effect on growth and development if such power is 
abused. The abuse hampers the good functioning of markets and the 
efficient allocation of resources so that the economy cannot reach its 
growth potential. Developing countries with low growth rates are unable 
to catch up with industrialized economies and are unlikely to experience 
substantial and sustained poverty reduction. Growth is therefore a 
central goal of limiting abuse of dominance in developing countries. On 
the other hand, the possibility of achieving a certain degree of market 
power is necessary, because it allows firms to make profits and this 
gives them incentives to become more efficient. If the limits on dominant 
firms and their conduct are too restrictive, growth may be reduced. 
 
Although the relationship between market structure and 
economic performance is complex, it is, particularly in developing 
countries, crucial to consider it in the context of abuse of dominance. 
The extreme view is “the market will fix it all”, which is partly based on 
the theory of contestable markets736. According to this theory, even a 
firm that enjoys a monopoly position in a market cannot price above the 
marginal costs because new firms would enter the market as soon as 
they observe that profits can be made. But this outcome depends on 
strong assumptions: the monopolist cannot change the prices as a 
reaction to entry and there are no barriers to and sunk costs of entry. 
These assumptions obviously do not hold in many markets of developed 
and developing economies. A third reason why market forces may not 
be able to reduce market power is anti-competitive practices, which is at 
the focus of this study. 
 
Even in newly liberalized economies where barriers to entry 
have been reduced substantially, incumbent monopolists may not be 
challenged by new entrants and foreign investments may remain low in 
many cases737. This could suggest that a stricter approach to 
                                                 
734
 Fox (2003: 163). 
735
 Economic theory predicts that the optimal pricing of a monopolist usually is 
above the welfare maximizing level. 
736
 Motta (2004: 73). 
737
 This situation has for example been observed lately in Albania. 
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dominance should be chosen, but it is clearly valuable to understand 
why there is no entry. Firstly, if the dominant position is unchallenged 
because of anti-competitive practices by incumbent firms or because 
obstacles to competition remain even after liberalization, then a stricter 
approach is appropriate738. Secondly, if dominant firms are not 
challenged simply because not enough profits can be made in the 
market, it would most likely be counterproductive to restrict incumbent 
firms and thereby reduce their incentives to invest in the development of 
the market. 
 
Acemoglu et al. (2006) argue that less developed countries rely 
more on investment by incumbent firms and that less product market 
competition may be beneficial739. The reason is that established firms 
are important in order to have sufficiently high levels of investment in 
these countries, even if less intense competition is likely to have a 
negative impact on innovation. If there was fierce competition with new 
firms constantly entering the market and established, but less efficient 
ones leaving it, then the currently existing firms will be able to make 
smaller investments. Since less developed countries operate in sectors 
with generally lower levels of technology, they can use existing 
technologies and do not themselves need to innovate as much. 
Consequently, it is less important for them to have the most innovative 
and efficient firms selected by the competitive process, but rather to 
have large incumbent firms that can make investments in production. In 
less developed economies, the benefits of increased investments are 
therefore more likely to outweigh efficiency losses such as higher prices 
and less innovation that may arise from the dominant position. In 
developed countries on the other hand, it is more important that the 
competitive process selects the firms that are the most efficient and 
innovative, because they compete in sectors where innovation is a key 
factor of success. For this selection process to work, a fiercer 
competition policy may be required740. 
                                                 
738
 Related to this issue is the discussion about natural and state-created 
monopolies and how liberalization should be managed. It is important that the 
consequences for competition are considered when planning and implementing 
liberalization. See also Section 4.5. 
739
 Acemoglu et al. (2006). 
740
 It may be difficult to switch out at the right time of the setting that protects 
dominant firms, because those who have profited from the monopolization will 
use their economic power to influence the political process. This raises the 
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A special case of the trade-off between investment and 
competition is infrastructure. This is particularly relevant for 
governments with low budget resources, because they may rely on 
private firms to finance and build infrastructure such as roads and ports. 
Given that the infrastructure would not come into existence if not 
financed, owned and used by a private enterprise, it may be a crucial 
driver for development. But at the same time, the firm can strengthen its 
dominant position and exclude competitors if the infrastructure is an 
essential facility that is necessary for all other industry participants and 
is not easily duplicated741. As in the case of intellectual property, 
governments need to calculate carefully how much ownership they want 
to transfer to firms in order to give sufficient incentives to invest. It must 
be assessed for what sectors a monopoly should be allowed, how broad 
it must be, for what period it is granted, and if concessions can be 
renegotiated after a certain time or when circumstances have changed. 
 
3.3. Exploitation of producers by dominant buyers 
 
Dominance not only has the potential to exclude competitors or 
exploit consumers, but can also lead to exploitation of producers if they 
are faced with a dominant buyer. This is likely to be the case if a large 
number of small producers supply a relatively homogenous good, such 
as a commodity, to a small number of large buyers. Producers in 
developing countries may often find themselves in such a situation, 
where they have little choice as to which buyer they sell to and at what 
price because there is only one buyer, they have limited information 
about other possible buyers or switching to a different buyer involves 
high costs. It can therefore be important for developing countries to also 
have rules that apply to the abuse of buyer power. 
 
                                                                                                            
related issue of linkages between political and economic power and we will 
come back to this in Section 3.3. 
741
 Motta (2004: 66). For example, a government can give a logistics enterprise 
the licence to build and maintain a port on a certain part of the coast. If this port 
cannot be duplicated nearby and if other firms need the port in order to 
compete, then the incumbent can exclude competitors by refusing them access 
to the essential facility. 
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Box 8: Buyer power of oligopsonistic cocoa traders vis-à-vis 
farmers 
Abuse of market power may occur in the upstream market at the 
farmers' level. Local farmers do not have bargaining power vis-à-vis 
an "oligopsony" of cocoa traders as buyers. The buyers have 
enough buyer power to set cocoa prices at a level below what would 
be set under competitive market conditions. Economic analysis has 
shown that the abusive behaviour of firms with excessive buying 
power tends to disadvantage sellers while the excessive profit made 
due to such behaviour is not passed on to consumers in the 
downstream market to which these firms sell, regardless of the 
degree of competition in this market.1 Thus, in the context of cocoa 
producers, the question would rather be how to deal with the buyer 
power of cocoa traders and processors.  
1
 Peter C. Carstensen, Competition, Concentration and Agriculture. Statement to the 
Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry, Agriculture Concentration 
and Competition Hearing, 27 April 2000. 
Quoted from UNCTAD, Cocoa Study: Industry Structures and Competition. United 
Nations, forthcoming 2008. 
 
 
3.4. The implementation of inequality considerations in 
developing countries 
 
Fox (2000) analyses the trade-off between efficiency and 
distributional aspects of competition in the cases of South Africa and 
Indonesia742. The question that the examination of these two countries 
helps to answer is whether competition law can be used in practice to 
foster social and economic equality and if these goals are compatible 
with the goals of efficiency and growth. 
 
                                                 
742
 The discussion of South Africa and Indonesia in Boxes 9 and 10 is based on 
Fox (2000). 
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Box 9: South Africa 
 
During the apartheid regime in South Africa, the white minority had political 
and economic power. Markets were extremely concentrated and cartels and 
monopolies largely controlled the economy1. When the apartheid regime 
ended in the mid-nineties, the process of democratization was accompanied 
by reforms of the competition law in order to reduce discrimination and 
inequality, but also to foster efficiency. For the most part, the competition 
law adapted rules and principles that were already successfully applied in 
developed countries2. But besides the common objective of efficiency, the 
new policy also wanted to “(…) ensure that small and medium-sized 
enterprises have an equitable opportunity to participate in the economy; and 
(to) promote a greater spread of ownership, in particular to increase the 
ownership stakes of historically disadvantaged persons”3. However, these 
objectives are balanced against the impact on competitiveness so that the 
additional clauses are only likely to be decisive in cases where there is 
doubt as to whether a conduct is efficient. 
 
1 OECD: Competition Law and Policy in South Africa. An OECD Peer Review. OECD. Paris. 2003. 
at p. 10. 
2 UNCTAD: Handbook on Competition Legislation. Note by the UNCTAD Secretariat. 
Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy. 2007. 
3
 Ibid. p. 6. 
 
 
 
Box 10: Indonesia 
 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) intervened in Indonesia in the late 
nineties because of the Indonesian financial crisis. This crisis was caused 
by a political elite, which controlled important parts of the economy and put 
a large debt burden on the country. One requirement after the intervention 
was the adoption of a competition law. This law included a large number of 
rules against certain conducts such as price discrimination and vertical 
foreclosure. The law generally contained more rules to promote equality 
than the South African law, but it gave less guidance on how the potential 
conflict between efficiency and equality should be resolved. There is 
therefore great responsibility on the courts to find a sound balance between 
the different goals1. 
 
1
 Eleanor M. Fox: Equality, Discrimination, and Competition Law: Lessons from and for South 
Africa and Indonesia. Harvard International Law Journal. Vol. 41. 2000. at p. 592. 
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3.5. The balance between different objectives 
 
What becomes clear from the study of the two countries is that if 
competition policy should play a role in reducing inequality in developing 
countries, there needs to be clear guidance on how to balance efficiency 
and equality743. The two cases of South Africa and Indonesia also show 
that the current political environment strongly influences the competition 
law. In both countries there was, in the beginning, a politically or 
economically powerful minority that had every reason to protect its 
position and to allow its enterprises to dominate the economy and 
restrict smaller competitors. Once the political situation changed and the 
links between political and economic power broke, politicians’ incentives 
may have moved towards protecting the smaller businesses of their 
supporters. Good political institutions are needed to make sure that 
there are incentives to follow long-term goals in both political 
environments. 
 
4. Cross-country differences and their implications for 
developing countries 
 
4.1. Abuse of dominance laws in the general context of 
unilateral conduct laws 
 
Abuse of dominance refers to cases in which a firm has a 
dominant position and then engages in harmful conduct. It is related to 
the concept of unilateral conduct, which focuses on single-firm action 
and its potential anti-competitive effects, including the creation or 
strengthening of dominance, but that does not always require a prior 
existence of a dominant position. 
 
The following section now gives an overview of how abuse of 
dominance and unilateral conduct are assessed in a number of 
developing and developed countries. A range of differences persists, 
and the recent EU Microsoft judgement of 17 September 2007744 and 
                                                 
743
 Fox (2000: 594). 
744Microsoft v Commission, T-201/04 [2007]. Judgement under: 
http://curia.europa.eu. 
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the US reaction to it have highlighted again that within the developed 
world also there are significant differences as to the treatment of 
dominant market players745. On the other hand, there are also areas of 
convergence. In this context, the International Competition Network 
(ICN) identified several issues that merit further research and 
cooperation746: objectives of unilateral conduct laws, assessment of 
dominance, and state-created monopolies. 
 
4.2. Objectives of unilateral conduct laws 
 
The objectives of unilateral conduct laws differ across 
competition systems. In most unilateral conduct regimes, more than one 
objective is considered relevant. Objectives include: ensuring an 
effective competitive process, promoting consumer welfare, maximizing 
efficiency, ensuring economic freedom, ensuring a level playing field for 
small and medium-sized companies, promoting fairness and equality, 
promoting consumer choice, achieving market integration, facilitating 
privatization and market liberalization, and promoting competitiveness in 
international markets. 
 
In many countries, ensuring an effective competitive process is 
considered an objective on its own. The competitive process is seen as 
a dynamic, self-initiating market phenomenon that requires competition 
agencies’ intervention only when obstructed. In other systems it is seen 
as a means to achieve other desirable goals such as consumer welfare, 
economic freedom or efficiency. In some cases it is both an objective 
and a means to achieve such goals. Apart from ensuring the competitive 
process itself, the most commonly used goals seem to be the economic 
goals of promotion of consumer welfare and enhancing efficiency. One 
example of the difficult relationship between these goals is the 
discussion about the ‘more economic approach’ to unilateral conduct 
rules in the EU747. This discussion focuses on whether the European 
rules of unilateral conduct should be interpreted in a more economic 
way thus aligning with current US law. This would essentially mean 
looking at the type of effects of a certain practice on consumers rather 
                                                 
745
 Vickers (2007). 
746
 Parts of the discussion below are based on International Competition 
Network (ICN) (2007). 
747
 European Commission (2005). 
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then at the market structure and the abusive behaviour in question, 
which were relevant criteria in the traditional European approach to 
unilateral conduct748. 
 
In developing countries, the objective of competition law and 
more specifically of unilateral conduct rules is sometimes also to protect 
domestic firms by seeking to prevent powerful foreign firms from using 
their power in order to eliminate local competitors749. In principle, 
countries are free to choose the objectives they see appropriate for 
unilateral conduct rules. This is a political decision that stakeholders in 
every country have to take, considering the economic realities in their 
markets. However, different standards across jurisdictions represent 
obstacles not only for companies with cross-boarder business, but also 
to the effective enforcement and cooperation in the field of competition 
policy. A certain degree of harmonization may therefore be desirable750. 
The relationship between the objectives of intellectual property 
and unilateral conduct rules remains another possible field of conflict, 
where further work is required. Also, the widespread practice of 
exemptions from unilateral conduct rules may create a conflict with the 
very goals of these rules. 
 
4.3. The assessment of dominance 
 
Significant differences exist in the way the surveyed jurisdictions 
assess dominance and also what the finding of dominance then implies 
for a dominant firm and its conduct. The following sections give an 
overview of the differences between countries and illustrate the situation 
with examples from individual countries. 
 
4.3.1. Finding of dominance as a filter for anti-competitive effects 
 
                                                 
748
 Dreher and Adam (2006: 259 et seqq.). 
749
 Gerber (2007: 707, 721). 
750
 The notion that domestic firms should be protected until they are able to 
compete against foreign competition leads to an industrial policy that wants to 
foster national champions. Section 4.5 discusses the relationship of industrial 
policy and competition policy in greater detail. 
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In the majority of countries the finding of dominance serves as a 
first filter for separating conduct that has anti-competitive effects from 
conduct that does not. However, it is not dominance itself that is 
prohibited, but the anti-competitive unilateral conduct of dominant firms. 
The underlying assumption is that such a conduct would not harm 
competition if exercised by a non-dominant firm or that such a firm 
cannot even enter into the conduct. Some countries do not use the 
existence of a dominant position as a filter, but the existence of a 
dominant position is nonetheless often a criterion in the assessment of 
the conduct751. 
 
4.3.2. Interventions against unilateral conduct by firms without strong 
market power or against the creation of dominance 
 
In total, 15 out of 35 jurisdictions in the ICN report have 
prohibitions against anti-competitive unilateral behaviour by non-
dominant firms or firms that attempt to acquire a dominant position752. 
These standards are also often related to fair trade laws. The examples 
of intervention against firms that do not have a dominant position show 
that dominance is not necessarily the decisive test in cases of unilateral 
conduct. But even in jurisdictions where dominance is not required as a 
precondition for considering unilateral conduct cases, it still has a role to 
play as a criterion in the assessment of the conduct and its potential for 
harm. 
 
Box 11: Examples of interventions against unilateral conduct by firms 
without strong market power or against the creation of dominance 
 
The Sherman Act in the US prohibits “attempts to monopolize” and 
“monopolization”. The former is the anti-competitive conduct with the 
specific intent to acquire a dominant position and with the high 
probability of doing so. The latter is the use of anti-competitive 
conduct either to acquire or to maintain a dominant market position. 
The existence of a dominant position prior to the conduct is therefore 
not required for attempts to monopolize. An example is the US 
Microsoft case where the Court of Appeals had to investigate whether 
                                                 
751
 Marsden (2006: 292). 
752 International Competition Network (ICN) (2007: 60–61). 
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Microsoft had unlawfully harmed Netscape’s Internet Navigator 
browser in order to protect the monopoly position of its Windows 
operating system (monopolization) or to leverage the monopoly 
position of Windows to the browser market (attempt to monopolize)1. 
Brazil and Chile contain a general prohibition of restrictive trade 
practices. The French competition law sanctions abuses of economic 
dependence on the basis of reputation, access to essential facilities or 
the structure of the business relationship. Similarly, the German law 
prohibits that one undertaking hinders another without objective 
justification if it has relatively more market power than the other one. 
An example would be sales under costs or under acquisition prices. 
Also, the Japanese law does not require dominance when prohibiting 
unfair trade practices, e.g. unjust refusals to deal. 
 
1
 United States v Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Section 5.2. will look at the US approach 
in more detail. For the above also see UNCTAD: Model Law on Competition. UNCTAD Series on 
Issues in Competition Law and Policy. United Nations. New York and Geneva. 2007. 
 
 
4.3.3. Behaviour vs structural definition of dominance 
 
Twenty-eight out of 35 jurisdictions in the ICN survey use a 
behaviour definition for dominance that focuses on a firm's appreciable 
freedom from competitive constraints. This freedom is sometimes 
referred to as independence (e.g. EU) and in other cases as the ability 
to profitably raise prices (e.g. Canada, US753). Many authorities also 
consider the durability of this freedom. Only five out of 35 use a 
structural definition, which means that dominance is primarily defined by 
structural criteria. 
 
Although most of the countries state that they use a behaviour 
definition, many of them still use structural criteria for the assessment of 
dominance. The following section illustrates that many of the most 
frequently used criteria are structural. The fact that the vast majority of 
countries name their general definition ‘behavioural’ consequently loses 
some significance, because a different – more structural – definition 
seems to be used for the actual assessment of dominance. 
 
                                                 
753
 See discussion on ‘hypothetical monopolist test’ in Section 2.1. 
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There is little doubt that structural criteria have an advantage in 
the practical application754. It seems easier for competition authorities to 
observe a current situation such as the market structure than to look at 
the behaviour of actors in the market. This concern of practicability is 
especially important for competition authorities in developing countries, 
because their means to assess dominance are more limited. On the 
other hand, the behaviour approach to defining dominance is 
theoretically more exact, because it focuses on the target variable, 
which is the actual and potential behaviour of firms. The downside of 
this approach is that it requires more case-specific analysis. 
4.3.4. The criteria for the assessment of dominance 
 
Table 1 shows that structural criteria are important for the assessment 
of dominance in most jurisdictions. 
 
Table 1: Criteria for assessment of dominance 
Which of the following criteria do you use?  Yes No 
- Market share of the firm and its competitors  32 0 
- Market position and market behaviour of competitors 32 0 
- Barriers to entry or expansion  32 0 
- Buyer power  32 0 
- Economies of scale and scope/network effects  32 0 
- Access to upstream markets/vertical integration  32 0 
- Durability of market power  30 2 
- Market maturity/vitality  30 2 
- Access to essential facilities  29 3 
- Financial resources of the firm and its competitors  23 9 
- High prices (at absolute or comparative level)  23 9 
- Profits of the firm 17 15 
    Source: ICN (2007). 
 
 
The first three criteria are also those most often mentioned as 
being among the most important criteria. However, this is not the case 
for some large jurisdictions such as the UK, the US and Japan755. 
                                                 
754
 Dreher and Adam (2006: 259 et seqq.). 
755
 This observation will be discussed further in Section 5, which concerns the 
US and EU laws. 
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Market shares: 
Market shares are a relevant criterion for the assessment of 
dominance, because they are a close approximation of how a firm 
stands vis-à-vis its competitors. It is not a perfect approximation for 
market power because the latter depends on a number of other factors. 
Even a firm that has more than a 50% market share may have little 
market power if there is only one buyer or many possible entrants. 
Therefore, the significance of a certain market share depends on the 
characteristics of the market. 
 
Market share thresholds are levels of market shares above 
which market power is assumed and below which it is not assumed. The 
use of market share thresholds has both advantages and 
disadvantages. The most obvious advantage is legal certainty and 
predictability. If the procedure of the competition authorities is 
sufficiently transparent, firms can to some extent predict how the 
authorities will define the market and what market share they will 
assume. A market share threshold then allows them to assess whether 
they are assumed to be dominant or not and consequently if their 
conduct could be prohibited. This higher degree of legal certainty allows 
them to invest more efficiently, because they know when an activity is 
likely to be profitable. The apparent disadvantage is that market share 
thresholds are generalizations across a large number of special cases. 
Consequently, they need to be defined conservatively, i.e. levels for 
safe harbours must be rather low to take into account that in some 
instances even firms with relatively low market shares can be dominant, 
and thresholds to assume dominance must be high in order to consider 
the possibility that firms with large market shares have no market power. 
However, when the levels are defined too conservatively, the market 
share thresholds lose their significance, because few firms can actually 
use them. It becomes evident from these considerations that the 
definition of the optimal thresholds is a difficult task. The benefits of 
thresholds are particularly high for jurisdictions with less experienced 
competition authorities that profit from a more structured approach. 
However, the definition of the accurate threshold is likely to be very 
difficult for these countries as well. Table 2 shows that in our sample 
less developed countries in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) per 
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capita are more likely to have market share thresholds, but they are not 
necessarily higher or lower than in developed countries756. 
 
Nineteen out of 35 jurisdictions in the ICN survey use market 
share thresholds to assume dominance or safe harbours. Interestingly, 
some countries have a differentiated approach to thresholds for 
dominance, since they apply a lower benchmark for a rebuttable 
presumption and a higher mark for a non-rebuttable presumption (South 
Africa, Ukraine). The majority of jurisdictions that use safe harbours only 
have 'soft' safe harbours, because their presumption is rebuttable. 
 
                                                 
756
 Our sample consists of countries referred to in the ICN report, the UNCTAD 
model law, and one additional country. Two identical thresholds do not 
necessarily imply the same treatment, because some jurisdictions make them 
dependent on other conditions. 
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Table 2: Market share dominance 
Country 
Dominance 
presumption 
Safe 
harbours Country 
Dominance 
presumption 
Safe 
harbours 
Australia*   Lithuania** 40%  
Brazil* 20% 20% Mexico*   
Bulgaria* 35% 20% Mongolia** 50%  
Canada* 80% 35% Netherlands*   
Chile*   New Zealand*  20% 
Croatia*** 40%  Pakistan* 33%  
Czech 
Republic** 40%  Poland** 40%  
Estonia* 40%  Portugal** 40%  
EC*   Romania* 40%  
France*   Russia* 50% 20% 
Germany* 33%  Singapore*   
Hungary*  20% Slovakia*   
India*   South Africa* 45% n.a. 
Indonesia** 50%  Spain*   
Ireland*   Sweden* 40%  
Israel* 50%  Switzerland*   
Italy*   Turkey*   
Jamaica* 50%  Ukraine* 35% 35% 
Japan*   
United 
Kingdom*   
Republic of 
Korea* 50% 10% United States* 70% 50% 
Latvia*  40% Zambia**  40% 
 Data: *ICN (2007), **UNCTAD (2007), ***country legislation. 
 
 
Barriers to entry: 
 
Apart from market shares, dominance is also linked to the ease 
of entry and thus to the existence of entry barriers. Entry barriers make 
it more difficult for potential competitors, i.e. new firms or firms that are 
currently active in other markets, to enter the market under 
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consideration. Entry barriers can for example be legal barriers in the 
form of licences or structural in the form of high sunk costs that make 
entry either more costly or more risky757. If such barriers exist, the firms 
already in the market are protected from potential competition and thus 
enjoy more market power. Most agencies look not only at the theoretical 
possibility of entry, but also at whether entry is likely, timely and 
sufficient. Some respondents stated that barriers must be put into a 
dynamic perspective, where the changes in barriers are observed over 
time. 
 
Buyer power: 
The profitability of a firm is not only threatened by its 
competitors who take away its costumers, but also by the costumers 
themselves, because buyers bargain with the sellers to get lower prices. 
If the bargaining power of a buyer is high, for instance if there is only 
one buyer but many potential sellers, the sellers have to lower the price 
until it only covers costs758. 
 
The ICN survey shows that buyer power is one of the most 
important criteria for competition authorities in the assessment of 
dominance. The EC stressed that strong buyers can discipline the 
dominant seller if they actually switch to new entrants when the 
incumbent offers bad deals. In doing so, they ease the entry of new 
firms that are willing to sell at lower prices and therefore also benefit 
other, smaller, buyers. Competition authorities in developing countries 
should pay special attention to this, because small and poor buyers are 
likely to suffer from the abusive conduct by dominant firms. 
 
4.3.5. Market size and economies of scale 
 
Developing countries, and especially the least developed 
countries, are mostly characterized by a low GDP, which has important 
implications for competition policy. Due to economies of scale, firms 
must be of a certain size to be cost-efficient. Small markets naturally 
                                                 
757
 Sunk costs can arise when a firm must make an investment, e.g. in 
infrastructure, to enter a market, but cannot recoup the investment if the market 
entry fails. This is especially the case if the investment cannot be used for other 
purposes. 
758
 This is conceptualized in Porter’s five forces analysis. See Besanko (2003). 
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enable fewer firms to be large enough to produce at the efficient scale 
and consequently there will be higher levels of concentration in small 
economies. 
 
For some industries the domestic markets may be too small to 
allow even one firm to be efficient and if it does, the resulting monopoly 
is likely to be inefficient exactly because it is a monopoly759. Openness 
to trade is therefore crucial for such countries in order to enlarge their 
markets and allow their firms to exploit economies of scale760. It is 
argued that due to this need of openness to trade, small economies are 
likely to have lower barriers to entry and that higher levels of 
concentration on domestic markets should be tolerated761. However, 
small economies are not always open, and it is therefore necessary to 
make a distinction between open and isolated small economies. This 
also becomes clear in the ICN survey: "There was a general consensus 
among the respondents that if an economy is small and isolated from 
external trade, this may result in higher barriers to entry which could 
facilitate a finding of dominance or substantial market power. On the 
other hand, the presence of free-trade agreements can be seen as 
lowering an economy’s entry barriers to new or potential competition, 
and thus making the exercise of market power in the economy’s 
markets less likely."762. 
 
Most respondents agreed that in small economies the same 
type of criteria for the assessment of dominance is appropriate, but that 
the size of the economy significantly influences the outcome. They didn't 
agree on the question of whether small economies should generally 
assume dominance at lower or higher levels of concentration, which is 
not surprising in view of the argument made above that countries are 
not equally open to trade and therefore have different entry barriers. The 
necessity to take into account openness to trade when defining tolerable 
concentration levels shows that the appropriate level of concentration 
needs to be defined by each country individually and that the markets 
are defined correctly. 
                                                 
759
 Monopolies can for example be inefficient because they set prices too high or 
do not innovate enough. 
760
 Alesina et al. (2000). 
761
 The definition of the market is crucial here. When economies are open and 
their markets expand beyond their political borders, the market should be 
defined accordingly and concentration levels will be lower. 
762
 International Competition Network (ICN) (2007: 58). 
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4.3.6. Examples of dominance assessment in developed and 
developing countries and countries in transition 
 
Box 12: Examples of dominance assessment in developed and developing 
countries and countries in transition 
The presumption contained in the 1991 Law of the Czech Republic is 40%, which is 
also the case in Portugal and Poland. In the Czech Republic, provided that the other 
indicators mentioned in the Act do not show otherwise, a competitor or competitors 
with joint dominance that have not achieved the 40% market share in a given period 
are considered not to have a dominant position on a market. 
In Estonia, an undertaking in a dominant position is one that accounts for at least 40% 
of the turnover in the relevant market or whose position enables the undertaking to 
operate in the market to an appreciable extent independently of competitors, suppliers 
and buyers. Undertakings with special or exclusive rights or in control of essential 
facilities are also undertakings in a dominant position. 
Under Lithuanian law, a 40% market share establishes a presumption of dominance; 
in addition, the new law creates a presumption of joint dominance when the three 
largest firms in a market have a collective market share of 70%.  
Under Canadian law, it must be shown that the practice has had, is having or is likely 
to have the effect of preventing or lessening competition substantially. 
In Germany, the legislation contains several presumptions, namely: at least one 
enterprise has one-third of a certain type of goods or commercial service; three or 
fewer enterprises have a combined market share of 50% or more; five or fewer 
enterprises have a combined market share of two-thirds or over.  
In the “Akzo” Judgement, the Court of Justice of the European Communities 
considered that highly important parts (of the market) are by themselves, except 
for extraordinary circumstances, the sole proof of the existence of a dominant 
position. In the Michelin Judgement, the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities stated that under Article 82 of the EEC Treaty a dominant position 
refers to a situation of economic strength that gives the enterprise the power to 
obstruct the maintenance of effective competition in the market concerned because it 
allows the enterprise to conduct itself in a way that is independent from its 
competitors, clients and, finally, consumers. In addition to market shares, the 
structural advantages possessed by enterprises can be of decisive importance. For 
example, the Court of Justice of the European Communities in the United Brands 
Judgement took into account the fact that the undertaking possessed a high degree 
of vertical integration, that its advertising policy hinged on a specific brand (Chiquita), 
guaranteeing it a steady supply of customers and that it controlled every stage of the 
distribution process, which together gave the corporation a considerable advantage 
over its competitors. In consequence, dominance can derive from a combination of a 
number of factors, which, if taken separately, would not necessarily be 
determinative. 
In the United States, monopoly power is not defined by statute but courts have 
traditionally defined it as being “the power to control market prices or exclude 
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competition.” (United States v E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 US 377, 391 
(1956)). The market share is not the only factor considered in determining whether 
monopoly power exists. Other factors, such as the absence of entry barriers, may 
indicate that a firm does not have monopoly power even if it does account for a large 
share of the relevant market. 
The Indian Competition Act 2002 defines, ‘dominant position’ as a position of 
strength, enjoyed by an enterprise, in the relevant market, in India, which enables it 
to: (i) operate independently of competitive forces prevailing in the relevant market; or 
(ii) affect in its favour its competitors or consumers or the relevant market. The 
Competition Commission of India, while inquiring whether an enterprise enjoys a 
dominant position or not, has due regard to all or any of these factors. 
The legislations of Mongolia and the Ukraine consider that dominance exists when a 
single entity acting alone or a group of economic entities acting together account 
constantly for over 50% of supply to the market of a certain good or similar goods, 
products or carried out works and provided services. 
In Zambia, under Section 7 (2) of the Act, an enterprise is considered to be dominant 
if it has a level of market power that allows it to behave independently of competitive 
pressures (e.g. pricing and distribution strategies). An important but not conclusive 
factor in determining dominance is the share of the market that the undertaking has. 
An undertaking is unlikely to be dominant if its market share is less than 40% – 
although this rule will largely depend on the circumstances of the case.  
The Saudi Arabian Implementing Regulations on Competition Law state in Article 1 
that dominance exists where an entity or group of entities are in a position to influence 
the prevailing price through controlling a specific percentage of the total supply. A 
specific threshold is not mentioned. 
The Indonesian Competition Law (Law No. 5) defines dominance in Article 25 as a 
situation in which one business actor or a group of business actors controls over 50% 
of the market segment of a certain type of goods or services; or if two or three 
business actors or groups of business actors control over 75% of the market 
segment.  
The Competition Act of Trinidad and Tobago defines in Section 20 monopoly power in 
a market as a situation in which an enterprise, by itself or together with an 
interconnected body corporate, occupies a position of economic strength that will 
enable it to operate in the market without effective constraints from its competitors or 
potential competitors. The Act contains no threshold for the positive presumption 
of dominance, but states in Section 22 (2) that the Commission should not investigate 
cases unless it is satisfied that the enterprise controls 40% of the market or more or 
such percentage as the Minister may by order prescribe. This can be labelled as a 
"negative presumption". 
 
Source: UNCTAD: Model Law on Competition. UNCTAD Series on Issues in Competition Law and Policy. United 
Nations. New York and Geneva. 2007. 
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4.4. Examples of abusive practices 
 
Once dominance has been found, authorities need to 
investigate whether a certain conduct should be prohibited. The 
following are some examples from both developing and developed 
countries of practices that are considered abusive. 
 
4.4.1. Predatory pricing 
 
Box 13: Some examples of rules on predatory pricing from 
country legislations 
Hungary prohibits the setting of extremely low prices that are not based on 
greater efficiency in comparison with that of competitors and that are likely 
to drive out competitors from the relevant market or to hinder their market 
entry. 
The Law for Countering Unfair Competition in the People’s Republic of 
China states that an operator (i.e. enterprises or individuals) may not sell its 
or his or her goods at a price that is below the cost for the purpose of 
excluding its or his or her competitors. 
In the United States, the Supreme Court has held that two elements must be 
present in order to establish predatory pricing. First, the prices complained 
of must be “below an appropriate measure of cost”, and second, the 
competitor charging low prices must have a “dangerous probability” of 
recouping its investment in below-cost prices.1 The US Supreme Court has 
stated that it is important to distinguish between pro-competitive price 
cutting and anti-competitive predatory pricing because “cutting prices in 
order to increase business often is the very essence of competition”2. 
Predatory pricing is also prohibited in the European Community. The 
European Court of Justice defined in TetraPak3 that pricing is predatory if 
the price is set below the average variable costs4. 
1
 Brooke Group Ltd. v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. (1993). See also 
Cargill Inc. v Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 117 (1986). 
2
 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986). 
3
 Tetra Pak v Commission, [1996] ECR I-5951 (ECJ). 
4
 For the above see also UNCTAD: Model Law on Competition. UNCTAD Series on 
Issues in Competition Law and Policy. United Nations. New York and Geneva. 2007. 
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Box 14: Case 5 – Predatory pricing in the Zambian beer brewing 
industry 
On 8th June 2001, the Official agents of the Zambian Breweries lodged a 
complaint, with the Commission alleging that MetPress Zambia Limited, t/a 
Metro Wholesalers was wholesaling the Zambian Breweries “Mosi” and 
“Castle” clear beers at prices lower than the manufacturer’s, i.e. predatory 
pricing. This conduct was allegedly forcing members out of business. It was 
observed that the firm was actually taking over business in various parts of 
Lusaka. The complainants alleged further that the local distributors did not 
have the financial power to compete with such pricing strategies from Metro. 
Metro is part of the Metro Cash & Carry, which operates in at least 15 
countries. The conduct by Metro appeared to be in breach of Section 7(2)(a) 
of the Competition and Fair Trading Act (the Act), which requires enterprises 
to refrain from predatory behaviour towards competition including the use of 
cost pricing to eliminate competitors. 
Metro was a new entrant in the market and was growing at a fast rate aided 
by its below-cost pricing (which was used as a market penetration strategy). 
It purchased its clear beer from Zambian Breweries as did other distributors. 
However, it appeared that its selling price was below the purchase price and 
there appeared to be no objective justification for the conduct. Zambian 
Breweries confirmed that they had no unique “trade arrangement” with 
Metro. The selling price from Zambian Breweries was uniform. 
The Commission considered that while Metro was not a dominant player, its 
pricing strategies had an effect on the smaller distributors, hence the 
intervention. Although the Competition and Fair Trading Act provides that 
any form of price resale maintenance is anti-competitive it was in this 
situation found to be special to justify its continuity. A resale price 
maintenance was proposed (the “minimum price”) to avoid future breaches. 
As noted already, the business relies heavily on volume sales and small 
disparities in price can and do have significant effects on other players. The 
favourable credit period awarded to Metro by Zambian Breweries was 
ordered to be discontinued and or be extended to all the other distributors. 
Quoted from: UNCTAD: Review of Recent Experiences in the Formulation 
and Implementation of Competition Law and Policy in Selected Developing 
Countries: Thailand, Lao, Kenya, Zambia, Zimbabwe. United Nations. New 
York and Geneva. 2005. 
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Box 15: Case 6 – Abuse of dominance cases in Jamaica 
The FTC (…) considered, under the abuse of dominance provisions, three 
complaints regarding predatory pricing. In its decision regarding price 
reductions of Super Plus Food Store, it found that the list of items for 
promotion was limited and the duration of the sale was short such that 
predation did not occur. With regard to the allegation that Tank-Weld Metals 
Limited (TWM) was selling nails at predatory prices, it concluded that TWM 
was dominant but, except for one month, its prices were above average 
variable costs. It thus found there was no evidence of predation. The last 
case involves an advertisement by Telstar Cable Ltd. for three months of 
free cable service to subscribers who switch from another cable company 
within the month of December 1999. The FTC found that the pricing was not 
below costs and the duration of the offer was not long enough to have an 
appreciable effect on competition. 
 
Quoted from: UNCTAD: Voluntary Peer Review on Competition Policy: 
Jamaica. United Nations. New York and Geneva. 2005. 
FTC, Fair Trading Commission. 
 
 
 
4.4.2. Resale price maintenance 
 
Box 16: Some examples of rules on resale price maintenance from 
country legislations 
In the Swedish Competition Act, setting minimum prices that have an 
appreciable effect on competition is prevented through the prohibition of 
anti-competitive cooperation. An economic approach has been chosen 
concerning resale price maintenance 
In the United States, the Supreme Court has held that minimum resale price 
maintenance is per se illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, but there 
must be an actual agreement requiring the distributor to adhere to specific 
prices1. Because maximum resale price maintenance may lead to low 
prices, the Supreme Court has recently ruled that maximum resale price 
maintenance is not per se an offence. 
Resale price maintenance is also prohibited for example in India, New 
Zealand, the Republic of Korea, and the United Kingdom. 
In the European Community, fixing the resale price of goods is normally 
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prohibited if competition between Member States is affected.2 
1
 See Business Elecs. Corp. v Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 720, 724 
(1988). 
2
 For the above see UNCTAD: Model Law on Competition. UNCTAD Series 
on Issues in Competition Law and Policy. United Nations. New York and 
Geneva. 2007. 
 
 
 
Box 17: Case 7 – Carbonated soft drinks sector in Kenya 
The Minister of Finance directed the Commission to investigate the 
carbonated soft drinks sector, believing that it might feature one or more 
factors relating to unwarranted concentrations of economic power. The 
Minister had received complaints from other companies and was aware of 
the dominance of Coca Cola and its vertical integration with its bottling 
operations and its distributors. The Commission conducted an investigation 
that included interviews with the major players in the industry and a sample 
of 85 distributors. 
The investigation found that Section 23(1)(a) of the Act, which deals with the 
control of a chain of distributing units, the value of whose sales exceeds a 
third of the relevant market, was relevant to the activities of Coca Cola East 
Africa Limited. Section 23(1)(b), which concerns companies that control two 
or more physically distinct units that manufacture substantially similar 
products and that supply more than one-third of the value at ex-factory 
prices of the domestic market, applied to Coca Cola Holdings Limited. 
Finally, Section 23(1)(c), which applies to a person who has a beneficial 
interest exceeding 20% in a manufacturing enterprise and simultaneously 
has a beneficial interest in one or more wholesale or retail enterprises that 
distribute products of the manufacturing enterprise, is relevant to ICDC and 
Softa Bottling Company. 
During the investigation, several potential restrictive trade practices came to 
light and were addressed in a draft consent order. These included possible 
resale price maintenance, territorial allocation, exclusive dealership 
arrangements and tied selling. However, the Commission suspended its 
investigation under Section 23 when some of the complainants took the 
matter to the High Court. The High Court proceedings have not been 
concluded. 
Quoted from: UNCTAD: Voluntary Peer Review on Competition Policy: 
Kenya. New York and Geneva. 2005. 
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4.4.3. Exclusive dealing 
 
Box 18: Case 8 – Exclusive dealing arrangements in the poultry sector in 
Zambia 
During investigations into alleged cartel activities in the poultry industry in Zambia in 
1998, the Commission became aware that there existed restrictive business 
arrangements involving Hybrid Poultry Farm (HPF – a day-old chicks (DOCs) rearer 
with 60% market share then), Galunia Holdings Limited (GH – a commercial chicken 
broiler rearer), and Tamba Chicks (Tamba – a (DOCs) rearer with 30% market share 
then). ZCC advised the parties to notify the said exclusive agreements as required 
under the Competition and Fair Trading Act Cap 417 of the laws of Zambia. At the 
time, parallel investigations were launched on the sale of Tamba Chicks. GH 
management was interviewed. 
During the investigations it was revealed that in the sale of Mariandale Farm, which 
specializes in the raising of DOCs into table birds, HPF required GH to only purchase 
DOCs from itself. Further, GH was also required to consider HPF’s right of first refusal 
should it intend to resell Mariandale Farm. GH was also not allowed to raise any type 
of poultry, at the farm, apart from broiler chickens, including the provision not to go 
into the business of a chicken hatchery. The parties also agreed that GH should be 
accorded the right of first refusal should HPF intend to sell some of its shares and that 
HPF should be given the first right of refusal to participate in an outgrowers scheme 
should GH come up with one. The ZCC noted that the parties to this transaction are 
the two leading players in the poultry sector’s upstream (HPF) and downstream (GH) 
subsectors. HPF is the dominant producer of DOCs in Zambia with a 60% market 
share. GH with its Mariandale and Diamondale Farms has an uptake of 48,000 DOC 
per week and hence is the largest buyer in the poultry sector. 
The exclusive dealing arrangements appear to have been over and above the offers 
each party made and hence the considerations made by the other. The excesses 
hinge on the ulterior motives of the parties in as far as the poultry sector is concerned. 
The parties seem to have taken advantage of their dominant market positions 
upstream and downstream – where each party was dominant. The parties were, both 
by motive and concerted practices, foreclosing competition both in the DOCs, table 
birds (broiler) and frozen chicken markets.  
These practices were in direct contravention of Section 7 of the Act and have the 
tenets of distractive cartel behaviour. The Board of Commissioners found all the 
exclusive dealing provisions in the sale and purchase agreements by the parties anti-
competitive and nullified them.  
UNCTAD: Review of Recent Experiences in the Formulation and Implementation of Competition Law and Policy in 
Selected Developing Countries: Thailand, Lao, Kenya, Zambia, Zimbabwe. United Nations. New York and 
Geneva. 2005. 
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4.5. State-created monopolies and national champions 
4.5.1. Sectors with state-created monopolies 
 
In many countries certain companies derive their dominant 
position from government support or are even publicly owned 
enterprises. The ICN report identified postal services, lottery, airports, 
and commodities as the most frequent sectors where monopolies have 
been created by the government763. Table 3 shows that both developing 
and developed countries have such sectors764. 
 
 
Table 3: Sectors with state-created monopolies 
Sector Countries 
Postal services Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech 
Republic, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Jamaica, 
Japan, Jersey, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, 
Slovak Republic, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, UK, 
US 
Lottery Brazil, France, Germany, Hungary, New Zealand, 
Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Turkey 
Airports/Airport infrastructure Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Jersey, 
Spain, UK 
Commodity Australia (rice, wheat, sugar, barley), Canada 
(wheat), Pakistan (rice), Turkey (opium) 
Ports Jamaica, Jersey, Israel, Pakistan, Spain, UK, 
Turkey 
Insurance France (insurance companies in social services), 
Germany (social insurances), New Zealand 
(accident), Pakistan 
Airlines  Jamaica, Israel, Pakistan, Spain, Turkey 
Public transport  Australia, Chile, France, Jamaica 
Highways  Brazil, France, Russia 
Tobacco  France (retail trade), Spain, Turkey 
Mining  Chile, Serbia, Turkey 
Alcohol retailing  Sweden 
Alcohol products  Turkey 
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 International Competition Network (ICN) (2007: 64). This report only covers 
state-created monopolies, not natural monopolies. 
764
 The table provides a non-exhaustive list of sectors where state-created 
monopolies existed or still exist. 
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Table 3: Sectors with state-created monopolies 
Sector Countries 
Hospitals  Germany 
Pharmaceuticals  Sweden 
TV/Radio centres  Russia 
Motor industry/automobile 
production Serbia 
Table from ICN (2007). 
 
4.5.2. Objectives of creating monopolies by the state 
 
These monopolies were usually created by governments in 
order to fulfil a public service mission or to play an active role in 
coordinating the economy instead of relying on free markets. Table 4 
provides a non-exhaustive list of the objectives that the various 
jurisdictions stated. 
 
 
Table 4: Objectives of creating monopolies by the state 
Objective Country 
Public service obligations ensuring citizens have 
access to important/essential services  
Australia, Czech Republic, 
France, Germany, Hungary, 
Japan, Republic of Korea, 
Serbia, UK, US 
The state made necessary investments in 
infrastructure and important sectors as part of a 
previous economic policy based on import 
substitution  
Brazil, Turkey 
Safety standards  Switzerland 
In order to align with the recommendations of the 
European Commission  
Czech Republic 
Prevent illegal gambling and ban excessive gaming 
incentives and exclude commercial profit-making 
purposes  
Germany, Hungary 
Marketing in an orderly manner grain grown and 
leveraging the size to obtain the highest price  
Canada 
Operation of state liquor monopolies in order to 
prevent over-consumption by limiting economic 
incentives for liquor sales  
US 
Public safety in taxi cab monopolies  US 
 614 
Table 4: Objectives of creating monopolies by the state 
Objective Country 
Public interest: government intervention is 
warranted if the private sector fails to produce the 
desired outcome  
Netherlands 
Insuring traffic security in air, space, naval 
transportation; meteorological service, including its 
satellite component  
Russia 
Table from ICN (2007). 
 
Public service missions may be particularly important in 
developing countries that face problems of severe poverty and lack of 
infrastructure. Governments in such situations may find it more often 
necessary to create or hold ownership of firms that fulfil these public 
service missions, but at the same they should keep restrictions on 
competition as low as possible. 
 
4.5.3. Natural monopolies and state-created monopolies 
 
In some industries, state intervention is due to natural 
monopolies that arise because the market size and the cost structure of 
production allow a monopoly to produce more efficiently than if 
production was split among several firms. The market failure is evident 
in this case because the resulting monopoly position will lead to 
inefficiencies and therefore regulation is needed. Where a monopoly is 
accepted (and possibly regulated) for such reasons, it is crucial to define 
the market correctly in the vertical dimension. For example, if 
economies of scale are highly important in the distribution, but not so 
much so in the production, then it has to be ensured that a distribution 
monopoly is not allowed to vertically integrate into production. A 
possible solution is the approach of the European Commission that 
intends to split the production and distribution of energy765. 
 
4.5.4. National champions 
 
Section 4.5.2 has shown that there are also industries without a 
natural monopoly justification, but where the state still intervenes and 
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 European Commission (2007a). 
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creates a monopoly in order to reach other political or economic goals. 
One such goal can be the creation or protection of ‘national champions’. 
This is subject to a lot of debate and is often related to the infant-
industry argument for developing countries. Those in favour of such 
protection argue that certain national firms must – at least for a certain 
period – be protected in order to become internationally competitive. It is 
often suggested that firms with small domestic markets have a 
disadvantage because they cannot exploit economies of scale and that 
they should be protected until they reach the critical size that allows 
them to compete globally against firms with larger home markets. A 
second argument is that some sectors are strategically important or that 
they produce positive externalities – such as innovation spillovers or 
supply capacities – on other sectors. One counter-argument is that 
competition on domestic markets is the best condition for firms to 
become internationally competitive, because they are forced to be 
innovative in order to succeed. Having incentives to become competitive 
is likely to be more important for productivity and growth than only 
having the ability to do so based on government protection. Secondly, it 
is difficult for governments to choose the sectors and firms that may 
deserve protection. In particular those firms that already receive support 
are likely to use their influence to get government assistance. Thirdly, 
the support that one country gives to its national champions generates 
pressure on other countries to also support their businesses. If every 
national champion receives support from its government, the relative 
positions between these firms remain the same, but resources are lost 
at the expense of private citizens and consumers. When all this is taken 
together, it becomes clear that the risks and costs that the support of 
national champions involves are often greater than the benefits766. 
 
4.5.5. Competition policy in sectors with state-created monopolies 
 
In some jurisdictions actions of public companies are exempted 
under a state action doctrine, others treat public companies as they 
would privately owned entities. The special treatment of public 
enterprises is usually justified by the ‘public service mission’. In these 
cases, the powers of competition authorities are often limited to 
advocacy activities and other ‘soft’ enforcement tools767. 
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 Paul A. Geroski: Competition Policy and National Champions. March 2005. 
767
 International Competition Network (ICN) (2007: 87). 
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Box 19: Case 9 – Preliminary probe into allegation of abuse of 
dominant position in the steel sheet industry in Thailand 
In 2002, there was a complaint lodged by end-users of steel sheet products 
that the alleged party and its wholesalers raised the price of their hot-rolled 
steel sheet every week and certain hot-rolled steel sheet products were not 
available on the market. Those end-users who tried to import such products 
were threatened by the alleged party that the supply would be cut off. The 
investigations conducted by the officials at the office of the Competition 
Commission revealed that the alleged party distributed its steel sheet 
through three channels. The first one was through its distributors (12%). The 
second one was through wholesalers (26%) and the third one was the direct 
sale to end-users (62%). During August 2002-December 2000, the alleged 
party adjusted its price up and down below the controlled-price ceiling (steel 
sheet is a “controlled product” under the Price Control Act of 1999). The 
price adjustment of the alleged party led its distributors, wholesalers, to do 
the same thing. The officials concluded that the price adjustment conduct of 
the alleged party did not violate the Price Control Act of 1999 because the 
price was below the controlled-price ceiling for steel sheet. Also, there was 
no evidence to support the allegation of abuse of market dominance by 
setting an unjustly high price. 
Quoted from: UNCTAD: Review of Recent Experiences in the Formulation and Implementation of 
Competition Law and Policy in Selected Developing Countries: Thailand, Lao, Kenya, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe. United Nations. New York and Geneva. 2005. 
 
 
 
Most agencies stated that they determine dominance in the 
same way as for privately owned and managed firms. The past has 
shown a tendency towards privatization and liberalization to foster 
efficiency and competition, which is implemented either by a general 
privatization law or by a sector-specific law. During privatization, 
competition authorities should have an advocacy role to ensure that the 
markets work properly after the privatization. For this advocacy to be 
effective, the competition authorities should be in a position to give 
binding recommendations in defined areas. 
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5. Best practices from the US–EU discussion regarding 
abuse of dominance 
 
While other areas of competition law have experienced 
significant convergence, rules on unilateral conduct differ considerably 
across jurisdictions768. The EU and the US are good examples of this as 
is illustrated by the diverging Microsoft rulings in the two jurisdictions769. 
 
5.1. Objectives and criteria of unilateral conduct laws in the 
US and the EU 
 
Almost all countries in the ICN report agree that ensuring an 
effective competitive process is an important goal or means to achieve 
other goals770. The survey also showed that the EU and the US have 
almost the same objectives (the EU has the additional objective to 
'achieve market integration'). Even the list of criteria used for assessing 
dominance seems similar, with the EU using two additional criteria 'high 
prices' and 'profits of the firm' which the US does not use. However, 
when asked what the most important criteria are, significant differences 
are revealed between the US and the EU In the EU, 'market share', 
'barriers to entry', 'market position and behaviour of competitors' and 
'buyer power' are very important, but the US authorities mention none of 
these criteria as the most important one and focus instead on consumer 
harm. The first conclusion therefore is that both jurisdictions say that 
they pursue the same goals but use different approaches to reach them. 
These differences may be justified not only due to the historic and 
political context, but also because of different business environments771. 
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 Vickers (2007). 
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 United States v Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) and Microsoft v 
Commission, T-201/04 [2007]. 
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 International Competition Network (ICN) (2007). See also Section 4.3, which 
concerns the assessment of dominance. 
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 Well-developed capital markets provide an example for this. It is more 
accurate to trust in the well functioning of competition if access to capital is 
relatively easy because it enables the creation and expansion of firms that can 
enter into the market. See Anderson and Heimler (2007: 71). 
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Table 5 illustrates the features that the US and EU laws have in 
common and where they differ:772 
 
 
Table 5: Differing features of US and EU unilateral conduct laws 
EU (Article 82 EC) US (Sherman Act Section 2) 
"Access-to-markets principle" 
• Contestability of 
monopolized markets 
• Fear of blockage of markets 
"Non-intervention principle" 
• Privilege to single-firm 
action 
• Fear of false positives 
5.2. Harm to competition vs harm to competitors 
 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty prohibits the abuse of a dominant 
position. The authorities have to establish that a dominant position 
exists and that there is anti-competitive conduct. The counterpart in the 
US is Section 2 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits the monopolization 
and attempts to monopolize. There is a different approach to dominance 
in the US, because it is not the existence of dominance that requires the 
dominant firm to refrain from an anti-competitive conduct, but the anti-
competitive attempt to create or maintain this position, which is 
forbidden by Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Hence, there must be a 
causal link from the anti-competitive conduct to market power773. 
 
The legal standards in the two jurisdictions differ considerably, 
but how much their approaches differ in practice depends crucially on 
how the terms are defined and interpreted. Harm to the competitive 
process for example is prohibited in the EU because it is assumed that 
the outcome of a sound competitive process is generally favourable to 
consumers. But harm to the competition process such as from 
foreclosure may also involve a strengthening or creation of a dominant 
position and consumers may be hurt directly, which are the necessary 
conditions in the US, so that the two standards may overlap in many 
respects. 
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 The following discussion is based on Fox (2003: 149 et seqq., 2006a). 
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 Vickers (2005: 247).  
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5.2.1. The US view 
 
The US Supreme Court followed the view of the US Department 
of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission that Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act is not an abuse of dominance law. Even monopolists who 
control a facility that competitors need have no duty other than to refrain 
from increasing their monopoly power by anti-competitive means. They 
have no duty of refraining from leveraging their market power in other 
markets, of fair dealing, or of providing a level playing field to 
competitors774. The framework that the US authorities follow is based on 
the harm to consumers and this harm is only expected when either 
prices increase or output decreases. If this is not the case, the unilateral 
conduct by a firm is said to only hurt competitors, not competition. 
Behaviour that increases efficiency and thereby benefits consumers is 
not prohibited by Section 2 even if that behaviour harms the competition 
process775. In the US Microsoft case, the Court of Appeals had to decide 
whether Microsoft had unlawfully tied its web browser to its operation 
system776. The Court of Appeals rejected the ruling of the lower court 
that had found the tying per se illegal and it demanded from the lower 
court a rule of reason evaluation that shows the anti-competitive effect. 
The Court of Appeals would probably require a showing that the tying 
increased or maintained the monopoly in the operating system market 
or that it decreased output and therefore directly harmed consumers777. 
This illustrates that even if a monopolist significantly suppresses the 
chances of competitors, the conduct is not necessarily illegal in the US 
The next section will show that in the EU, on the other hand, such 
conduct is likely to be illegal. 
 
 
                                                 
774
 Fox (2006b: 69). Leveraging market power means that the dominant position 
in one market is used to exercise power in a related market. For example, a firm 
that has market power in one market can tie its product for this market to a 
product that it sells in another market where it initially does not have market 
power. 
775
 Bloch et al. (2005: 331). 
776
 United States v Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). For a description of 
the case, see Motta (2004: 511). The case not only involved tying, but also 
monopolization and attempted monopolization. 
777
 Fox (2006a: 737). 
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5.2.2. The EU view 
 
Article 82 EC prohibits all conduct that is covered by the 
Sherman Act Section 2 and in addition covers conduct by dominant 
firms that is not increasing market power. In the EU, dominant firms 
have the special duty not to exclude competitors by anti-competitive 
means, because it is assumed that a conduct that excludes firms from 
competing may harm the competition process778. This can be explained 
by the 'access-to-markets principle' mentioned above and is illustrated 
in Table 6. Harm to the competition process refers to situations where 
the behaviour of a firm reduces the intensity of competition, for example 
by putting constraints on the entry of new competitors, but does not 
have an immediate effect on consumers by limiting output or raising 
prices. 
 
Table 6: The EU vs. US view 
Harm to Competition Harm to 
Competitors 
(Outcome) 
Business conduct 
limits output, raises 
prices 
(Process) 
Business conduct 
unnecessarily blocks 
competition on the 
merits 
Efficient business 
conduct hurts 
competitors. 
Enforcement 
against this conduct 
will protect 
competitors and 
harm consumers. 
Table based on Fox (2006b). 
 
In a recent ruling, the European Court of First Instance 
considered the tying of the Windows Media Player to the Windows 
operating software779. The court found that Microsoft had foreclosed 
competition because other providers of media players could not 
compete on the merits and that Microsoft had tied the two products 
without objective justification. The diverse decision of the Microsoft case 
                                                 
778
 This is expressed in the case law of the European courts, but there is 
currently a discussion about a re-orientation of the European rules in the sense 
of a ‘more economic approach’. See Dreher and Adam (2006: 259 et seqq., 
2007). 
779
 Microsoft v Commission, T-201/04 [2007]. The case also involved the refusal 
to supply interoperability information. 
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in the US and the EU are illustrated in Table 6. The US authorities tend 
to assume that if a conduct does not directly harm consumers, it is only 
harmful to competitors, not to competition. Harm to the competition 
process is not investigated if there is no harm to consumers. The 
European authorities on the other hand are concerned with the 
foreclosure of markets and thus harm to the competition process. But 
harm to the competition process is difficult to distinguish from harm to 
competitors and there is a risk that they unnecessarily prohibit a conduct 
that is not harmful. 
 
5.2.3. Identifying harmful conduct 
 
The US courts and agencies assume that this probability of 
error is high because they consider it to be difficult to distinguish 
conduct that is harmful to the competition process from conduct that 
only hurts competitors. Furthermore, they assume the damage of over-
enforcement to be greater than that of under-enforcement and are more 
sceptical towards the capabilities of enforcement agencies780. Their 
approach is therefore mainly a fear of false positives (incorrectly 
prohibiting conduct that belongs to the right-hand column of Table 6) 
and they do not consider harm to the competition process (i.e. assume it 
to be within the right-hand column of Table 6). The follow-up question is 
whether this leads to too many false negatives, because if cases of 
harm to the competition process are frequent, firms are allowed to 
behave anti-competitively. This shows the differences between the 
approaches in the two jurisdictions. The US law gives preference to 
single-firm action and not to possible harm to the competition process, 
because it considers it difficult to distinguish it from not harmful conduct. 
The EU law privileges the contestability of markets and thus investigates 
cases where markets are blocked. As pointed out above, the divide 
between the two jurisdictions is also due to differing assumptions about 
the consequences of considering or not considering a conduct. A 
possible answer would be a more detailed analysis of cases in the 
middle column of Table 6, i.e. those that concern the competition 
process781. Empirical work should be done to assess the effects of 
                                                 
780
 Kovacic (2007: 70). 
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 Fox (2006b: 76). 
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exclusionary practices and to quantify the dynamic losses from harm to 
the competition process782. 
 
Other competition authorities are more likely to be successful in 
the implementation and application of abuse of dominance laws when 
they are aware of the various possible conducts and their impacts in 
their country-specific context. Instead of following one of the approaches 
discussed above, competition authorities in developing countries should 
assess the consequences of, for example, considering or not 
considering harm to the competition process. If they choose to consider 
such cases, it will need more resources and may in some cases result in 
the prohibition of conduct that is not harmful. On the other hand, not 
considering them will allow certain dominant firms to foreclose the 
market and thus increase inequality, which may have particularly 
negative consequences in developing countries. Knowing the actual 
impact of these cases on the economy helps to find the optimal balance 
between the advantages and disadvantages of different approaches and 
legal standards. 
 
5.3. Assessing error costs of competition enforcement 
 
A possible approach to analyse the impact on the economy is 
an empirical assessment that estimates the error costs and the 
probability of errors based on the analysis of past cases783. Table 7 
illustrates schematically the types of errors that can be made. One type 
of error is to declare a practice that is actually not harmful to competition 
to be illegal (dark grey). The other type is to declare a conduct that is 
harmful to competition as legal (light grey). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
782
 This is another question addressed by a study on the quantitative effects of 
anti-competitive practices in developing countries, which is currently being 
undertaken by UNCTAD. 
783
 Kovacic (2007: 71). Such an error-cost framework must constantly be 
updated to take into account that the investigation techniques of the authorities 
are improving and the economic environment changing. 
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Table 7: Error costs of competition enforcement 
 
Harm to Competition 
 (should be illegal) 
Harm to Competitors  
(should be legal) 
Declared 
illegal 
Correctly prohibit conduct that 
harms competition 
Incorrectly prohibit conduct 
that does not harm 
competition, but only 
competitors 
Declared 
legal 
Incorrectly allow conduct that 
harms competition 
Correctly allow conduct that 
doesn't harm competition, but 
only competitors 
Table based on Evans and Padilla (2004) 784 
 
 
Evidence about the probability that a certain conduct is 
assessed incorrectly should be provided. Together with the costs of 
each incorrectly decided case, these probabilities provide evidence on 
the accuracy of the present law and can give guidance on what changes 
should be made, because it will give competition authorities as well as 
policy makers a better picture of the economic reality in their jurisdiction. 
An illustrative example is the use of market share thresholds. Once 
authorities know how likely and costly it is to incorrectly find or not find 
dominance with the current standard, they know if they should change 
the threshold or use more behavioural criteria. Other costs, such as 
increased inequality, social instability, etc., should also be given a 
weight and be included in the framework. This will allow basing the legal 
standards on empirical evidence, but it will also increase the capacity of 
less experienced authorities and courts to use economic analysis in the 
decision making in future cases and therefore advance their 
competence and lead to convergence in the approaches between 
countries. It is clearly a demanding exercise and the lack of accurate 
data will form an obstacle to many jurisdictions, especially in developing 
countries. However, the discussion above showed that the benefits are 
likely to be significant and competence in the application of economic 
analysis is increasingly an essential skill for the competition authorities. 
 
                                                 
784Evans and Padilla (2004). 
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6. Recommendations  
 
Abuse of dominance refers to cases in which a firm has a 
dominant position and then engages in a harmful conduct. It is related to 
the concept of unilateral conduct, which focuses on single-firm action 
and its potential anti-competitive effects, including the creation or 
strengthening of dominance, but does not require a prior existence of a 
dominant position. Abuse of dominance can be seen as an approach 
that uses the criterion of dominance as a filter to only analyse cases in 
which harmful effects are likely, because it is assumed that only 
dominant firms can engage in such conduct or that the conduct is only 
harmful if entered into by a dominant firm. 
 
To find dominance, the relevant market first has to be defined. 
One problem here is that the often-used criterion 'willingness of the 
consumer to switch to other products' (substitution) is biased by the 
firm’s conduct, which has already taken place and possibly allowed the 
sellers to set prices above the competitive level. Consumers who are 
then faced with an even further price increase might easily be willing to 
switch to other suppliers. When this criterion is used for the market 
definition, then the suppliers to which consumers switch are included in 
the relevant market under consideration because it is assumed that 
these producers sell close substitutes. But actually the switch to other 
suppliers is due to the fact that the price of the original product is 
already too high. The relevant market is then defined too broadly and 
other criteria, which focus more on product characteristics, have to be 
given more weight. On the basis of the market definition, it needs to be 
established that a dominant position exists. This assessment includes 
the analysis of market shares, entry barriers, position of competitors, 
vertical integration, economies of scale, buyer power, and access to 
infrastructure. 
 
The second element of abuse of dominance is the abusive 
conduct. There are generally two types of abusive conduct: exploitive 
conduct and exclusionary conduct. The former refers to cases where 
firms charge excessively high prices from its customers, pay low prices 
to suppliers, or discriminate among consumers. The latter refers to 
cases where firms suppress competition by refusing to deal, engaging in 
predatory pricing or raising costs of entry in order to exclude competitors 
from the market and thus to create or strengthen a dominant position. 
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The difficulty here is that the same conduct may be harmful or efficient, 
depending on the individual case. 
 
After looking at what abuse of dominance is and how it is 
approached in theory, we turned to the role of laws on abuse of 
dominance in developing countries. Such laws have to find a balance 
between three objectives: ensuring enough competition between firms in 
order to force them to be efficient, allowing a certain degree of 
profitability so that they have incentives to invest and innovate, and 
achieving an equal distribution of wealth and business opportunities 
among different parts of the society. While the discussion in developed 
countries focuses on the first two aspects in order to maximize 
innovation and growth, developing countries may also want to consider 
the third dimension and include the reduction of inequality and poverty 
in their objectives. But even the relationship between the first two 
aspects tends to be different in developing countries than in other 
regions, because they depend on factors that differ between developing 
and developed countries. 
 
Firstly, since developing economies often have smaller markets 
and therefore a lower equilibrium number of firms that can exploit 
economies of scale and operate efficiently, it is more likely that one finds 
more concentrated national markets. One argument is that smaller 
markets allow fewer firms to operate efficiently and that higher 
concentration should therefore be accepted. The opposite view is that 
since small economies are more vulnerable to abuse of dominance, a 
stricter approach should be followed. The optimal solution differs from 
one country to another, because it depends on a number of individual 
characteristics such as barriers to entry. A stricter approach prevents 
high levels of concentration and this may be more accurate in cases 
where barriers to entry are high and where the economies are isolated 
from international trade. But this approach would have significant 
disadvantages for open economies with low barriers to entry if the 
market was not defined accordingly, because it can prevent firms from 
reaching an efficient size. Each country therefore must choose the 
optimal approach and define the relevant markets according to its 
situation. In general, in developing countries there are higher barriers to 
entry, less developed capital markets and more information asymmetry, 
which make the good functioning of competition more difficult than in 
developed countries. 
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Secondly, large firms play a different role regarding their 
investment activity in developing countries than they do in more 
developed economies. Established and possibly dominant firms can be 
important for less developed economies to have a sufficiently high level 
of investment in production. Long-term relationships and profitability 
make it easier for incumbent firms to invest. If there was fierce 
competition with constantly new firms entering the market and 
established, but less efficient ones leaving it, then the currently existing 
firms would not be able or willing to make sufficient investments. The 
dominant positions may have a negative impact on innovation, but since 
less developed countries generally operate in sectors with less 
advanced technology, they can use existing technology and innovation 
is not as important for them. Therefore, it may be less important for 
them to have the most innovative and efficient firms, but rather to have 
large incumbent firms that can make investments more easily. In less 
developed economies, the benefits of increased investments are more 
likely to outweigh efficiency losses that arise from a dominant position, 
because investments in production are relatively more important. As 
economies become more developed, it is increasingly crucial that the 
competition process selects those firms that are the most efficient and 
innovative. Countries therefore need to switch out of the more protective 
setting at the right time and expose their firms to more competition. 
 
A related issue concerns investment in infrastructure. A 
government may not have sufficient resources to make investments in 
infrastructure and therefore may allow private firms to exercise a 
monopoly position in markets such as port, airport, or even road 
infrastructure. If the infrastructure is an essential facility for other 
enterprises, this firm has the power to exclude competitors or demand 
high prices. There needs to be a balance between the firm’s incentives 
to invest and efficiency losses. It must be carefully assessed for what 
sectors the monopoly is allowed, how broad it needs to be, for what 
period it should be granted, and if concessions can be renegotiated after 
a certain time or situation. 
 
Thirdly, distributional aspects may be important for developing 
countries. Smaller firms, which often represent poorer parts of society, 
may have to be given a better chance to compete against large 
dominant firms. Enforcement against exclusionary practices of dominant 
firms may therefore have to be fiercer. Competition law can be used for 
such public interest issues, but it is crucial that the law gives clear 
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guidance on how these objectives should be balanced against other 
objectives such as efficiency. Comparing this to the investment 
argument above shows that there are justifications for more but also for 
less strict standards in developing countries. These justifications 
naturally contradict each other and therefore necessitate a sound 
balance. 
 
After analysing the role of abuse of dominance laws in 
developing countries, we took a broader perspective and compared the 
approaches to abuse of dominance across a number of developed and 
developing countries. A survey by the ICN investigated the differences 
between countries regarding the objectives of unilateral conduct laws 
and the assessment of dominance. It found that 'effective competitive 
process' and 'consumer welfare' are objectives that almost all 
jurisdictions share. There are, however, considerable differences in 
other objectives such as 'ensuring a level playing field' and ‘promote 
fairness and equality’. 
 
The assessment of dominance is very much based on the 
criteria mentioned above. Most countries rank 'market shares of the firm 
and its competitors' and 'barriers to entry or expansion' among the most 
important criteria. These criteria are structural criteria, because they do 
not directly look at the firms’ behaviour, but at the market structures that 
influence their behaviour. The use of more structural criteria has the 
advantage of giving more clear-cut rules, which may be important 
particularly for developing countries and less experienced competition 
authorities. But even apparently clear rules such as market share 
thresholds for the assessment of dominance can make demanding 
case-specific analysis such as market definition necessary. 
 
Developing countries often look at the situation in developed 
countries for possible ways to design their own competition laws. 
Examples could be the US or the EU, but particularly in the area of 
abuse of dominance, these two jurisdictions differ significantly. It is 
therefore beneficial to look at the differences in the two approaches in 
order to derive some lessons for developing countries. The first 
difference is that in the US Section 2 of the Sherman Act is not regarded 
as an abuse of dominance law, but as a unilateral conduct law. It does 
not always require a prior existence of a dominant position, but there 
has to be a causal link from the conduct to the creation or maintenance 
of a dominant position. A second difference is that the EU law wants to 
protect the competition process, while the US law only intervenes when 
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there is direct harm to consumers. The legal standards in the two 
jurisdictions differ considerably, but how much their approaches differ in 
practice depends crucially on how the above-mentioned terms are 
defined and interpreted. Harm to the competition process for example is 
prohibited in the EU because it is assumed that the outcome of a sound 
competition process is generally favourable to consumers. But the harm 
to the competition process may also involve a strengthening or creation 
of a dominant position and consumers may be hurt directly, which are 
the necessary conditions in the US, so that the two standards overlap in 
many respects. A reason for the disparity are differing assumptions 
about what types of conduct are harmful and how difficult it is to 
differentiate them from other conduct. The 'access to market principle' of 
the EU probably arises from the assumption that impediment to this 
access is severe and that it can be distinguished from other, not 
harmful, conduct. On the other hand, the 'non intervention principle' of 
the US is rather based on the assumption that the distinction of such 
conduct is difficult, that there is great danger of prohibiting behaviour 
that is not harmful, and that the unnecessary prohibition of efficient 
conduct is severe. One conclusion from the comparison is that such 
assumptions should be analysed and be grounded on the economic 
reality. How likely and severe errors of competition authorities are can, 
for example, be assessed in an analysis of past decisions and their 
effects on the economy. The impact of decisions should be assessed ex 
post in order to know if the rules need to be revised. The resulting 
country-specific error-cost framework can be an important input for 
competition authorities in developing countries, because it allows basing 
the rules on empirical evidence. Support of competition authorities in 
analysing their own cases and their impacts would therefore be 
valuable. 
 
The insights from quantitative analysis are also crucial for 
finding a sound balance between the different objectives of competition 
policy. For example, incentives to innovate arise from the possibility to 
make profit and therefore depend to some extent on dominance, but this 
must be weighted inter alia against price increases by dominant firms. A 
second example is that developing countries often also have to consider 
distributional aspects of laws on abuse of dominance and therefore 
need to assess whether there exists a trade-off with efficiency 
considerations. Quantitative analysis will help competition authorities to 
understand the economic and political context in which their decisions 
and rules take place. 
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STRIKING A BALANCE BETWEEN COMPETITION LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AND PATENT POLICY: A DEVELOPING 
COUNTRY’S PERSPECTIVE 
Thomas K. Cheng* 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The intersection of competition law and intellectual property 
rights (IPRs) is one of the most complex areas of competition law785. 
These two areas of law share a potentially conflicting relationship, as 
competition law restricts the abuse of substantial market power while 
IPRs may confer market power. Commentators in developed countries 
have proposed various ways to resolve this conflict. Some of them give 
primacy to competition law, while others emphasize the importance of 
protecting IPRs786. Yet some others advocate solutions that require 
balancing the policy considerations underpinning these two bodies of 
law, while scholarship from developed countries is didactic on how 
developing countries should resolve this conflict1. In a well-known article 
in 1984, Louis Kaplow proposed a complex analytical framework for 
balancing the conflicting policy goals of competition law and patent 
policy. (See generally Kaplow, supra note 785.) Developing countries 
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Singapore for inviting him to New York to attend the Asian IP Law & Policy Day 
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 Kaplow characterizes the intersection of competition law and patent law in 
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Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1815–16 (1984). 
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must be mindful of their own unique policy considerations. The main 
justification for protecting IPRs, especially patents, is to generate 
incentives to innovate. This justification is persuasive in developed 
countries, where most of the potential inventors in the world are located. 
It carries much less weight in developing countries, most of which 
possess limited capacity to innovate. In resolving the conflict between 
competition law and IPRs, developing countries must recalibrate the 
balance struck by developed countries.  
 
Although all the major IPRs grant their owners some proprietary 
rights, the focus of this research is primarily on patents. Of the three 
major types of IPR — patents, copyrights and trademarks — patents 
grant the strongest protection. A patent gives a patentee the exclusive 
right of exploitation, which entitles the patentee to exclude others from 
copying or commercializing an invention that falls within the scope of the 
patent. Patents are also more likely than copyrights and trademarks to 
endow their owners with substantial market power. As will be discussed 
in greater detail later, whether an IPR creates market power, and hence 
potentially raises competition law issues, crucially depends on the 
availability of substitutes for the product incorporating the protected 
intellectual property787. In the absence of substitutes, the producer of 
such a product will wield substantial market power. An example will 
illustrate this point. Assume that a patentee has obtained a patent on a 
new drug that cures a rare disease. The patented drug is currently the 
only cure for that disease. Under these circumstances, the patentee will 
possess substantial market power in the market for treatment for that 
rare disease. In practice, it is not altogether rare for a patented 
technology to be the only one capable of performing a certain function 
or possessing a unique quality desired by consumers. Patent protection 
of such a technology would create market power and raise competition 
law issues.  
 
In comparison, with the exception of software copyrights, 
copyrights are less likely to create substantial market power788. This is 
                                                 
787
 The focus here is on competition law issues in product markets incorporating 
intellectual property, and not on technology markets and innovation markets. 
While the latter two are undoubtedly important, the economics literature and 
legal thinking on them still remain to be developed. Moreover, these two types of 
markets are likely to have less salience for developing countries.  
788
 In many ways, software is different from other types of materials that are 
copyrightable in that software is mostly valued for its functionalities and not its 
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due to the fact that copyrights offer a narrower scope of protection789. 
While a patent prohibits an unauthorized third party from replicating a 
protected technology, even if that is done with no assistance from the 
patentee or with no knowledge of the patentee’s know-how, copyright 
protection poses no bar to independent creation of protected content. 
Copyright law merely prohibits a third party from copying and 
reproducing the content created by the copyright holder. Moreover, 
copyright-protected materials rarely constitute the only product in a 
relevant market. Even in the case of most popular fiction, a novel such 
as The Da Vinci Code is but one of many popular adult thriller novels in 
the market. If the price of The Da Vinci Code doubled, some readers 
might switch to other novels, or to other forms of entertainment, such as 
films or music, altogether.  
 
Trademarks are similarly unlikely to give rise to substantial 
market power. A trademark rarely possesses such unique qualities that 
it faces no competition from other trademarks. It is important to 
distinguish between the substitutability of the trademark and that of the 
underlying product. One may argue that a desktop computer operating 
system bearing the Microsoft mark has few meaningful substitutes. 
However, it is the underlying product of a desktop computer operating 
system, not the Microsoft mark that lacks substitutes. Presumably, if 
Windows were manufactured by, say, Sun Microsystems instead of 
Microsoft, consumers would be happy to purchase it from Sun. Two 
prominent U.S. competition law commentators have concluded that “IP 
other than patents, secret know how or software copyrights, is unlikely 
to yield sufficient economic power to give (sic) rise to serious Section 2 
[monopolization] issues”790. In light of the preceding discussion, the 
focus is on the conflict between competition law enforcement and patent 
policy.  
 
                                                                                                            
creative content. Due to a variety of reasons, such as network externalities, 
software may possess unique properties and functions that give it a very low 
degree of substitutability in the eyes of consumers. In terms of market effects, a 
software copyright is similar to a patent. This may explain why software is often 
protected by patent as well as copyright.  
789
 Pierre Régibeau & Katharine Rockett, IP Law and Competition Law: An 
Economic Approach, in THE INTERFACE BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
AND COMPETITION POLICY, 541 (2007).  
790
 LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN 
INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 831 (2000).  
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At this juncture, it is important to clarify the scope of this 
research. It does not address the relationship between competition law 
and economic development. The question of whether competition law 
enforcement may promote economic development has received 
considerable attention in recent years. It has been argued that by 
improving consumer welfare and encouraging domestic enterprises to 
become more efficient, competition law enforcement helps developing 
countries to progress economically. It is certainly possible that the 
balance between competition law enforcement and patent policy may 
have general implications on development, and that possibility is itself a 
worthwhile object of research. However, the scope of this research is 
narrower. It is confined to how developing countries should strike a 
balance between competition law enforcement and patent protection as 
a matter of sound competition policy, taking into account both allocative 
and dynamic efficiency considerations. The perspective adopted is one 
of competition law, and not one of development.  
  
Part 2 explains the prevalent views in developed countries on 
the intersection of competition law enforcement and patent policy, with a 
special focus on the framework advocated by Louis Kaplow. Part 3 
examines the problems with applying Kaplow’s framework to developing 
countries, and suggests necessary modifications based on lessons from 
development economics literature. Part 4 reviews some practical issues 
arising from the implementation of the modified framework and suggests 
how developing countries may use this framework to help them balance 
competition law enforcement against patent policy.  
 
2. The balance between competition law enforcement and 
patent policy in developed countries   
 
The fundamental cause of the conflict between competition law 
enforcement and patent policy lies in the fact that competition law 
restrains the abuse of substantial market power that patents sometimes 
create. Competition law constrains a dominant firm’s choice of 
competitive conduct. As the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has 
repeatedly asserted, a dominant firm bears a special responsibility 
towards the competitive process791. While the U.S. courts have 
                                                 
791
 In Michelin, the ECJ stated that a dominant firm “has a special responsibility 
not to allow its conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition” in the market. 
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generally given dominant firms greater freedom of action,792 it is 
nonetheless true that in U.S. antitrust jurisprudence, there exists a class 
of competitive conduct that a firm without market power is free to 
pursue, but which may ran afoul of competition law when undertaken by 
a dominant firm793. Meanwhile, by granting a patentee the exclusive 
right to exploit an invention for a certain period of time, a patent may 
give rise to market power. The existence of market power must be 
determined on a case-by-case basis. As discussed earlier, one of the 
main determinants is whether there are close substitutes for a patented 
product. Early U.S. case law suggested that patent ownership created a 
presumption of market power on the part of the patentee794. This 
presumption had long been criticized by economists and competition 
law scholars as being inconsistent with economic reality. In 1995, the 
U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission 
announced in the Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual 
Property that they would not, as a matter of enforcement policy, apply 
this presumption to a patentee795. Finally, in 2006, the U.S. Supreme 
Court adopted the same view in the Illinois Tool Works case796. After 
elucidation of the fundamental cause for the conflict between 
competition law enforcement and patent policy, what follows is a review 
of the divergent approaches suggested by commentators to resolve the 
conflict. 
 
2.1. Patent policy trumps competition law enforcement 
 
Some commentators have suggested that patent policy trumps 
competition law conflict. Bowman is a prime example. His competitive 
superiority test “assumes the propriety of allowing a patentee to use any 
method of charging what the traffic will bear if, and only if, the reward to 
                                                                                                            
Case 322/81, NV Nederlandsche Banden-Industrie Michelin v. Commission 
[1983] ECR 3461, [1985] 1 CMLR 282, para. 57.  
792
 See Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 
U.S. 398 (2004).  
793
 See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).  
794
 See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16 
(1984); United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962).  
795
 Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines 
for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, 4.  
796
 Independent Ink, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 547 U.S. 1002 (2006).  
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the patentee arising from the conditional use measures the patented 
product’s competitive superiority over substitutes”797. This test favours 
patent policy by giving a patentee enormous freedom of action. Under 
this test, “a licensee’s or buyer’s willingness to accept a restriction as a 
condition” to a patent licensing transaction is treated “as affirmative 
evidence of legitimacy”798. In fact, according to Kaplow, Bowman’s test 
is so permissive that “pure horizontal cartelization is virtually the only 
behavior he would prohibit”799.  
 
Régibeau and Rockett propound a similarly pro-patent view. 
They advocate for “independence” of patent law from competition law 
enforcement. In particular, they argue that “competition law should 
respect the rights granted by (intellectual) property law and that the 
trade-off between static and dynamic efficiency is not a primary concern 
of competition law”800. They provide two main justifications for their 
position. First, they argue that patent law, and intellectual property law 
generally, has struck an appropriate balance between static efficiency 
and dynamic efficiency considerations, with which competition law 
should not tinker801. Second, they argue that patent law focuses on the 
ex ante incentives to innovate whereas competition law evaluates the 
competitive effects of a business practice ex post. More information is 
always available in the ex post scenario, when competition law 
intervenes. With the benefit of hindsight, a competition authority often 
will be tempted to take away the rewards that induced an inventor to 
pursue the innovation ex ante. In fact, Régibeau and Rockett assert that 
“the optimal level of monopoly power ex post is none”802. However, 
falling for this temptation would “wreck the delicate balance achieved by 
IP law”803.  
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 Bowman, supra note 786, at x; see id. at 88.  
798
 Kaplow, supra note 785, at 1849–50.  
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 Régibeau & Rockett, supra note 789, at 524.  
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 Id. at 523. 
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 Id. at 524. 
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2.2. Competition law enforcement trumps patent policy 
 
Another common view is that competition law enforcement 
takes precedence over patent policy, although this view is usually 
asserted less forcefully than is the patent primacy view. One of the early 
proponents of this view is Baxter, who put forward the comparability test 
as a solution to the competition law–patent conflict. Under this test, 
competition law should ensure that a patentee receives benefits that are 
roughly comparable to the ultimate value of the patent804. Kaplow 
characterizes Baxter’s test as reflecting “a bias toward minimizing the 
infringement upon antitrust policy” and as tending “toward results 
favoring [the] antitrust side of the conflict”805. In a variety of contexts, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has expressed a similarly pro-antitrust view. In 
Kodak v. Image Technical Services, the Court, addressing the issue of 
leveraging monopoly power from one market to another, stated that 
“power gained through some natural or legal advantage such as patent, 
copyright, or business acumen can give rise to liability if a seller exploits 
his dominant position in one market to expand this empire into the 
next”806.  
 
On the other side of the Atlantic, the European Community 
courts have propounded similar views favouring competition law in a 
number of landmark refusal-to-deal cases. In the Court of First Instance 
(CFI) Microsoft decision, the CFI concluded that the fact that Microsoft’s 
workgroup server interoperability information was protected by patent 
and trade secret laws did not relieve the company’s refusal to supply 
competitors with such information from competition law scrutiny807. 
Under certain conditions, “an undertaking in a dominant position may be 
required to grant a license covering its intellectual property rights”808. In 
IMS Health v. NDC Health, the ECJ laid down the conditions that must 
be established to compel a dominant firm to license its IPRs to 
competitors: first, the refusal to license prevents “the emergence of a 
new product for which there is a potential consumer demand”, second, 
                                                 
804
 Baxter, supra note 786, at 313.  
805
 Kaplow, supra note 785, at 1853–54.  
806
 Eastman Kodak v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, at 480, n. 29 (1992). 
807
 Case T-201/04, Microsoft v. Commission [2007] ECR 00, [2007] 5 C.M.L.R. 
11, para. 283–290.  
808
 Id. at para. 290. 
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the refusal “is unjustified”, and third, the refusal excludes “any 
competition on a secondary market”809. Two observations of this 
judgment are in order. First, even though the IPR at issue in the IMS 
case was a copyright and not a patent, the ECJ did not limit its 
conclusions to copyrights. The ECJ spoke of IPRs generally in the 
judgment810. The ECJ’s characterization of an intellectual property that 
may be subject to a special duty to supply is also more reminiscent of a 
patent than of a copyright. The ECJ asserted that only an intellectual 
property that is indispensable to competitors’ ability to compete with the 
dominant firm is subject to this duty811. The ECJ defined indispensability 
by the following two criteria: “whether there are products or services 
which constitute alternative solutions, even if they are less 
advantageous, and whether there are technical, legal or economic 
obstacles capable of making it impossible or at least unreasonably 
difficult for any undertaking seeking to operate in the market to create, 
possibly in cooperation with other operators, the alternative products or 
services”812. Copyrighted materials rarely enjoy such a degree of 
indispensability; patented subject matter is more likely to do so. 
Therefore, the ECJ’s statements in IMS are likely to apply with equal 
force to patented products. The CFI’s invocation of the IMS criteria in 
the Microsoft case, which involved patent and trade secret protection, 
corroborates this view.  
 
The second observation is that the three conditions laid down in 
the IMS case are very stringent and the judgment therefore should not 
be read as an unequivocal endorsement of the competition law primacy 
view. However, the fact remains that the European Community courts 
have generally taken a pro-competition law stance on the conflict 
between competition law enforcement and patent policy. This is all the 
more apparent when one compares the European Community’s 
approach to refusal to license IPRs to that in the U.S., where some have 
argued for a per se right to refuse to license813. 
 
                                                 
809
 Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH v. NDC Health GmbH [2004] ECR I-5039, 
[2004] 4 C.M.L.R. 28, para. 38. 
810
 Id. at para. 23, 25. 
811
 Id. at para. 28–29. 
812
 Id. at para. 28. 
813
 SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 790, at 848–53.  
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2.3. Striking a balance by weighing allocative efficiency 
losses against dynamic efficiency gains 
 
While there are some merits to the views that either competition 
law enforcement or patent policy should reign supreme, these are 
nonetheless overly simplistic. Kaplow has insightfully pointed out the 
deficiencies in Bowman’s and Baxter’s tests, which will not be repeated 
here814. Moreover, the assertion by Régibeau and Rockett that 
competition law should not be concerned with balancing static efficiency 
with dynamic efficiency is plainly mistaken. Competition law regularly 
takes into account the effects of a business practice on innovation, and 
balances dynamic efficiency against static efficiency. Merger review is 
one prime example. It would be untenable to argue that competition law 
should ignore dynamic efficiency considerations only in its interface with 
patent policy, which is arguably the area of competition law in which 
these considerations are the most important. These commentators fail 
to take into full account the fact that both competition law and patent law 
incorporate allocative efficiency and dynamic efficiency considerations. 
A sensible resolution of the competition law–patent conflict would 
require a careful balancing of these considerations. 
 
Despite their different purposes, both competition law and 
patent law take into account allocative efficiency and dynamic efficiency 
considerations, albeit with different emphases815. Competition law is 
primarily focused on allocative efficiency, i.e. ensuring that consumers 
obtain the goods they desire the most at the lowest possible price and 
that producers produce the goods that consumers desire in the most 
cost-efficient manner. However, competition law recognizes the 
importance of dynamic efficiency and the fact that the most significant 
improvement in consumer welfare often results from technological 
innovations that give rise to new or better products, and not from keener 
competition in the provision of existing products. Therefore, as 
mentioned earlier, competition authorities and courts do consider gains 
in dynamic efficiency when assessing the competitive effects of a 
business practice. Patent law grants exclusivity in exploitation in order to 
induce potential inventors to innovate. This exclusivity results in losses 
in allocative efficiency, because patented products are likely to be 
produced below the competitive level. However, these losses are 
                                                 
814
 See Kaplow, supra note 785, at 1845–55. 
815
 For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see id. at 800–07.  
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deemed to be the necessary price that must be paid to induce 
innovations. The balance to be struck in patent policy is how to offer 
potential inventors sufficient incentives without incurring excessive 
losses in allocative efficiency. Therefore, both bodies of law balance 
allocative efficiency against dynamic efficiency, which forms a useful 
starting point for the resolution of the conflict between them. 
 
Having established a common ground between competition law 
and patent law, it remains to be seen how precisely this common ground 
can be used to resolve the conflict between them. Kaplow provides the 
most elegant framework for the resolution of this conflict816. Two 
fundamental premises underpin Kaplow’s framework. First, there are 
two main policy dimensions to the competition law–patent conflict — the 
length of the patent term and the scope of patent protection and 
permissible exploitation, the latter of which is governed by a variety of 
patent and competition law rules817. Second, society should set the first 
dimension by maximizing the net social benefits of granting patent 
protection, and the second dimension by comparing the reward that 
redounds to a patentee from adjusting a particular rule on patent 
exploitation with the allocative efficiency loss resulting from the 
adjustment. The second dimension, which is the principal concern of 
this research, is set taking the optimal patent life as given, even though 
the two dimensions ideally should be determined simultaneously.  
 
With respect to the second dimension, the fewer and the more 
lax are the restrictions imposed by competition law on patent 
exploitation, the greater is the patentee reward from an invention, and 
therefore the greater is the inducement to potential inventors. With 
respect to the first dimension, the net social benefits of patent protection 
are maximized when the difference between the total social benefits and 
the total social costs of patent protection is the greatest. This difference 
is maximized when the marginal social benefit of patent protection 
equals its marginal social cost. The social benefits of patent protection 
include the consumer welfare derived from the emergence of a new 
                                                 
816
 The following discussion is based on Kaplow’s article, “The Patent-Antitrust 
Intersection: A Reappraisal”. Unless otherwise indicated, the ideas are attributed 
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817
 Although he does not discuss the possibility, Kaplow’s model presumably 
can be used to determine other dimensions to the scope of patent protection, 
such as the breadth of the patent misuse doctrine.  
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product or the improvement of an existing product, and the possible 
future inventions that are built upon the current invention. The most 
important social cost of patent protection is the deadweight loss 
resulting from the exclusive exploitation of a patent. Exclusive 
exploitation is likely to result in production below the competitive level. 
Whenever that happens, society suffers a loss in allocative efficiency, 
known as the deadweight loss.  
 
The pivot of Kaplow’s framework is the ratio test, which is 
defined as patentee reward divided by monopoly loss. This test is used 
to determine the second dimension discussed above, i.e. whether 
competition law should permit a particular patent exploitation practice, 
such as an exclusive license. Patentee reward and monopoly loss refer 
to the incremental reward and loss from allowing the patent exploitation 
practice at issue. When setting the optimal patent life, the policy maker 
will implicitly also determine an optimal patentee reward–monopoly loss 
ratio, which represents the reward–loss trade-off made when extending 
the patent life by the last incremental year. The implicit determination is 
explained by the fact that the marginal social benefit of patent protection 
is dependent on the incremental patentee reward, and the monopoly 
loss is one very important component of the marginal social cost of 
patent protection.  
 
Once the optimum patent life has been set, what the ratio test 
seeks to answer is “whether the total reward to the patentee implicit in 
the optimal patent life can be achieved at a lower cost”818. The answer is 
obtained by comparing the ratio associated with a particular patent 
exploitation practice with the optimal ratio. A patentee reward–monopoly 
loss ratio can be computed for every patent exploitation practice819. The 
optimal ratio represents the most cost-effective way in which society can 
induce inventions by adjusting patent life. If the ratio for a particular 
patent exploitation practice is lower than the optimal ratio, the practice 
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 Kaplow, supra note 785, at 1831. 
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 Strictly speaking, there is a ratio associated with every patent exploitation 
practice for every patent, because patentee reward depends on “a number of 
factors, including the market value of the invention, the structure of the market 
involving the patented process or product, and the attributes of the patentee 
(such as marketing and production capacities) that determine its range of 
options within that market.” Id. at 1823. However, for ease of application, it is 
assumed that there is a generalized ratio for every type of patent exploitation 
practice.  
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should be prohibited. Society would be better off prohibiting the practice 
at issue and keeping the last incremental year of patent life. If the ratio 
for a particular patent exploitation practice is higher than the optimal 
ratio, the practice should be allowed, subject to the requirement that 
patent life should accordingly be shortened. Society would be better off 
obtaining the incremental patentee reward by allowing a particular 
patent exploitation practice than by granting the last incremental year of 
patent protection.  
 
Despite the theoretical elegance of his model, Kaplow himself 
acknowledges that there are considerable obstacles to applying his 
model in real-world contexts. First and foremost, the optimal patentee 
reward–monopoly loss ratio that serves as the benchmark for 
comparison is very difficult to ascertain. Kaplow remarks that “our 
knowledge is inadequate to inspire great confidence even in the 
desirability of having a patent system at all, much less in the ability to 
make the subtle measurements of marginal effects that determine the 
ratio implicit in the optimal patent life”820. As a second-best solution, 
Kaplow proposes a cost-effectiveness analysis, which requires the 
competition authority to derive the ratios for all possible patent 
exploitation practices and align them from the highest to the lowest. A 
comparison can then be made of the practices that are currently allowed 
and prohibited to ensure that the total patentee reward is obtained from 
practices that have the highest ratios. This analysis is so named 
because the goal of the exercise is to obtain the same total reward in 
the most cost-effective manner, i.e. by incurring the least aggregate 
monopoly loss.  
 
Even this second-best formulation of his ratio test, however, is 
too difficult to apply. Therefore, Kaplow suggests a number of factors 
that can be used as proxies to facilitate the application of the test. These 
factors include “the extent to which the reward is pure transfer, the 
portion of the reward that accrues to the patentee, and the degree to 
which the reward serves as an incentive”821. The first of these factors 
requires some explanation. By a pure transfer, Kaplow refers to a 
situation in which a patent exploitation practice results in transfer of 
surplus from one group in society to another, such as licensees to the 
licensing patentee, without an attendant increase in deadweight loss. In 
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the case of a pure transfer, the patentee reward may increase 
substantially without a corresponding increase in monopoly loss. 
Therefore, all else being equal, a patent exploitation practice that results 
in a pure transfer is to be preferred to one that does not.  
 
Given the difficulty in quantification, in the concrete applications 
of the ratio test in his article, Kaplow does not attempt to calculate any 
ratios. Instead, he analyses qualitatively the effects of a patent 
exploitation practice on the ratio’s denominator and numerator. This is 
often done with reference to the three factors mentioned in the last 
paragraph. If a practice is likely to result in a substantial increase in the 
numerator, patentee reward, without an attendant substantial increase 
in the denominator, monopoly loss, Kaplow concludes that competition 
law should permit it. An example would be a practice that results in a 
pure transfer. If a practice is likely to result in a substantial increase in 
the denominator without an attendant increase in the numerator, 
competition law should prohibit it. An example would be a price-fixing 
cartel disguised as a licensing arrangement with price restrictions.  
 
Even though Kaplow’s ratio test and its alternative formulations 
are difficult to apply in practice, they provide useful insights into how the 
balance between competition law enforcement and patent policy should 
be attained. When assessing a patent exploitation practice, a 
competition authority must consider both its effects on patentee reward 
and hence innovation incentives, and its social costs in the form of 
deadweight loss. This insight proves to be useful in balancing 
competition law enforcement and patent policy in developed and 
developing countries alike.  
3. The balance between competition law enforcement and 
patent policy in developing countries 
 
3.1. Adapting Kaplow’s model to developing countries — 
relevant considerations 
 
Having introduced an analytical framework for balancing 
competition law enforcement and patent policy in developed countries, it 
is important to articulate why adjustments are needed to adapt Kaplow’s 
framework to the developing country context. At this point, one should 
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recall that one of the basic premises of Kaplow’s framework is that 
patentee reward induces potential inventors to engage in research and 
development. The ratio test compares patentee reward against 
monopoly losses resulting from allowing a particular patent exploitation 
practice. The underlying policy judgment is that some static efficiency 
loss in the form of monopoly loss should be sustained to generate 
patentee reward to induce innovative activities. However, depending on 
the country at issue, what is a sound policy decision in the context of a 
developed country may not be so in a developing country. As noted by 
Correa, “the static-dynamic efficiency rationale applicable to a 
developed country does not necessarily hold in low income 
countries”822. In the case of least developed countries, “the present 
sacrifice of static efficiency finds no justification in future gains of 
dynamic efficiency as domestic innovation is unlikely to occur and 
foreign innovation depends on larger markets in developed 
countries”823. 
 
The fundamental reason that Kaplow’s framework requires 
adaptations is that, oftentimes, the potential inventors are not located in 
developing countries, but in developed countries. This is especially true 
of countries with little capacity to innovate. The implications of this are 
twofold. The first concerns the domestic welfare impact of favouring 
patent policy. Increasing patentee reward by adopting more permissive 
competition law standards for patent exploitation practices may not spur 
innovation in some developing countries because there may not be any 
potential inventors to whom to provide incentives. These developing 
countries may legitimately question whether the trade-off of between 
allocative efficiency and dynamic efficiency is worth making. Moreover, 
adopting more permissive competition law standards for patent 
exploitation practices may impede domestic producers’ ability to imitate 
a foreign technology. For instance, under a stringent competition law 
standard — one that imposes significant restrictions on a patentee’s 
freedom of action — a developing country may make it easier for 
domestic firms to obtain a compulsory licence from a foreign patentee. 
This could be achieved by adopting a liberal interpretation of the 
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essential facilities doctrine, as is advocated by Correa824. Such a policy, 
which favours competition law enforcement, will enhance a developing 
country’s imitative capacity. Adopting a contrary policy in the name of 
promoting dynamic efficiency will hurt domestic imitative capacity. 
Whether this is a relevant consideration depends on the extent of 
imitation taking place in a particular developing country.  
 
The second implication concerns the international incentive 
effects of favouring patent policy. With the exception of a few developing 
countries, potential inventors are much more likely to be found in 
developed countries. Therefore, favouring patent policy will only 
increase reward to foreign patentees and induce foreign inventors to 
innovate. A developing country may justifiably ask whether and why it 
should sacrifice domestic consumer welfare and perhaps imitative 
capacity in favour of foreign inventors, especially those in developed 
countries. Even if the answer is in the affirmative, the competition 
authority of a far-flung developing country may still wonder whether a 
potential inventor in a developed country would take into account the 
incentives provided by its competition law regime. The answer to this 
question will depend on the size of the economy of the developing 
country at issue, among other factors.  
 
If adjustments were to be made, would one set of adjustments 
suffice? The answer seems to be no. Correa’s comments crucially 
suggest that developing countries cannot be treated as a monolith. The 
question is how one should categorize developing countries for our 
present purpose. In order to do so, one must distinguish between 
production capacity, imitative capacity, and innovative capacity825. The 
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meaning of the first and the last capacities should be apparent. 
Regarding the second capacity, economists have observed that 
imitation itself requires considerable know-how and human capital. 
Therefore, some developing countries may only have the technical 
capacity to produce and not to imitate.  
 
Some developing countries may have little imitative and 
innovative capacities, and only engage in production of the simplest 
kind. The least developed countries are examples of such countries, 
which may be called “production” countries. Some developing countries 
may possess both production and imitative capacities, but not innovative 
capacity. Even though imitation requires know-how and human capital, 
the technological sophistication required for innovation is higher than 
that required for imitation. Therefore, some developing countries may 
only possess the technical capabilities to imitate and not to innovate. 
Most developing countries are likely to belong to this category of 
“imitation” countries. Finally, some developing countries may possess all 
three capacities. South Korea, with its prominent electronics and 
shipbuilding industries, and Taiwan, with its strength in the computer 
and the semiconductor sectors, come to mind. China, which has 
become one of the top five countries of origin for Patent Cooperation 
Treaty applications at the World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO), is another example826. These countries may be called 
“innovation” countries. The importance of patentee reward in Kaplow’s 
ratio test, and more generally, the importance of dynamic efficiency 
considerations in the competition law–patent balance, understandably 
differs for various categories of developing countries. The balance must 
be struck differently for each of them.  
 
3.2. Review of economics literature 
 
To understand precisely the kind of adjustments needed to be 
made to Kaplow’s framework, it is didactic to consult relevant economics 
literature. Unfortunately, there is scant economics literature that 
examines the relationship between the competition law–patent balance 
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 World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO Patent Report: Statistics on 
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and the incentive to innovate in developing countries. However, based 
on stylized models, economists have studied the impact of heightened 
IPR protection on the incentives to imitate and innovate in developed 
and developing countries. Heightened IPR enforcement will render it 
more difficult for competitors to imitate a protected technology, hence 
increasing patentee reward. Even though this body of literature does not 
directly address the competition law–patent balance, it is nonetheless 
highly relevant. Recall Kaplow’s insight that adjusting the length of 
patent life and modifying the scope of permissible patent exploitation 
under competition law are two means to the same end827. Stated more 
generally, as long as a policy decision raises patentee reward, whether 
it is made in the realm of patent policy by lengthening the patent life or 
by intensifying patent enforcement, or in the realm of competition law by 
adopting more permissive standards on potentially anti-competitive 
patent exploitation practices, that policy decision will boost incentives to 
innovate.  
 
In keeping with the prevalent approach in the development 
economics literature, known as the international product cycle, Parello 
constructs a model, which assumes that developed countries innovate 
and developing countries imitate the technology created by developed 
countries, to study the impact of heightened IPR protection on the rate 
of innovation in developed countries and the rate of imitation in 
developing countries. Parello elaborates two scenarios, one in which 
imitation is the only means of technology transfer, and one in which 
technology transfer takes place both by imitation and through foreign 
direct investment (FDI)828. In his model, firms in developing countries 
only compete with those in developed countries by imitating the 
technology of the latter829 Parello concludes that in the absence of FDI, 
improved IPR protection induces a short-term slowdown in the 
innovation rate in developed countries (even though there is no change 
in the long-term innovation rate), and impedes technology transfer by 
imitation830. Parello does not draw any definitive conclusions regarding 
the rate of innovation and the rate of imitation in the presence of FDI831.  
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One key analytical step in Parello’s model is that improved IPR 
protection affects producers in developing countries by raising the costs 
of imitation832. The causal link between improved IPR protection and the 
costs of imitation is likely to be strong. Even though the causal link 
between adopting more permissive standards for patent exploitation 
practices and the costs of imitation may not be as strong, it is 
nonetheless substantial. For example, as mentioned earlier, by making 
it harder for domestic producers to obtain a compulsory licence from a 
foreign patentee, a developing country raises the costs of technology 
transfer to its producers and hence the costs of imitation. Moreover, by 
allowing a developed country patentee to use exclusive dealing 
arrangements to foreclose imitating domestic competitors, a developing 
country similarly raises the costs of imitation by making it harder for its 
domestic producers to market their products. The costs of imitation 
determine the ease and likelihood of imitation by a developing country 
producer. In Parello’s model and other models considered below, once 
a developing country producer successfully imitates a foreign 
technology and produces the same product to compete with the 
developed country patentee, the patentee’s profit from his invention 
falls. The patentee reward diminishes, thereby reducing a potential 
inventor’s incentive to innovate. Therefore, favouring patent policy in the 
competition law–patent balance has a similar effect to raising IPR 
protection in Parello’s model. The fact that the variable at issue is 
different does not undermine the relevance of his conclusions.  
 
Lai supplements Parello’s analysis by examining the effect of 
enhanced IPR protection in developing countries on the rate of 
innovation in developed countries when the means of technology 
transfer consists of both imitation and FDI. Again, Lai assumes that only 
developed countries innovate and developing countries can only imitate 
technologies created by developed countries833. When imitation is the 
only means of technology transfer, Lai’s conclusions are similar to 
Parello’s. They both find that the rate of innovation in developed 
countries and the rate of imitation in developing countries fall as a result 
of heightened IPR protection in developing countries834. Meanwhile, 
when technology transfer is accomplished through FDI, Lai finds that 
both the rate of innovation and the rate of imitation rise in response to 
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enhanced IPR protection in developing countries835. The difference in 
results is due to the fact that in the former case, heightened IPR 
protection in developing countries will induce inventors in developed 
countries to invest in more innovation, raising their demand for skilled 
labour in their countries836. Wages for these workers rise raising the 
costs of innovation837. This increase in costs will in fact overwhelm any 
gains to the inventors from the enhanced IPR protection in developing 
countries, causing the overall rate of innovation to drop838. More 
importantly, Lai concludes that, when technology transfer is 
accomplished through both imitation and FDI, the rate of innovation in 
developed countries and the rate of imitation in developing countries will 
increase in response to improved IPR protection in developing countries 
so long as certain conditions are met, including that the rate of FDI is 
sufficiently high839.  
 
Yang focuses on a different aspect of the relationship between 
IPR protection in developing countries and the incentive to innovate in 
developed countries. Yang posits that only developed countries have 
the capacity to create the technologies for which developing countries 
are the main source of demand840. An example of such a technology is 
the cure for a tropical disease that is most commonly found in 
developing countries, such as malaria. The question that Yang seeks to 
answer is that, under these circumstances, how developing countries 
can induce developed country inventors to invest in these technologies 
by offering adequate IPR protection to these technologies in their 
countries. Yang finds that because of their incentive to freeride on each 
other’s IPR protection, developing countries must cooperate with one 
another841. One of Yang’s key insights is that it is not worthwhile for a 
developing country to offer IPR protection to developed country 
technologies alone842. The welfare loss from the enhanced IPR 
protection will more than outweigh the gains from the increased inflow of 
developed country technologies, given that one country’s enhanced 
protection will provide negligible incentives to developed country 
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inventors. In the ideal world, all the developing countries would 
cooperate to offer IPR protection to developed country technologies. 
Given the practical difficulties in achieving that goal, some of the 
developing countries should form “cooperation coalitions”843. Countries 
within these coalitions offer higher protection than those outside of the 
coalitions844. In fact, non-coalition developing countries are likely to 
lower their IPR protection to freeride on the effort of the coalition 
countries845. However, once the number of countries in these 
cooperation coalitions is large enough, developed country inventors will 
receive sufficient incentives to invest in technologies needed by 
developing countries846.  
 
Yang leaves unanswered an important question, which is how 
one goes about deciding which developing countries should join these 
cooperation coalitions. Yang merely suggests that a “practical approach” 
would be to start with “WTO member countries”847. He does not 
distinguish developing countries by their ability to induce R&D 
investment by developed country inventors. However, given the varying 
sizes of the economies of developing countries, one would most 
certainly expect some of them to have greater ability to induce 
investment by developed country inventors.  
 
Chen and Puttitanun construct a model that examines both the 
imitative and the innovative capacities of a developing country. Their 
model includes two sectors, the import sector and the local sector848. 
The import sector consists of two firms, a foreign firm from a developed 
country, which possesses a patented technology, and a domestic firm 
which competes by imitating the foreign firm’s technology849. The local 
sector consists of two local firms, one of which engages in innovation 
and the other of which only imitates850. The variable in the model, again, 
is the level of IPR protection. In this model, heightening IPR protection is 
a double-edged sword for a developing country. It both benefits and 
harms it. On the one hand, it renders it more difficult for the domestic 
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firm in the import sector to imitate the foreign firm’s technology, thereby 
reducing competition in that sector851. The price of the good in the 
sector increases and consumer welfare is harmed852. On the other 
hand, heightening IPR protection also increases incentives for the 
innovative firm in the local sector to innovate, as it is now more difficult 
for its domestic competitor to imitate its technology853. A developing 
country must balance the effects in these two sectors and find an 
optimum level of IPR protection. 
 
Chen & Puttitanun’s conclusion is that the optimal level of IPR 
protection for a developing country is related to its level of economic 
development. In particular, they find that the relationship between these 
two variables is captured by a U-shaped curve. For a country with a low 
level of economic development, “an initial increase in [the] country’s 
technological ability has a greater impact on the efficiency of imitating 
northern [developed countries’] technologies than on the efficiency of 
domestic innovations, which makes it desirable for the country to lower 
[the protection of] IPRs”854. However, at some point in economic 
development, the “imitation effect is dominated by the innovation effect, 
and the optimal protection of IPRs increases with the level of 
development”855. Their empirical study shows that the bottom of the U-
shaped curve — the point at which the innovation effect begins to 
dominate the imitation effect and developing countries should start to 
enhance IPR protection — is US$854.06 in per capita GDP in 1995 
prices856. This is a rather low level of development, suggesting that it is 
beneficial for most developing countries to enhance IPR protection. 
 
3.3. Conclusions from the review 
 
Recall the three types of capacity — production, imitative, and 
innovative — distinguished by economists and the categorization of 
developing countries based on their possession of these capacities 
proposed earlier. The discussion for now proceeds by examining the 
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developing countries individually, and not in the aggregate as 
“cooperation coalitions” as suggested by Lai. It focuses on the domestic 
welfare effects of a shift in the competition law–patent balance, in 
particular, on how such a shift affects the domestic rate of imitation and 
the domestic and foreign rates of innovation.  
 
Nothing in the economic models seems to refute the obvious 
conclusion that the “production” countries have little to gain by favouring 
patent policy. Since there is no domestic innovation to be had, 
monopoly loss should not be traded off to increase patentee reward and 
to create incentives to innovate. Unless the patentee reward provided by 
these countries is a strong inducement to developed country inventors, 
these countries should favour competition law enforcement in the 
balance. For the remaining two categories of countries, the trade-off in 
shifting the competition law–patent balance is between the allocative 
efficiency loss plus the reduced domestic imitation on the one hand, and 
the increased domestic innovation on the other hand. For the “imitation” 
countries, since once again there is no domestic innovation to be had, 
they should favour competition law enforcement over patent protection. 
This conclusion is subject to the same caveat as that for “production” 
countries regarding inducements to developed country inventors. The 
trade-off becomes difficult for the “innovation” countries. Chen & 
Puttitanun suggests that these countries have much to gain from 
domestic innovation, even though their domestic imitative capacity 
suffers. These countries may strike a more neutral balance between 
competition law enforcement and patent protection.  
 
The picture becomes more complicated for all three categories 
of developing countries if the incentive effects on developed country 
inventors are considered. Here, the main distinction among developing 
countries is whether they receive substantial foreign direct investment 
as a means of technology transfer. For those that do not receive much 
FDI, Parello’s model is most salient and suggests that favouring patent 
policy will give little boost to the incentive to innovate in developed 
countries. These countries should continue to favour competition law 
enforcement. For those that do receive substantial FDI as a means of 
technology transfer, Lai’s model is more relevant and suggests that 
these countries could boost the incentive to innovate in developed 
countries by favouring patent protection. Lastly, if one considers 
technologies that only developed countries have the capacity to develop 
— the scenario examined by Yang — one may conclude that at least 
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some developing countries should tilt the balance in favour of patent 
protection. Recall that Yang offers no guidelines on how to decide which 
countries should join the “cooperation coalitions”. The most one can say 
for now with some confidence is that developing countries with large 
economies are likely to offer the most substantial inducements to 
developed country inventors, and hence should join these coalitions. 
The least developed countries are likely to freeride on these large 
developing countries’ effort. China, Brazil and India are probable 
candidates for these cooperation coalitions.  
 
In sum, both “production” and “imitation” countries with little FDI 
should favour competition law enforcement in the balance. “Production” 
and “imitation” countries with significant FDI, and “innovation” countries 
of all kinds need to take greater care in striking the balance. Lastly, to 
induce developed country inventors to create technologies required by 
developing countries, developing countries with larger economies may 
need to shoulder the responsibility to favour patent protection.  
 
One observation here is in order regarding the causal link 
between a policy change and the incentive to innovate in the economic 
models explained above and in Kaplow’s framework. In most of these 
economic models, the policy decision at issue is the intensity of IPR 
enforcement, which determines the costs of imitation for producers in 
developing countries, which in turn affects the patentee reward and the 
incentive to innovate. Most of these models assume that once imitation 
begins, it is no longer profitable for the original inventor in the developed 
country to produce the product. The developing country producer has 
lower costs of production, due to its lower wage costs, and therefore can 
undercut the developed country producer by charging a lower price. As 
soon as that happens, the developed country producer will shut down its 
production. Therefore, a change in the intensity of IPR enforcement has 
a direct and immediate effect on patentee reward and the incentive to 
innovate.  
 
Meanwhile, not every type of patent exploitation practice 
regulated by competition law has such a direct and immediate effect on 
patentee reward and the inventive to innovate. In fact, most of them do 
not. Take the practice that is likely to have the most direct impact, 
compulsory licensing, as an example. A developing country may adopt 
permissive standards for compulsory licensing that allow domestic 
imitators to obtain such licences from developed country inventors 
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easily. Such a policy obviously will have a significant impact on patentee 
reward, as patentees now must face competition in the market for their 
products. However, even under these circumstances, the extent of the 
impact may be less than expected. As long as the licence fee is set at 
such a rate that it compensates the patentee for its loss of profit from 
increased competition in the supply of the product, the patentee reward 
may not be drastically affected. In fact, the licence fee could be set at 
such a rate that the patentee is indifferent between commercializing the 
patent itself and licensing it to developing country producers. In that 
case, the patentee reward will not be reduced at all. One may question 
how likely it is that a developing country intent on providing easy access 
by its domestic producers to a patented foreign technology would set 
the licence fee at such a high level. The point remains that the causal 
link between adjusting competition law restrictions on patent exploitation 
practices and patentee reward is more tenuous than the effect of 
altering the level of IPR protection in the economic models examined in 
the previous section. 
  
The causal link may be further weakened by the fact that a 
potential inventor does not look at actual reward, but expected reward, 
when deciding whether to undertake certain research and development. 
In general, a potential inventor is likely to be more aware of his/her 
entitlements under the patent system than of the scope of his/her 
permissible exploitation practices under competition law. Kaplow notes 
that “the wholesale abolition of patent rights would likely have a greater 
negative influence on expectations of reward, and hence on innovative 
activity, than would a severe cutback in the range of permissible 
licensing practices”857. To sum up, even though the economic models 
examined in the last section suggest that strengthening IPR protection 
in developing countries may induce both domestic and foreign 
innovation, cutting back competition law restrictions on patent 
exploitation practices in developing countries may in reality offer weaker 
inducement effects than is the case in these models. The paramount 
conclusion from this discussion — a modification of Kaplow’s framework 
— is that, whatever is the appropriate competition law–patent balance in 
developed countries, developing countries, especially those with little 
innovative capacity but considerable imitative capacity or neither 
capacity, should tilt it more in favour of competition law enforcement. 
Developing countries have stronger policy justifications than do 
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developed countries for imposing more stringent competition law 
restrictions on patent exploitation practices.  
 
4. Practical implementation of Kaplow’s framework to 
developing countries 
 
The above discussion of the competition law–patent balance — 
both Kaplow’s original framework and the suggested modifications 
based on the development economics literature — still needs to be put 
into practice in developing countries. The obstacles to implementing 
these ideas are many. First, recall that Kaplow’s framework itself faces 
considerable practical difficulties in implementation. The patent reward–
monopoly loss ratio implicit in the optimal patent life is very difficult to 
calculate858. The alignment and comparison exercise that he calls the 
cost-effectiveness analysis is similarly difficult to undertake859. If an 
advanced competition law jurisdiction with more than a hundred years of 
enforcement experience such as the US has difficulty applying its 
framework, developing countries with newly instituted competition law 
regimes will have little hope. However, this does not mean that the 
above discussion was an unproductive endeavour. The key insight from 
Kaplow’s framework that a competition authority must balance patentee 
reward and monopoly loss when assessing the legality of a patent 
exploitation practice remains valid. While a precise quantitative weighing 
of the two is unlikely to be easy, a general qualitative balancing should 
be the guiding principle in a competition authority’s assessment. 
 
What about the modifications to Kaplow’s framework suggested 
by the development economics literature? The modifications suggested 
in Part 2 would require the competition authority of a developing country 
to take into account a variety of general economic factors, such as the 
imitative and innovative capacities in the country, the extent to which 
technology transfer is achieved through FDI as opposed to direct 
imitation, or even whether there is international cooperation in IPR 
protection in the form of “cooperation coalition” between that country 
and other developing countries. One may legitimately question whether 
any competition authority has the capability to incorporate such a wide 
variety of general economic factors in its analysis. One may further 
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question whether such general economic factors should determine the 
outcome of a case. Prohibiting a particular patent exploitation practice 
on the grounds that the dominant mode of technology transfer in that 
country is imitation may justifiably cause uneasiness.  
 
Further complicating the matter is the fact that the dominant 
mode of technology transfer in any developing country probably differs 
sector by sector. This suggests a possible need to strike a different 
competition law–patent balance on a sector-by-sector basis. This need 
is substantiated by the fact that the existence of the three capacities 
likely differs not on a country-by-country basis, but on a sector-by-sector 
basis. Calling developing countries “production”, “imitation”, and 
“innovation” countries is a gross simplification. The reality is more likely 
to be that a developing country will possess only production capacity in 
some sectors, but imitation capacity in some other sectors. While a 
sector-by-sector approach may be most consistent with the theoretical 
implications of the development economics literature, it is also 
susceptible to allegations of inconsistent enforcement, and worse still, 
regulatory capture and corruption. It would be much easier for a 
competition authority to justify arbitrary enforcement by arguing that the 
same patent exploitation practice in various sectors demands disparate 
analysis in light of sectoral differences. This state of affairs would 
undermine competition law enforcement in many developing countries, 
where competition law is still in its early stages of development.  
 
The most practical implementation of the lessons from the 
development economics literature is for the legislature of a particular 
developing country to calibrate the competition law–patent balance for 
the general economy, taking into account all the relevant factors 
highlighted in Part 2. This will lead to overly stringent competition law 
standards with respect to patent rights in some sectors but overly lax 
standards in other sectors. However, that is an inevitable price to pay to 
attain more consistent enforcement. Based on the lessons learned in 
Part 2, many developing countries are likely to come to the conclusion 
that tenuous dynamic efficiency gains do not justify substantial allocative 
efficiency losses and reduced imitative capacity in their countries, and 
are likely to impose stringent competition law restrictions on patent 
exploitation practices.  
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5. Conclusion  
 
This research suggests a theoretical framework for calibrating 
the competition law–patent balance in developing countries. It takes as 
the starting point Kaplow’s ratio test, and asserts that modifications to 
the framework are needed due to the fact that most developing 
countries have much weaker innovative capacities than do developed 
countries. Canvassing the relevant development economics literature, 
this research suggests some modifications to be made to Kaplow’s 
framework, and concludes that different categories of developing 
countries must approach the competition law–patent balance differently. 
Despite this need for more nuanced approaches, overall, developing 
countries should favour competition law enforcement more than 
developed countries do in the balance between competition law 
enforcement and patent policy. 
 
